State of New South Wales v Hudson (Final) - [2023] NSWSC 374

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: State of New South Wales v Hudson (Final) [2023] NSWSC 374
Hearing dates: 6 April 2023
Date of orders: 17 April 2023
Decision date: 17 April 2023
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Yehia J
Decision:
(1) Revoke the current interim supervision order
(2) Pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of two years commencing on 17 April 2023
(3) Pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), direct that the defendant, for the period of the extended supervision order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to the orders made
(4) Access to the Court’s file is only permitted to a non-party with the leave of a judge of this Court, and with prior notice to the parties so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in respect of the application for access

Catchwords:
HIGH RISK OFFENDER — Extended Supervision Order — Final hearing — No opposition to order being made — Disagreements as to the form of two conditions — Order made

Legislation Cited:
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) ss 3, 3(1), 3(2), 4A, 5B, 5B(a), 5B(d), 5D, 5I, 7(4), 9, 9(1), 9(1)(a), 9(2), 9(3), 9(3), 9(3)(b), 9(3)(d1), 9(3)(e), 9(3)(e2), 9(3)(f), 9(3)(h), 9(3)(h1), 10A, 10C(1A) 11, 11(1), 11(2)

Cases Cited:
Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374
Kamm v New South Wales (No 4) (2017) 95 NSWLR 179; [2017] NSWCA 189
Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57
New South Wales v Ibrahim (Final) [2021] NSWSC 793
State of New South Wales v Bieber (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 104
State of New South Wales v Bugmy [2017] NSWSC 855
State of New South Wales v Burchell (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 1191
State of New South Wales v Cannon [2022] NSWSC 1622
State of New South Wales v Chaplin [2019] NSWSC 471
State of New South Wales v Devaney(Final) [2022] NSWSC 60
State of New South Wales v Green (Final) [2013] NSWSC 1003
State of New South Wales v Holschier (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 341
State of New South Wales v Holschier (No. 2) [2018] NSWSC 1921
State of New South Wales v Hudson (No 2) (Preliminary) [2022] NSWSC 1655
State of New South Wales v Hudson (Preliminary) [2019] NSWSC 194
State of New South Wales v Hudson [2019] NSWSC 1761
State of New South Wales v Kamm (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1
State of New South Wales v Loto [2018] NSWSC 1522
State of New South Wales v Nikua (Final) [2021] NSWSC 1240
State of New South Wales v Pacey [2015] NSWSC 1983
State of New South Wales v Simcock(Final) [2016] NSWSC 1805
State of New South Wales v Wilkinson (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 1813
State of NSW v Hudson [2019] NSWSC 1761
Winters v Attorney General of New South Wales (2008) 182 A Crim R 107; [2008] NSWCA 33

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Ian James Hudson (Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:

R McEwen (Plaintiff)
K Averre (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Hugo Law Group (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2022/305828
Publication restriction: Nil

Judgment

By Summons, dated 13 October 2022, the State of New South Wales (the plaintiff) seeks a two-year Extended Supervision Order (ESO) against Ian James Hudson (the defendant), pursuant to the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act).
By way of final relief, the plaintiff seeks the following orders:

pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Act, that the defendant be the subject of an ESO for a period of two years;

pursuant to s 11 of the Act, that the Court direct the defendant, for the period of the ESO, to comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule annexed to the Summons; and

that access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a Judge of the Court, and, if any application for access is made by a non-party for any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.

The defendant does not oppose the making of an ESO for a period of two years and concedes that the Court would be satisfied, to a high degree of probability, that he poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.
The present dispute between the parties is of limited compass and concerns two conditions of the ESO:

the condition concerning scheduling (condition 5); and

condition 19 which concerns non-association that has resulted in a direction that the applicant does not associate with his partner, Rebecca Norris.

The following table details the plaintiff’s proposed conditions, the defendant’s position, and the plaintiff’s response:

Condition Number

Plaintiff’s Proposed Conditions

Defendant’s Proposed Amendment

Plaintiff’s Response

5

If the defendant breaches a condition of the ESO or commits a criminal offence or there is a significant concern as to the defendant’s movements, then at the discretion of the Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO) or supervisor, the defendant may be required to provide a weekly plan (called a ‘schedule of movements’) to a DSO.

a. This is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start.

b. If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by a DSO, he must seek approval from a DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless a DSO approves a shorter period.

c. The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency.

If the defendant breaches a condition of the ESO or commits a criminal offence then at the discretion of the DSO or supervisor, the defendant may be required to provide a weekly plan (called a 'schedule of movements') to a DSO.

If the defendant breaches a condition of the ESO or commits a criminal offence, or if his DSO considers that it is reasonably necessary to respond to or prevent an increase in the defendant’s risk of committing a serious offence, then at the discretion of the DSO or supervisor, the defendant may be required to provide a weekly plan (called a 'schedule of movements') to a DSO.

19

The defendant must not associate with people that a DSO tells him not to.

The defendant must not associate with people that a DSO tells him not to other than Rebecca Norris.

The plaintiff opposes the proposed amendment.

Although the defendant does not oppose the making of an ESO for two years and the issues are of narrow compass, it is necessary that the Court be satisfied, on the material tendered in the hearing, that the statutory test is met.

Legislative Framework

In determining whether final supervision orders should be made, regard must be had to the objects enunciated in s 3 of the Act. The primary object of the Act, stated in s 3(1), is to:

“…provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high-risk sex offenders and high-risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community.”

Although this is the “paramount consideration”, s 3(2) of the Act provides that a secondary object is to encourage such offenders to “undertake rehabilitation”. In making orders, I must have full regard to the various objects of the Act.
It is important to note that the Court’s power to make an ESO is discretionary. Section 5B of the Act provides that the Court “may” make an order for the supervision in the community of a person.
Section 5B of the Act further sets out a four-tier test for the making of an order:

“5B Making of extended supervision orders—unacceptable risk
The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—
(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and
(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and
(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and
(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.”

For the purposes of s 5B(a) of the Act, an “offender” is defined under s 4A as a person who:

is of, or above, 18 years of age; and

has, at any time, been sentenced to imprisonment to be served by way of full-time detention or intensive correction in the community following the person’s conviction for a serious offence.

A “serious offence” is defined in section 4 of the Act as being either a “serious sex offence” or a “serious violence offence”. These two categories of offences are further defined in ss 5 and 5A of the Act respectively.
Secondly, a person is deemed to be a “supervised offender” within the meaning of s 5I of the Act. The definition includes an offender who, when the application for the order is made, is in custody or under supervision –

“(a) while serving a sentence of imprisonment—
(i) for a serious offence, or
(ii) for an offence of a sexual nature, or
(iii) for an offence under section 12, or
(iv) for another offence (whether under a law of this State or another Australian jurisdiction) that is being served concurrently or consecutively, or partly concurrently and partly consecutively, with one or more sentences of imprisonment referred to in subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii), or

(b) under an existing interim supervision order, extended supervision order, interim detention order or continuing detention order.”

Thirdly, an application for an order must be made in accordance with s 5I of the Act. This includes satisfying the Court that the offender is a “supervised offender” at the time the application was made.
The final statutory pre-condition requires the Court to be satisfied, to a “high degree of probability”, that the defendant poses an “unacceptable risk” of committing another “serious offence” if not kept under supervision.
In determining whether an ESO ought to be made, I must also consider the factors set out in s 9 of the Act. Section 9(1) provides that an application for an ESO may be determined by either making an order or by dismissing the application. Section 9(2) once again mandates that the “paramount consideration” when making a determination is to ensure the “safety of the community”.
Section 9(3) of the Act goes on to provide that in determining whether or not to make an ESO, the Court “must” have regard to a list of matters contained within the section. This list is non-exhaustive, and the Court may also have regard to “any other matter it considers relevant”. I intend to address the matters to be considered under s 9(3) of the Act more completely below.

Background

Procedural History

The First Extended Supervision Order

On 22 February 2019, the State of New South Wales filed an amended Summons seeking an ESO of three years duration to be made in respect of the defendant.
On 13 December 2019, Button J ordered that the defendant be subject to an ESO (the previous ESO) for a period of three years from 13 December 2019, and made orders directing the defendant to comply with the schedule of conditions set out in Schedule A of his Honour's judgment: see State of NSW v Hudson [2019] NSWSC 1761.
On 23 December 2019, the defendant was released from custody in Victoria and returned to New South Wales to commence the first extended supervision order. The defendant was serving an aggregate term of 3 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years and 3 months, for one count of having sexual intercourse with a person aged between 14 and 16 years. An identical count was taken into account on a Form 1. In 2008 or early 2009, an interposing event occurred, and the defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 6 years and 4 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 4 months, for offences of sexual penetration of a child under 16 years of age. The defendant then breached his obligations as a convicted child sex offender. As a result, he was placed on a suspended sentence. The defendant’s parole was then revoked, with the result that he served the balance of his parole in custody until 23 December 2019, on which date all his custodial sentences expired: see State of New South Wales v Hudson [2019] NSWSC 1761 at [8], [9].
The first extended supervision order expired on 22 December 2022.

The Interim Orders

On 16 December 2022, Davies J made interim orders pursuant to s 7(4) of the Act, appointing experts to examine the defendant and directing the defendant to attend the examinations. Davies J also imposed an interim supervision order (ISO) on the defendant pursuant to ss 10A and 11 of the Act: see State of New South Wales v Hudson (No 2) (Preliminary) [2022] NSWSC 1655 (Hudson (No 2) (Preliminary)).
At that time, the defendant was remanded in custody awaiting sentence for pending criminal charges, namely two counts of failing to comply with the Previous ESO. Pursuant to s 10(2) of the Act, the ESO was suspended as the defendant was in “lawful custody”.
The previous ESO was revoked with effect from 26 January 2023 by Davies J, at which point the ISO commenced.
Since his release from custody, having served a three month sentence of imprisonment imposed for the November Charges, the defendant has been subject to an ISO. The ISO was imposed on 16 December 2022 and commenced on 11 February 2023, when the defendant was released from custody, having served the three month sentence.

Factual History

The Previous ESO and the Breach Charges

Until early 2022, the defendant was compliant with the previous ESO. He participated in treatment, completed sex offender programs, commenced employment, and was (and continues to be, subject to what is said below) in an intimate relationship with Rebecca Norris.
Ms Norris has children, including teenage daughters. Since early 2022, there have been several concerns about the defendant’s concealed attempts to contact Ms Norris’s teenage daughters, including on at least one occasion, an attempt to be alone with one of Ms Norris’s teenage daughters.
On 17 March 2022, an allegation was made that the defendant had concealed contact with Ms Norris’ children. The subsequent events are set out in the risk management report of Wendy Dryden dated 12 September 2022, and in the OIMS notes.
The allegation caused the ESO team to conduct several home, vehicle, and device searches. During an inspection on 23 March 2022, the ESO team identified that messages had been sent between the defendant and Ms Norris’ 14 year old daughter, encouraging her to spend time alone with him.
The defendant was issued with a warning for the messaging in circumstances where he had been directed not to contact Ms Norris’ children. There were also messages between Ms Norris and the defendant when she discovered that the defendant had been messaging Eileen.
On 1 September 2022, the defendant was issued with a formal written warning concerning alleged non-compliance with certain conditions of his ESO. The warning related to the following matters.

A search of the defendant’s devices conducted on 14 June 2022 revealed that the defendant had not provided an up-to-date password for the Google account associated with his email address. In addition, an undeclared laptop was located in his bedroom.

Following the 14 June 2022 search of the defendant’s phone and computer, it was identified that the “record search history” function had been turned off the defendant’s phone and computer.

The defendant’s behaviour towards Electronic Monitoring Room (EMR) staff was described as “increasingly hostile”.

The defendant’s failure to charge his electronic monitoring tag on 17,18 and 19 July 2022.

On 11 November 2022, the defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of failing to comply with his ESO (November Charges).
The first offence alleged that the defendant, between 31 October 2022 and 1 November 2022, was in the presence of Rebecca Norris at his home address. The second offence alleged that between 1 October 2022 and 8 November 2011, whereby the defendant failed to comply with the non-association direction, namely that he was in the company of Rebecca Norris.
The November Charges first came before the Gosford Local Court on 11 November 2022. The defendant was refused bail and was remanded in custody on that date. The proceedings were adjourned to 24 November 2022. The defendant pleaded guilty to the charges, and on 24 November 2022, the matter was adjourned for sentence to 2 February 2023. On 2 February 2023, the defendant was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment. He was released on 11 February 2023, and his ISO came into effect.

Further Background of Offending

In 2008 and early 2009, when the defendant was 27 and 28 years of age, the defendant committed sexual offences against two child victims, the first in New South Wales (the Index Offending) and the second in Victoria (the Victorian Offending).

The Victorian Offending

On 31 July 2009, the defendant was sentenced by her Honour Judge Pullen at the Melbourne County Court in relation to the Victorian offending. The defendant pleaded guilty to:

six counts of sexual penetration with a child under 16;

one count of production of child pornography;

one count of procuring a minor for child pornography; and

one count of committing an indecent act with a child under the age of 16 and one count of theft.

The defendant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of six years and 4 months imprisonment, commencing on 31 July 2009, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 4 months imprisonment.

The Index Offending

On 9 September 2016, following his release on parole in Victoria and extradition to New South Wales, the defendant was sentenced by Lerve DCJ at the Dubbo District Court in relation to the Index Offending, which comprised two charges of having sexual intercourse with a 14 year old female in April 2008. Following pleas of guilty, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 3 years and 6 months, commencing 9 September 2015, and expiring 8 March 2019. A non-parole period of 2 years and 3 months imprisonment was imposed, expiring on 8 December 2017.

Submissions

Submissions on Behalf of the Plaintiff

The plaintiff submitted that the defendant poses an “unacceptable risk” of committing a serious sex offence unless he is kept under supervision under an ESO. The plaintiff contended that this is consistent with the views previously reached by this Court in relation to the previous ESO. The plaintiff relies upon the defendant’s criminal history involving serious sex offences against female minors. The plaintiff contended that the consequences of repeat offending would be extremely grave, and the Court is faced with circumstances where the defendant’s present partner has three minor female children.
The plaintiff contended that whilst there is no doubt that the defendant has shown he has worked at addressing his dynamic risk factors, given the risk assessment tools and the elevated non-compliance with authorities exhibited towards the end of the previous ESO, it is too early to be confident that, without supervision, the defendant does not pose an unacceptable risk of repeat offending. The plaintiff contended that the defendant’s personality traits make him vulnerable to impulsivity, and the statistical assessment tools categorise him in the high-risk category of repeat offending with moderate criminogenic needs.
The plaintiff submitted that if the Court is satisfied that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence it nonetheless retains a discretion as to the making of an ESO: see Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 2016 (Lynn) at [47]–[48], [64], [82], [149].

The Court may take into account matters such as the impact of the ESO on an offender’s liberty and privacy: see New South Wales v Ibrahim (Final) [2021] NSWSC 793 at [336]. However, in the context of the Act, and the paramount importance of the safety of the community, “it would be an unusual case before the [C]ourt would decide in its discretion not to make an ESO”: see Kamm v New South Wales (No 4) (2017) 95 NSWLR 179; [2017] NSWCA 189 at [57]; New South Wales v Ibrahim (Final) [2021] NSWSC 793 at [333].
The plaintiffs submitted that there is no reason this Court would not exercise its discretion to make an ESO in the event it was satisfied that the threshold requirements under the Act were satisfied.
In relation to condition 5, the plaintiff submitted that the condition proposed by the defendant is not sufficient because it does not allow the DSO to impose scheduling in response to or to prevent an escalation in the defendant’s risk.
In relation to condition 19, the proposed amendment has the effect that the defendant’s DSO cannot tell the defendant not to associate with Ms Norris, even in circumstances where that association may be connected with an increase or potential increase in the defendant’s risk, including a risk to the safety of Ms Norris or her children.
The plaintiff contended that arrangements are on foot to formulate a “relationship integration plan” to commence a staged approach whereby the defendant and Rebecca Norris can associate.

Submissions on Behalf of the Defendant

The defendant submitted that the conditions sought by the plaintiff could be adapted to enable the defendant to have contact and association with Ms Norris and to overcome difficulties concerning last-minute deviations from any schedule of movements.
The defendant’s submissions can be summarised as follows:

the defendant does not oppose the making of an ESO as sought by the plaintiff for a period of 2 years from the date of the order;

the defendant concedes that the Court would be satisfied to a high degree of probability that he poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order;

in the event that the Court makes an ESO, the Court would not make an order in respect of all of the conditions sought by the plaintiff;

the defendant agrees to an order in terms of prayer 4 of the Summons concerning the restriction of access to the Court’s file in the proceedings; and

The defendant seeks amendments to conditions 5 and 19.

Evidence

Given the confined issues on this application, I intend to summarise the evidence in relatively brief form. Much of what follows is taken from the summary of evidence, which was very helpfully provided in the plaintiff’s written submissions.

Section 9(3) Factors

Reports Received from the Persons Appointed Under Section 7(4) (section 9(3)(b))

In compliance with the orders made by Davies J, the defendant was examined by Dr Gordon Elliott and Patrick Sheehan, the reports were furnished to the Court on 4 February 2023 and 17 February 2023 respectively.

Report of Dr Gordon Elliott

Dr Elliott conducted a psychiatric assessment of the defendant by video link on 3 February 2023.
Dr Elliott considered that the defendant was “forthcoming about his psychosexual history”, although noted that elements of his account were inconsistent with the documentation. Dr Elliott observed that “Mr Hudson was initially confident and assured as well as forthcoming about his sexual offending, but as the discussion progressed his account grew to be considerably at odds with his criminal record”. He was “keen to recount the benefits of his sex offender treatment programs, and also keen to tell me that he has identified now why his problems and sexual offending occurred”. Dr Elliott recorded:

“When asked what he considered would be a potential pathway to sexual recidivism, Mr Hudson replied, ‘I’d say I wouldn’t go back to offending, but if worst case scenario, if I wasn’t allowed any contact with my partner, I’d be lonely, I’d be in a hole’. He then returned to his comments that he has been in a stable relationship for many years and he has completed ‘all the hard work’. He also was anxious to tell me that he has a support network in the community and that he knows ‘how to reach out and ask for help. Back then I didn’t know how to do that.’”

The defendant described the Previous ESO as “a very tough struggle”. In relation to the present proceedings, Dr Elliott opined:

“Mr Hudson also spoke of his response to his upcoming hearing to extend his ESO. He told me this was initially a shock but he is now more understanding of it. He said he struggles more with any threat of not being able to see his partner. He added that he also finds it difficult that his progress has not been fully acknowledged. He said, ‘I don’t see myself as hurting anybody or causing anyone pain. I understand that why they (the authorities) are doing that (extending his ESO). They have to protect the community and that’s their job’. He did inform me that it is his ultimate goal to live with his partner and her children, but he is aware that on release it is likely he will be living in a COSP facility.”

Dr Elliott considered that there was no evidence that the defendant suffers from a major mental illness. He identified that the defendant’s childhood and adolescent Tourette’s and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) were in long-term remission. He observed that the collateral documentation indicated that the defendant’s intellectual functioning falls within the borderline range. Dr Elliott went on to state:

“As has been indicated in previous psychiatric and psychological reports, Mr Hudson’s history is suggestive of an underlying mixed personality disorder of antisocial and borderline traits. I note he has an early history of self-harming behaviour and further a varied criminal record including juvenile offending. These problems are set against a background of a deeply disturbed early developmental experience characterised by sustained and severe childhood physical abuse, adolescent homelessness and sexual abuse. He does not however, present with all of the features of an ASPD. I again note that he has been able to sustain long term employment, despite his lack of support, and he also has engaged in a long term and stable relationship. He also does not have a history of substance use disorders or marked risk taking behaviour; features normally prominently associated with an ASPD.
With regards to a diagnosis of a paraphilia, Mr Hudson does have an obvious history of deviant sexual behaviour. There is also a clearly defined target group for his offending with this being adolescent females. The collateral documentation from Victorian custodial mental health services suggests that he does have a pervasive interest and sexual attraction towards adolescent women. Mr Hudson himself has acknowledged that his criminal record indicates he is attracted to this target group, and he has further admitted that his offences towards the adolescent victims in 2008 and 2009 demonstrate that he was sexually attracted to these adolescent women. He claimed however, that he does not have an enduring attraction to adolescent women and that he is only interested in conventional sexual practices with his current partner. Nonetheless, the weight of material about him indicates that he does have a paraphilia, specifically hebephilia primarily attracted to females.”

In relation to the question of whether the defendant poses a risk of committing a further “serious sex offence” or “serious violence offence” (as defined in the Act), Dr Elliott opined:

“Mr Hudson does pose a risk of further sexual offending. He has now been assessed by multiple forensic psychiatrists and psychologists, all of whom have suggested that he falls within a group of offenders that overall would be considered at high risk of reoffending. I agree with those assessments. Once again Mr Hudson appears to respond poorly to challenge or stress, although with time he appears to be gradually learning and moderating these problems. More positively, he does not have a history of substance use problems, a common feature of ASPD and a key risk factor for both sexual and non-sexual violent offending.”

Dr Elliott considered that the defendant’s risk may fluctuate over time, and that social isolation, stress, relationship conflict and access to victims were all “potential red flags”. He did not consider that the defendant’s risk could be managed in the community without an ESO and opined:

“I do consider that Mr Hudson’s risk could be managed in the community under an ESO. I consider the assertive nature of an ESO is necessary based upon his potential to regress at times of stress or relationship conflict or breakdown. I also have concerns about his access to the teenage daughters of his partner at such times. An ESO with conditions similar to those imposed during his previous order will be the most assured means of managing this risk. Should he move to cohabiting with his partner however, the effectiveness of this order will be limited. Influencing my assessment in this regard are concerns about his reliability as a historian, noting the inconsistencies with the history of his offending provided during this assessment and the collateral documentation. I have concerns about his conviction for fraudulent misrepresentation and the apparent complicity of his current partner in this charge. I also have serious concerns about the nature of his messages to Ms Norris’s teenage daughter Eileen, detailed in the Corrective Services case notes at pages 431-2 of Volume 2 of the brief. These appear suspiciously like grooming; an impression reinforced by Ms Norris’s reaction, and Mr Hudson’s subsequent angry and utterly inappropriate response. These negatives suggest that ongoing supervision by trained community corrections officers working with police and utilising the powers of an ESO is required to assertively manage his risks.
Mr Hudson does appear genuinely motivated to avoid re-offending. Residing with Ms Norris and her children is also his foremost goal. He refers to them as his family. I also note the opinion of his treating forensic psychologists and the risk assessment report prepared by Mr Samuel Ardasinski indicating that his pattern of offending does not involve such close contact with the victims. His treating psychologists of course have the advantage of sustained assessments of him whereas my opinion is based on a single interview limited by the problems with the AVL link. I hold concerns nonetheless about such defined demarcations being placed around his potential offending behaviour, or whether his offending profile can be used to confidently exclude these close contact teenage girls as potential victims.
Conversely, Mr Hudson’s chief support is his current partner and it is natural for him to wish to progress this relationship and cohabitate. This could be seen as natural progress towards rehabilitation and excluding him from this relationship could potentially increase his risk of offending towards stranger victims. Overall, I consider that the risks towards each potential set of victims, related and stranger, are best managed under an ESO.”

Dr Elliott concluded that the defendant should be managed under the conditions in force under the ISO. He considered that a minimum further period of two years was suitable.

Report of Patrick Sheehan

Mr Sheehan interviewed the defendant for 2 hours and 30 minutes in person. Mr Sheehan noted that “[u]nsurprisingly, he tended towards positive impression management, seeking to present favourably and avoiding information that was unflattering to him unless specifically prompted”. Mr Sheehan opined that the defendant “reported feeling frustrated, exasperated and undermined by his ESO”. The report given by the defendant about his family history was “roughly consistent” with previous reports, with some differences.
Mr Sheehan observed:

“Since his release to ESO in December 2019 Mr Hudson has been focused on returning to live with his partner and her children. The evidence indicates that this was accepted as a reintegration goal but has been undermined by Mr Hudson’s behaviour, lack of transparency and the perception of risk to the teenage girls in that family. Mr Hudson was ultimately given a non-association direction regarding his partner in late 2022, which he breached over subsequent weeks, entering custody on 11 November 2022. He said that he was not restricted from contacting his partner when in custody and spoke with her by phone everyday. However, on release to ISO on 10 February 2023 he is prohibited from any form of contact. He expressed frustration and a sense of unfairness, explaining to me that all of his possessions (including his registered motor vehicle) are with his partner and he is unable to access his own property without breaching ISO. Managing the benefits/risks of Mr Hudson’s relationship has been the dominant feature of his ESO between 2019-2022 and remains a key consideration of his case at the present time.”

Mr Sheehan further opined:

“In my opinion, there is evidence to indicate the presence of a disorder of personality, with Mr Hudson evincing a long history of problems with emotional immaturity, rule violation, self defeating behaviour, poorly controlled anger, insecure self-concept, complex and insecure interpersonal relationships, fear of rejection/humiliation, all of which point towards personality disturbance. The adverse circumstances of Mr Hudson’s early development have likely played a role in the formation of these traits. These characteristics have been identified in previous personality testing. There are antisocial traits identifiable (early conduct disorder, rule violation, exploitation), however, Mr Hudson’s regular employment is out of keeping with this disorder and I am convinced that his broader goals are basically prosocial. There are traits of borderline personality identifiable (insecurity, anger, unstable relationships, fear of abandonment, desperation for attachment) that have rightly been hypothesised to have played a role in Mr Hudson’s gravitation towards younger girls, who are perceived by Mr Hudson to be less threatening than adult females. In all, Mr Hudson could be described as having a “Cluster B” personality presentation.
Mr Hudson’s history reveals episodes of disordered sexual behaviour over a 15- year period. In my view, he does not meet criteria for pedophilic disorder, although one of the complainants was aged 12 years when offending commenced, which sits with the target range for that disorder. His history would support a diagnosis of Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder - Hebephilia (nonexclusive, interest in girls), consistent with Dr Furst’s opinion. There is no evidence of ongoing sexual fixation with young teens, but nor is there a remission rule with paraphilia in the DSM-V.”

Having considered the defendant’s criminal and custodial history, Mr Sheehan opined:

“One of the primary supervision themes in file material has been managing the tension between Mr Hudson’s long term intimate partner relationship and the identified potential risk to his partners’ children and/or associations of his partners’ children. There has been a collaborative case management approach shared between CSNSW, FACS and police. The psychological report of Mandy Lau (15 February 2022) refers to the complex challenges that this has presented to Mr Hudson and the case management team throughout supervision. Whilst there has been a broader goal of family re-integration, this has been undermined by Mr Hudson’s episodes of dishonesty, impatience and the perception that his partner minimised the risks associated with Mr Hudson being unsupervised with her children.”

Although the defendant expressed frustration with how his previous ESO “played out”, and felt that he was treated unfairly and arbitrarily, he was able to state that he had also made poor decisions that contributed to his situation.
Mr Sheehan considered that the defendant’s current score on the STATIC-99R was 6, consistent with Mr Ardasinski’s assessment in September 2022, which is the highest risk range on that instrument. Mr Sheehan acknowledged that the STATIC-99R has limitations.
In relation to the Risk of Sexual Violence Protocol Tool (RSVP), Mr Sheehan noted that he would regard the defendant’s history of sexual violence as “chronic in terms of persistence and at times frequency”. He noted that “[t]here is clear evidence of escalation during the defendant’s juvenile sex offending but this would appear to have plateaued in his adult offending”. Mr Sheehan stated that the defendant acknowledged his sexual offending but showed a tendency to focus on nonsexual motivations and “avoids dealing with the sexual deviancy evident in his offending”, although he did not engage in extreme minimization or denial. Mr Sheehan opined:

“He has never outwardly expressed attitudes that condone or support sexual violence, however he has in the past sought to promote his later offences as consenting, showing a simplistic and inadequate understanding of consent. Having completed multiple sex offender treatment programs, he no longer upholds such attitudes. He has problems with self-awareness in making realistic self-appraisal and ability to recognise risk of reoffending, emerging at times when his neediness and insecurities override his judgement. This has been observed on occasion during his ESO. There is a history of chronic problems with stress and coping that has been related to episodes of offending (emotional collapse leading to sexual coping). There are clear improvements in Mr Hudson’s ability to manage stress and coping, however he has continued to show some problems in this area, evidenced by adversarial, passive aggressive and dishonest behaviour as a means of coping. Mr Hudson has a history of serious child abuse (violence, mistreatment and sexual abuse) that would appear to have contributed to his pervasive maladjustment in childhood and also his personality vulnerabilities in adulthood.”

Mr Sheehan observed that “sexual deviance is strongly and specifically associated with sexual violence, although on its own may be unnecessary or insufficient for the perpetration of sexual violence”. Mr Sheehan noted that the defendant has a history of sexual deviance, with diagnostic criteria for paraphilia being met (although it is a non-exclusive type of paraphilia). Mr Sheehan did not consider that the evidence supported a diagnosis of major mental illness. Mr Sheehan stated that the defendant has a long history of “serious problems” in intimate relations, and in establishing sexual relationships with minors. He observed that “[d]uring his ESO, his social reintegration was hampered by a combination of his reticence, COVID-19, and the difficulties of establishing friendships whilst subject to intensive supervision”.
In relation to manageability, Mr Sheehan made the following comments:

“Mr Hudson has shown ability to re-establish himself in the community through accommodation and employment. In this sense his planning abilities are solid. However, his plans have at times failed to recognise or account for risk, mostly in circumstances where his need for attachment overrides other considerations (such as seeking to secretly increase his communication with his partners’ teenage daughter). Mr Hudson has obtained extensive psychological treatment but has shown some difficulty in drawing on that insight during supervision, through episodes of poor decision-making, and failure to raise these issues in maintenance treatment. The pattern of presenting positively whilst subverting supervision is the main issue. His tendency to feel wounded by supervision and creating an adversarial dynamic with supervisors has also been a problem. He continues to be at risk of this.”

In terms of serious violent offending (as opposed to serious sexual offending), Mr Sheehan concluded that the defendant was at low risk of violence. In relation to risk scenarios and overall risk, Mr Sheehan opined:

“Formulation and Risk scenarios for sexual offending
The antecedents and maintaining factors to Mr Hudson’s sex offences have been well examined over many hours of specialist psychological treatment. Mr Hudson’s juvenile offences, comprising of impulsive attacks on roughly peer aged females in public settings, would appear to have been underpinned by broader disinhibition and impulse control, diminished boundaries (evidenced by observations of inappropriate attachment to a refuge worker) and role confusion (inquiring about a possible relationship with a girl he had just sexually assaulted). In my view, the risk of these types of stranger assaults has largely attenuated in the same way much of Mr Hudson’s other juvenile psychopathology has attenuated. His adult offending (focussed on establishing sexual romantic relationships with young vulnerable teens) appears to have been underpinned primarily by poor emotional self-regulation (being unable to tolerate low mood states), low self-esteem, feelings of social rejection (and sexual rejection), loneliness, and attempts to feel masterful and secure in relationships with young inexperienced girls.
Were Mr Hudson to reoffend sexually, it would most likely be against a young female teen, in circumstances where he feels isolated and socially rejected. This could occur whilst he is single or perhaps during a period of relationship stress, where he feels overwhelmed, exposed, insecure and overburdened by the demands of adult relationships. He may transfer his affections to a young female in those circumstances, ignoring warning signs and being focused on the reinforcing feelings of security, attachment and confidence. A potential victim could be met socially, or known to Mr Hudson through his existing network, including through adult partners. The timing for the onset of offending would be driven by the confluence of the risk factors identified above, and availability of potential victims. The victim’s defences would most likely be broken down through grooming as opposed to force. There is a possibility of some aggression in the circumstance that the victim ends the relationship. The possibility of serious or life-threatening injury would be inconsistent with his history.”
OVERALL RISK
Mr Hudson is assessed as within the ‘well above average’ risk category with regard to actuarial factors. There are a number of identifiable dynamic risk factors that would appear to be correlates of offending in Mr Hudson’s case. The evidence is that he has increased stability with emotional regulation, but he remains vulnerable to feelings of social rejection and insecure attachment. The overall evidence leads me to estimate Mr Hudson’s risk of committing a sex offence to remain within the upper range (high range) of the risk spectrum relative to other adult male sexual offenders. Given that his risk profile extends to sexual intercourse with females under the age of 16 years, Mr Hudson’s risk would approach the threshold for serious sexual offending, as defined in the Crimes (High Risk Offender) Act 2006.”

Mr Sheehan concluded that the proposed conditions were adequate to reasonably manage the defendant’s risk of sexual recidivism. He noted that the “primary means of managing the defendant’s risk will be through managing his associations, promoting stability, self-regulation, transparency and positive social engagement that might reduce his sense of social rejection”. He made the following specific comments:

electronic monitoring should be finite and with a specified end date;

it may be adequate in relation to accommodation to specify that visitors need to be aged over 18 years unless specifically approved;

it is not necessary for a condition to be imposed in relation to drugs; and

while the non-association conditions are reasonable and necessary, “[g]iven the centrality of [the defendant’s] current partner relationship to contemporaneous risk, it would seem prudent to make the supervision strategy known now, as a specific element of the supervision plan”.

Mr Sheehan concluded:

“In my view, the evidence suggests that notwithstanding Mr Hudson’s successes, the risk of a serious offence cannot be adequately managed without an extended supervision order at this time. In my view, the Child Protection Register (CPR) or even a Child Protection Prohibition Order (CPPO) would not be an adequate alternative to an ESO, given the absence of a case management function in those options. The State of NSW seeks an Extended Supervision Order of two years duration and in my view, if an order is imposed, this timeframe would be suitable, although it will require the case management strategy to move at a quick pace in order to achieve the goals of rehabilitation and self-management. The overarching strategy to resolve or manage Mr Hudson’s current partner relationship remains unclear and in my view, the strategy should be made clear during the current proceedings in order to provide Mr Hudson with a transparent understanding of what is expected of him over the course of his order.”

Both appointed experts identified that the defendant poses a risk of committing a serious sex offence if he is not the subject of supervision, and both experts consider that this risk can be managed in the community. These reports support the making of an ESO.

Results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious offence (section 9(3)(c))

Risk Assessment Report and Supplementary Risk Assessment Report by Samuel Ardasinski

Samuel Ardasinski prepared a risk assessment report on 5 September 2022 (RAR), and a supplementary risk assessment report on 23 September 2022 (supplementary RAR). Mr Ardasinski interviewed the defendant for approximately 2 hours on 29 July 2022. In the interview, the defendant accepted responsibility for his offences and “presented with relatively good insight into his risk profile and the differences between his current situation and the situation he was in when he offended in 2008”.
Mr Ardasinski commented:

“There have been concerns raised about the risk potential within the family unit, since Mr Hudson's partner has a number of children, one of whom is now an adolescent (15) in the same age range as Mr Hudson's two latest victims. However, such a risk scenario was not forecast in Mr Hudson's risk assessments previously, and he has never sexually offended from within a family unit.”

The RAR states that the defendant reached his 300 hours of treatment by the time he was released to the community in 2019, and after this, the defendant continued to participate in psychological interventions. The RAR stated:

“While there have been oscillations in his level of participation and disclosure during his time attending these sessions, there has been an overall picture of someone who is using these mandated psychology sessions for his benefit, mostly spending his sessions ventilating his frustration about his management in the community. However, there has been some suggestion that Mr Hudson’s level of engagement has been largely superficial throughout these sessions, and that there has been a level of concealment which indicated that he has not been fully engaged with community supervision or treating psychologists.”

Mr Ardasinski’s key opinions on risk included:

“The most significant concern is the potential for risk of serious harm against any one of the children within the family unit and/or the potential for harm if any teenager family friends of these children were ever to visit.
…
A return to offending would almost certainly involve social isolation if Mr Hudson were to experience a relationship breakdown. In this scenario, Mr Hudson would experience heightened negative emotional states including feelings of rejection, low self-esteem and loneliness. He may return to patterns of thinking such as ‘I’m alone and nobody cares about me’. He may seek out connection with younger adolescent girls to ameliorate these feelings.
…
While the overall totality of evidence suggests that Mr Hudson still falls in the high risk category of sexual offending relative to other adult male sexual/violent offenders, it is unclear how such risk might materialize from his current situation.”

The RAR noted the defendant’s engagement with intervention and compliance with his ESO has been “adequate”. Mr Ardasinski considered the totality of evidence suggested that the defendant falls in the high-risk category for sexual offending relative to other adult male sexual offenders, with a moderate level of criminogenic needs. It was unclear to Mr Ardasinski how the risk may materialise, whether it was a repeat of how he committed his past offences or whether it may be a “third scenario” within the family unit. Mr Ardasinski acknowledged the uncertainty around predicting the risk of that third scenario eventuating.

Risk Assessment of Holly Cieplucha

Holly Cieplucha prepared a report dated 24 August 2018.
Ms Cieplucha opined that the defendant posed a high risk of repeat sexual offending because of his impulsivity, general social rejection, and history of sexual deviance (although Ms Cieplucha noted that the defendant denied that he had such thoughts anymore) and that he has used sex as a coping mechanism. Ms Cieplucha noted that while the defendant “purports to have developed prosocial coping strategies over the course of the sex offender treatment these strategies lack depth”. Given his history of problems in this area it should be considered an ongoing risk factor until there is further evidence of his ongoing ability to cope. Ms Cieplucha acknowledged protective factors in the defendant’s life which included his stable relationship with his partner, Ms Norris, and that he was committed to work and continued to engage and show a willingness for offence-targeted treatment.

ESO Report of Mandy Lau

Ms Lau, Forensic Psychologist at the Serious Offenders Assessment Unit, prepared a report dated 15 February 2022 (ESO Completion Report).
The ESO Completion Report noted child protection concerns:

“Community Corrections also became aware that there was some involvement from FACS regarding the children for some years. Limited details were made available to CSNSW regarding specific risk concerns, but FACS identified general concerns around Mr Hudson’s partner’s capacity to monitor Mr Hudson from grooming behaviours. FACS also identified general concerns regarding her dismissal of risk around Mr Hudson’s past behaviour and future risk of sexual harm to her children, and her time spent away from the children. For these reasons, FACS initially did not support any contact between Mr Hudson and his partner’s children
…
Mr Hudson’s risk to his partner’s children was reviewed by FACS again in July 2021, in consultation with CSNSW. The outcome of this review was that Mr Hudson would be allowed to gradually increase contact with his partner’s children if Mr Hudson and his partner were willing to engage in relationship counselling and if Mr Hudson’s partner was willing to work with FACS and demonstrate adequate change to alleviate the concerns that they have identified. Mr Hudson and his partner initially presented as difficult to engage following this review and expressed feelings of mistrust towards FACS and CSNSW and frustration about having to engage in counselling.
Specifically, Mr Hudson reported that they believe that the agencies intends to access information that they may disclose about their relationship during counselling to direct Mr Hudson to terminate his relationship with his partner. Mr Hudson was difficult to engage during this period and was aggressive in his verbal interactions with CSNSW staff. After several weeks of consistent feedback and further clarification from staff, Mr Hudson reported willingness to work with CSNSW and FACS to engage in a staged approach to integrating with his family.”

Although FACS recommended that the defendant could gradually have increased contact with Ms Norris’ children, this position changed when it was discovered the defendant had been contacting Ms Norris’ 14 year old daughter in early 2022.
The ESO Completion Report summarises the defendant’s sessions with Forensic Psychology Services (FPS), which he attended from March to December 2020. Ms Lau stated that she observed that the sessions with FPS focused on emotion regulation, self-esteem, interpersonal skills, particularly in an intimate context, and attitudes towards young females and women. As for any treatment gains, Ms Lau opined:

“His therapist commented that he demonstrated good insight into his offending and was respectful when receiving feedback from her. Mr Hudson was also noted to be willing to process episodes of emotional dysregulation with his therapist after difficult interactions with his supervising officers. Overall, Mr Hudson appeared to have utilised the support appropriately and effectively.”

Ms Lau was the defendant’s treating psychologist from April 2021. Ms Lau stated that her sessions focused on supporting the applicant to develop a comprehensive self-management plan which focused on mediating his risk to children and on his thoughts, feelings and attitudes around his offending. In relation to Mr Hudson’s treatment gains, Ms Lau opined:

“Mr Hudson impressed as having retained gains from previous participation in treatment and demonstrated insight into his offending. He demonstrated good insight into areas that he would benefit from further intervention and was generally willing to discuss these issues in sessions.”

Ms Lau looked at the risk factors identified in the risk assessment report of 2018 (presented for the first ESO application) and assessed whether those dynamic risk factors had been mitigated or were present at all. Ms Lau’s findings included the following.

Sexual self-regulation: “there is no recent evidence to suggest that Mr Hudson experienced difficulties managing his sexual needs…however it should also be considered that at the time [Mr Hudson] had only recently been approved to allow his partner to visit his home…their new opportunity to spend time in private may have been a relevant factor to his reported higher frequency of sexual activities”.

Sexual deviance: “when this was explored with Mr Hudson in intervention, he attributed his offending to loneliness, poor self-esteem, and cognitive distortions. He demonstrated insight into the development of poor self-esteem and how this impacted on his lack of confidence in his ability to develop a romantic intimate relationship with a similar-aged female peer…throughout intervention Mr Hudson consistently accepted responsibility for his offending and appeared to have kept efforts to self-manage areas that he identified as relevant to his offending”.

Significant social relationships: Ms Lau noted that Mr Hudson has a prosocial relationship with his partner and a good relationship with his family.

Ms Lau did not recommend a further ESO and opined:

“Given Mr Hudson demonstrated good insight into his sexual offending and has made improvements in the relevant risk areas, this is some evidence to suggest that he has developed skills to mediate his risk in the community whilst being subject to an ESO. If Mr Hudson continues to maintain or further the level of stability that he has established in his life and complies with his self-management around his partner’s children, it is possible that he can manage his risk in the community without further sexual offending. Therefore, a further order is not recommended at this stage.”

The recommendation of Ms Lau, however, was during the period of February 2022, and was premised on the defendant maintaining stability. It was also prior to learning that the defendant had been contacting Ms Norris’ children without her knowledge and in breach of his ESO. There were still some concerns regarding the defendant’s risk factors and there was also an overall impression that Ms Lau was not confident that the defendant could manage his risks with stressors or instability in his life.
Although Ms Lau did not consider a further ESO was required, she expressed the view before the defendant’s non-compliance with the previous ESO and contact with Ms Norris’ children.
The primary other reports of relevance are the RAR and the supplementary RAR which support the making of an ESO.

Any Report Prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the Extent to Which the Offender can Reasonably and Practicably be Managed in the Community (section 9(3)(d1))

Risk Management Report of Wendy Dryden

Ms Dryden, Corrections Community Officer, furnished the Court with a report dated 12 September 2022 (the RMR).
The RMR sets out that the defendant commenced treatment with FPS on 14 February 2020, within individual risk management sessions on a fortnightly basis. Ms Dryden commented on the defendant’s satisfactory response to supervision, engagement with FPS and progression to stage 3 electronic monitoring (electronic monitoring, no schedules and no curfew).
The defendant commenced treatment with the Serious Offender Assessment Unit – High Risk Offenders (SOAU-HRO) around April 2021, which was to support the defendant in developing a comprehensive self-management plan which focused on mediating his risk to the children if he were to live with Ms Norris (Ms Lau was the treating psychologist). Ms Dryden stated that her contact with his psychologist revealed that the defendant engaged well in his treatment sessions and appeared to have maintained gains that he made during his participation in custody-based treatment. This ended in April 2022 and the defendant returned to sessions with FPS.
In July 2022, the defendant was resistant to sessions with FPS, which saw the need for him to be issued with a direction to attend and participate. The defendant has not breached that direction.
Ms Dryden raised the following concerns relevant to assessing the defendant’s risk:

he continues to demonstrate impulsivity;

he displayed a lack of consequential thinking; and

had a limited social network whereby without his relationship with Ms Norris, he would likely face social isolation. Of particular concern, are that those behaviours are directly linked to his identified risk factors.

The RMR sets out that the defendant engaged with his partner’s Family and Community Services (FACS) centre with the aim of being permitted access to his partner’s children. As set out above, contact was about to be given when on 17 March 2022, there was an allegation made to FACS that the defendant was having concealed contact with Ms Norris’ children since January 2022.
The RMR also noted that warnings had been issued to the defendant (since June 2022) for failing to declare the possession of laptops to his DSO, failing to provide updated passwords and passcodes, and that the Google browser had the setting for recording the search history turned off. In September 2022, the defendant was issued another warning for failing to charge his tag as directed and being increasingly hostile to ESO officers.
The RMR suggests a management plan that could mitigate the defendant’s current risks which include non-association with children without being in the presence of a responsible adult, monitoring access to the internet and conditions regarding accommodation.

Treatment and Rehabilitation Programs (section 9(3)(e))

High Intensity Sex Offender Treatment Report

The Court was furnished with a High Intensity Sex Offender Treatment Report (HISOP) dated 19 March 2019.
The defendant participated in, and completed the HISOP, from 28 May 2018 to 28 February 2019. This custody-based program is for men who have sexually abused adults and/or children. The defendant also participated in 52 sessions of the Victorian equivalent from 16 May 2013 to 5 December 2013. The defendant was observed to find the initial stages of HISOP difficult and responded aggressively in those situations, but later showed a “positive behaviour change”. The defendant was “actively seen implementing strategies within the wing regarding his general behaviour and relationships with others”. The author of the HISOP report considered that the test for the defendant will be how he fares in the community. The identified dynamic risk factors at that time included intimacy deficits and making meaningful connections with others, impulsivity and sexual self-regulation. The Maintenance program was recommended to address these factors. Warning signs identified included:

difficulties in romantic relationships;

feelings of worthlessness and insecurity;

focusing on sex or using it to cope; and

distancing himself from the support offered by others.

Ordinarily, positive participation in treatment programs might weigh against the making of an ESO. However, the RAR author and the court-appointed experts all considered that the defendant continues to pose a risk of serious sexual offending that cannot be managed without supervision in the community, notwithstanding his positive participation. Although the defendant’s history demonstrates that he has made progress under the Previous ESO, and gained insight into his offending, this has not mitigated the risk posed by the defendant.

The Likelihood that the Offender will Comply with the Obligations of an Extended Supervision Order (section 9(3)(e2)) and the Level of the Offender’s Compliance with any Obligations to which He or She is or Has Been Subject While on Release on Parole or While Subject to an Earlier Extended Supervision Order (section 9(3)(f))

The defendant has an inconsistent history of compliance with obligations while under supervision. Until mid-2022, the defendant had been generally compliant with his ESO. However, since that point in time, he has been issued with a number of warnings and was charged with, and convicted of, breaching the ESO by interacting with Ms Norris. He has previously breached parole.
The defendant has expressed frustration with the ESO, including the perception that he has been treated unfairly. However, he also acknowledged to Dr Elliot that he understood that the authorities were “doing their job” in seeking a new ESO. It appears that a key issue for managing compliance will be managing the defendant’s relationship with Ms Norris.

The Defendant’s Criminal History (section 9(3)(h))

The defendant’s criminal history was summarised by N Adams J in State of New South Wales v Hudson (Preliminary) [2019] NSWSC 194. That summary was adopted by Davies J in Hudson (No 2) (Preliminary). It is as follows:

“The defendant is 39 years old. His prior convictions for sexual offences date from when he was only 14 years of age.
When the offender had just turned 14, he approached a 16-year-old from behind in a shopping centre car-park and squeezed her breasts. He admitted being ‘sexually excited’ by the act when that proposition was put to him by police. The following day he approached another ‘young girl’ who was walking from a shopping centre back to high school and grabbed her around the waist until she apparently said, ‘fuck off’, struggled and broke free, at which point he stopped. He was charged with assault. He admitted being sexually excited by this offence as well. He pleaded guilty to indecent assault and common assault and was placed on a good behaviour recognisance for 2 years for each offence.
On 2 October 1993 whilst still subject to the bond the defendant followed a 16- year-old girl home from the swimming pool. He put his left arm around her chest and right hand over her mouth after she screamed, and then let go of her and ran into a park. The defendant was sentenced for common assault to a 12-month control order, with release recommended after 3 months.
In December 1995, then aged 16, the defendant was charged with abduction, two counts of aggravated sexual assault and one count of aggravated act of indecency. The victim, who was 15 years of age, had been walking home at night around 7.10 pm when the defendant grabbed her from behind, placed his hand over her mouth and forced her to the ground. He led her to bushland on a vacant block and made her lie on the ground and remove her top. He threatened her and sexually assaulted her by forcing her to commit fellatio to ejaculation (aggravated sexual assault) and then digitally penetrated her vagina (aggravated sexual assault). After that, the defendant asked if he could be the victim’s boyfriend and began to kiss her. The defendant told her to get dressed and he left the scene.
The defendant was later placed on a control order. He then assaulted a youth worker in the detention centre. A further charge of assault in 2000 was dismissed under the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) s 32. This related to the break-up of the defendant’s then relationship. He entered her residence, damaged her property and then assaulted her by pushing her against a wall several times. He was fined in 2002 for behaving in an offensive manner near a school. In 2002 and 2003 he was convicted on other charges of: furnishing false information, receiving stolen property, taking and driving a conveyance, making a false instrument, break and entering and stealing a motor vehicle were dealt with. Further driving offences were dealt with in 2007.
Victorian Offences
The defendant has convictions in Victoria for child sexual assault offences committed between 27 December 2008 and 31 January 2009. At the time of the commission of these offences the defendant, who was 29 years old at the time, was working as a dodgem car operator and lived at the back of a truck trailer. Upon meeting the 12-year-old victim in December 2008 he gave her his mobile number and they began contact through text messages and the internet. On 27 December 2008arrangements were made for the defendant to collect the victim from her home and stay with him in his trailer. After collecting the victim from her home under the pretence of being the father of one of the victim’s school friends their sexual relationship began that day. The victim stayed with the defendant for approximately two weeks during which time they had sexual intercourse on numerous occasions with the defendant penetrating the victim anally, vaginally, and orally.
The defendant pleaded guilty to count 1 (a rolled-up count relating to four separate counts of penile/vaginal sexual intercourse); to count 2 (a rolled-up count relating to three separate instances of penile/anal sexual intercourse); to count 3 of penal/oral sexual intercourse; to count 4 (a rolled-up count of production of pornography relating to the photographs, images and videos of vaginal and anal intercourse with the victim taken by the defendant); to count 5 (a rolled-up count of three occasion of procuring a minor for child pornography, which involved the defendant posting a package to the victim on her thirteenth birthday containing a mobile phone capable of video playback and a vibrating sex toy and subsequent to that a video of himself masturbating to her on her phone as well as text messaging the victim encouraging her to make videos and picture herself using the vibrator); to counts 6 to 9 relating to oral/anal/vaginal sexual intercourse with the victim when the defendant borrowed a car and collected the victim; and to count 10 relating to stealing a wheel of the boot of a parked car when he damaged wheels on his car.
Following his plea of guilty, the defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 6 years and 4 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 4 months commencing from the date of the sentence on 31 July 2009. His Honour Judge Pullen considered that the defendant had reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, provided he completed the sex offender program in custody
The index offence
On 9 September 2016, Lerve DCJ sitting at Dubbo District Court sentenced Mr Hudson to a total sentence of 3 years 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years 3 months on one count of sexual intercourse with a child aged between 14 and 16 years, contrary to s 66C(3) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (with a further charge under s 66C(3) taken into account on a Form 1. These charges arose from events that occurred in NSW in April 2008. He is currently serving the remainder of this sentence which expires on 8 March 2019. [26] The defendant pleaded guilty and agreed facts were tendered. The remarks on sentence of Lerve DCJ disclose that he met the victim in April 2008 while working at a fast food outlet in Dubbo. The offender provided his phone number and the two exchanged text messages. The victim was 14 years of age at the time. The offender was 27. She is reported to have told the offender her age.
Two weeks later, the victim left her family home and began to reside with the offender in a caravan while he worked on amusement rides at the Dubbo Showgrounds. The two shared a bed together. The sentencing judge’s remarks indicate that ‘[o]n one occasion the two of them hugged each other and the offender placed his fingers into the victim’s vagina, which conduct relates to the offence on the Form 1 document. The offender and the victim then had penile/vaginal intercourse. The offender was not wearing a condom and ejaculated inside the victim’s vagina’.
The victim and the offender subsequently travelled with the carnival to and around southern Queensland. While in Queensland the relationship reportedly deteriorated and the victim contacted her mother and returned to Dubbo. By June 2008 the relationship broke down and the victim was reported to have become pregnant as a result of the relationship. DNA analysis following the termination of the pregnancy confirmed that the victim was impregnated by the offender. The offender indicated that he was unaware of the pregnancy until informed sometime later by his legal representatives.”

The Views of the Sentencing Court at the Time the Sentence of Imprisonment was Imposed on the Offender (section 9(3)(h1))

Lerve DCJ, in passing sentence in relation to the New South Wales serious sex offence committed by the defendant in April 2008, made the following remarks relevant to assessing prospects of a further ESO.

The defendant, in his oral testimony to the Court, said he was sorry for what he put the victim through and his Honour found the defendant showed genuine remorse.

Whilst serving his sentence in Victoria, the defendant was a compliant prisoner and placed in an “open camp” where he was permitted day leave and worked as a tractor driver. That ended because the defendant was extradited to NSW.

The defendant completed the sex offender’s program in Victoria which the defendant said had a “very positive effect” on him.

The defendant showed “some very positive signs about long term rehabilitation” but his Honour, at that time, could not find there were good prospects of rehabilitation. His Honour said the situation was “not hopeless”.

His Honour found that there was a real need for specific deterrence.

Her Honour Judge Pullen, in passing sentence for the serious sex offence committed in Victoria between December 2008 and January 2009, made the following relevant remarks:

at that time, the defendant denied any sexual attraction to children and denied any deviant sexual interests;

Dr Sullivan noted that the defendant’s diagnoses of Tourette’s syndrome, OCD and possible attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) were unrelated to the offending;

the sex offender program was recommended; and

the defendant’s prospects of rehabilitation were reasonable if he completed such a program.

Unacceptable Risk Test

Standard of Proof

As stated earlier, the determination of this application turns on whether I am satisfied to a “high degree of probability” that the offender poses an “unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept supervised”: see s 5B(d) of the Act.
The term “to a high degree of probability” has been held to indicate a higher standard of proof than the normal civil standard, although not to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. In Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374, the Court of Appeal observed at [21]:

“The expression ‘a high degree of probability’ indicates something ‘beyond more probably than not’; so that the existence of the risk, that is the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious sex offence, does have to be proved to a higher degree than the normal civil standard of proof, though not to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt...”

Unacceptable Risk

At present, the legislation does not define the term “unacceptable risk”. Some insight into the term is provided by s 5D of the Act, namely, that in determining risk:

“…the Supreme Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.”

The expression “unacceptable risk” is to be understood according to its everyday meaning in the context of s 5B(d) and having regard to the objects of the Act: see Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636. Noting the paramount concern for community safety, in State of New South Wales v Holschier (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 341, Campbell J observed at [49]:

“…guaranteeing community safety is, of course, an impossible task; making it secure is a relative, not absolute, standard.”

The meaning of an “unacceptable risk” in section 5B(d) and the principles which are to be applied were summarised by Hoeben CJ at CL in State of New South Wales v Holschier (No. 2) [2018] NSWSC 1921 at [23] and [24] as follows:

“As to the meaning of the phrase “an unacceptable risk”, the case law establishes the following:
(a) What the court must find to be unacceptable is the “risk” of the offender “committing a serious [sex] offence if he or she is not kept under supervision” (see Lynn v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 57; 91 NSWLR 636 at [51] (Beazley P)).
(b) The word “unacceptable” – which means, relevantly, “so far from a required standard, norm, expectation etc as not to be allowed” – is one that “requires context in which, or parameters against which, the unacceptable risk can be measured” (see Lynn at [50]).
(c) While the HRO Act does not specify “the precise parameters or standard or norm against which that determination (i.e. the determination whether an offender poses an unacceptable risk) is to be made”, this “must be so” because “[a] determination as to whether something is unacceptable is an evaluative task, and evaluative determinations require a context in which to be made” (see Lynn at [51]).
(d) The determination whether an offender poses an unacceptable risk has to be understood in the context of the objects or purposes of the Act; in particular, its purpose in ensuring the safety and protection of the community (see Lynn at [55]).
(e) The right of an offender to his or her personal liberty at the expiry of a sentence of imprisonment is not relevant to the determination of whether an offender poses an unacceptable risk (Lynn at [44], [55]-[58], [128], [148]). Nevertheless, as their Honours held, the intrusion on a subject’s liberty and privacy are undoubtedly matters which the Court may take into account in its discretion to make an ESO.

The “unacceptable risk” inquiry is not discretionary, but it does involve an evaluative balancing exercise. It involves consideration of both the likelihood of the risk eventuating and the gravity of the risk that may eventuate: New South Wales v Simcock [2016] NSWSC 1805 at [71].”

In State of New South Wales v Pacey [2015] NSWSC 1983, Harrison J observed at [43]:

“It is perhaps trite to observe that the assessment of the ordinary meaning of the unacceptability of any risk involves at least notionally the arithmetical product of the consequences of the risk should it eventuate on the one hand and the likelihood that it will eventuate on the other hand. A very high risk of occurrence of something that is insignificant, or a very low risk of occurrence of something that is significant, are both risks of similar or corresponding proportions, but neither risk could be considered to be unacceptable.”

These observations were affirmed by Wilson J in State of New South Wales v Simcock(Final) [2016] NSWSC 1805, who observed at [71], that “unacceptability of risk involves consideration of both likelihood of the risk eventuating, and the gravity of the risk that may eventuate”: see also State of New South Wales v Chaplin [2019] NSWSC 471 at [15].
In State of New South Wales v Loto [2018] NSWSC 1522, Rothman J noted the following at [14]-[17]:

“The ascertainment of a risk and its denotation as ‘unacceptable' occurs in the usual way. There are many areas of the law in which risk assessments are required to be undertaken and, generally, they identify and evaluate the possibility of an injury that may be sustained as a result of a possible (and often foreseeable) occurrence. In assessing risk and whether the risk is unacceptable, a court is required to deal with a matrix of considerations.
First, there is the probability or possibility that the risk will manifest. Secondly, there is the seriousness of the harm that will ensue if the risk were to manifest.
The matrix exists because of the need to balance the likelihood of the manifestation of the risk, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the seriousness of the manifestation of that risk. Thus a risk, the consequences of which are catastrophic, may be unacceptable, even though the occurrence of that risk is only slightly possible.
On the other hand, where the manifestation of a risk involves minor injury, such as a contusion, even a high probability of its manifestation may not render the risk unacceptable.”

Accordingly, the seriousness of an index offence is a particularly significant factor in making any determination under the Act. The unacceptability of risk is not a discretionary matter. I must make an assessment based on the likelihood of a risk eventuating and the potential consequences if it does eventuate. Thus, an offender may pose an unacceptable risk, even where the likelihood of committing another serious offence is low if the likely consequences of such an offence are very grave: see State of New South Wales v Devaney(Final) [2022] NSWSC 60 (Devaney) at [73]; State of New South Wales v Kamm (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1 at [41] and [43].
It is apt to note that the right of an offender to his or her personal liberty at the expiry of their sentence is not a relevant consideration in the determination of whether a person poses an “unacceptable risk”. However, consideration of an offender’s circumstances, including the offender’s interest in liberty and privacy may influence the ultimate exercise of discretion as to whether or not to make an order: see Lynn at [44] (Beazley P, Basten JA and Gleeson JA).

Determination of Unacceptable Risk

I am satisfied that the statutory test has met and that an ESO for a period of two years should be made. I turn to consider the areas of dispute with respect to conditions 5 and 19.

Imposition of Conditions

Section 11(1) of the Act states that in determining to impose an ESO, the Court:

“…may direct an offender to comply with such conditions as the Supreme Court considers appropriate…”

The section includes a list of directions that the Court can impose, however, this list is not exhaustive.
A mandatory condition is accounted for in s 11(2) of the Act, whereby an offender must comply with a condition to not leave New South Wales except with the approval of the Commissioner of Corrective Services.
The Court’s power to impose particular conditions depends in turn upon the scope of the Act: see Winters v Attorney General of New South Wales (2008) 182 A Crim R 107; [2008] NSWCA 33 at [19]. When determining such conditions, not only are the considerations in s 11(1) relevant, but the Court must have regard to the objects of the Act, as stated earlier.
Important principles to be considered in relation to the imposition of conditions were set out in State of New South Wales v Wilkinson (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 1813 (Hoeben CJ at CL at [44). They are as follows:

“(i) having served a sentence of imprisonment for their offences, an offender has a right to personal liberty, however, this right is not absolute: State of New South Wales v Donovan at [83];
(ii) in imposing conditions, the Court needs to strike a balance between competing considerations: Attorney General for NSW v Tillman at [68];

(iii) a relevant consideration in imposing conditions is that a breach gives rise to a criminal penalty: State of New South Wales v Ley Thomas Baker (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 483 at [36];
(iv) conditions do not have to have a demonstrated link to past offending, but they should address the risk of future offending based on the scope, purpose and objects of the Act: Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28 at [53].
(v) conditions should not be designed toward future general criminal conduct, but instead focussed on mitigating the risk of a serious offence: State of New South Wales v Green (Final) [2013] NSWSC 1003 at [36]-[38].
(vi) conditions must not be unjustifiably onerous or punitive, “nor should they simply be an expression of State paternalism or imposed to meet what might be thought to be in the public interest in some generalised sense or because they might be a convenient or resource-efficient means of the Department exercising supervision”: State of New South Wales v Bugmy [2017] NSWSC 855.
(vii) conditions “must be understood as having substantial work to do; a mere speculative possibility that it could be useful will not suffice”: State of New South Wales v Ley Thomas Baker (No 2) at [36].
(vii) to ensure a balance between the community interests and personal liberty, the Court should impose conditions that are the least intrusive possible (Lynn v State of New South Wales at [129]-[131].”

It is important to note that while the paramount consideration of the Act is to ensure the protection of the community. The Act also encourages the successful rehabilitation of an offender. Any conditions attaching to an order ought to specifically address issues relevant to currently identified risk factors in relation to future offending. Accordingly, conditions must not be fashioned that are unjustifiably onerous or simply punitive: see State of New South Wales v Green (Final) [2013] NSWSC 1003 at [36]-[38]; State of New South Wales v Bugmy [2017] NSWSC 855 at [89].
It is a legitimate concern to see an offender’s progress “recognised, encouraged, and not stunted”: see State of New South Wales v Nikua (Final) [2021] NSWSC 1240 at [90] (Dhanji J). Having noted all of the above matters, in Devaney, Dhanji J at [93], further affirmed that:

“As has been said many times, the protection of the community is enhanced by the successful rehabilitation of offenders. In this regard, for a person in the position of the defendant, the introduction of more stringent conditions than necessary or those currently in place may be discouraging and resultingly, impede his rehabilitation.”

I now turn to consider the specific conditions to be imposed. In the course of the proceedings, Mr Sheehan and Ms Grabham (Community Corrections) were cross-examined.
Mr Sheehan is aware that a significant issue for the defendant is his relationship with Rebecca Norris, and in particular his frustration at not being able to associate with her. That relationship is said to be a protective factor. The risk identified is in relation to the children of Rebecca Norris, particularly having regard to the escalation of risk demonstrated by the defendant’s attention towards Ms Norris’s teenage daughter. Mr Sheehan stated that in his opinion there is no impediment to the defendant having immediate contact with his partner. The concern relates to contact with her children.
Ms Grabham was also cross-examined. She has had some contact with the defendant, albeit only once face-to-face. Ms Grabham also confirmed the defendant’s desire to have contact with his partner and that the non-association direction has been the source of frustration on his part. It was conceded that his frustrations may be counter-productive to his rehabilitation.
A “relationship integration plan” is being considered, although it is uncertain at this stage as to when that plan will commence. The proposal is that there be a staged plan with initial contact being by telephone only.
I proceed upon the basis of the power conferred on a DSO is exercised reasonably and in good faith: State of New South Wales v Burchell (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 1191 at [76]; State of New South Wales v Cannon [2022] NSWSC 1622 at [58]; State of New South Wales v Bieber (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 104.
In respect of condition 19, there are competing considerations which must be addressed. I bear in mind that the paramount consideration is the safety of the community and the safety, in particular, of children.
On the one hand, a condition that the defendant must not associate with people that a DSO tells him not to, confers a total discretion on a DSO with respect to the defendant’s capacity to associate with his partner. On the other hand, the non-association condition that has been in place for some time has been the source of frustration for the defendant which is counter-productive to his rehabilitation. The relationship with Rebecca Norris is said to be a protective factor. While some steps have been taken to consider a “relationship integration plan”, the evidence about when such a plan would commence and the details of the plan, are vague at this stage.
The defendant has been successful in arranging his own accommodation and employment. There are a number of conditions that will attach to the ESO which serves to protect the community and in particular, the children of Rebecca Norris. For example, the defendant must not approach or have contact with anyone who he knows and reasonably believes is under the age of 18, other than incidental contact in a public place with a person in the course of that person’s duties, unless a DSO tells him he can, and he is with someone who has been approved in writing by a DSO for that purpose.
The defendant must not go to a place if a DSO tells him he cannot go there. The defendant will still be subject to a direction, if a DSO sees fit, that he not attend the home of Rebecca Norris, thereby avoiding any contact with her children. The defendant will be subject to a condition that he does not go to any residences where he knows that persons under 18 ordinarily reside, without the approval of a DSO.
The defendant is subject to electronic monitoring and his electronic devices can be examined. The details of his communication devices and data storage devices must be provided to a DSO and any change to that inventory notified immediately.
Several onerous conditions exist which serve the paramount purpose of the safety of the community. In light of the fact that his relationship with Rebecca Norris is a protective factor, continuing non-association with her will only serve to increase the defendant’s frustration and sense of injustice, which may compromise his rehabilitation.
I am persuaded that condition 19 should be amended so as to read:

“The defendant must not associate with people that a DSO tells him not to other than Rebecca Norris”.

I am not, however, persuaded that condition 5 should be amended as proposed by the defendant. The proposed amendment is not sufficient because it does not allow a DSO to impose scheduling in response to, or to prevent, an escalation in the defendant’s risk. I prefer the alternative proposed by the plaintiff, which reads:

“If the defendant breaches a condition of this ESO or commits a criminal offence, or if his DSO considers that it is reasonably necessary to respond to or prevent an increase in the defendant’s risk of committing a serious offence, then at the discretion of the DSO or supervisor, the defendant may be required to provide a weekly plan (called a ‘schedule of movements’) to a DSO.”

Accordingly, I make the following orders.

Revoke the current interim supervision order;

Pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of two years commencing on 17 April 2023;

Pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), direct that the defendant, for the period of the extended supervision order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to the orders made; and

Access to the Court’s file is only permitted to a non-party with the leave of a judge of this Court, and with prior notice to the parties so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in respect of the application for access.

SCHEDULE A

Terms

In these conditions:

“Associate” includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or to communicate by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication).

“CSNSW” means Corrective Services NSW.

“Commissioner” means Commissioner for Corrective Services

“Defendant” means Ian James Hudson, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.

“DSO” means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order.

“Electronic Identity” means each of the following:

(a) an email address,

(b) a user name or other identity allowing access to an instant messaging service,

(c) a user name or other identity allowing access to a chat room or social media on the internet,

(d) any other user name or other identity allowing access to the internet or an electronic communication service.

“Material” includes:

1.       any written or printed material;
2.       any picture, painting or drawing;
3.       any carving, sculpture, statue or figure;
4.       any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced;
5.       any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and
6.       any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced.

“NSWPF” means NSW Police Force.

“Search” includes:

1. A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant’s possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person’s body; and
2. A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant’s clothed body is touched.

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

Monitoring and Reporting

1. The defendant must submit to the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.

2. Where a direction may conveniently be given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.

3. The defendant must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going, who he is with, what he is doing and the nature of his associations.

Electronic Monitoring

4. The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO or any other person supervising him.

Schedule of Movements

5. If the defendant breaches a condition of this ESO or commits a criminal offence, or if his DSO considers that it is reasonably necessary to respond to or prevent an increase in the defendant’s risk of committing a serious offence, then at the discretion of the DSO or supervisor, the defendant may be required to provide a weekly plan (called a ’schedule of movements') to a DSO.

Part B: Accommodation

6. The defendant must live at an address approved by a DSO (the "approved address").

7. The defendant must allow a DSO or any other person supervising him to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.

8. The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address without the approval of a DSO.

9. The defendant must not permit any person to enter and remain, or to stay overnight, at his approved address, without the prior approval of a DSO. For the purpose of this condition, a DSO may give pre-approval from time to time of a list of "approved visitors" who may enter and remain at the defendant's approved address without a requirement for him to notify a DSO upon each occasion of that person entering and remaining at his approved address. The defendant must give a DSO a minimum of 48 hours' notice to seek approval for a new visitor to be considered for the "approved visitors" list.

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

10. The defendant must not stay outside of or leave New South Wales without the approval of CSNSW.

11. The defendant must surrender any passports held by the defendant to the Commissioner.

12. The defendant must not go to a place if a DSO tells him he cannot go there.

13. The defendant must not go to any residences where the defendant knows that persons under 18 ordinarily reside, without prior approval of a DSO.

Part D: Employment, finance and education

14. The defendant must not start any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of his DSO.

15. The defendant must provide any information relating to his financial affairs, including income and expenditure, if directed by a DSO.

Part E: Drugs

16. The defendant must not possess or use illegal drugs, and he must not possess or use prescription medication other than as prescribed.

17. The defendant must submit to testing for drugs as directed by a DSO.

Part F: Non-association

Association with Children

18. The defendant must not approach or have contact with anyone who he knows or reasonably believes is under the age of 18, other than incidental contact in a public place with a person in the course of that person's duty, unless a DSO tells him he can, and he is with someone who has been approved in writing by a DSO for the purpose of this condition.

Associations with Others (not children)

19. The defendant must not associate with people that a DSO tells him not to other than Rebecca Norris.

20. The defendant must not knowingly associate with any people who are consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs.

21. If the defendant starts a new intimate/romantic or sexual relationship with a woman who is the parent or guardian or has care and control of a child under the age of 18 years, he must notify the DSO of that relationship as soon as possible. The DSO may want to tell the person about the defendant’s criminal history and the defendant must permit that disclosure.

22. The defendant must obtain permission from a DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation, including any internet or mobile based social networking service.

Part G: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

23. The defendant must give a DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers. This includes the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user-names and relevant passwords and codes, used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connection, as directed.

24. The defendant must not use any coded or encrypted messaging application or service.

25. The defendant must provide any code or encryption for any electronic data or any electronic communication if discovered on the defendant’s electronic devices or accounts as a result of a search or a remote inspection.

26. If a DSO suspects on reasonable grounds that the defendant may be breaching one of the conditions of this order, a DSO (or another person at the request of a DSO) may remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including the defendant's email addresses, in monitoring compliance with this order.

27. The defendant must obey any reasonable directions by a DSO about the use of phones, tablet devices, data storage devices, computers and other devices, including any reasonable directions relating to his access to the internet.

28. The defendant must allow his telephone and/or internet service provider to share information about his accounts with a DSO.

29. The defendant must provide a list of communication devices and data storage devices in the defendant's possession and advise a DSO of any change to the inventory immediately.

Part H: Search and seizure

30. If a DSO forms a reasonable suspicion that a search is required, either to monitor the defendant’s compliance with this Order, or for the safety and welfare of any other person, or because a DSO suspects the defendant of having engaged in behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of committing a serious offence, the defendant must submit to the search of any item or place in his possession or under his control, including his residence, any vehicle in which he is traveling or which is under his effective control, or any storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility, and the seizure of any items object located during the search.

31. The defendant must submit to the search of any computer, electronic or communication device in his possession or under his control and to the seizure of such devices.

Part I: Personal details and appearance

32. The defendant must not change his name from "Ian James Hudson" or use any other name without the approval of a DSO.

33. The defendant must not use any alias, log-in name, or a name other than "Ian James Hudson" or use any email address other than those known to a DSO under condition 23 above, on any internet site (including social networking sites), any online communication applications or any third-party sites or applications that requires the user to have a user identification name or log-in email.

34. The defendant must not significantly change his appearance without the approval of a DSO.

35. The defendant must let CSNSW photograph him when reasonably requested to do so for the purposes of CSNSW maintaining an accurate image of the defendant's current appearance.

36. If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide a DSO with such details.

Part J: Medical intervention and treatment

37. The defendant must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults.

38. The defendant must attend all psychological and psychiatric assessments, therapy, support and treatment that a DSO tells him to attend.

39. The defendant must agree to his healthcare practitioners sharing information including reports on his progress and information he has told them with each other and with a DSO.

40. The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO and CSNSW.

********

Schedule A_2023_04_17_12_32_24_945 (122968, pdf)

Decision last updated: 07 April 2025

Medium Neutral Citation:	State of New South Wales v Hudson (Final) [2023] NSWSC 374
Hearing dates:	6 April 2023
Date of orders:	17 April 2023
Decision date:	17 April 2023
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Yehia J
Decision:	(1) Revoke the current interim supervision order (2) Pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of two years commencing on 17 April 2023 (3) Pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), direct that the defendant, for the period of the extended supervision order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to the orders made (4) Access to the Court’s file is only permitted to a non-party with the leave of a judge of this Court, and with prior notice to the parties so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in respect of the application for access
Catchwords:	HIGH RISK OFFENDER — Extended Supervision Order — Final hearing — No opposition to order being made — Disagreements as to the form of two conditions — Order made
Legislation Cited:	Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) ss 3, 3(1), 3(2), 4A, 5B, 5B(a), 5B(d), 5D, 5I, 7(4), 9, 9(1), 9(1)(a), 9(2), 9(3), 9(3), 9(3)(b), 9(3)(d1), 9(3)(e), 9(3)(e2), 9(3)(f), 9(3)(h), 9(3)(h1), 10A, 10C(1A) 11, 11(1), 11(2)
Cases Cited:	Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374 Kamm v New South Wales (No 4) (2017) 95 NSWLR 179; [2017] NSWCA 189 Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57 New South Wales v Ibrahim (Final) [2021] NSWSC 793 State of New South Wales v Bieber (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 104 State of New South Wales v Bugmy [2017] NSWSC 855 State of New South Wales v Burchell (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 1191 State of New South Wales v Cannon [2022] NSWSC 1622 State of New South Wales v Chaplin [2019] NSWSC 471 State of New South Wales v Devaney(Final) [2022] NSWSC 60 State of New South Wales v Green (Final) [2013] NSWSC 1003 State of New South Wales v Holschier (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 341 State of New South Wales v Holschier (No. 2) [2018] NSWSC 1921 State of New South Wales v Hudson (No 2) (Preliminary) [2022] NSWSC 1655 State of New South Wales v Hudson (Preliminary) [2019] NSWSC 194 State of New South Wales v Hudson [2019] NSWSC 1761 State of New South Wales v Kamm (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1 State of New South Wales v Loto [2018] NSWSC 1522 State of New South Wales v Nikua (Final) [2021] NSWSC 1240 State of New South Wales v Pacey [2015] NSWSC 1983 State of New South Wales v Simcock(Final) [2016] NSWSC 1805 State of New South Wales v Wilkinson (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 1813 State of NSW v Hudson [2019] NSWSC 1761 Winters v Attorney General of New South Wales (2008) 182 A Crim R 107; [2008] NSWCA 33
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	State of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Ian James Hudson (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: R McEwen (Plaintiff) K Averre (Defendant) Solicitors: Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff) Hugo Law Group (Defendant)
File Number(s):	2022/305828
Publication restriction:	Nil