State of New South Wales v Harrison

[2009] NSWSC 198

CITATION:	State of New South Wales v Harrison [2009] NSWSC 198
HEARING DATE(S):	16 February 2009
JUDGMENT DATE :	24 February 2009
JUDGMENT OF:	Fullerton J
DECISION:	I order that the extended supervision order made by me on 26 November 2008 pursuant to s 17(a)(i) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act be extended for a period of 4 years and 9 months from 24 February 2009.
CATCHWORDS:	SERIOUS SEX OFFENDER - extended supervision order
LEGISLATION CITED:	Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006
CASES CITED:	State of New South Wales v Harrison [2008] NSWSC 1306 State of New South Wales v Tillman, 11241/08, Hoeben J, 11 April 2008
PARTIES:	State of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Graham Loughlan Harrison (Defendant)
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 2008/15357
COUNSEL:	P Menzies QC / D Kell (Plaintiff) P Strickland SC / R Mathur (Defendant)
SOLICITORS:	Crown Solicitor's Office (Plaintiff) Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales (Defendant)

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION

FULLERTON J

24 FEBRUARY 2009

2008/15357 THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES v
GRAHAM LOUGHLAN HARRISON

JUDGMENT

1 HER HONOUR: On 26 November 2008 I made orders providing for the defendant’s extended supervision pursuant to s 17(4) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 (“the Act”) under specified conditions.

2 On 9 December 2008 I published reasons for coming to the concluded view that despite being satisfied of the high probability that the defendant was likely to commit a further serious sex offence his continued detention could not be justified and an extended supervision order should issue (Stateof New South Wales v Harrison [2008] NSWSC 1306).

3 The order was expressed to be for “an initial period” of three months to allow for an assessment to be made of the defendant’s suitability as a recipient of anti-libidinal hormonal treatment and to permit that assessment to be undertaken in the community under supervision before considering what further conditions would be imposed and the ultimate length of the extended supervision order.

4 With that in mind on 21 January 2009 I ordered that Dr Ellis and Dr Roberts, two court appointed psychiatrists who had given evidence at the earlier hearing, conduct further and separate examinations of the defendant for the purposes of the further conduct of the proceedings. On that date the matter was listed before me for further hearing on 16 February 2009 since the orders I made on 26 November 2008 were due to expire on 25 February 2009.

5 On 16 February 2009, by notice of motion filed instanter, the plaintiff sought an order that the extended supervision order made on 26 November 2008 be varied by extending its term for a further period of 5 years pursuant to s 13(1) of the Act. The plaintiff also sought an order directing the defendant to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to the notice of motion for the duration of the order as extended.

6 The plaintiff tendered the following evidence in support of the motion:

NO.	DOCUMENT	DATE
1	Notice of Motion	11 Feb 2009
2	Letter from Marcelo Rodriguez (Justice Health) to Crown Solicitor’s Office	21 Jan 2009
3	Report of Dr CP White (Endocrinologist) (produced by Justice Health on 6.02.09 pursuant to s 25 order)	21 Jan 2009
4	Joint report of Marcelo Rodriguez and Dr Ian Korbel (Justice Health)	27 Jan 2009
5	Letter to Justice Health from Crown Solicitor’s Office	28 Jan 2009
6	Progress report by Darelle Williams (CCG)	28 Jan 2009
7	Report of Dr Ian Korbel (Justice Health)	3 Feb 2009
8	Letter of instructions to Dr Samson Roberts	5 Feb 2009
9	Letter of instructions to Dr Andrew Ellis	5 Feb 2009
10	Supplementary report of Dr Samson Roberts	9 Feb 2009
11	Supplementary report of Dr Andrew Ellis	10 Feb 2009
12	Letter to Dr White from Crown Solicitor’s Office	10 Feb 2009
13	Documents provided by Mr Harrison to Dr Roberts	various
14	Further documents produced by Justice Health pursuant to s 25 order	various
15	OIMS case note entries produced by Department of Corrective Services pursuant to s 25 order	31 Oct 2008 to 9 Feb 2009

Each of Drs Korbel, Roberts and Ellis gave evidence concurrently and were cross-examined.

7 The defendant did not resist an extension of the term of the extended supervision order per se, or the imposition of conditions to which he would be subject for its duration. He did however seek the imposition of a term of significantly less duration than that proposed by the plaintiff and resisted the imposition of some of the conditions sought by the plaintiff in their entirety, and others in part, for reasons which were addressed by him in an affidavit tendered in the proceedings. He was not cross-examined.

8 In the course of the hearing some of the issues in dispute between the parties were resolved and those that remained in dispute crystallised. I invited the parties to forward by email a document that reflected their settled positions in both respects. The orders that I have made include both the agreed conditions and those that have required adjudication, including the term of the extended supervision order.

The issue of jurisdiction

9 The defendant sought to persuade me that the jurisdiction for extending the supervision order did not vest by operation of s 13(1) of the Act but by the operation of s 6 and s 10 of the Act and that the proceedings brought by notice of motion were incompetent for that reason. In effect, so it was submitted, the order made by me on 26 November 2008 was a final order expiring on 25 February 2009. The defendant submitted that in these circumstances it is not open to the plaintiff seek a variation of that order pursuant to s 13(1) and, if the plaintiff seeks a further term of supervision, a fresh application for an extended supervision order must be accompanied by the filing of a summons and supporting evidence in accordance with the regime provided for in s 6 of the Act with a view to persuading the Court of the probability that the defendant is likely to commit a further serious sex offence as provided for in s 9(2) of the Act. It was common ground that the plaintiff is not prohibited from making an application for a second or subsequent extended supervision order given the express terms of s 10(3).

10 Section 13, which is found within Part 2 of the Act and which deals expressly with extended supervision orders, provides as follows:

(1) The Supreme Court may at any time vary or revoke an extended supervision order or interim supervision order on the application of the State of New South Wales or the offender. (emphasis added)
(2) For the purpose of ascertaining whether to make such an application in relation to an extended supervision order, the Commissioner of Corrective Services must provide the Attorney General with a report on the offender at intervals of not more than 12 months.

11 The defendant submitted that the section ought not be construed to permit an “extension” of the term of an order for extended supervision under the auspices of a power to “vary” an order so as to protect against the risk that s 13 may be utilised by the plaintiff to extend a supervision order on multiple occasions (albeit that no single order can exceed the statutory maximum of 5 years as provided for in s 10(1)(b)) without the protections that are afforded an offender by the requirement that there be strict adherence to the statutory regime provided for in s 9 of the Act before orders for extended supervision can issue. The defendant also submitted that were it the intention of the legislature to permit the plaintiff to seek an extension of the term of an order for extended supervision during its currency by the simple expedient of filing a notice of motion, then an express power to “extend” an existing order, in addition to the power to “vary” an order, would have been provided for in the section. In essence the defendant submitted that the power provided for in s 13 should be limited to those situations where either the offender or the Attorney General seeks to vary a condition to which an offender is subject and for no other purpose.

12 The plaintiff submitted that having regard to the operation of the Act as a whole the Court has power under s 13 to make orders of the kind sought by the notice of motion and that there is no warrant for confining the operation of section in the way contended for by the defendant. In support of that interpretation my attention was drawn to s 19 of the Act which is in identical terms to s 13 save only for the fact that it deals with continuing detention orders. Since the Act does not allow for conditions to be imposed under a continuing detention order, the only feature of a continuing detention order susceptible to variation under s 19 is the term of the order. Section 19 has been invoked for precisely that purpose (see State of New South Wales v Tillman, 11241/08, Hoeben J, 11 April 2008). I regard that interpretation and analysis as persuasive. The defendant advanced no submission to meet it.

13 The fact that the Attorney General may bring fresh proceedings seeking a further or additional extended supervision order of up to 5 years duration where an existing supervision order is due to expire as provided for in s 6(1)(b) of the Act does not, in my view, detract from the power provided for in s 13 to vary an existing extended supervision order by extending its term at any time during its currency so ever long as the term of the order as extended does not exceed 5 years. In the course of the argument the plaintiff acknowledged that this is a necessary limitation on the power under s 13 to extend the supervision order and, accordingly, sought and was granted leave to amend the notice of motion to seek a variation of the existing term of 3 months by a period of 4 years and 9 months in substitution for a term of 5 years as the notice of motion was originally framed. There was no objection to leave being granted.

The term of the extended supervision order and the conditions to which the defendant is to be subject

14 In fixing the term of the order for extended supervision and the formulation of the conditions by which the defendant will be bound during its currency I have been assisted by the insights and expertise of each of the three psychiatrists who have furnished reports and given evidence.

15 After conducting an investigation into the defendant’s suitability as a candidate for anti-libidinal hormonal treatment the doctors agreed that its use is contraindicated primarily as a result of the defendant presenting with osteopenia, a condition where the density of the bone is compromised. Although the defendant‘s current condition is associated with a low risk of fracture, the use of the medication may increase the risk of bone fracture in the future such as to result in the medication being contraindicated at this time. Dr Ellis was of the view however that the osteopenia may be a result of the extended period the defendant has spent in prison where access to a balanced diet and regular exercise may have been compromised and that vitamin and mineral supplementation may improve his bone density and leave the way clear for hormonal treatment in the future. In addition, although it would seem of less significance, the defendant’s impotence and weight gain were also regarded as relative contraindications for treatment with an anti-libidinal hormonal treatment. In the result the doctors were of the shared view that further investigation by an endocrinologist should be undertaken before anti-libidinal treatment is further considered.

16 The defendant is currently prescribed Sertraline by Dr Korbel. Sertraline is a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SRRI). He has also been prescribed Cialis, a medication for erectile dysfunction, by his private general practitioner. The use of Sertraline (conventionally prescribed as an anti-depressant), or the use of SSRIs generally to address paraphiliac disorders, is relatively new. While preliminary clinical trial data indicates that SSRIs reduce deviant sexual fantasy arousal and associated behaviours there are no current studies establishing any link between the prescription of SSRIs and reduced rates of recidivism. Dr Roberts was of the view however that since there is evidence to support use of the medication in the treatment of paraphilia and the suppression of other deviant sexual desires the absence of a link of that kind was not a prohibiting factor. That said, since the effect of Sertraline is idiosyncratic, in the sense that there can be no accurate prediction as to whether it will cause either a desired effect or side effects, continued supervision of the defendant and his response to the proposed pharmaceutical regime is essential. Dr Roberts did emphasise that the use of SSRIs for the reduction of sexual function would be considered “an off label use” such that the pharmaceutical companies that produce the drug would not sanction it for that use. As a consequence, it is not supported under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.

17 The doctors emphasised that given the chronicity of the defendant’s disorder Sertraline was not the preferred treatment. Dr Ellis emphasised the advantage of treatment by anti-libidinal hormonal medication, where it is not contraindicated, in that observational studies conducted over an extended period bear out a relationship between the use of the drug and a reduction in the rates of recidivism in serious sex offenders. In addition, the use of hormonal medication is more reliably monitored as compared with SSRIs since compliance (and the effectiveness of the hormonal medication in reducing deviant sexual arousal) can be measured by the extent to which testosterone levels are reduced on serum testing. By contrast, monitoring compliance with a regime of treatment by SSRIs is neither practical or affordable and the measurement of the drug’s efficacy in suppressing sexual desire depends largely on self report.

18 The doctors were asked to consider whether an SSRI has any work to do in circumstances where the subject denies deviant sexual fantasy - the position strenuously advocated by the defendant. Dr Ellis was of the view that treatment by SSRIs may prevent the occurrence of deviant sexual fantasies even in a person who falsely denies experiencing them. On the other hand, where the subject’s sexual fantasies are unconscious, or not necessarily accessible to a rational conscious awareness, the drug may have a role to play in suppressing the emergence of sexual fantasies at a conscious and rational level and be effective in this way.

19 The doctors were of the shared view that the defendant should remain under continued psychiatric observation and treatment and that his current pharmaceutical regime be the subject of ongoing monitoring and adjustment, particularly if there is an admitted or observed emergence of deviant sexual fantasies, urges or behaviour and generally be maintained to minimise the risk of him committing a serious sex offence, a risk which remains high. It was also the recommendation of the psychiatrists that any medication for erectile dysfunction be discontinued at this time in order that the cause of his dysfunction, whether it be psychological or physiological, be investigated. While there was no reason to suppose that the use of Cialis would decrease the effectiveness of the Sertraline it was the shared view of the experts that further investigation was called for.

20 It was also the view of the doctors that the defendant not engage with multiple treatment providers, such as private psychiatrists, psychologists or relationship counsellors as there is serious risk, in the short term at least, that fragmentation of his therapy will worsen his underlying disordered personality structure. There is no need for me to refer to the evidence bearing upon that issue in detail since the defendant ultimately consented to a condition that he not seek other psychological or psychiatric treatment and advice otherwise than by persons approved by the treating psychiatrist appointed by Justice Health.

21 The defendant sought to persuade me that he should not be the subject of extended supervision for a period in excess of 2 years. It was submitted on his behalf that a further term of supervision of 4 years and 9 months, subject to the same conditions to which he has been subject over the last 3 months, involved an not only an unwarranted curtailment of his liberty but had the potential to hinder his adaptation to community life and his integration into the community. It was also submitted that if at some stage in the course of 2 years of supervision the plaintiff came to the view that the defendant’s rehabilitation was not progressing satisfactorily, or that the risk of his reoffending remained high despite treatment of the kind envisaged by the conditions he has expressly consented to, a fresh application for an extended supervision order could be made. This approach, so it was argued, ensured a proper balance between the safety and protection of the community and the rehabilitation of the defendant as a serious sex offender as the dual statutory objects provide for in s 3 of the Act.

22 The plaintiff acknowledged that the defendant has strictly complied with the conditions imposed by me in November 2008. However, having regard to the unanimous views of the doctors that the ongoing monitoring and management of the defendant’s disorder is essential given the chronic and relapsing nature of his paraphilia and the associated high risk of him reoffending, the plaintiff submitted an extension of the initial term of 3 months by a further 4 years and 9 months is appropriate.

23 The defendant did not seek to persuade me that his condition and the risk of his reoffending is otherwise than as described by the doctors. Similarly, he did not seek to persuade me that I should come to a view different from the views I expressed at [53] and [61] of my earlier judgment to the effect that at that time, in light of all the available evidence, he lacked insight into the sexual dimension of his offending. I note that while he denied any ongoing deviant fantasies when examined by Dr Ellis for the purpose of these proceedings, Dr Ellis noted that he gave variable responses as to whether he had experienced deviant sexual arousal in the past. In addition, and despite telling Dr Ellis with regard to medication he is “willing to do anything”, I note that he has made it plain to Dr Korbel that he would not even consider taking medication were it not for the compulsion of an order of this Court.

24 While I accept that the defendant is committed to his resolve not to reoffend I am not confident that he appreciates with any depth of understanding or acceptance the nature of his illness and the risks that it poses for others. For this reason and giving appropriate weight to his compliance with the supervision order to date I am not satisfied that at this time it should be for any term other than that for which the plaintiff contends.

25 After the parties spent some time discussing the reformulation of some the conditions the subject of contest, the defendant expressly consented to conditions 13 through to 18 while others remained in dispute

The consumption of alcohol

26 The defendant submitted that there ought be no prohibition or limitation on his entering licensed premises or consuming alcohol. It was submitted that he ought to be able to freely associate in hotels, bars, licensed clubs, racecourses and other premises where alcohol is sold or consumed and, at least implicitly, to do so irrespective of the age of the patrons or the hours of the operation. Consistent with his wishes in that regard he did not consent to a prohibition on his possession or consumption of alcohol although he did consent to an order that he not possess or consume any illicit drug.

27 In resolving the dispute as to the defendant’s consumption of alcohol I gained some assistance from the views of the doctors, given that they were asked to offer an opinion whether, having regard to the defendant’s current pharmacological, psychological and psychiatric treatment, alcohol is contraindicated. Dr Ellis was of the view that the general literature implicates alcohol as a dynamic risk factor in reoffending by serious sex offenders since a side effect of the consumption of alcohol is an increased libido, heightened levels of aggression and is generally disinhibiting in effect. On the other hand, as Dr Ellis pointed out, a social and responsible use of alcohol may assist a person in the defendant’s position to integrate into the community. He was of the firm view that as a result of the defendant’s lengthy incarceration the question as to whether he in fact uses alcohol socially and responsibly remains to be tested. Dr Ellis was of the view that if the defendant is permitted to consume alcohol it should be closely monitored by a supervising psychiatrist and progressively introduced as a means of appropriate social integration once the defendant demonstrates a level of social stability and appropriate interaction in a community setting.

28 The conditions on the defendant’s consumption of alcohol that I have decided ought to be imposed reflect the doctor’s legitimate concerns, a concern which I share.

The provision of a timetable of proposed movements and wearing of electronic monitoring equipment

29 The defendant submitted that the conditions imposed by me on 26 November 2008, requiring him to inform the departmental supervising officer of his movements in advance and on a weekly basis (or as otherwise directed by the officer) by providing a schedule in writing which he must not depart from without prior approval, to comply with a curfew and to wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by the departmental supervising officer, ought be deleted. Despite the plaintiff offering an amelioration of all three conditions by requiring the provision of a written schedule only if directed by a departmental officer, by reappointing the curfew to between 10pm and 6am unless prior approval has been given to extend the hours and reviewing the need for the continued use of the monitoring equipment after 3 months from the date of these orders, the compromise was rejected.

30 The conditions I have imposed are in the amended form proposed by the plaintiff. I am satisfied that they both recognise the defendant’s compliance with the orders to date and the potential for the conditions to become unduly onerous and invasive over the long term, whilst at the same time ensuring that supervision of the defendant by a close monitoring of his movements can be and will be maintained at the discretion of the departmental supervising officer so as to minimise the risk of his reoffending thereby ensuring the protection of the community.

Association condition

31 The defendant submitted that conditions prohibiting him from “associating” with persons specified by the departmental supervising officer or “associating” with females under the age of 18 should be amended so as to prohibit “contact” of the specified kind. It was argued that there was a vagueness that attends a prohibition on association that may result in the defendant unwittingly breaching the orders. I am confident that the defendant’s legal advisers and/or the departmental supervising officer will make plain what is comprehended by the concept of a prohibition on association to guard against any risk of that kind.

32 Accordingly the orders I propose are as follows:

In the matter of the State of New South Wales v Graham Loughlan Harrison pursuant to s 13 of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 (“the Act”) I order that the extended supervision order made by me on 26 November 2008 pursuant to s 17(a)(i) of the Act be extended for a period of 4 years and 9 months from 24 February 2009 and, pursuant to s 17(5) and s 11, I direct that the defendant comply with the following conditions:

1. The defendant must accept the supervision of the Probation and Parole Service (which includes the Community Compliance Group (“CCG”)) for the duration of the order.

2. The defendant must report personally once a week to the responsible Departmental supervising officer or otherwise as directed by that officer.

3. The defendant must comply with any reasonable direction given by the Departmental supervising officer or any other Departmental officer (including from the CCG or Probation and Parole) who may from time to time be involved in supervision of the defendant.

4. The defendant must be of good behaviour and must not, for the duration of the order, commit any offence.

5. If directed by the Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must inform the Departmental supervising officer of his movements 48 hours in advance by providing a schedule in writing (or as otherwise directed by the Departmental supervising officer).

6. The defendant must accept visits at his approved accommodation, including visits without prior notice, by the Departmental supervising officer or any other Departmental officer.

7. The defendant must not undertake employment other than that which has been approved by the Departmental supervising officer.

8. The defendant must not leave the State of New South Wales without the written permission of the Departmental supervising officer.

9. The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment if and as directed by the Departmental supervising officer and comply with all instructions given by a Corrective Services Officer in relation to the operation of such equipment, and must not tamper with or remove such equipment. At the expiration of 3 months from 25 February 2009 the continued need for the defendant to wear the electronic monitoring equipment will be reviewed by the Departmental supervising officer.

10. The defendant must not enter into any “exclusion zone” designated for the purpose of the operation of electronic monitoring equipment or as may be otherwise designated by the Departmental supervising officer.

11. For the duration of the order the defendant must reside at accommodation approved in advance by the Departmental supervising officer.

12. If and as directed by the Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must be at his approved address between 10pm and 6am (or at such other period as may be specified by the Departmental supervising officer) unless his presence at another place during those hours has been approved in advance by the Departmental supervising officer.

13. The defendant must accept such intervention by psychologists or psychiatrists as may be offered to, or arranged for, him by the Department or as approved by the Department from time to time, including attendance at, and engagement in, community maintenance programs for sex offenders.

14. The defendant must accept a comprehensive assessment (and further assessments from time to time) including medical examinations, pathological investigations, psychometric testing and radiological imaging to be conducted by the Community Forensic Mental Health Service (CFMHS) or the Area Mental Health Service (AMHS) (or Justice Health), to determine whether he is suitable to receive anti-libidinal treatment and, in addition, to determine what other treatment is required, in light of the defendant’s potential for sexual reoffending.

15. The defendant must accept psychological and psychiatric treatment as may be provided by an AMHS (or CFMHS or Justice Health), including counselling, psychological therapy and any anti-psychotic or other psychiatric medication as indicated.

16. Without limiting (15) above, the defendant must accept such sex drive reduction medical treatment or any other therapy, if prescribed by a medical practitioner, as may be provided by Justice Health or any medical practitioner , and must not unreasonably refuse his consent to the administering of that prescribed drug or therapy.

16A. Without limiting (3) above, the defendant must comply with all reasonable directions required of him by the Departmental supervising officer or any other Departmental officer for the purpose of assisting such officer to be satisfied that the defendant has been and is compliant with the prescription to him of any medication and any other therapy.

16B. The defendant must not take any medication or substance which may affect any anti-libidinal medication (including SSRIs) being taken by the defendant unless the defendant’s Justice Health treating psychiatrist prescribes such medication.

16C. The defendant must not seek or obtain psychological or psychiatric treatment or advice from persons other than those approved by the defendant’s Justice Health treating psychiatrist.

17. The defendant must attend all appointments for medical and psychiatric consultations, psychological consultations, physical examinations, pathology testing, and medical imaging as may be directed by an AMHS, CFMHS or Justice Health.

18. The defendant must continue to engage a general practitioner and must continue to provide consent to the disclosure of confidential medical information as between the general practitioner and any treating psychologist and/or psychiatrist and/or other medical specialist and the Departmental supervising officer.

19. The defendant must disclose to his Departmental supervising officer the identity of any other medical or mental health practitioner that he consults.

20. Without limiting the preceding conditions, the defendant must participate in treatment and rehabilitation as directed by the Departmental supervising officer.

21. The defendant must waive the confidentiality of information disclosed by him to treating doctors and psychologists as between those practitioners themselves and with officers of the Department charged with the responsibility of monitoring the defendant’s compliance with the extended supervision order.

22. The defendant must consent to the Departmental supervising officer and other responsible officers (including officers from the CCG) accessing all relevant information regarding his progress whilst subject to supervision, which may include confidential medical information disclosed in the course of his treatment.

23. The defendant must agree to the sharing of all information between the Departmental supervising officer, the Department (including the CCG), Justice Health, the defendant’s general practitioner and any treating psychologist or psychiatrist.

24. The defendant agrees that, if the Departmental supervising officer considers it appropriate to do so, the Departmental supervising officer may provide to any prospective or actual employer of the defendant information relating to the defendant’s criminal history and may notify such prospective or actual employer that the defendant is subject to an extended supervision order and of the terms of this order. 25. (i) Unless otherwise approved by the Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must not possess or consume any alcohol (including any alcohol-based products such as methylated spirits);
(ii) The defendant must not abuse prescription medication or other forms of medication;
(iii) The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing as directed by the Departmental supervising officer;
(iv) The defendant must not possess or consume any illicit drug.


26. The defendant must not go to any licensed premises, excluding restaurants and cafes but including hotels, bars, licensed clubs and racecourses, without the prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer.

27. The defendant must not use a computer for the purpose of downloading or otherwise accessing pornography, including but not limited to bondage, gagging and ill-treatment of women and must not possess or obtain pornographic material (whether in paper or electronic form) from any other source.

28. Should the defendant propose to enter into a sexual relationship with another person, other than Ms Kim Cowley, he must notify the Departmental supervising officer at the earliest opportunity. The Departmental supervising officer may disclose the defendant’s offence history to such other person if the officer is satisfied that to do so is necessary or desirable in the interests of the safety of the other person.

29. Except with the permission of his Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must not associate (directly or indirectly, whether by telephone, by text messaging or by internet connection) with any females under the age of 18 years.

30. The defendant must not whilst travelling in any type of vehicle give a lift to a hitchhiker and otherwise must not invite any person previously not known to him to travel with him.

31. The defendant must not associate with any persons specified by the Departmental supervising officer.

32. The defendant must not engage or solicit any prostitute and must not enter into any area for the purpose of soliciting a prostitute.

33. The defendant must not change his name from Graham Loughlan Harrison, or use any other name, without the prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer.

34. The defendant must not, without the approval of the Departmental supervising officer, change his facial appearance (including facial hair) or the colour of his hair and must not alter the length of his hair to the extent that he cannot be easily recognised.

35. If the defendant’s proposed change of appearance is approved, he must allow himself to be photographed by or on behalf of the Departmental supervising officer.

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