State of New South Wales v Hardy

[2022] NSWSC 1724

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

State of New South Wales v Hardy [2022] NSWSC 1724

Hearing dates:

14 December 2022

Date of orders:

16 December 2022

Decision date:

16 December 2022

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

Campbell J

Decision:

See Judgment at [39].

Catchwords:

HIGH RISK OFFENDERS – extended supervision orders – application – relevance of conditions to risk

Legislation Cited:

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Part 5.3, s 100.1

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 31

Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), ss 36, 51F

Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW), ss 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 50

Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW), s 7

Cases Cited:

Hardy v State of New South Wales [2021] NSWCA 338

State of New South Wales v Hardy [2021] NSWSC 323

State of New South Wales v Hardy (Final) [2021] NSWSC 900

State of New South Wales v Mathers (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 473

Category:

Procedural rulings

Parties:

State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Christopher Bruce Hardy (Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
J Emmett SC with A Zheng for the Plaintiff
D McLure SC with J Wilcox for the Defendant

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors NSW (Plaintiff)
Ryan Payten Le (Defendant)

File Number(s):

2022/335955

Judgment

1. By summons filed on 9 November 2022, the State of New South Wales (“the State”) applies for what would be, if the application is successful, the third extended supervision order against the defendant under s 25 of the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW). (References to legislative provisions in this judgment are references to that Act unless otherwise specified).

2. The Extended Supervision Order (“ESO”) to which the defendant, Mr Hardy, is currently subject was imposed on 26 July 2021 for a period of 18 months by Johnson J: State of New South Wales v Hardy (Final) [2021] NSWSC 900 (“NSW v Hardy (Final)”); Hardy v State of New South Wales [2021] NSWCA 338. It expires on 27 January 2023.

3. By way of interim relief, the State seeks the imposition of an Interim Supervision Order (“ISO”) for a period of 28 days in accordance with the provisions of ss 27 and 28, the appointment by the Court of two qualified experts, being psychiatrists or registered psychologists to conduct separate examinations of Mr Hardy and furnish reports to the Court and an order directing Mr Hardy to attend those examinations. Those latter orders are sought under s 24(5).

4. This judgment follows the preliminary hearing into the State’s application which the Court is required to conduct in accordance with the provisions of s 24(4).

5. I have received the considerable assistance of written and oral submissions by Mr J Emmett SC and Ms Alice Zheng on behalf of the State and Mr D McLure SC and Mr J Wilcox on behalf of Mr Hardy. Without any intended disrespect to the careful arguments of counsel and because this will be the sixth judgment by the Court (including the Court of Appeal) dealing with Mr Hardy’s supervision under the Act and as there is no real dispute that the facts alleged in the supporting documentation relied upon by the State as referred to in s 23(3) would support the grant of the interim relief sought, I propose to deal with the matter relatively briefly.

Pre-conditions to interim relief

6. Under s 27, the court may make an ISO if two conditions are satisfied, namely:

1. that Mr Hardy’s current supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined; and

2. that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO.

Given that the current law term ends today, 16 December 2022, the new term does not commence until 30 January 2023 and Mr Hardy’s current supervision expires on 27 January 2023, as I have said, the first condition is satisfied.

7. The second condition is a reference to the pre-conditions specified in s 20 and the requirements of s 25. In their written submissions, Mr McLure and Mr Wilcox state (Working Folder (“WF”), Tab C [3]):

“[Mr Hardy] accepts for the purpose of the preliminary hearing that the statutory preconditions for the making of the interim orders are established, and, accordingly, if the Court is independently satisfied, it would be appropriate to grant the interim relief sought by [the State] – in other words, the appointment of experts and the making of an ISO for 28 days.”

Initially three conditions of supervision were in issue, but this has now been reduced to two.

8. It is well established that the jurisdiction exercised by the Court under the Act is “protective”, for this reason, the non-opposition of Mr Hardy notwithstanding, it is appropriate that the Court satisfy itself that the orders sought by the court should be made.

9. I am satisfied that the pre-conditions specified in s 20 (a) to (c) have been made out. There is no question that Mr Hardy is an offender under supervision under the existing ESO, or that the State’s application has been made in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of the Act. It is also the case that each of Button J, who made the first ESO (State of New South Wales v Mathers (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 473), Johnson J and the Court of Appeal held that Mr Hardy was a convicted NSW terrorism offender for the purpose of s 20(c)(iii) (see s 10(1)(c)(i)). Having regard to the provisions of s 50, my own view is that those earlier findings give rise to an issue estoppel in respect of that matter for the purpose of these proceedings. Lest I am wrong about that, I acknowledge the force of Mr McLure’s submission that given those earlier findings, the repetition of the same evidence and the supporting documentation would, if proved at the final hearing, not establish anything materially different.

10. The central pre-condition relates to unacceptable risk. The question is whether the matters alleged in the State’s supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the Court being satisfied to a high degree of probability that Mr Hardy poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under an ESO. Mr McLure accepts that the s 23(3)(b) risk assessment report dated 16 September 2022 of Ms Ahu Kocak, forensic psychologist, if accepted at the final hearing, is capable of discharging that high onus (WF tab E).

11. Mr Hardy declined to participate in an interview with Ms Kocak for the purpose of the preparation of her risk assessment report. Accordingly, she was restricted to a desktop review of Mr Hardy’s substantial file to make her assessment. She had met and assessed Mr Hardy in the past, but she stated, of course, that she was unable to give a personal account of Mr Hardy’s current clinical presentation and mental state. She relied upon the work of others in that regard. With these restrictions she applied the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment – 2R (“VERA – 2R”) using the available file information and assessed his overall risk profile for extremist violent offending/re-offending as being in the Low/Moderate range. She expressed her conclusions as follows (WFN p. 130 [106]):

“Mr Hardy continues to be compliant with all directions of his ESO and engages with his Community Corrections Officer. This engagement is limited however as he remains overtly unreceptive to interventions. His overall risk profile suggests he is currently at the Low/Moderate risk for violent extremist offending or activity. Mr Hardy’s highest intervention needs continue to be his personality and mental health vulnerabilities, his perceived grievances and sense of victimisation and inability to assess any genuine rejection of violent and extremist ideology.”

12. This aspect of the question of the sincerity or depth of Mr Hardy’s compliance with the conditions of the ESO and engagement with its therapeutic aspects is a central aspect of the State’s case. It may be said that this is likely to be a central issue should the matter proceed to a final hearing.

13. Despite having pleaded guilty to the index offending, Mr Hardy has virtually ever since protested his innocence, stating he pleaded guilty on legal advice and offering an account apparently consistent with his innocence to explain the forensic evidence against him. The index offending, as the judgments to which I have referred made clear, is a conviction for sending a document to the State member for Charlestown threatening death or grievous bodily harm contrary to s 31(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), two counts of possessing a prohibited weapon without permit contrary to s 7(1) of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW) and one count of possessing an unregistered firearm, a pistol, contrary to s 36(1) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW). Following his arrest and in the execution of a search warrant police seized a body of extremist literature related to right wing extremism associated with the Sovereign Citizens Movement and the home manufacture of explosives. An examination of his computer revealed a number of other internet searches relevant to those matters.

14. The threat to the Member of Parliament was in the following terms:

“To the Minister

You are in TREASON … you will be hung until you are dead.

No Mercy, no Prisoners

You are scum.”

The MP was not a Minister. The prohibited weapons were nun-chucks and a sling shot with ball bearing ammunition. The firearm was a replica pistol.

15. Mr Hardy’s bail was revoked, and he was committed to custody on remand on 19 September 2017 for failing to appear in accordance with his bail acknowledgment. He was sentenced for all this offending on 21 February 2018 by Magistrate Brennan sitting at the Newcastle Local Court. His Honour made the following remarks:

“So far as the pre-sentence report is concerned, it is a favourable one. I am surprised that they thought they did not need to supervise. I am not so sure that you are a low risk, only because of the oddness of these offences.

Again, it troubles me that the pre-sentence report talks about you not personally putting the envelopes under the door. I did not know whether that is a genuine thought on your part or whether you are just telling them a story, but I am dealing with you on the basis of the agreed facts, where your involvement appeared to be greater.”

He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest of which was in relation to the s 31(1) Crimes Act offence, being 16 months imprisonment from 19 September 2017 to 18 January 2019 with a non-parole period of 12 months expiring on 18 September 2018. However, the applicant was not released until the expiration of his sentence on 31 January 2019, his parole having been revoked. At the time of his release, he was subject to the first ISO imposed by Justice Button on 16 January 2019 and he has been under supervision under the Act ever since.

16. Prior to his release from custody, on 20 November 2018 Mr Hardy was charged with 12 offences of possessing digital blueprint for the manufacture of firearms contrary to s 51F(1) Firearms Act. This is why his parole was revoked. He pleaded guilty to these charges and on 11 December 2020 was sentenced in the Toronto Local Court to a term of 18 months imprisonment to be served by way of an Intensive Corrections Order.

17. It has been a feature of Mr Hardy’s presentation over the years that notwithstanding his pleas of guilty, as I have said, he has maintained his innocence and provided exculpatory accounts explaining his apparent involvement. These are matters which, it is apparent, were important to Johnson J’s conclusions: see NSW v Hardy (Final) [385], [392]. Part of the State’s case is that Mr Hardy’s mindset of denial extends to a denial that he experienced mental health problems when the index offending occurred in 2017. He continues to deny any mental health issues today notwithstanding the body of expert psychiatric opinion: see for example, supplementary report of Dr Christopher Bench dated 1 February 2021 (Exhibit WFN). Dr Bench was of the opinion that Mr Hardy was probably suffering a delusional disorder at the time of the index offending. He considered he probably had a vulnerable personality “such as a schizotypal personality disorder”.

18. It will be the State’s case at the final hearing that there has been no material change in Mr Hardy’s mindset, beliefs or presentations since the current ESO was imposed. It will submit that the allegations in its documentation demonstrate: a lack of insight; a lack of meaningful psychological engagement and progress; and a material set of fixed or fixated beliefs relevant to his risk of re-offending.

19. Mr Hardy will likely join issue with each of these allegations at the final hearing. But it is not my role to evaluate the issue or to attempt to predict the outcome now. My task is that fixed by the statute and in particular s 27(b). I remind myself that a serious terrorism offence for the purpose of s 20(d) means an offence against Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) for which the maximum penalty is seven or more years of imprisonment. As Basten JA pointed out in the Court of Appeal (at [8]) the definition of terrorist act in the Criminal Code s 100.1 is complex. In broad terms, sufficient for present purposes, a terrorist act is an action done with the intent of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause and with the intention of influencing government or intimidating the public or a section of the public. Relevant actions include those that cause death or serious harm to a person, endanger life or damage to property. There are other categories of action which do not fit within the risk scenario poatulated by Ms Kocak which relates most readily to a direct interpersonal threat toward a person against whom Mr Hardy harbours a grievance such as a public figure or law enforcement officers. The risk would be heightened if his personality vulnerability caused him to decompensate mentally to the point where his previous probable delusional disorder resurfaced.

20. Although there may be an air of artificiality surrounding this degree of specificity, it is important to bear in mind that at the final hearing the State will need to prove more than a low/moderate risk of “extremist violent offending”; it will need to prove to a high degree of probability of an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence most likely within the range of actions to which I have referred. This is not a foregone conclusion, but I repeat, this is not for me to say. It is also appropriate that I remind myself, as Mr McLure reminded me, that Johnson J said (at [405]):

“… I should emphasise that the Court is determining the present application on the evidence adduced at the hearing. The decision by the Court does not constitute a foundation for rolling ESOs to be made in the future with respect to the Defendant.” (Mr McLure’s emphasis).

This statement was endorsed by the Court of Appeal (at [71]).

21. For these reasons I am satisfied that the matters alleged in the State’s supporting documentation, would if proved at the final hearing, justify the finding to the requisite high degree of probability that Mr Hardy poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under an ESO.

Mandatory considerations

22. I have also had regard to the provisions of s 25 and borne in mind that the safety of the community is the paramount consideration. I have also made reference to the mandatory matters prescribed by s 25(3) to the extent to which that evidence is currently available. Certainly, I am satisfied that the State’s documentation referred to in s 23(3) addresses each of those matters with the exception, obviously because they are currently unavailable, of the reports of the court appointed experts. I have already referred to material relevant to paragraphs (b), (c), (h), (j) and (k) and I will not repeat those references.

23. From the Risk Management Report of Det. Snr. Constable Mathew Wise of 9 September 2022, part of the supporting documentation I am satisfied that there will be evidence that Mr Hardy can be reasonably and practicably managed in the community subject to appropriate conditions. This report also, in my judgment, indicates that evidence will be available at the final hearing which satisfies s 25(3)(e).

24. So far as s 25(3)(f) is concerned, I have received a PRAXIS discharge report in relation to Mr Hardy. On the State’s case, it is of concern that he discontinued his engagement with that service on the basis he would undertake private psychological counselling in the community. He has done so with a Mr Vincent Cook. However, recent evidence suggests, the State will argue at the final hearing, that he denies the need for ongoing treatment. So far as s 25(3)(g) is concerned, it is not suggested that its necessary that Mr Hardy be kept in custody and as I have said, the evidence indicates he can be managed in the community. Section 25(3)(h) is concerned with the likelihood that Mr Hardy will comply with the obligations of an ESO. This is likely to be, as I have indicated, one of the issues at the final hearing. There is no doubt that Mr Hardy has been punctilious in observing the letter of the ESO and its conditions. The evidence the State will lead at the final hearing questions his true commitment. And this will be a central factor upon which the State will rely seeking an extension of the ESO. The same observations can be made in relation to s 25(3)(i). So far as s 25(3)(j) is concerned, until the index offending the applicant had no record to speak of, but the index offending and the subsequent offending contrary to s 51F Firearms Act of themselves are capable of establishing a pattern of concern. So far as s 25(3)(l) is concerned, while Mr Hardy disavows any adherence to any particular belief that may be associated with terrorism, the State’s documentation contains evidence of earlier support and advocacy for the Sovereign Citizen Movement.

25. In my judgment the pre-conditions for making an ISO established by s 27 are satisfied in this case. To my mind there is no discretionary reason to refuse such an order.

Conditions

26. As I have said save for two matters the parties are agreed that the ISO should direct Mr Hardy to comply with the same regime of conditions he is currently under save as to two matters. Those two matters are condition 3 as it relates to the obligation to provide a schedule of movements, and condition 64 imposing obligations on Mr Hardy to comply with prescribed medical treatment in relation to his mental health.

27. A previous dispute concerning condition 66 allowing for the exchange of information between Mr Hardy’s supervisors and health professionals has been agreed. As I understand it, the agreement relates to restricting the matter to exchange of information involving mental health care practitioners.

Condition 3

28. The current condition 3 is in the following terms:

“The defendant must submit to the supervision and guidance of any enforcement officer responsible for the supervision of the offender for the time being and obey all reasonable directions of an enforcement officer (including in respect of providing a schedule of movements).”

The State presses the requirement for the provision of a schedule of movements and Mr Hardy opposes it. It is well to point out that condition 3 is in the term prescribed by s 29(1A) and is a mandatory condition, unless I order “differently”.

29. In support of maintaining the condition, the State has read the affidavit of DSC Wise sworn on 13 December 2022 to which I have had close regard. DSC Wise has emphasised that the provision of a schedule of movements assists community safety and supervision of the offender in a number of ways. First, it enables the relevant enforcement officer to assess any likely enhancement of risk involved in an offender’s movement in the community. Secondly, it facilitates spot checks on compliance. Thirdly, it enables an assessment of CCTV coverage to be made in advance which may facilitate obtaining relevant evidence. Fourthly, it engenders confidence that the whereabouts of an offender can be established at any given time.

29. Mr Hardy opposes the condition as an unreasonable and unnecessary infringement upon his right of free passage in the community. He points out that he has complied with all conditions imposed on him since his release from custody in January 2019 without giving cause for any complaint. Given his compliance, it is submitted on his behalf, the provision of a schedule of movements is unduly intrusive. A sample of the weekly schedule was tendered as Exhibit 1. It is quite detailed, and no doubt takes some trouble to prepare.

30. It is important to briefly summarise the history in relation to the provision by Mr Hardy of a schedule of movements. Button J imposed a condition of electronic monitoring and detailed conditions governing the preparation and the provision of a schedule of movements. As I have said, Mr Hardy complied in all respects with these conditions.

31. Harrison J dispensed with conditions 6 to 9 dealing with the schedule of movements because he formed the view that condition 3 adequately covered that field. He formed the view that condition 5 requiring electronic monitoring was “oppressive, invasive and disproportionate” and deleted it: State of New South Wales v Hardy [2021] NSWSC 323 at [42] – [45].

32. The regime imposed by Harrison J was continued by Johnson J when he made final orders. There was, however, debate before Johnson J about the schedule of movements (see Exhibit C). Senior Counsel then appearing for Mr Hardy expressed concern that the deletion of conditions 6 to 9 may be outflanked by condition 3 unless it was amended to provide “greater flexibility”. In argument Johnson J said he would be concerned if condition 3 “is meant to be an application by the State via the back door to have 6 to 9 operating on some discretionary basis”. He was reassured by Senior Counsel for the State that there was no attempt “to adopt some kind of back door entry”. However, Senior Counsel pointed out it was a prescribed condition. In his judgment Justice Johnson said (at [418]):

“I note that the Plaintiff does not seek proposed Conditions 6 – 9 concerning a schedule of movements. In these circumstances, I consider proposed Condition 3 is reasonable and note that it is not intended to operate as a type of backdoor way of introducing a requirement for a schedule of movements.”

34. If I may say so, with respect, notwithstanding his Honour’s expectation, within 2 days of the date of his Honour’s judgment the enforcement officer responsible for Mr Hardy’s supervision gave him Written Direction no. 2, in substance replicating conditions 6 to 9 of the regime imposed by Button J in all respects. So much for “flexibility” (see Exhibit A). That was amended on 21 September 2021 (Exhibit B) which relaxed somewhat the requirements for a schedule of movements. However, the practical effect as demonstrated by Exhibit 2 remains somewhat onerous from Mr Hardy’s point of view.

35. I give full weight to DSC Wise’s explanation, but it must be pointed out the considerations to which he refers are somewhat general rather than specific to Mr Hardy’s case.

36. I accept that the provision of a detailed schedule of movements is an appropriate tool of supervision in most cases. However, Mr Hardy is subject to a very detailed suite of conditions covering many aspects of his behaviour while in the community. He has in fact been compliant with that regime, even if the State succeeds in proving at the final hearing that his compliance has been begrudging rather than whole-hearted. It is apparent to me that he does live a stable lifestyle involving a relatively fixed pattern of activities and movements. I am not of the view that even the more relaxed regime in place since September 2021 is reasonable and necessary. However, like Johnson J, I am influenced by the consideration that condition 3 is a prescribed condition. I propose to allow it with some amendment to incorporate a regime of what is apparently referred to as “dry scheduling”. I would impose condition 3 but amend it by adding after the phrase “schedule of movements” the words “consisting of a broad outline of the defendant’s expected movements during the period intended to be covered”.

Condition 64

37. Condition 64 need not be set out in full. Essentially it places an obligation upon Mr Hardy to comply with a course of medication prescribed for him by a treating mental health care practitioner. This is opposed as unnecessarily impinging upon Mr Hardy’s privacy and his physical integrity. I understand the gravamen of the arguments. However, as the supporting documentation proffered by the State includes persuasive medical opinion to which I have made reference already that the index offending was probably related to a period of mental decompensation involving the symptoms of a delusional disorder and the formulation of risk scenarios for management purposes incorporates the prospect of future deterioration, I am of the opinion that the proposed condition is appropriate to Mr Hardy’s risk and for the purpose of community protection. I do not regard it as unduly intrusive, oppressive or unreasonable in these circumstances to oblige Mr Hardy to comply with a course of medication prescribed for him for the treatment of any mental health condition by a treating duly qualified medical practitioner. Obviously, the obligation crystalises if and only if a treating doctor prescribes medication. That this has not been necessary so far does not mean it will not be. Some of the qualified experts have suggested a low dosage of medication may be appropriate having regard to the diagnosis of delusional disorder. I repeat, in my opinion, the condition is relevant to risk management and should be imposed.

38. It follows that I will make orders in accordance with the proposed short minutes of order handed up Senior Counsel for the State. The conditions will need to be amended to incorporate what I have said about condition 3.

39. The Court orders:

Appointment of experts

1. Pursuant to s 24(5) of the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) (“the Act”),

1. a qualified psychiatrist and a registered psychologist be appointed to conduct separate psychiatric and psychological examinations (as the case may be) of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and

2. that the defendant attend those examinations.

Interim Supervision Order and Conditions

1. Pursuant to s 27 of the Act, that the defendant be subject to an Interim Supervision Order commencing on 28 January 2023.

2. Pursuant to s 28(1) of the Act, that the Interim Supervision Order be for a period of 28 day.

3. Pursuant to s 29(1) of the Act, that the defendant comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to this Short Minutes of Order for the duration of the order specified at order 3.

Restriction of access to file

1. Access to the Court’s file in this proceeding be restricted such that access would be permitted to a non-party only with the leave of a Judge of the Court, and with prior notice to the parties so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in respect of the access application.

Relisting

1. Direct the parties to approach the associate to the HRO List Judge to obtain a suitable appointment for directions in the new law term.

**********

SCHEDULE A

CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

CHRISTOPHER BRUCE HARDY

In these conditions:

"CSNSW" means Corrective Services NSW.

"Defendant" means Christopher Bruce Hardy, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.

"Digital blueprint" has the same meaning as in the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998(NSW) and means any type of digital (or electronic) reproduction of a technical drawing of the design of an object.

"Electronic identity" means each of the following:

an email address,

a user name or other identity allowing access to an instant messaging service,

a user name or other identity allowing access to a chat room or social media on the internet,

any other user name or other identity allowing access to the internet or an electronic communication service.

"EO" means Enforcement Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Office or Police Officer supervising the defendant under the order.

"Extremist material" means:

material that a reasonable person would understand to be:

directly or indirectly encouraging, glorifying, promoting or condoning terrorist acts; or

seeking support for, or justifying, the carrying out of terrorist acts; or

material that a reasonable person would understand or suspect to be produced or distributed by a terrorist organisation.

"Garment search" means a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body.

"Material" includes:

any written or printed material;

any picture, painting or drawing;

any carving, sculpture, statue or figure;

any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced;

any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and

any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced.

“Mental healthcare practitioner” means any general practitioner, psychiatrist, mental health nurse, psychologist who can make referrals for medication for mental health issues or any other person who provides treatment or services in relation to the defendant’s mental health.

"NSWPF" means NSW Police Force.

"Order" means the interim supervision order or extended supervision order under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017(NSW) to which the defendant is subject.

"Pat-down search" means a search of a person where the person's clothed body is touched.

"Serious offence" means an offence that is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more.

"Terrorist act" has the same meaning as in Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and means an action or threat of action where:

The action:

causes serious harm that is physical harm to a person;

causes serious damage to property;

causes a person's death;

endangers a person's life, other than the life of the person taking the action;

creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; or

seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic system including, but not limited to:

an information system;

a telecommunications system;

a financial system;

a system used for the delivery of essential government services;

a system used for, or by, an essential public utility; and

a system used for, or by, a transport system; and

the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause;

the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of:

coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country, or of part of a State, Territory or foreign country; or

intimidating the public or a section of the public; and

the action is not advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action that is not intended to cause serious harm to a person, cause a person's death, endanger the life of a person, or create a serious risk to the health and safety of the public.

"Terrorist organisation" has the same meaning as it has in Division 102.1 of Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and means an organisation that is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act and includes but is not limited to Islamic State/ ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra.

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations Monitoring and Reporting

The defendant must accept the supervision of NSWPF and CSNSW until the end of the Order.

The defendant must report to his EO as reasonably directed.

The defendant must submit to the supervision and guidance of any enforcement officer responsible for the supervision of the offender for the time being and obey all reasonable directions of an enforcement officer (including in respect of providing a schedule of movements consisting of a broad outline of the defendant’s expected movements during the period intended to be covered).

The defendant must be available for interview at such times and places as his EO (or the officer's nominee) may from time to time direct.

Electronic Monitoring

[Not utilised].

Schedule of Movements

[Not utilised].

[Not utilised].

[Not utilised].

[Not utilised].

Part B: Accommodation

The defendant must live at an address approved by his EO and must notify his EO of any intention to change his address or living arrangements.

[Not utilised].

The defendant must be at his approved address between 12am and 6am unless other arrangements are approved by his EO.

The defendant must allow his EO to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.

[Not utilised].

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

The defendant must not leave New South Wales except with the approval of the Commissioner for Corrective Services.

The defendant must surrender any passports held by the defendant to his EO.

The defendant must not frequent or visit any place or district specified by his EO.

In addition to and without limiting any of conditions 15 to 17 listed above, the defendant must not go, without the prior approval of his EO, to any internet cafes, libraries, or other businesses which provide physical access to devices that have the ability to access the internet, either for payment or for no charge (other than employment agencies).

In addition to and without limiting any of conditions 15 to 17 listed above, the defendant must not go within 500m of Sydney and Bankstown Airports and Sydney Cove Passenger Terminal, or any point of departure for an international destination, except:

for the purpose of reporting to his EO as directed,

attending upon a Community Corrections office in accordance with his approved schedule or as directed, or attending upon other government services in accordance with his approved schedule or as directed, or

as otherwise approved by an EO.

Part D: Employment, finance and education

The defendant must not start any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of his EO.

The defendant must notify an EO of any intention to change the defendant's employment if practicable before the change occurs and otherwise at his next interview with an EO.

The defendant must provide any information relating to his financial affairs, including income and expenditure, if directed by his EO.

The defendant must not sign any legal instrument that gives the defendant control of any money or assets of another person or organisation, without notifying his EO.

The defendant must not sign any lease, mortgage, contract for sale for goods or services above the value of $500, hire agreement, power of attorney, deed, or any instrument relating to obtaining any credit, opening of any account held at a bank, credit union, building society or similar institution, without prior approval of his EO.

The defendant must not transfer money or money's worth to another person over the value of $500, whether by cash, cheque or electronic transfer, without the permission of his EO.

The defendant must not transfer any funds outside Australia without the written permission of his EO.

The defendant must not form any corporation, partnership, unincorporated association, register any business names or operate a business without notifying his EO.

Part E: Drugs and alcohol [not utilised]

[Not utilised].

[Not utilised].

Part F: Non-association

The defendant must not associate, contact or communicate with any persons specified by the EO.

Without limiting condition 30, the defendant must not associate with or otherwise affiliate with any persons or with any organisations advocating support for engaging in any terrorist acts or violent extremism.

[Not utilised].

The defendant must obtain written permission from his EO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation, including any internet or mobile-based social networking service.

The defendant must not engage in any act, or attempt to influence others to engage in any act, that would provide support for or promote extremist ideologies or acts of violence.

Part G: Weapons

The defendant must not possess or use any of the following:

a firearm, firearm part or ammunition within the meaning of s. 4 of the Firearms Act 1996;

a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998,

a spear gun;

without his EO's approval, any article or device, not being such a firearm, that is designed or intended as a defence or anti- personnel spray and that is capable of discharging by any means:

any irritant matter in liquid, powder, gas or chemical form or any dense smoke; or

any substance capable of causing bodily harm.

any explosive substance intended, by the person having custody of the thing, to be used in an explosive device;

a fuse capable of use with an explosive or a detonator, or a detonator, where the item is intended by the person having custody of the thing, to be used as a fuse or detonator for an explosive device, as the case may be;

a knife without reasonable excuse;

any other implement made or adapted for use for causing injury to a person;

anything intended, by the person having custody of the thing, to be used to injure or menace a person or damage property;

a laser pointer; or

a digital blueprint for the manufacture of a prohibited weapon on a 3D printer or on an electronic milling machine.

The defendant must not manufacture any of the articles or devices listed in condition 35 above.

Part H: Vehicles

The defendant must not, without the approval of his EO, purchase, hire or drive any vehicle:

exceeding a gross vehicle mass of 3 tonnes; or

the lawful driving or operation of which requires the driver or operator to have a licence class of Light Rigid, Medium-Rigid, Heavy-Rigid, Heavy Combination or Multi- Combination within the meaning of cl. S(l)(c) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Regulation 2017(NSW).

The defendant must tell his EO of the colour, make, model and registration of any vehicle registered to the defendant or that the defendant intends to drive.

The defendant must notify his EO prior to applying for a driver's licence.

Part I: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

The defendant must obey any reasonable direction by an enforcement officer about communication, internet access and use of electronic devices (including, but not limited to, approval of devices used, method of communication, access to internet and restrictions on deleting information).

[Not utilised].

[Not utilised].

42A. The defendant must not use any of the following items unless disclosed and approved for use by an EO:

Usernames other than "Christopher Hardy" or "Chris Hardy";

Internet account (including email addresses, internet services provider accounts, social media accounts, online communities);

Devices that have the ability to access the internet;

Passwords (including encryption codes); and

Applications (including instant messaging services).

42B.    The defendant must advise his EO of any change to any of the items listed above immediately.

The defendant must provide the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names as well as any relevant passwords (including encryption codes) used by the defendant, and the nature and details of any internet connection used by the defendant, as directed.

[Not utilised].

[Not utilised].

[Not utilised].

[Not utilised].

The defendant must allow his EO (or any other person requested by his EO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including the defendant's email addresses, in monitoring compliance with this Order.

[Not utilised].

The defendant must allow his telephone and/or internet service provider to share information about his accounts with his EO.

Part J: Search and seizure

If the EO reasonably believes that a search (of the type referred to in sub- paragraphs e to h below) is necessary:

for the safety and welfare of residents or staff or persons present at the defendant's approved address;

the welfare or safety of any member of the public or any other person;

to monitor the defendant's compliance with this order; or

because the EO reasonably suspects the defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence; then the EO may direct, and the defendant must submit to:

search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, the defendant's approved address;

search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any vehicle owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant;

search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any storage facility, including a garage, locker or commercial facility owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant; and/or

search and examination of his person.

For the purposes of the condition above:

a search of the defendant means a garment search or a pat- down search; and

to the extent practicable, a pat-down search will be conducted by a EO of the same sex as the defendant, or by an Officer of NSWPF or CSNSW of the same sex as the defendant under the direction of the EO.

During a search carried out pursuant to condition 51 above, the defendant must allow the EO (or any other person requested by the EO) to seize anything found, whether in the defendant's possession or not, which the EO reasonably suspects will compromise:

the safety of residents or of staff at the defendant's approved address;

the welfare or safety of any member of the public or any other person; or

the defendant's compliance with this order; or

which the EO reasonably suspects relates to behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence.

The defendant must allow his EO, or another person the EO arranges, to search any phone, tablet device, data storage device or computer that he may use.

The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to conditions 51-54 above.

Part K: Access to violent and extremist material

The defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to:

material which is classified as Refused Classification or material which, if classified, would be classified as Refused Classification;

extremist material; or

other material as directed by his EO for reasons related to concerns regarding violence; or for reasons related to his risk of committing a serious terrorism offence.

Part L: Personal details and appearance

The defendant must not change his name from "Christopher Hardy", or use any name other than "Christopher Hardy" or "Chris Hardy", without notifying his EO.

The defendant must not use any alias, log-in name, or a name other than "Christopher Hardy" or "Chris Hardy" or use any email address other than those known to his EO, on any internet site (including social networking sites), any online communication applications or any third party sites or applications that require the user to have a user identification name or log-in email.

The defendant must not significantly change his appearance without the approval of his EO.

The defendant must let EO photograph him, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to his appearance.

If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide his EO with such details.

Part M: Medical intervention and treatment

The defendant must notify his EO of the identity and address of any health care practitioner that he consults.

The defendant must attend, upon the direction of his EO, any psychological and psychiatric assessments or counselling, therapy sessions, disengagement services, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction, including for the purposes of a Mental Health Care Plan or Community Treatment Order.

The defendant must take medications that are prescribed to him by his mental healthcare practitioners only in the manner prescribed.

The defendant must notify his EO immediately if he ceases to take any medication referred to in the above condition.

The defendant must:

facilitate the provision of information to any mental healthcare practitioner providing care and treatment to the defendant that his EO considers reasonably necessary and relevant to that care and treatment; and

consent to his mental healthcare practitioner sharing information, including reports on the defendant’s progress and information the defendant has told them, with his EO, if the mental healthcare practitioner forms the view that sharing such information is consistent with the effective management of the defendant's risk factors.

The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, his EO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

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Decision last updated: 16 December 2022