State of New South Wales v Cannon (Final)

[2023] NSWSC 53

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	State of New South Wales v Cannon (Final) [2023] NSWSC 53
Hearing dates:	3 February 2023
Date of orders:	3 February 2023
Decision date:	03 February 2023
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Button J
Decision:	Extended supervision order for two years imposed
Catchwords:	HIGH RISK OFFENDER – application for extended supervision order – serious sex offender – criminal record includes murder with sexual flavour – over three decades of continuous custody - whether unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision – extended supervision order not opposed by defendant – length not opposed – no reliance on discretion not to impose – dispute limited to single condition – extended supervision order imposed
Legislation Cited:	Crimes (High Risk Offenders)Act2006 (NSW) ss 5B, 9(1)(a), 11
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	State of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Kenneth Cannon (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: C McGorey (Plaintiff) J Wilcox (Defendant) Solicitors: Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff) Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)
File Number(s):	2022/259007
Publication restriction:	Nil

REVISED EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. Having had a further period of reflection, I do think that it is appropriate that my judgment be delivered orally now.  I say that for the following reasons. 

2. First, the parties helpfully got the materials to my chambers in a timely manner, and I believe that I have had adequate time to reflect upon the matter. 

3. Secondly, my comprehension has been further expanded with the assistance of both counsel today. 

4. Thirdly, the position of the parties is a joint one. To be clear about that, all mechanistic statutory preconditions are accepted by counsel for the defendant as having been established. In particular, what I shall call the "fulcrum test" in
   s 5B of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders)Act2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) is also accepted as having been established. There is no basis upon which the imposition of an extended supervision order, (“ESO”), is resisted. Indeed, through the good work of the parties, the only dispute that requires resolution and explanation is about a single condition.

5. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, I respectfully think that the joint position of the parties with regard to the substantive question is incontrovertible.  To express that another way, my own opinion is that it is unarguable in the circumstances of this case that there must be a further period of conditional liberty imposed upon Mr Kenneth Cannon (the defendant).

6. Background

7. The background is that the plaintiff, in the form of the State of New South Wales, has made an application to that effect, pursuant to the relevant Act.  The length of the ESO sought, it has been clarified today, is for two years.  It pertains to Mr Kenneth Cannon, the defendant.  He is 62 years of age.

8. To sketch the factual background of the matter quite succinctly, it is clear that he suffered from an unsatisfactory upbringing that featured violence.

9. Indeed, there is a suggestion in the material that both of his parents were violent alcoholics, and there's also a suggestion that he himself was the subject of sexual offending committed against him when he himself was a child.

10. At the age of 15, he committed an indecent assault against a sister who was aged 7. Thereafter he committed a further offence of an identical nature against a sister who was 9. As Mr McGorey for the plaintiff has accepted today, it is not entirely clear whether there were one or two victims of that offending.

11. As a result of that offending, the defendant was made a ward of the state and was committed to an institution, which I think in itself is a sign of the unsatisfactory nature of his living circumstances when a child and a teenager.

12. In other words, well before the defendant had become an adult, there were already signs of the existence of sexual deviance, and it was acted upon twice.

13. Subsequently, when he was an adult, he committed two penetrative sexual assaults against young women, who could be thought of, perhaps, as young girls, in light of their age.  Those offences were of the utmost gravity.

14. The victims were randomly attacked, and were not otherwise known to the defendant.  The offences took place in a public place.  Knives were used to subdue the victims.  There was penile‑vaginal penetration, and I believe on both occasions, ejaculation. One of the victims suffered the undoubted added trauma of having to undergo a termination as a result of the sexual assault upon her.

15. At around the same time - and by that I mean the latter part of the 1980s and the early 1990s - the defendant murdered a young woman. That offence occurred in similar circumstances to the other two sets of offences as follows. A knife was used, though on this occasion the deceased was stabbed repeatedly, including to the heart.  The offence took place in a public place. Again, the defendant and the deceased were not known to each other.  The clear difference here, of course, is that the knife was used, not just to put the victim in fear of death, but to inflict death.

16. At the conclusion of the interaction, the deceased was thrown into a river.  In fact, scientific evidence demonstrates that she was still alive at that time.  Brazenly and perhaps irrationally, the defendant drew attention to himself having been at the scene by posing as a passer‑by.

17. Undoubtedly, there was a sexual flavour to the murder, because the semen of the defendant was detected, albeit many years later, on a piece of clothing of the deceased.

18. These three sets of crimes came to light out of chronological order.  The murder and one of the sexual assaults were detected by way of DNA “cold hits”.  One of the sexual assaults was admitted at an early stage, and one of them was admitted at a later stage. But the murder was not, and to my understanding it has never been admitted, despite the case being, on my assessment many years later, being close to overwhelming.

19. I do not believe there is any need for me to set out the complex sentencing structure that was the result of three separate sets of sentences imposed by three separate judicial officers, which was itself adjusted slightly by the Court of Criminal Appeal subsequently. But the upshot of those terms of imprisonment is that the defendant spent 32 years in continuous custody.

20. It is absolutely clear that, when he entered custody in 1990, he suffered from a pathology, whereby in his mind, sex and violence far from being the antithesis of each other, were closely connected; secondly, that he was prepared, repeatedly, to act upon that pathology; and thirdly, its implementation extended to murder.

21. As it happened, the three sets of offences were dealt with by three sentencing judges in different jurisdictions and at different times ‑ who are all well known to have been vasty experienced with regard to criminal law.  Justice Studdert of this Court sentenced the defendant, with regard to the murder of the deceased, who was 18 years old.  His Honour spoke of the crime as having been a “dreadful one”.  His Honour referred to the “savagery of the attack”, and also spoke of the exculpatory account provided by the defendant as having been “fanciful”.

22. Judge Shadbolt QC – whose wisdom with regard to criminal law is well remembered even now by the criminal justice system many years later – who dealt with the offence committed against the 16‑year‑old, referred to a “slide into alcoholism” on the part of the defendant having played some role in the offending.  That learned sentencing judge felt that, with regard to one of the offences that was placed before him, only the maximum penalty could suffice.

23. Judge Payne, who sentenced the defendant with regard to the sexual offending against the 15‑year‑old – more recently, although even that sentence was imposed eight years ago, unless I am mistaken – referred to the violent alcoholism of the parents of the defendant. Her Honour also noted that that offence occurred something like five months before the murder.

24. In short, the picture is of one life lost and two lives damaged, perhaps permanently, as a result of the offending of the defendant, not forgetting the distinct possibility of long‑term psychological damage having been inflicted upon the sister or sisters of the defendant.

25. In that regard, I was provided, kindly, with a victim's statement by one of the victims of sexual assault.  It will be kept confidential on the file and it will be placed in an envelope marked to that effect ‑ unless I hear from Mr McGorey that the wish of the author is to the contrary.  I do not propose to traverse the contents of that document in this judgment.  I have looked at it and reflected on it carefully, but I propose to protect the privacy of its author. But I will say, in general, that it is a perfect example of how a fellow human being's life can be damaged very badly by a sexual assault, even almost 40 years later.

26. In custody, the defendant reasonably quickly became isolated from the outside world. I think that his last contact in that regard was in 1994. That is the same time, I think, when his last custodial infringement was entered.

27. My overall impression is that he was able to use that remarkably extended period of well over three decades quietly and constructively.  It is noteworthy that he now identifies as bisexual. A very positive aspect is that the defendant has engaged in getting therapeutic help in custody and, on the evidence, I believe that that has been a sincere effort.

28. There have been some discordant notes in custody: one is an allegation of the defendant's cellmate at one stage – a male of course – that the defendant had sexually assaulted him.  That is not to be disregarded entirely, but it was never pursued, and the defendant was never charged with it, let alone convicted of it. In the circumstances, I give it very little weight.

29. The other discordant note is that, whilst engaged in a well‑known therapeutic program for sexual offenders in custody, it is asserted that the defendant sought sexual favours from an intellectually disabled prisoner.

30. When he was confronted with the inappropriateness of that behaviour, he seemed to have little or no awareness of its inappropriateness and, in particular, the obvious power imbalance.

31. The State Parole Authority took a cautious approach to the defendant and, with respect, quite understandably he was not released immediately at the conclusion of his total non‑parole period on parole.  He was released ultimately on parole in January 2022. His parole expired completely a couple of months ago on 28 December 2022.  Before that expiry occurred, he had been placed on an interim supervision order (“ISO”) and, it having been extended a couple of times, as things stand, he will be subject to that form of condition liberty until 17 February 2023.

32. On release, the defendant lived for a time in a Community Offender Support Program (“COSP”), a well-known form of halfway house for persons who have served long sentences, and in a sense a transitional step between being incarcerated and living independently in the community. As things stand now, he is living in a boarding house occupied solely by men.

33. In a nutshell, it could be said that things are going well.  By that I mean, he is getting help from various therapeutic workers.  There is no suggestion that he is drinking - and I interpolate that although the evidence seems to be that at the time of the murder he was not intoxicated, I approach the matter generally on the basis that being intoxicated for this man is indeed a criminogenic factor.  He is leading, I believe, a quiet, isolated life. The situation is, as I understand it, that he has no family support and little or no friends.

34. In particular, it is important that whilst he was on parole, there had been no suggestion of a breach of parole.  There has been no suggestion of further offences allegedly having been committed. Whilst he has been subject to the ISO, there has been no suggestion of a breach of that either.

35. I was told today from the Bar table, without dispute, that the defendant has recently obtained work, and certainly I regard that as a further pro‑social and protective step.

36. As I have said, the indications are that, speaking generally, things are going well.  But even so, I think for anybody to have served more than three decades of continuous custody for whatever reason, to seek to readjust oneself to normal lawful community life, after all of that time in a very restricted, artificial, unnatural environment, is inevitably an enormous challenge.

Reports

37. When Justice Walton imposed the ISO, he also, as is orthodox, ordered that two reports be obtained.

38. In a nutshell, a well‑qualified psychologist, in her report, focused on the violent turbulent childhood of the defendant; the suggestion that he suffered abuse at the hands of his father and the death of a sibling; the short and poor education of the defendant; his maintenance of employment in various positions before his incarceration; the history of some mental health issues in custody and the suggestion of a suicide attempt ‑ at least one; the history of alcohol abuse in the past, and the proposition that the defendant has been sober for 33 years.

39. Applying a well‑known actuarial risk assessment, the psychologist assessed the defendant as constituting "an average" risk of re‑offending, and gave a percentage with regard to a five-year sexual recidivism rate.  The psychologist spoke of various dynamic ‑ by that I understand her to mean changeable - risk factors. They included the question of general self‑regulation; patently the question of sexual self‑regulation; deficits in intimacy (and as I have said, I am of the understanding that this man is leading a very solitary, quiet, unsupported life); the lack of pro‑social supports (which is really a reflection of the same phenomenon); and possibly a limited insight into how he thinks and feels about himself and the world.

40. The psychologist also spoke of various protective factors.  She suggested that there needs to be meaningful and pro‑social support. There needs to be ongoing therapeutic work.  The psychologist concluded her analysis by finding that without support there is a risk of returning to his previous lifestyle.

41. The forensic psychiatrist similarly focused on the defendant's traumatic childhood, and focused in particular on the fact that already as a child the defendant was breaking the law, including by way of sexual offences; and the obvious issues with regard to sexual deviance and lack of control in that regard in adulthood. The forensic psychiatrist took the view that there had been reasonable conduct and progress in the many decades in which this man has been in gaol.

42. The psychiatrist raised a note of caution - again, similar to that of the psychologist - about the psychological views of the defendant and, in particular, for example, his view that he is not preoccupied with sex. The psychiatrist came to a primary diagnosis of the defendant suffering from an anti-social personality disorder.

43. Again, applying a well‑known actuarial tool, the forensic psychiatrist felt that there was a “moderate to high risk” of reoffending. In those circumstances, the forensic psychiatrist felt that management by way of an ESO would be appropriate and had a couple of things to say about conditions that at that stage were disputed.

44. I certainly do not, myself, contradict those experts. In particular I do not impugn their, in a sense perhaps a little surprisingly, optimistic assessment of risk.  But as a lay person, who is not a psychologist or a psychiatrist or a medical person, I think that really here there is a compelling combination of repeated sexual offending of the utmost gravity (including a murder that had, unquestionably, a sexual flavour), combined with 32 years of continuous custody, with the result that the undeniable reality must be that the question of risk is uppermost in one's mind.

Submissions and determination about primary question

45. Mr Wilcox of counsel for the defendant, whose experience in this area is well‑known, as I have said, conceded that the mechanistic statutory pre‑conditions have been established.  Mr McGorey in his written submissions delved into a detailed analysis of how they are established.  I will not trouble over that now but suffice to say I have read it, I understand it, and I accept it.

46. Mr Wilcox has also written, and confirmed explicitly orally today, that the “fulcrum test” is also accepted to have been established.  No doubt that was after reflection on his part and also, I safely infer, discussion with his client about the adoption of that position. I infer that that in itself is a constructive step.  By that I mean, I infer that there is a realisation on the part of the defendant about his need to continue to get help, in the interests of everybody.

47. As well as that, Mr Wilcox has not disputed the length of the ESO that is proposed by the State. I interpolate at this stage that, in the circumstances my own assessment is that two years is a moderate period, appreciating entirely that these forms of conditional liberty can be extended or repeated by statute as needs be.

48. In my opinion the fulcrum test is soundly established.  There has been unquestionably a lengthy passage of time. As I have said, I also accept that there has been quite a deal of constructive therapy, and that is continuing now in the community.  Even so, what has been demonstrated here is a powerful paraphilia (and by that, I mean a sexual deviance), with repeated catastrophic implementation.  I think the proposition that an ESO is necessary so that the defendant receives continuing help and supervision, underpinned by a degree of compulsion is, with respect, inescapable.

49. To express that opinion of mine in terms of the explicit terms of the statute: I am amply satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious offence if not kept under supervision by way of an ESO.

50. As I have said, I think the proposed period of two years is unimpeachable. Finally, I do not believe that there is any basis upon which I would exercise a residual discretion not to make that order.

51. It follows that once I have departed the Bench that order will be made and entered in the Court records forthwith by my staff.

Dispute about one condition

52. Turning now to the only real dispute in the matter, I have looked at all of the conditions that are accepted by counsel for the defendant to be “appropriate” to use the statutory term, and that is my own view as well.

53. The only disputed condition pertained to the possession of a fishing knife in a public place. That is because, as Mr Wilcox has explained, the defendant, as part of his reintegration into normal lawful community life, would like to explore fishing as a possible hobby; and it is common sense that, if one is engaged in that, one needs to have a fishing knife for a number of purposes.

54. I see the force in that. I appreciate that for a person leading a solitary isolated life, fishing can be a contemplative, rehabilitative activity. I also appreciate that if the defendant really wished to offend again he would be able to obtain a kitchen knife from his home, or purchase such an item, or countless other steps.

55. But I just cannot accept, respectfully, as I said briefly before morning tea, that for the time being this man can be out and about in a public place with a knife, however it is to be secured.  In particular, as things are proposed, in winter he would be able to be out and about during hours of darkness. I resile from that proposition.

56. After all, the defendant is a mature man in his early 60s.  I agree with counsel for the defendant that hobbies and pastimes are a valuable form of reintegration and rehabilitation. But a mature man of that age can pursue countless alternative pastimes that do not require him to be out and about in a public place with a weapon that can be used either to inflict death or fear of death upon another human being.

52. To repeat a little with regard to my resolution of this single disputed condition, this man had an entrenched deviancy whereby sex and violence were connected; he acted on it repeatedly; he spent 32 years in custody; he has been in the community for a little over a year; and the centrepiece of each of the offences was: a knife.

53. As I explained that single disputed condition will be made in accordance with the proposal of the State in the amended summons with which I was provided today.

Conclusion

59. In short then, orders will be entered as soon as reasonably practicable to the effect that the defendant will be subject to an ESO of two years.  I will be guided by Mr McGorey in a moment as to whether that should commence today or whether it should commence at the end of the current ISO.  As well as that, the conditions will be all those proposed attached to the amended summons.

60. Finally, a revised version of this judgment will be placed on NSW Caselaw. I will rely upon each of the legal teams to explain to interested persons how they can access that and, indeed, when the revised judgment is available my Associate will provide it to each of the legal teams electronically.  The legal teams will be at liberty to provide it as they see fit to all interested persons.

Orders

61. I make the following orders:

62. 1. An order pursuant to s 9(1)(a) of the Act that the defendant be the subject of an extended supervision order for a period of two years commencing 3 February 2023; and

63. 2. An order pursuant to s 11 of the Act, directing that the defendant, for the period of the extended supervision order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to the Amended Summons.

SCHEDULE OF CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

KENNETH BARRY CANNON

Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO)

Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW)

In these conditions:

“CSNSW” means Corrective Services NSW.

“Commissioner” means Commissioner for Corrective Services

“Defendant” means Kenneth Barry Cannon, also known as Kenneth Barry Durbin, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.

“Electronic Identity” means each of the following:

(a) an email address,

(b) a user name or other identity allowing access to an instant messaging service,

(c) a user name or other identity allowing access to a chat room or social media on the internet,

(d) any other user name or other identity allowing access to the internet or an electronic communication service.

“DSO” means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order.

“Material” includes:

1.   any written or printed material;

2.   any picture, painting or drawing;

3.   any carving, sculpture, statue or figure;

4.   any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced;

5.   any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and

6.   any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced.

“NSWPF” means NSW Police Force.

“Associate” includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or to communicate by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication).

“Search” includes:

1.   A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant’s possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person’s body; and

2.   A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant’s clothed body is touched.

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

Monitoring and Reporting

64. The defendant must submit to the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.

65. Where a direction may conveniently be given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.

66. The defendant must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going, who he is with, what he is doing and the nature of his associations.

67. The defendant must not engage in any threatening, intimidating or abusive behaviour towards CSNSW or electronic monitoring staff involved in his supervision that would cause the staff member to fear for their safety and/or interfere with or impede supervision.

Electronic Monitoring

68. The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with, or remove, the equipment.

Schedule of Movements

69. If directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start.

70. If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by a DSO, he must seek approval from a DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless a DSO approves a shorter period.

71. The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency.

Part B: Accommodation

72. The defendant must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change the defendant’s address or living arrangements.

73. The defendant must be at his approved address between 910PM and 6AM unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO.

74. The defendant must comply with rules or by-laws (or both) of any approved accommodation for the defendant.

75. The defendant must allow a DSO to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.

76. The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address or any alternative approved addresses (if relevant) without the approval of a DSO.

77. The defendant must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor entering and remaining at his approved address and must not permit any person to stay overnight, at his approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside at his approved address), without the prior approval of a DSO.

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

78. The defendant must surrender any passports held by him to the Commissioner, must not be in possession of any passports, and must not attempt to apply for any passports.

79. The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner of CSNSW.

80. The defendant must not frequent or visit any place or district specified as reasonably directed by a DSO.

81. Without limiting condition 17 above, the defendant must not go to any of the following without the prior approval of a DSO:

82. Libraries and neighbourhood centres;

83. Camping grounds and caravan parks;

84. Pools, playing fields and sporting facilities; and

85. Residences where the defendant knows that persons aged under 18 years ordinarily reside.

86. The defendant must not attend any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material, or for providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment, without the prior approval of a DSO.

Part D: Employment, finance and education

87. The defendant must take all reasonable steps to participate in interventions as recommended by a DSO, including the development of a case management plan which may include employment, education, training or participation in personal development programs.

88. The defendant must not start on his own initiative any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of a DSO.

89. The defendant must notify a DSO of any intention to change his employment if practicable before the change occurs or otherwise at his next interview with a DSO.

90. The defendant must provide any information relating to his financial affairs, including income and expenditure, if directed by a DSO.

Part E: Drugs and alcohol

91. The defendant must not possess or use prohibited drugs, or abuse drugs unlawfully obtained.

92. The defendant must not possess or consume alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO.

93. The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing.

94. The defendant must not enter any licensed premises including hotels, bars, racecourses and licenced clubs, but excluding cafes and restaurants, without the prior approval of a DSO.

95. The defendant must attend and participate in programmes and courses for drug and alcohol rehabilitation as reasonably directed by a DSO, and must not discharge himself from such programs and courses without prior approval of a DSO.

Part F: Non-association

Association with Children

96. The defendant must not associate with anyone who he knows or reasonably should know is under 18, other than Incidental contact in a public place in the course of the duties of the minor; or with the written permission of a DSO and in accordance with any requirements reasonably determined by a DSO, including that the contact takes place in the presence of an adult who has been approved in writing by a DSO.

Associations with Others (not children)

97. The defendant must not associate with any person or persons specified by a DSO.

98. Without limiting condition 3230, the defendant must not:

99. associate with any people who he knows are consuming or under the influence of alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO.

100. associate with any people who he knows are consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs.

101. associate with any person held in custody without prior approval of a DSO.

102. The defendant must not engage the services of sex workers without the prior approval of a DSO.

103. The defendant must agree to a DSO disclosing his criminal history to another person if the disclosure is reasonably necessary.

104. The defendant must obtain written permission from a DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation.

Part H: Weapons

105. The defendant must not possess or use any of the following a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998.

106. Without limiting or altering condition 3635, the defendant must not possess or use any of the following, without a DSO’s prior approval:

107. a knife, machete, sword or any other device that consists of a single-edged or multi-edged blade or spike that is designed or adapted to inflict violence, whether actual or threatened;

108. any other implement made or adapted for use for causing injury to a person; and

109. anything intended, by the person having custody of the thing, to be used to injure or menace a person or damage property.

NOTE: The defendant is permitted to keep kitchen knives and tools at his approved residence for the purposes of household tasks, and he must not use them or have them on his person when Corrective Services NSW staff and/or NSW Police are present at his approved address.

Part I: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

110. The defendant must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about communication, internet access and use of electronic devices (including, but not limited to, approval of devices used, method of communication, access to the internet and restrictions on deleting information.

111. The defendant must not use any alias, electronic identity, log-in name, name other than Kenneth Barry Cannon or any email address other than those known to a DSO. The defendant must give a DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet and advise a DSO of any change to the list immediately. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers.

112. The defendant must only use an electronic device which has the ability to access the internet after the device has been disclosed to a DSO and the device has been seen and approved for use by a DSO.

113. The defendant must provide the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names as well as any relevant passwords, pin codes and pass codes used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connection, as directed.

114. The defendant must provide a DSO with all passwords, pin codes and pass codes used to access all electronic devices, electronic applications, internet sites and communication platforms of any kind.

115. The defendant must not use any coded or encrypted messaging application or service.

116. The defendant must provide any code or encryption for any electronic data or any electronic communication if discovered on the defendant’s electronic devices or accounts as a result of a search or a remote inspection.

117. The defendant must not access, join and/or connect to any social networking service or application without the prior approval of a DSO, including, but not limited to, use of internet-based email, instant messaging services, online community services, multi player video games and other telecommunications-based services including text and voice services.

118. The defendant must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by a DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this Order.

119. The defendant must not delete or alter any applications, email, text messages, any electronic message, call history, any data, internet search, internet or application search history, any application chat or communication history from his phone, computer, tablet or any other electronic device without the prior consent of a DSO.

120. The defendant must provide consent for his telephone provider and internet service provider to share information about his accounts with a DSO.

Part J: Search and seizure

121. The defendant must submit to the search of any item or place in his possession or under his control, including his residence, any vehicle in which he is traveling or which is under his effective control, any computer, electronic and communication device, or any storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility; and to the seizure of any object located during the search.

122. The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure carried out pursuant to this Order.

Part K: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material

123. Without prior approval of the DSO, the defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified or material that would be classified as Refused Classification, X18+, Restricted Category 2 and Restricted Category 1, or any other material as directed by a DSO with respect to concerns related to risk of committing a serious offence.

Part L: Personal details and appearance

124. The defendant must not change his name from “Kenneth Barry Cannon” or use any other name without notifying a DSO.

125. The defendant must not significantly change his appearance without the approval of a DSO.

126. The defendant must let a DSO photograph him, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to his appearance.

127. If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide a DSO with such details.

Part M: Medical intervention and treatment

128. The defendant must undergo ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by a DSO, including any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.

129. The defendant must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults.

130. The defendant must take medications that are prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioners for treatment of his mental health only in the manner prescribed.

131. The defendant must notify a DSO immediately if he ceases to take or declines to commence taking any medication as referred to in the above condition recommended or prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioner for the treatment of his mental health.

132. The defendant must agree to his treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on his progress and attendance, and information he has told them, with each other and with a DSO.

59A. The defendant must agree to his healthcare practitioners sharing information with the DSO as to the fact of his attendance at appointments and his overall progress in therapy or counselling including the practitioner’s general opinion as to his development of insight into offending risk factors and strategies to abstain from substance abuse.

133. The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

134. The defendant must agree to the disclosure of his criminal history to any healthcare professionals that are treating him.

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Decision last updated: 14 February 2023