State of New South Wales v Bugmy (No 2)

[2016] NSWSC 1432

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	State of New South Wales v Bugmy (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1432
Hearing dates:	23 September 2016
Date of orders:	30 September 2016
Decision date:	07 October 2016
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Button J
Decision:	(1) The defendant is subject to a continuing detention order for a period of 12 months commencing on 10 October 2016 and expiring on 9 October 2017. (2) The Court is to issue a warrant for the committal of the defendant to a correctional centre for the period specified in order 1. (3) The defendant is subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 3 years from the date of the expiry of the continuing detention order. To express my order another way, the extended supervision order is to commence on 9 October 2017, and expire on 8 October 2020. (4) For the period specified in order 3 above, the defendant must comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to the Summons of 12 July 2016.
Catchwords:	CIVIL – Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) – application for continuing detention order – final hearing – high risk violent offender – whether an extended supervision order would be adequate – whether appropriate accommodation is available – continuing detention order made
Legislation Cited:	Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), ss 3(1), 4, 5A, 5A(1)(a), 5A(2A)(b), 5A(3)(a), 5E, 5G(1), 13(1), 17(4), 18(3), 18CA
Cases Cited:	State of New South Wales v Bugmy (preliminary hearing) [2016] NSWSC 1128
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	State of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Damien Charles Bugmy (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: P Aitken (Plaintiff) M Johnston SC (Defendant)   Solicitors: Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff) Legal Aid New South Wales (Defendant)
File Number(s):	2016/210721

Judgment

Background

1. Mr Damien Bugmy (the defendant) was born in February 1981, and accordingly is 35 years of age. An Aboriginal man, he grew up in the area of Wilcannia, in far western New South Wales. Although he has given various descriptions of his upbringing, I am satisfied that, from an early age, he was damaged by the violence and abuse of alcohol and prohibited drugs of those around him. That damage has never been able to be repaired.

2. He himself began to abuse alcohol and a wide variety of prohibited drugs from the age of 13. He left school at 14, and has never worked for more than 2 weeks. He is unable to read or write, and has never held a licence to drive a motor vehicle. I accept the opinion of Professor Susan Hayes that he is functioning at an intellectual level lower than that of 99% of the Australian population, though whether that is as a result of a developmental disability or profound disadvantage is unclear.

3. The defendant has four children and two grandchildren, but for reasons that will become apparent shortly he has had little contact with them for many years.

4. He is not in good physical health, and despite his relative youth already suffers from high blood pressure and non-insulin dependent diabetes. He is currently taking a mood-stabilising drug and methadone.

Criminal history

5. Regrettably, the infliction of violence by the defendant on other persons, including with weapons, has been a recurrent, indeed continuous, theme in his life for over 20 years. I proceed to provide a thumbnail sketch of his criminal record, with particular emphasis on crimes of violence.

6. The defendant first intersected with the criminal justice system when he was placed on a bond by the Children’s Court at Wilcannia for illegally using a motor vehicle. That was in December 1993, when he was 12 years old. I shall not recount in detail his subsequent offences for dishonesty; suffice to say they are numerous.

7. In 1995, he was placed on a control order for 4 months by the Children’s Court at Wilcannia for malicious wounding. In a nutshell, the defendant and another young person approached a 66 year old man who was in his car, and requested a cigarette. When he declined, the other young person smashed the windows of the car, and the defendant stabbed the victim in the top of the right forearm with a knife. Both the defendant and the other young person fled the scene and jumped into a river.

8. In January 1996, in the Children’s Court at Deniliquin, he was sentenced to a control order for 6 months for an offence of robbery. He accepted that he had stolen petrol from a tin in an unlocked motor vehicle of the victim with another young person, poured the petrol into a bottle, and sniffed the petrol fumes. The element of force or threat of force is not clear on the evidence placed before me.

9. In December 1996, in the Children’s Court at Wilcannia, he was fined for the offence of common assault.

10. In March 1998, in the Children’s Court at Broken Hill, he was placed on a 3 month control order for assault occasioning actual bodily harm (his criminal record is unclear as to whether he received a greater sentence than that; I proceed on the basis of the lesser sentence). On the same day, he was sentenced to a concurrent control order for two charges of assaulting a police officer acting in the execution of his or her duty.

11. On the same day and in the same Court, he was placed on a control order for 9 months with a non-probation period of 3 months. That was for one charge of malicious wounding. In a nutshell, he struck his mother in the face with a broken beer bottle. When arrested, he yelled “when I get out I am going to come back here and cut your fucken throat. Your [sic] fucken gone you slut.”.

12. In December 1999, the defendant was placed on a control order for 3 months for one charge of common assault. On the same day, he was placed on various concurrent control orders for offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and breaching an apprehended domestic violence order.

13. On 17 August 2000, the defendant (by then aged 19 years and 5 months) was sentenced for two counts of malicious wounding in the District Court of New South Wales.

14. In short, he had been drinking with the male victim and there had been a disagreement resulting in a fist fight. The two men had then walked to another location, and another disagreement developed. The defendant obtained a carving knife and struck out towards the victim while the latter tried to defend himself. The defendant then broke a glass, approached the victim with the knife and the broken glass, and proceeded to stab him.

15. The second count related to an argument between the defendant and his girlfriend that resulted in him hitting her with a bottle, kicking her in the head, and then obtaining a knife and stabbing her in the shoulder.

16. In the remarks on sentence of that date, Judge Job QC said “… these are very serious charges involving the use of knives” at p 6, and “I cannot get over the objective seriousness of the offences” at p 13. A total sentence of imprisonment of 5 years with a total non-parole period of 2 years was imposed.

17. The defendant was released to parole pursuant to that sentence. However, his parole was revoked by the Parole Board and he returned to custody to serve his balance of parole.

18. In October 2003, in the Local Court at Broken Hill, the defendant was imprisoned for 1 year and 3 months with a non-parole period of 9 months for two charges of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

19. On 15 June 2006, in the District Court at Broken Hill, Judge Hosking SC sentenced the defendant to a head sentence of 4 years with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months for one count of malicious wounding. The facts in short were that the defendant and his romantic partner were leaving a social gathering when the defendant started to punch her to the chest. He then hit her in the face with a bottle of beer, causing her to fall to the ground and bleed profusely from a cut to her temple.

20. In July 2006, the defendant was imprisoned by the Local Court at Broken Hill for 6 months for one charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. That sentence was wholly concurrent with the sentence imposed in the District Court the month before.

21. On 15 June 2008, the defendant was charged with the murder of his de facto, Ms Anita Williams. To state the facts of that allegation very succinctly, whilst grossly affected by alcohol, the defendant stabbed the deceased twice in the back, fatally piercing her heart. He had been expressly asked by those at the social event from which he departed shortly before the killing not to inflict violence upon the deceased. After the fatal stabbing, he attempted to stab himself to death. At the time, the defendant was on parole for malicious wounding, although it seems that, because he was living in the small and isolated town of Ivanhoe at the time, he was not receiving supervision of any intensity.

22. At one stage, the defendant was found unfit to stand trial for homicide on the basis of his intellectual disability. Ultimately, he was judged fit to do so. The allegation was resolved by way of a plea of guilty to manslaughter, on the basis that the defendant had committed an unlawful and dangerous act.

23. In her remarks on sentence of 7 April 2011, McCallum J sought to balance, on the one hand, the extremely deprived upbringing and life of the defendant, and the fact that he had never really been able to get the help that he undoubtedly needed; and, on the other hand, his entrenched tendency to violence against others (especially whilst intoxicated) that had culminated in a homicide calling for significant denunciation.

24. Her Honour imposed a head sentence of imprisonment of 8 years and 3 months, with a non-parole period of 5 years and 6 months, each to date from 14 June 2008.

25. It is pursuant to that sentence that the defendant was in custody until very recently. His non-parole period expired some time ago on 13 December 2013, but he was not released to parole. His head sentence expired entirely on 13 September 2016.

26. To summarise then the criminal record of the defendant as recounted above: he has been convicted of 14 offences of violence (including two counts of common assault and two counts of assaulting a police officer). He has been convicted of six offences that featured stabbing other persons with sharp implements, many of them knives, the most recent of which was fatal. He has committed many offences whilst subject to conditional liberty, including manslaughter. He was first incarcerated in an adult prison in October 1999. Since that time, he has lived in the community for a period of one month in 2000, three months in 2003, two months in 2005, and four months in 2008, before being returned to custody on each occasion. To express that another way, in total the defendant has been at liberty for 10 months in the past 17 years.

In custody

27. Separately, the defendant has presented a severe management problem whilst in custody. He has committed many offences against prison discipline. Focussing only on those committed during his most recent sentence, he was dealt with for fighting in 2010; failing to comply with drug tests on many occasions; two separate acts of intimidation in 2015; and one charge of fighting towards the end of the same year.

28. Of significant concern is the fact that, only three months ago, the defendant was suspended from the well-known Violent Offender Treatment Program (VOTP) for assaulting a prison officer.

29. As one would expect, very many psychological and psychiatric assessments have been made of the defendant over the years. Whether he actually suffers from a psychiatric illness has been controversial, and is not clear on the evidence before me, although I certainly accept that he labours under many psychological difficulties. Most recently, a psychologist employed by the Department of Corrective Services, Dr Richard Parker, has conducted a risk assessment of the defendant. Dr Parker has expressed the opinion that the defendant is “at high risk of further violent offending”. I regard that opinion, in all the circumstances that I have recounted, as being incontrovertible.

Procedural history

30. It was in that context that, on 16 August 2016, McCallum J made preliminary orders calling for the preparation of reports with regard to the defendant. Her Honour also imposed an interim detention order (IDO) of 28 days that commenced on 13 September 2016 (as I have said, the date of the complete expiry of the sentence for manslaughter) and expires on 10 October 2016: see State of New South Wales v Bugmy (preliminary hearing) [2016] NSWSC 1128.

31. The matter came before me on 23 September 2016 as an application for final orders, founded upon the summons of the State of New South Wales (the plaintiff) filed on 12 July 2016. The submission of the plaintiff was that I would make a continuing detention order (CDO) of 18 months, to be followed by an extended supervision order (ESO) of 3 years and 6 months. In the alternative, the submission of the plaintiff was that I should make an ESO of 5 years with extremely strict conditions.

32. On 30 September 2016, I imposed a CDO of 12 months to date from 10 October 2016, to be followed by an ESO of 3 years, and indicated that I would provide my reasons subsequently, but certainly during the currency of the IDO of McCallum J and before the CDO imposed by me was to commence. I adopted that course because accommodation that was open to the defendant would shortly become unavailable, and I did not think that that should simply slip away, whilst the matter was reserved, without the defendant and the plaintiff knowing what was to occur.

Position of the defendant

33. At the hearing before me, the defendant was represented by senior counsel very experienced in such matters. He conceded that all of the statutory tests for curtailing the liberty of his client had been made out (although, of course, his submission was that I would need to be separately satisfied of that proposition myself).

34. In particular, he accepted that the central test contained in s 5E of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act) had been established, in that I would be satisfied that “the offender is a high risk violent offender”. The entirety of that section is as follows:

5E High risk violent offender

(1) An offender can be made the subject of a high risk violent offender extended supervision order or a high risk violent offender continuing detention order as provided for by this Act if and only if the offender is a high risk violent offender.

(2) An offender is a high risk violent offender if the offender is a violent offender and the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious violence offence if he or she is not kept under supervision.

(3) The Supreme Court is not required to determine that the risk of a person committing a serious violence offence is more likely than not in order to determine that the person poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious violence offence.

35. His submission, however, was that I would not be satisfied, in accordance with s 5G(1) of the Act, that “adequate supervision will not be provided by an extended supervision order”. In other words, he submitted that I would not make a CDO, but would rather make an ESO on very strict conditions.

36. In short, subject to my acceptance of the concession of senior counsel, the real dispute calling for my resolution is whether to make a CDO to be followed by an ESO (as the plaintiff submits), or a very lengthy and strict ESO (as the defendant submits).

Evidence placed before me

37. At the hearing on 23 September 2016, the two reports ordered by McCallum J were placed before me, and their authors were called to give supplementary oral evidence.

38. Dr Martin, psychiatrist, expressed the view that use of prohibited drugs and alcohol is a very high risk factor for the defendant. He also considered that the defendant presents a high risk of future acts of violence. He considered that the proposed stringent conditions of an ESO were all reasonable, and would reduce the risk presented by the defendant to some extent. Dr Martin expressed the view, however, that the defendant presents a significant risk, regardless of the setting in which he may be placed.

39. The psychiatrist spoke of the dangerous combination of impulsivity with a pattern of use of lethal weapons. Dr Martin envisaged a period of supported housing for a period of years not months, and a need for supervision by way of (for example) imposition of a curfew, and strict supervision of any use of alcohol.

40. In summary, Dr Martin, expressed the view that there was little to be gained by the defendant from therapy in custody. Having said that, nor was he optimistic with regard to the prospects of rehabilitation in the community. Entirely as common sense would suggest, Dr Martin assessed the defendant as being “at high risk of future violence”.

41. Dr Martin suggested that the defendant could benefit from continuing mood-stabilising medication and methadone, each of which he has been content to receive in custody. The psychiatrist also suggested that medication that reduces one’s craving for alcohol could play a role, as could medication that causes one to have a violent and adverse physical reaction if one consumes alcohol. Having said all that, the generally pessimistic view of Dr Martin about the future of the defendant, whether incarcerated or at liberty, and expressed in his report of 1 September 2016, was maintained in the witness box.

42. Dr O’Dea, psychiatrist, expressed the view that the defendant possesses limited insight or remorse with regard to his offending, and said that that factor complicates engagement in treatment by the defendant and management of the risk he presents. The psychiatrist emphasised the ongoing problems with regard to mood on the part of the defendant, including anger, agitation, and aggression.

43. Dr O’Dea felt that future acts of violence could escalate quickly from a trivial interaction with another person. Dr O’Dea emphasised the importance of continued use of a mood-stabiliser, and noted that non-compliance with a regime of medication or use of alcohol would significantly elevate the risk that the defendant presents. He expressed the view that the defendant is suffering from a schizo-affective disorder and should receive treatment for it. He endorsed the use of medication designed to reduce a craving for alcohol, and spoke of medications being advisable on a long term basis. Like Dr Martin, Dr O’Dea spoke of the need for structured and supervised accommodation for years, not months.

44. Dr O’Dea also felt that therapy in custody would not be of great assistance. He endorsed an approach in which medication played a central role. He envisaged a rigorous regime whereby the defendant could be monitored closely, including with regard to his compliance with any prescribed medication. In his report of 6 September 2016, Dr O’Dea expressed the opinion that there would be “a high degree of probability that [the defendant] would pose an [sic] significant risk of committing a further ‘serious violence offence’”.

45. Separately, I was told from the Bar table by senior counsel for the defendant, without demur by his opponent, that the instructions of the defendant are now that he would be willing to take all and any medication prescribed for him, if it meant the difference between a CDO and an ESO.

46. As one would expect, the suitability of available accommodation largely underpinned the question of whether an ESO would be sufficient. The evidence before me was that a number of options in the community are simply unavailable. They are as follows.

47. First, the defendant will not be received at a Community Offender Support Program (COSP) because of his untreated proclivity for violence.

48. Secondly, he is not assessed as suitable for the Integration Support Centre (ISC) (a specialist form of COSP at Campbelltown) for the same reason.

49. Thirdly, he cannot be received at a residential drug and alcohol rehabilitation centre because he will be continuing on the methadone program, and there is a policy against accepting patients who are participating in opioid replacement therapy.

37. At the time of the hearing, the proposal of senior counsel for the defendant was that the defendant would live at Rainbow Lodge, in the inner city suburb of Glebe. The evidence was that it is a half-way house for Aboriginal men who have recently been released from custody. A bed was available for the defendant, was being kept open for him, and would be available for three months or a little more. Rainbow Lodge is staffed by a full time worker, and there is drug and alcohol counselling every two weeks or so. Senior community corrections officer, Ms Recquel Cook, who would be supervising the defendant if he were released to an ESO, had, previous to the hearing before me, expressed the opinion that Rainbow Lodge would be “perfect” for the defendant. She confirmed in the witness box that she was quite “comfortable” with the defendant going to live there.

38. Senior counsel made it clear that it was not his case that I should simply consider the appropriateness of Rainbow Lodge in isolation. In other words, he submitted that its suitability needed to be assessed in light of the panoply of other supervisory and rehabilitative measures that would be in place with regard to the defendant if he were subject to a strict ESO, not the least of which would be electronic monitoring. He submitted that that could, as a first step, be used to ensure that the defendant be confined to those premises 24 hours a day.

39. Senior counsel accepted that Rainbow Lodge could only accommodate the defendant for a period of three months or so. And he did not submit that I would impose an ESO for such a short period. He did submit, however, that at the end of that period, the defendant would either have succeeded (in which case, the evidence established that he would very likely be assessed as suitable for a COSP or the ISC), or he would have failed (in which case he would promptly be returned to custody for breaching his ESO).

40. In short, it was submitted that there is no reason to think that the rehabilitation of the defendant would be furthered by him remaining in custody; that extremely rigorous and restrictive conditions of an ESO could be imposed upon him; that the defendant had explicitly and advisedly consented to take all and any medications prescribed for him; that there is suitable accommodation available to him; that the very person in authority who would be responsible for him in the community was content with the proposal; and, finally, that the defendant would inevitably either succeed or fail over the next three months, with the result that I could be confident that at the end of that period he would be either received into a COSP or returned to custody.

41. Finally, my attention was invited to the relatively new mechanism in s 18CA of the Act whereby, if circumstances suddenly changed, the plaintiff can apply very urgently to have the defendant returned to custody, and can do so ex parte.

Determination

Statutory Preconditions

55. As I have said, there was no dispute about any statutory precondition for curtailing the liberty of the defendant. I am also satisfied of them, for the following reasons.

56. First, the manslaughter committed in 2008 and based on an unlawful and dangerous act is a “serious violence offence” as defined by s 5A of the Act, and in particular s 5A(1)(a), s 5A(2A)(b), and s 5A(3)(a) of the Act.

57. Secondly, by way of s 4 and s 5A of the Act, the defendant is a “violent offender” as defined.

58. Thirdly, I accept the concession made by senior counsel on behalf of the defendant that the central test contained in s 5E is made out. In other words, I am soundly satisfied that, if the defendant were released without any supervision, he “poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious violence offence if he… is not kept under supervision”. I say that not only because of the expert evidence that is unanimously supportive of that proposition, but also because of the following facts.

59. First, the criminal record of the defendant shows his entrenched proclivity to violence, his entrenched proclivity to use lethal weapons, and the fact that those two proclivities culminated in the homicide of a fellow human being when he was last at liberty 8 years ago.

60. Secondly, the defendant has spent 10 months out of custody in the past 17 years; all of those periods ended in failure and return to prison.

61. Thirdly, the defendant is dependent upon alcohol and prohibited drugs, each of which plays an undoubted criminogenic role in his life.

62. Fourthly, he is effectively untreated with regard to violence and, except by way of methadone, effectively untreated with regard to prohibited drugs and alcohol.

63. Fifthly and finally, he was suspended from an anti-violence program for an act of violence as recently as three months ago.

64. In combination, those factors lead inevitably to the conclusion that the test is made out. Accordingly, I accept the concession of senior counsel for the defendant.

CDO or ESO

65. In short, I respectfully agree that there is no question of the defendant being released without supervision. The only question is whether he should be released subject to an extremely stringent ESO, or detained for a time pursuant to a CDO.

66. As for that dispute, I respectfully lack the optimism of Ms Smith about the suitability of Rainbow Lodge.

67. It is true that it is the best option available to the defendant. But I do not accept that Rainbow Lodge is sufficiently rigorous to give effect to the primary purpose of the Act “to ensure the safety and protection of the community”: see s 3(1) of the Act. By that I mean that Rainbow Lodge is not a therapeutic, closed community like a residential drug and alcohol rehabilitation centre. Nor is it a highly structured place like a COSP.

68. Rather, it is a place where men can live for a short time after release. As the documents placed before me show, it does not include 24 hour monitoring of its residents. In particular, a case note attached to the affidavit of Ms Recquel Smith of 5 September 2016 states that there will be periods where the defendant is “left to his own devices”.

69. Furthermore, it seems to me imperative that the defendant obtain very intense help with regard to the abuse of alcohol and prohibited drugs that has occurred for over two decades and that is, as I have said, undoubtedly criminogenic. I do not regard therapy every two weeks as approaching what is required.

70. Whilst I unreservedly accept the good intentions of those who run Rainbow Lodge, and give due deference to the optimism of Ms Smith, I think that, regrettably, if released to that facility the defendant could present a very real risk of violence to members of the community. And I include in that class of person other residents of Rainbow Lodge.

71. In particular, I consider that, whatever the rules of that facility may be, it is possible that the defendant could consume alcohol or prohibited drugs there. I also think that the defendant could readily perceive himself as having been provoked or made an object of disrespect by another resident over some trivial or mundane dispute, as he has perceived himself as being on many other occasions in the past. If the defendant were intoxicated by alcohol or prohibited drugs, or if he believed that he had been mistreated, and in particular if those things were to happen at the same time, that could lead to an act of violence by the defendant with catastrophic results.

72. To be clear, despite the expert evidence of Dr Parker (and Ms Matsuo) that a return to violence prevention therapy in custody could be of assistance to the defendant, I certainly do not propose to detain him in order to facilitate his rehabilitation in custody. I say that not only because the evidence placed before me on that topic is equivocal, but also because that is not the function that I am called upon by Parliament to exercise. Rather, it is simply a matter of me coming to the view that what is available to the defendant if he were released pursuant to an ESO would insufficiently protect the community. And I say that whilst well aware of the rigour of the conditions of the ESO proposed by the plaintiff and accepted by the defendant.

73. In short, I am persuaded by the plaintiff, in accordance with s 5G(1) of the Act, that adequate supervision will not be provided by an ESO. That is because I consider that the accommodation available to the defendant is insufficiently structured and rigorous. I cannot accept that it is appropriate for the defendant to be released to a reasonably open half-way house; to the contrary, I consider that that would present a real danger of serious physical violence to other persons.

74. I am also satisfied, with regard to s 5G(1) of the Act, that I should not exercise a discretion not to impose a CDO. I say that because of the same concern: the risk of catastrophic violence to members of the community.

75. Finally, I have not recounted seriatim in this judgment all of the factors mandated to be considered by me by s 17(4) of the Act. I have referred myself to the section, and believe that this judgment refers to all of them, albeit briefly in some cases.

Length of CDO and ESO

76. Turning to the length of the CDO that should be imposed, I do not accept that it should extend for 18 months in order to permit the defendant comfortably to complete a further violence prevention program. Apart from anything else, as senior counsel for the defendant submitted, the defendant has recently returned to such a program, and it is possible that he will complete it quickly. As well as that, I do not consider that citizens should be detained for periods that are extended merely to facilitate their rehabilitation. I consider that a CDO of 12 months is sufficient in the circumstances of this case.

77. Similarly, and contrary to the submission of the plaintiff, I consider that a subsequent ESO of 3 years would also be sufficient. I say that because I am reluctant to make predictions that restrict the liberty of the defendant four years from now, when much could change between now and then.

78. As well as that, I am mindful of the flexibility that the Act provides to both parties (by way of the ability to apply to vary an ESO in s 13(1) of the Act and the ability to apply for a second or subsequent CDO in s 18(3) of the Act) if the length of the CDO and the ESO imposed by me is thought to be inappropriate, in due course. In those circumstances, I think I should err on the side of brevity with regard to the length of periods of deprivation or diminution of liberty.

Orders

79. It is for those reasons that I made the following orders on 30 September 2016:

1. The defendant is subject to a continuing detention order for a period of 12 months commencing on 10 October 2016 and expiring on 9 October 2017.

2. The Court is to issue a warrant for the committal of the defendant to a correctional centre for the period specified in order 1.

3. The defendant is subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 3 years from the date of the expiry of the continuing detention order. To express my order another way, the extended supervision order is to commence on 9 October 2017, and expire on 8 October 2020.

4. For the period specified in order 3 above, the defendant must comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule (31.3 KB, pdf) to the Summons of 12 July 2016.

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Decision last updated: 07 October 2016