Starcevich and Repatriation Commission
[2005] AATA 629
•30 June 2005
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2005] AATA 629
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No W2004/313
VETERANS’ APPEALS DIVISION ) Re GEORGE EDWARD STARCEVICH Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Brigadier R D F Lloyd, Member Date30 June 2005
PlacePerth
Decision The Tribunal decides:
1. to vary the VRB decision under review by amending the diagnosis of the condition claimed to be PTSD and Alcohol Abuse;
2. to accept the two conditions PTSD and Alcohol Abuse as service related, with effect from 9 September 2002; and
3. to remit the matter of assessment of incapacity from these two conditions, together with all previously accepted disabilities, to the respondent.
.........(sgd R D F Lloyd)..........
Member
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS – Veterans’ Entitlements – ex Royal Australian Navy (cook) – deemed operational service and eligible defence service – Anxiety Disorder / Depression and Alcohol Abuse / Dependence war and/or defence related(?) – diagnosis of claimed conditions varied to PTSD and Alcohol Abuse – both accepted as service related – assessment remitted to respondent
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) ss 120(1), 120(3), 120(4), 120A, 157(2)
Statement of Principle Concerning Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Instrument No 3 and No 4 of 1999 – as amended)
Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse (Instrument No 76 and No 77 of 1998)
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82
Stoddart v Repatriation Commission [2003] FCA 334
Lees v Repatriation Commission [2002] FCAFC 398
Mines v Repatriation Commission [2004] FCA 1331
REASONS FOR DECISION
30 June 2005 Brigadier R D F Lloyd, Member 1. This is an application before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) by George Edward Starcevich (“the applicant”) for a review of a decision by the Veterans’ Review Board (“the VRB”) dated 13 August 2004. The VRB decision varied an earlier decision by the Repatriation Commission (“the Respondent”) of 15 May 2003 by changing the description of the applicant’s claimed condition(s) from Depressive Disorder and Alcohol Dependence or Abuse, to that of Generalised Anxiety Disorder (“GAD”) and Major Depression. It then nevertheless decided that neither of these two conditions, as varied, was war or defence-caused.
2. The applicant attended the Tribunal hearing but at his choice was not assisted by an advocate. The respondent was represented by Mr C Ponnuthurai. The Tribunal had before it the documents filed pursuant to s37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Act 1975 (“the T documents”), and in addition the following document was taken into evidence at the request of the applicant:
·Exhibit A1: Letter by G E Starcevich dated 17/02/2005 (addressed in error to the Veterans’ Review Board, but intended for and in fact received by the Tribunal)
No additional documentary evidence was provided by the respondent.
3. At the hearing the applicant gave oral evidence. In so doing he was given considerable assistance by the respondent’s representative, who also questioned and cross-examined Mr Starcevich. Additionally, the applicant answered questions raised by the Tribunal. As a consequence the Tribunal regards him as an apparently credible and forthright witness, albeit he readily admits – with admirable honesty – that there are earlier events he doesn’t recall at all and some, although of significance, he is very hazy about. Additionally he acknowledges that in some instances he is uncertain whether incidents he does recall actually occurred, what the source of any related information is or was, nor its accuracy etc. Nevertheless his oral evidence, in particular, was helpful.
4. Under the circumstances outlined above the Tribunal has considerable difficulty in satisfying itself as to the reliability of some evidence, both documented and oral, despite the applicant’s attempts to clarify and assist in this regard at the hearing. For the same reasons, in the Tribunal’s opinion it throws into doubt the accuracy and / or value of some of the conclusions reached in the medical opinion evidence before the Tribunal.
5. Furthermore, apart from Mr Starcevich himself, no additional witnesses were called by the applicant, which may have helped the Tribunal and him if he had. Two respondent witnesses gave oral evidence, both by conference telephone in the hearing room. These were:
·Dr A J Mander – Consultant Psychiatrist of Nedlands WA; and
·Commodore P M Mulcare – RAN (Rtd) of Writeway Research Services.
6. It was commented at the hearing that Dr Fellows-Smith, a psychiatrist who had earlier seen the applicant, had not been made available to give oral evidence and to be questioned by the Tribunal. This omission due to unavailability was considered by the Tribunal and under the circumstances, particularly with Dr Fellows-Smith’s reports being available in the T documents, the Tribunal is satisfied that no material disadvantage occurred. The applicant raised no objection in this regard at the time and later expressed his gratitude for the manner in which the hearing was conducted – both the Tribunal and Mr Ponnuthurai having provided him with considerable assistance.
Applicant’s Eligible Service and Related Matters of Law
7. Mr Starcevich served in the Royal Australian Navy (“the RAN”) from 1965 to 1985. His eligible service under the Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (“the Act”) is however limited to the following periods.
(a)Operational Service: Deemed allotted for duty in an operational area – on board HMAS Sydney’s eight voyages to and from Vietnam as follows:
15 February to 4 March 1971
26 March to 8 April 1971
13 May to 1 June 1971
20 September to 16 October 1971
26 October to 18 November 1971
24 November to 17 December 1971
14 February to 9 March 1972
1 November to 30 November 1972
(b)Eligible Defence Service: 7 December 1972 to 5 January 1985 (date of discharge from the RAN)
Note: The question was raised at the hearing as to whether HMAS Diamantina (in which ship the applicant had served) had been allotted for operational service in the FESR. A post-hearing check was made of this on behalf of the Tribunal. The result is that no such allotment instrument was issued for Diamantina.
8. For the applicant’s operational service periods the matter before the Tribunal is to be determined in accordance with s 120(1) and s 120(3) of the Act. Under these provisions the Tribunal is required to decide whether, on the material before it, there is raised a reasonable hypothesis to connect the claimed conditions with this service. If so, it must determine, based on the facts before it that the conditions are war-caused unless it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is no sufficient ground for doing so. The Tribunal’s manner of consideration follows the process set out in Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82.
9. For the applicant’s eligible defence service, as defined in the Act, the matter is to be determined in accordance with s 120(4) of the Act. Under this provision, the Tribunal is required to decide the matter to its reasonable satisfaction – that is, on the balance of probabilities.
10. Additionally, as the claim was lodged after 1 June 1994, by virtue of s 120A of the Act, the Tribunal is required to assess the matter in accordance with any relevant Statement of Principle (“SoP”) issued by the Repatriation Medical Authority (“RMA”).
Diagnosis of Claimed Conditions and Clinical Onset
11. As the initial step in its review process the Tribunal must be relevantly satisfied as to the appropriateness of the diagnosis and description of the claimed conditions suffered by the applicant within the assessment period. It is common ground that the assessment period in this case is from 9 December 2002 to the present.
12. The standard of proof in establishing the appropriate diagnosis/description of Mr Starcevich’s conditions now claimed is that of reasonable satisfaction, i.e., on the balance of probabilities. In this case, the Tribunal finds this process to be an unduly difficult one, caused largely by the differing medical opinion evidence before it concerning diagnoses of the applicant’s psychiatric conditions.
13. I do not intend setting out fully the evidence in regard to this diagnostic matter, but rather to summarise relevant aspects. The detail is adequately covered in the T documents, eg. in the specialist doctors medical reports, the VRB’s two Decisions and Reasons, and in the transcript of this Tribunal’s hearing (“the Tribunal Transcript”). The summary is as follows:
(a)Dr S Hodgson (Consultant Psychiatrist)
· Having been duly referred, the applicant was examined in January 2003 by Dr Hodgson and her report dated 4 February 2003 is at T7 pages 43-46. She was at the time evidently addressing the applicant’s immediate condition(s); however the Tribunal notes that the date of examination is just within the official assessment period for this case. The Tribunal is not of the view that Dr Hodgson’s opinion should be discounted, as was the stated decision of the VRB. It is believed that parts of her report are relevant and the Tribunal takes account of these.
· Dr Hodgson’s diagnosis of psychiatric illness was that of major depression with symptoms occurring in conjunction with a fall (by the applicant) in March 2002, exacerbated by the effects of suicide of a friend. The doctor opined that there was “…a relationship of a major depression to his service history”, but gave no reasons or basis for reaching that conclusion.
· Dr Hodgson also diagnosed alcohol dependence, with symptoms still current at the time of examination, and being related to the onset of the applicant’s depressive disorder.
· In the report by Dr Hodgson she states “…There are no symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder”.
(b)Dr Fellows-Smith (Psychiatrist)
· Having been referred for a further psychiatric opinion, the applicant was examined by Dr Fellows-Smith in October 2003 and his report dated 31 October 2003 is at T14 pages 66-68.
· Dr Fellows-Smith’s diagnosis was that on examination, in his opinion, the applicant presented with “…Post Traumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD] and Alcohol Dependence Syndrome in partial remission….”. He went on to state his medical opinion was that these conditions were directly due to his operational service in Vietnam.
· Dr Fellows-Smith sets out the basis for his assertion of this casual relationship in his report and with reference to DSM IV. He opines that the clinical onset of the condition {PTSD) as being “…soon after his [Mr Starcevich’s] return from Vietnam.” As the applicant returned some eight or more times from Vietnam the Tribunal nevertheless assumes that Dr Fellows-Smith means that he believes the PTSD onset was in 1971/72.
(c)Dr A J Mander (Consultant Psychiatrist)
· The VRB, faced with these conflicting psychiatric diagnoses at its review on 16 February 2004, requested that a further medical examination of the applicant be conducted by an independent psychiatrist and that a report be provided. The report was to include medical opinion information concerning a list of matters raised by the VRB (T15 pages 70-71).
· The independent psychiatrist chosen by DVA to undertake this was Dr Mander, who examined Mr Starcevich on 21 April 2004. His report dated 11 May 2004 is at T17 pages 73-78. As is obvious from its content, it is a comprehensive report, covering a lot of relevant ground – as clearly it was intended to do, at the request of the VRB.
· The applicant had indicated (Exhibit A1 also refers) that he was somewhat unhappy with Dr Mander’s method of examination of him in April 2004. However, as a consequence of the hearing and the oral evidence given by both the applicant and Dr Mander, this aspect seems to the Tribunal to have been largely resolved. In any case the Tribunal is satisfied that there was nothing inappropriate about Dr Mander’s examination that warranted comment or that affected the course of this review. The error in quantity of beer consumed by the applicant per day contained in Dr Mander’s report was noted and corrected.
· Dr Mander’s opinion evidence in his report covers in detail the reports by Dr Hodgson and Dr Fellows-Smith as well as providing his own diagnosis. He disagrees with the differing opinions of both his colleagues. He conducted the official SI-PTSD test on the applicant which in his opinion resulted in the applicant not satisfying symptomatically the criteria (B) for the diagnosis of PTSD and he opines that clinically he does not believe he satisfies criteria (A) either. This is directly contrary to Dr Fellows-Smith’s opinion as far as the diagnosis of PTSD is concerned.
· Dr Mander’s examination concerning alcohol, even subsequently taking the intake quantity error into account, results in him finding no evidence of alcohol dependence, as distinct from abuse.
· The final conclusion in Dr Mander’s May 2004 report is a diagnosis of Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD), and a raised alcohol intake (Alcohol Abuse? but not Alcohol Dependence). He also comments on a past history of one episode of major depression following a series of adverse life events. Dr Mander concludes with the statement “I could find no connection between these diagnoses and the Veteran’s service.”
· Dr Mander gave oral evidence at the hearing (the Tribunal Transcript refers). This augmented his May 2004 report and helped clarify some issues. The major aspects were as follows:
(i)Based on the amended/corrected evidence, Dr Mander is now of the opinion (liver tests aside) that the applicant does suffer from the condition of ‘Alcohol Abuse’ (but not ‘Alcohol Dependence’).
(ii)Based on the additional evidence provided to him by the Tribunal, Dr Mander opined in his oral evidence that subject to the Tribunal’s positive findings “…it’s possible that PTSD is a reasonable diagnosis … but I couldn’t go as far as to say it’s probable”. He concluded with the statement that, based on all the evidence he had heard – including that updated to him at the hearing – he would maintain his original diagnosis of GAD not service caused.
14. From all the medical evidence before the Tribunal, despite the conflicts contained in that evidence, it is clear that Mr Starcevich suffers from a form of psychiatric disorder. Whilst the SoPs were mentioned as part of the diagnostic process, the Tribunal has refrained from the use of these documents in this regard, in accordance with the related findings made by the Federal Court. Having carefully weighed the medical evidence and that provided by the applicant, the Tribunal is reasonably satisfied, i.e. on the balance of probabilities, that the appropriate diagnosis of the applicant’s psychiatric condition is PTSD.
15. It does so largely on the basis of Dr Fellows-Smith’s strongly held opinion and despite the Tribunal having some disagreement with that doctor’s apparent picture of the ‘warlike’ conditions involved. It does so also despite the contrary opinion of Dr Hodgson of ‘not PTSD’, about which she did not substantiate. Understandably her main concern was for the depression episode being experienced by the applicant at that time. And finally the Tribunal settles on the PTSD diagnosis assisted by the evidence of Dr Mander, who in the end opined that a PTSD diagnosis is possible subject to the Tribunal being satisfied of specific symptoms based on newly provided evidence. The Tribunal is relevantly satisfied in that respect and whilst alert to the ‘possible’ versus ‘probable’ argument and of Dr Mander’s careful choice of words in that respect, it nevertheless comes down in favour of the PTSD diagnosis.
16. Again despite conflicting medical evidence, the Tribunal is reasonably satisfied that the applicant also has a significant alcohol problem and that the appropriate diagnosis of this second condition is ‘Alcohol Abuse’.
17. There is further difficulty in this diagnostic area of the review – in ascertaining from the evidence the time of clinical onset for the two conditions involved, now clarified by the Tribunal as being PTSD and Alcohol Abuse. Whilst this aspect is not as critical for PTSD in terms of review as it is for other psychiatric disorders, the Tribunal sees the need for it to examine the evidence in this regard.
(d)PTSD
· The evidence as to onset is complicated by the fact that the diagnoses by the medical experts differs. Nevertheless the Tribunal drew as much as it could from the evidence of each concerning the applicant’s psychiatric condition as perceived by them at the time.
· Dr Fellows-Smith for example, who diagnoses PTSD, says the onset of the condition was “…soon after his return from Vietnam…” (i.e. approximately 1972). This opinion, some 30 years later, was apparently based heavily on a comment by Mr Starcevich’s wife that at the time she had noticed differences/changes in her husband’s behaviour “…on his return….”. The Tribunal’s opinion in this regard is based on considerable first-hand and relevant experience of this very point and it is experience of which both parties are aware. Such changes, in the Tribunal’s experience, stated to have been noticed by Mrs Starcevich, are to be expected. They are relatively normal for someone exposed to a combat situation, albeit in this case for very short periods and then not in a directly confronting sense either. The Tribunal’s opinion is that one would be more concerned if such changes in behaviour were not evident. Furthermore medical opinion evidence is that when they are noticeable, this on its own does not necessarily indicate the onset or presence of a clinically evident psychiatric condition.
· Dr Hodgson saw Mr Starcevich in January 2003 and she described the applicant as having a psychiatric disorder at that time (and diagnosed Major Depression). In her report (T7 Pages 43-46) she gives the onset of these psychiatric symptoms as being in conjunction with a fall in March 2002, the later suicide of a close friend and the death of the applicant’s sister. The doctor also opined a service relationship to his condition but the Tribunal is unable to ascertain her reason for doing so, including any onset relationship, from the evidence available. Additionally the relevance is questionable as the weight of evidence points to the Major Depression condition being a one episode short term affair, albeit some minor depression symptoms may continue, encompassed in his more significant psychiatric disorder (now diagnosed as PTSD).
· Dr Mander’s primary diagnosis of a psychiatric condition relates to GAD, although his subsequent oral evidence entertains the possibility of PTSD. He gives no specific opinion in the latter evidence as to when the onset of a possible condition of PTSD may have been. In his 2004 report (T17 pages 73-78) Dr Mander opines that relevant psychiatric symptoms were of a “…recent origin…”. His evidence did clearly indicate that in his opinion any PTSD (or other psychiatric condition) onset would have been post discharge from the Navy. He also pointed to his post discharge employment activity to substantiate his view that any significant onset of problems was of a more recent nature.
· As a consequence of the above and the overall evidence available to it regarding this aspect, including the oral evidence given by the applicant, the Tribunal (albeit with difficulty) reaches the position where it is relevantly satisfied that the clinical onset of the applicant’s PTSD is in the late 1990’s.
(b)Alcohol Abuse
· Unclear evidence on this subject also is presented to the Tribunal. However it seems that Mr Starcevich’s drinking habit, as a member of the RAN, goes back to his early days in the Service. ‘Abuse”, as defined, is however another matter altogether.
· Dr Hodgson’s evidence in her 2003 report states in part that the increase in consumption has been “gradual over the years – in particular the past two years and he now [2003] drinks 1 – 4 750ml beers daily … symptoms still current.”
· The applicant’s Service records do not indicate any noted drinking problems or recorded drinking related offences up to the time of discharge (1985). His own evidence confirms this observation and indicates that consumption increased post discharge. That picture of significant alcohol abuse, and by his evidence routinely 4 bottles per day (sometimes more), was a situation which was not identifiable as such until well after discharge. The Tribunal is relevantly satisfied the abuse onset to be around the early 2000’s and it is unable to be more precise than that.
18. In summary, concerning the diagnoses of the conditions found relevant to the applicant’s claim, based on the material available as outlined, the Tribunal is reasonably satisfied that the conditions are:
(e)PTSD with a clinical onset in the late 1990s; and
(f)Alcohol Abuse with a clinical onset of the condition in the early 2000s.
There is the additional matter in the assessment period of one isolated episode of Major Depression in 2002 following a number of non-Service life events. The Tribunal is reasonably satisfied that this did not become an on-going condition in its own right. Based on the weight of medical opinion evidence made available it seems that any depression symptoms the applicant has should more appropriately be regarded as being encompassed in the wider category of PTSD. The Tribunal therefore varies from the VRB in this respect and does not pursue this condition further in its review.
Applicant’s Contentions
19. The applicant’s contention is that he suffers from a psychiatric condition (PTSD) which he maintains is the result of incidents he experienced during his eligible periods of service in the RAN. In this regard he says he felt at the time of these incidents fear, stress and/or horror and has had resultant difficulties since – which currently continue. He therefore contends that his present psychiatric condition (determined by the Tribunal to be PTSD) was caused or contributed to in a material degree by his defence and war service.
20. Coupled with this, the applicant’s alcohol consumption has increased to the point where it is formally diagnosed as Alcohol Abuse. Mr Starcevich contends that this increase is the result of his stressful experiences during eligible service, or is a consequence of his service caused PTSD. The Tribunal notes that the respondent accepts that if PTSD is determined to be service caused then the acceptance of the condition of Alcohol Abuse would not be contested. The Tribunal agrees that this should be the case – subject to any subsequent finding to the contrary in its review.
21. Again following the process as set out in the Federal Court’s decision in Deledio, the Tribunal then considered the relevant material before it in relation to the contentions raised – but without at this stage making findings of fact. As a consequence the Tribunal is satisfied that the material adequately points to a hypothesis connecting the conditions of PTSD and Alcohol Abuse with his war (or defence) service.
Statements of Principle
22. There are SoPs in force, determined by the RMA, dealing with the conditions involved and it is common ground that these are:
(g)PTSD
· For operational service - Instrument No. 3 of 1999 (as amended)
· For defence service - Instrument No. 4 of 1999 (as amended)
(b) Alcohol Abuse
· For operational service - Instrument No.76 of 1998
· For defence service - Instrument No 77 of 1998
23. Because of the reliance placed on the decision relating to PTSD, for the Alcohol Abuse claim as well, the Tribunal dealt with this aspect in full first. The only relevant factor of those stipulated in the two PTSD SoPs is factor 5(a), which states:
“(a) experiencing a severe stressor prior to the clinical onset of post traumatic stress disorder; or”
24. The Tribunal notes that both SoPs (as amended) were current at the time of the respondent’s May 2003 decision (but of course were not used due to a differently diagnosed condition), and remain current a the time of this Tribunal’s decision. It is further noted that no time gap is stipulated between experiencing the stressor(s) and the onset of the PTSD condition (paragraph 17 of these Reasons refers).
25. The term ‘experiencing a severe stressor’ is defined in both SoPs at paragraph 8 (as amended), as follows:
“experiencing a severe stressor means the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threat of death or serious injury, or a threat to the person’s, or another person’s physical integrity.
In the setting of service in the Defence Force, or other service where the Veterans’ Entitlements Act applies, events that qualify as severe stressors include:
(i) threat of serious injury or death; or
(ii) engagement with the enemy; or
(iii) witnessing casualties or participation in or observation of casualty clearance, atrocities or abusive violence;”
Applicant’s Evidence
26. The applicant’s evidence of what he describes as stressful incidents/events during his Navy service is set out in the combination of the T documents (including the applicant’s statements and the psychiatrists’ reports), Exhibit A1 – Mr Starcevich’s letter of 17 February 2005, the Decision and Reasons of the VRB and the Tribunal Transcript. The evidence is not repeated here, however in summary the major aspects in outline are:
(a)Incidents whilst on board HMAS Sydney during that ship’s visits to Vung Tau Harbour, Vietnam 1971-72. These include: use of scare charges; circumstances involving the death of a ship’s officer; a body in the water; concern for soldiers killed in action in Vietnam who he may have known; etc.
(b)Other incidents include: in Jakarta being held at gun point and threatened; being rounded up with others and stopped by armed ‘soldiers’ pointing their weapons while he was filming on leave in the Seychelles (or Maldives?); going aground in North American waters; going overboard into shark infested waters twice; etc.
(c)Other events about which it is not sufficiently clear to the Tribunal (or the applicant) from the evidence whether they involved eligible service or not.
27. Based on the relevant evidence available, the Tribunal has some misgivings in being sufficiently satisfied that one or more of these incidents meets the requirements of the ‘template’ of the SoP. However the Tribunal considers that the applicant is a man who tends to significantly understate things that have occurred in this respect and the evidence of Dr Mander is that he would agree that Mr Starcevich is “…a pretty stoical sort of person…”. This attitude may help explain matters, including some of his replies to Dr Mander in particular and to the Tribunal. Whilst the Tribunal has assessed the onset of PTSD as being in the 1990s, it may well be the case that the impact of the stressful events on him was greater than he has stated and that he put up with consequent problems from somewhat earlier than that time. From another point of view the Tribunal is aware of the importance, in a military sense, of the Starcevich (family) name and the effect this may have on the applicant’s attitude to his past service. However, in the end result the Tribunal found only little evidence of this and insufficient to affect the applicant’s portrayal of events. Additionally, the favourable opinion evidence of Dr Fellows-Smith regarding the applicant having experienced relevant stressors should be given due weight, unless found seriously at fault. Whilst the Tribunal is not entirely happy with the doctor’s understanding of the ‘warlike’ conditions involved, as has been previously mentioned his evidence in this regard is substantial and is appropriately weighted by the Tribunal in its assessment.
28. Taking all aspects as outlined into account, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the hypothesis raised regarding the applicant’s psychiatric condition, determined by the Tribunal to be PTSD, is reasonable in terms of the Act.
Tribunal’s Findings
29. The Tribunal makes the following findings of fact, based on the evidence as outlined:
(a)The applicant suffers from PTSD (rather than GAD and Major Depression), the clinical onset of which was approximately in the 1990s.
(b)He suffers from Alcohol Abuse, the clinical onset of which was approximately in the early 2000s.
(c)He has experienced one or more severe stressors, as defined in the relevant SoPs relating to PTSD, during his war and/or defence service.
30. Subject to the Tribunal determining that the applicant’s PTSD is service-caused/related, then his condition of Alcohol Abuse is also similarly caused/related.
Conclusion
31. By virtue of its findings as outlined and the total evidence available the Tribunal is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is no sufficient ground for accepting that the applicant’s PTSD is caused or contributed to in a material degree by his war or defence service.
32. Consequently the applicant’s condition of Alcohol Abuse is also accepted as being service related. The effective date of acceptance of both conditions, in accordance with s 157(2) of the Act is 9 September 2002.
Decision
33. For the above reasons as outlined and pursuant to s 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, the Tribunal decides as follows:
(a)To vary the VRB decision under review by amending the diagnosis of the conditions claimed to be PTSD and Alcohol Abuse.
(b)To accept the two conditions of PTSD and Alcohol Abuse as service-related with effect from 9 September 2002.
(c)To remit the matter of assessment of incapacity from those conditions, together with all previously accepted disabilities, to the respondent.
I certify that the 33 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Brigadier R D F Lloyd, Member
Signed: ........(Sgd D Brodie)......................................
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 28 April 2005
Date of Decision 30 June 2005
Solicitor for the Applicant Self represented
Advocate for the Respondent Mr C Ponnuthurai
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