Stanway v Information Commissioner

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Stanway v Information Commissioner & Anor [2019] QCATA 33

PARTIES:

ADAM STANWAY
(applicant/appellant)

v

INFORMATION COMMISSIONER

(first respondent)

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

(second respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

APL055-18

ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO/S:

313479

MATTER TYPE:

Appeals

DELIVERED ON:

25 March 2019

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Justice Daubney, President

ORDERS:

The appeal is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – REVIEW OF DECISIONS  – whether a deemed decision of refusal had been made – where a charges estimate notice was issued on the final day of the application processing period – whether pursuant to s 38 Acts Interpretation Act (Qld) the charges estimate notice could be considered as being issued prior to the application processing period expiring

Acts Interpretations Act 1954, s 38
Right to Information Act 2009, s 18, s 35, s 36, s 46, s 119

ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel [2014] 254 CLR 1
DHLD v Executive Director, Social Security Appeals Tribunal [2010] AATA 377
Stanway v Queensland Police Service [2018] QICmr 7

REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

Self-represented

First Respondent:

Self-represented

Second Respondent:

I Fraser, Senior Legal Officer, Queensland Police Service

APPEARANCES:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. On 24 July 2017, the applicant made an “access application”, within the meaning of that term in the Right to Information Act 2009 (“RTI Act”) to the second respondent.

  2. It was not in issue that the last day of the “processing period” (as defined in the RTI Act) for that access application was 29 August 2017.

  3. On 29 August 2017, the second respondent gave the applicant a charges estimate notice (“CEN”) pursuant to s 36 of the RTI Act and sought an extension of time of 20 business days to process the application. The giving of a CEN triggers a “revision period”, which does not count as part of the “processing period”.

  4. The applicant did not agree to the extension and then sought external review of what he contended had been a deemed decision to refuse access to the documents which were the subject of the access application, by virtue of the operation of s 36 of the RTI Act. The applicant’s contention, in short, was that the day on which the CEN was given (29 August 2017) ought be excluded in the calculation of the commencement of the “revision period” and that, on that basis, the processing period had expired before the revision period triggered by the CEN would have taken effect. On that argument, it followed that a deemed decision had been made when the processing period expired on 29 August 2017.

  5. On considering the application for external review, the first respondent rejected this argument, and found that, on a proper construction of the legislation, the date on which the CEN was given was the first day of the revision period, and because the…

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Details
Case
[2019] QCATA 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Stanway v Information Commissioner, the applicant contested the Information Commissioner’s refusal to review the decision to charge fees under the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld). The central issue in the appeal was whether a deemed decision of refusal had been made when a charges estimate notice was issued on the final day of the application processing period. The applicant argued that section 38 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) implied that the date on which the notice was given should be excluded from the revision period. The Information Commissioner, however, held that the wording of section 18 of the Right to Information Act indicated that the revision period should be calculated from and including the day of the notice. This interpretation, the Commissioner reasoned, ensured that the applicant had a full revision period to negotiate charges, which was crucial for striking a balance between efficient resource allocation and the community’s right to access government-held information.

The court was required to determine the proper interpretation of section 18 of the Right to Information Act in light of section 38 of the Acts Interpretation Act. The applicant's argument hinged on the exclusion of the date the charges estimate notice was given from the revision period. In contrast, the Commissioner asserted that the plain meaning of section 18, which includes the day of the notice, was consistent with the overall intention of the Right to Information Act to provide a balanced and fair process for both the applicant and the agency. The court considered whether the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Act was consistent with the legislative intent and whether the applicant’s proposed interpretation would unduly limit the agency's ability to assess charges. Ultimately, the court found that the Commissioner's interpretation aligned with the statutory language and legislative purpose.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Information Commissioner’s decision. The court upheld that the revision period should indeed include the date on which the charges estimate notice was given, thereby allowing the applicant a full period to negotiate charges. This interpretation was consistent with the statutory language and legislative intent, ensuring a balanced and fair process for both the applicant and the agency. The court concluded that the Commissioner’s decision was correct and that the applicant's argument did not align with the plain meaning and purpose of the Right to Information Act.

ORDERS:
The appeal is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Also relevant for this appeal is the operation of s 38(1) of the Acts Interpretations Act 1954 (“AIA”), which provides:(1) If a period beginning on a given day, act or event is provided or allowed for a purpose by an Act, the period is to be calculated by excluding the day, or the day of the act or event, and – (a) if the period is expressed to be a specified number of clear days or at least a specified number of days – by excluding the day on which the purpose is to be fulfilled; and(b) in any other case – by including the day on which the purpose is to be fulfilled.The first respondent’s decision The applicant’s argument before the first respondent (and indeed, before this Tribunal) was fundamentally premised on the contention that s 38 of the AIA operated in such a way that the date on which the CEN (29 August 2017) was given was excluded from the revision period triggered by the giving of the CEN. The first respondent, however, held that the language of s 18 of the RTI Act, read in the context of the entire RTI Act, evinced an intention to displace what would otherwise have been the effect of the operation of s 38 of the AIA. The Information Commissioner said:[1] In my view, Parliament’s use of the words ‘starting on the date’ in section 18 of the RTI Act evinces an intention for the revision period to be calculated from and including the day of the notice, rather than excluding the day of the notice. This means that, for the purpose of counting the days of the processing period, ‘the clock stops’ on the date of the first CEN and does not ‘re-start’ until after occurrence of one of the events prescribed in that section’s definition of ‘revision period’.Section 38 of the AI Act applies where, as noted, an Act provides for ‘a period beginning on a given day, act or event’. This is relevant for counting a range of time-frames under the RTI Act, including for example, when determining ‘25 business days from the day the application is received by the agency’— in which case, the day of receipt does not count as part of the processing period because of the wording ‘from the day the application is received’. However, the scheme of section 18 of the RTI Act allows for the processing period, once commenced, to stop and re-start, in order to accommodate a range of circumstances that arise in processing applications. Parliament’s wording of the definition of the revision period is clear in stating the date on which the revision period starts, and therefore evinces an intention contrary to section 38 of the AI Act.[1]Stanway v Queensland Police Service [2018] QICmr 7 (22 February 2019) (omitting footnotes). The first respondent also noted a concern that implementation of the applicant’s construction would circumscribe the operation of s 36(1)(b) by truncating the period available to an agency to undertake the work preparatory to issuing a CEN. The applicant demurred from this, arguing that he still had the rest of 29 August 2017 after the time of being given the CEN to accept the charges and this gave the charging provisions utility. As to this, the first respondent said:I do not accept this submission. The revision period initiated by a CEN is integral to the charging scheme prescribed in the RTI Act, a period during which an affected applicant can negotiate with an agency in an effort to avoid monetary imposts and which, to be properly undertaken, requires something more than a matter of hours. The charging regime set out in the RTI Act is complex, but ultimately intended to strike a balance between the efficient allocation of scarce public resources and the right of the community to obtain access to Government-held information. This balance is best achieved by allowing agencies the benefit of the full processing period in which to undertake the preliminary work necessary to assess whether charges will, in fact, be payable in relation to a given application, and an applicant the benefit of a full revision period within which to contemplate the several options open in reply to a CEN. Such an outcome is, in turn, only possible if section 18 is interpreted in accordance with its plain and natural meaning, ie, the revision period is taken to start on the date that a CEN is given to an applicant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established