SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
| RICHARD DAVID STANNARD | S APCR 2010 0156 |
| Applicant | |
| v | |
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Respondent |
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JUDGES: | REDLICH and BONGIORNO JJA and HANSEN AJA | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 23 June 2010 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 23 June 2010 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2010] VSCA 165 | |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Application for leave to appeal from interlocutory decision – Whether defence of consent available to offence of sexual penetration of child under 16 pursuant to s 45 of Crimes Act 1958 – Meaning of ‘more than two years older than child’ – s 45(4)(b) – Grounds upon which certificate for an interlocutory appeal should be granted pursuant to s 295(3)(b) – Application refused.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr P F Tehan QC with | Martin Irwin & Richards |
| For the Respondent | Mr D O’Doherty | Mr C Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
REDLICH JA:
This is an application for leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision made by a judge of the County Court on 10 May 2010 refusing to allow the applicant to withdraw his pleas of guilty to five counts of sexual penetration of a child under 16 years. In accordance with s 295(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 the trial judge granted a certificate ruling that the decision was of sufficient importance to justify it being determined on an interlocutory appeal. The applicant seeks to rely on the following grounds:
1.The trial judge erred in refusing leave to withdraw a plea of guilty.
2.The trial judge erred in his ruling that consent was not available as a defence in the present proceeding.
3.The trial judge erred in holding that [t]he accused was ‘more than 2 years older’ than the complainant a[t] the time of the alleged commission of the offences.
4.The trial judge erred in the interpretation of the provisions of subsection 45(4)(b).
The Proceedings Below
On 6 August 2009 the applicant was charged with a number of offences in relation to the alleged sexual penetration of a child under the age of 16 years. The applicant pleaded guilty at the committal mention stage. He was then arraigned and pleaded guilty to five counts of the offence of sexual penetration of a child under 16 years. The matter was listed for a plea hearing in the Mildura circuit of the County Court commencing 23 November 2009. He was then granted an adjournment to enable an application for a nolle prosequi to be made. This application was filed with the Director of Public Prosecutions in mid December and was subsequently rejected.
The applicant then made the application the subject of the present appeal. He sought to change his pleas, arguing that he had acted on the basis of inaccurate advice supplied by his previous legal counsel that the defence of consent was not available. Critical to this submission is the interpretation of s 45(4)(b) of the Crimes Act 1958 which provides:
(4)Consent is not a defence to a…
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- Case
- [2010] VSCA 165
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was the interpretation of section 45(4)(b) of the Crimes Act 1958, which pertains to the age difference between the offender and the victim. The appellant contended that if the offender was no more than two years older than the child, the defence of consent could be available. The court needed to decide whether the term 'more than two years older' meant that the offender could be up to two years older, or if the offender had to be strictly less than two years older than the child. Furthermore, the court needed to consider whether the appellant's case met the criteria for an interlocutory appeal certificate under section 295(3)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic).
The court found that the plain meaning of 'more than two years older' required the offender to be strictly less than two years older than the child. This interpretation was consistent with the statutory language and legislative intent. The court further held that the appellant had not demonstrated the exceptional circumstances necessary to warrant the grant of an interlocutory appeal certificate. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed. The court concluded that the appellant had not shown that the appeal had a real chance of success or that there were other compelling reasons to allow the interlocutory appeal.
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