Stanford, Andrew James v The Queen - [2007] NSWCCA 370

Reported Decision: 70 NSWLR 474179 A Crim R 541

New South Wales

Court of Criminal Appeal

CITATION: STANFORD, Andrew James v R [2007] NSWCCA 370

HEARING DATE(S): 6 December 2007

JUDGMENT DATE:
20 December 2007

JUDGMENT OF: Grove J at 1; Hulme J at 2; Simpson J at 3

DECISION: (1) Appeal allowed; (2) Conviction quashed; (3) Verdict of acquittal entered.

CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – appeal against conviction – specially aggravated break, enter and commit serious indictable offence – meaning of “break” – entry by co-offender through window left partly open – co-offender further opened window – window left open by arrangement – no evidence appellant opened window – no evidence of breaking – conviction quashed

LEGISLATION CITED: Crimes Act 1900

CASES CITED: R v Boyce (1954) 38 Crim App R 111
R v Brown (1799) 2 East PC 487
R v Chandler [1913] 1 KB 125
R v Galea (1989) 46 A Crim R 158
R v Hyams (1836) 7 C & P 441
R v Johnson and Jones (1841) Car & M 218
R v Lackey [1954] Crim LR 57
R v Russell (1833) 1 Mood CC 377
R v Sing [2002] NSWCCA 20; 54 NSWLR 31
R v Smith (1827) 1 Mood 178
R v Walker (1978) 19 SASR 532

PARTIES: Andrew James Stanford (Applicant)
Regina (Respondent)

FILE NUMBER(S): CCA 2006/5102

COUNSEL: H Dhanji (Applicant)
T Thorpe (Respondent)

SOLICITORS: Legal Aid Commission (Applicant)
Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 05/51/0017

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: McLoughlin DCJ

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION: 14 September 2006

2006/5102

GROVE J
HULME J
SIMPSON J
20 DECEMBER 2007

Andrew James STANFORD v R

Judgment

1 GROVE J: I agree with the orders proposed by Simpson J for the reasons which she has given.

2 HULME J: I agree with Simpson J.

3 SIMPSON J: On 23 February 2006, in the Coffs Harbour District Court, the appellant was arraigned on an indictment that contained two counts, presented in the alternative. It is necessary to set out in full the terms of the indictment. They were that the appellant:

“1A On 1 November 2004 at Sawtell in the State of New South Wales did break and enter a pavilion, namely Sawtell Bowling and Recreation Club, Sawtell, and did commit a serious indictable offence therein namely stealing, at the time being in company with Dudley Ian Shaw, being armed with an offensive weapon and inflicting grievous bodily harm upon Wayne Richard Dennett.

4 On 7 March 2006, after the close of the Crown case, and with the consent of the then counsel for the appellant, the trial judge (McLoughlin DCJ) granted leave to amend each count in the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Stanford, Andrew James v The Queen and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2007] NSWCCA 370
Decision Date: 20 December 2007

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of Australia, the case of Stanford v The Queen dealt with an appeal against the conviction of Andrew James Stanford for committing a particularly serious offence. Stanford was convicted for a specially aggravated break, enter and commit serious indictable offence, pursuant to section 419AB(1)(b) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The dispute centred on the interpretation of the term "break" in the context of the offence, specifically whether the act of breaking was established when a co-offender entered through a window left partly open, with the window subsequently opened further by the co-offender. The window had been left open by arrangement, and there was no evidence that Stanford had opened the window himself. The central issue before the court was whether the act of further opening a window that was already partly open constituted a "break" under the statute.

The court considered the legislative intent behind the term "break" and whether it included the act of further opening a window that was already open. The High Court determined that for a "break" to occur, there must be evidence of an actual breaking or forceful entry. Since there was no evidence that Stanford had opened the window, and the window was already left open by arrangement, the court concluded that there was no breaking in the statutory sense. The court found that the evidence did not support the conviction for the specially aggravated break, enter and commit serious indictable offence. Consequently, the conviction was quashed by the High Court, as the act of further opening a window that was already open did not amount to a "break" under the statute.

The High Court's decision in this case highlights the importance of strict adherence to statutory language in criminal cases. The court's reasoning focused on the absence of evidence of actual breaking and the legislative intent behind the term "break." The court's determination that the act of further opening a partly open window did not constitute a "break" has significant implications for similar cases. The final orders of the court were to quash the conviction for the specially aggravated break, enter and commit serious indictable offence, as the evidence did not support the required element of "breaking" under the statute.

Orders