Stanbridge, D. v Minister for Defence

[1995] FCA 318

CATCHWORDS

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - standing - no sufficient standing to challenge the decision by the relevant Minister to destroy military weapons

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) - ss 3(4) and 5

Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers v Secretary, Department of Transport (1986) 71 ALR 73 Applied
Broadbridge v Stammers (1987) 76 ALR 339 Applied
R v Greater London Council; Ex parte Blackburn (1976) 1 WLR 550 Not followed
Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association v Minister for Industrial Affairs (High Court, unreported, 10 May, 1995) Considered

Dennis Stanbridge v Minister for Defence, Senator The Hon. Robert Francis Ray & Anor.
QG 54 of 1995

Drummond J
Brisbane
18 May, 1995

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )    No. QG 54 of 1995
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY     )
GENERAL DIVISION                 )

BETWEEN:  DENNIS STANBRIDGE

Applicant

AND:MINISTER FOR DEFENCE, SENATOR THE HON.

ROBERT FRANCIS RAY and the BOARD OF

DIRECTORS OF BHP (BROKEN HILL PROPRIETARY)

FOR 1994/5

Respondents

MINUTES OF ORDERS

JUDGE MAKING ORDER:         Drummond J
DATE OF ORDER:              18 May, 1995
WHERE MADE:                 Brisbane

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The application be dismissed.

1. The applicant pay the respondents' costs of these proceedings, to be taxed.

NOTE:     Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )    No. QG 54 of 1995
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY     )
GENERAL DIVISION                 )

BETWEEN:  DENNIS STANBRIDGE

Applicant

AND:MINISTER FOR DEFENCE, SENATOR THE HON.

ROBERT FRANCIS RAY and the BOARD OF

DIRECTORS OF BHP (BROKEN HILL PROPRIETARY)

FOR 1994/5

Respondents

Coram:    Drummond J
Date:     18 May, 1995
Place:    Brisbane

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Mr. Stanbridge applies under s. 5(1) the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ("the ADJR Act") to review a decision of the Minister for Defence to have a large number of military weapons melted down.  Mr. Stanbridge has put material, which includes newspaper reports, before me that indicates that BHP, whose directors he has also joined in these proceedings, has been engaged to carry out this task.  There is an obvious difficulty in justifying the joinder of the BHP directors in these proceedings under the Act upon which Mr. Stanbridge relies.

However, when the matter was before me last week, it was also obvious from what Mr. Stanbridge had to say in his application on the issue of his being "a person aggrieved" by the Minister's decision, that it was highly unlikely that he comes within the meaning of that expression in s. 5 the ADJR Act as defined in s. 3(4)(a), and as explained in a large body of case law, which includes decisions of appeal courts that are binding on me.

I therefore set down for determination today as a preliminary question whether Mr. Stanbridge was an aggrieved person for the purposes of the ADJR Act.  Mr. Stanbridge and the other parties to the application, in accordance with my directions, have prepared and exchanged written arguments.  Mr. Stanbridge's is exhibit 1.  It contains not only argument but factual material which Mr. Stanbridge wishes to put before me and which I have read.

His concerns centre on the decision by the Minister to have a large quantity of what he says are perfectly serviceable weapons melted down when the Australian military now has to rely on what he submits is an inferior basic weapon.  He fears that this decision will encourage the invasion of this country.  He has identified many other concerns he has which he says are associated with these two core considerations.  I accept that he has gone to much trouble and effort to inform himself about the decision, the background to it and what he identifies as the consequences of it.  He has no doubt taken a much greater interest personally in the matter than most other Australian citizens.
         However, it is plain beyond doubt in my view that he is not a person aggrieved by this decision within the meaning which I am bound to give to this term in the ADJR Act by the case law.  The meaning of the term is authoritatively laid down in a decision of the Full Court of this Court Broadbridge v Stammers (1987) 76 A.L.R. 339. There it was suggested that a person employed as a country post master lacked standing because he was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of that expression in the ADJR Act to challenge a decision of the Postal Authorities under the Postal Services Act 1975 (Cth) to close down his post office.

The submission failed.  The Court approved a statement by Gummow J, of what it is necessary to show before a person can establish that he is an aggrieved person for the purposes of the ADJR Act, in Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers v Secretary, Department of Transport (1986) 71 A.L.R. 73 adopting the principle that, before a person will be an aggrieved person for the purposes of s. 5 the ADJR Act, there must flow from the decision sought to be challenged a danger and peril to the interests of the person challenging it that is clear and imminent rather than remote, indirect or fanciful, and that the person challenging the decision must be able to show that he has an interest in the matter of an intensity and degree well above that of an ordinary member of the public.

The issue of what is required to show standing to sue in the courts and thus to bring people compulsorily before the courts for the adjudication of issues of concern to the person instigating the litigation in the context of the general law, which is an issue closely related to that raised by the need for a person to show he is an aggrieved person before he has standing to challenge an administrative decision under the ADJR Act, has recently been referred to by the High Court in Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association v Minister for Industrial Affairs, a decision delivered on 10 May last.  Their Honours there said that in order to establish standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a court, the existence of a special interest in the subject matter of the litigation must be established by the applicant. 

Their Honours continued:

"That is in accordance with the rule established in Australian Conservation Foundation v The Commonwealth which was stated by Gibbs CJ in Onus v Alcoa of Australia Limited to be as follows:

`A plaintiff has no standing to bring an action to prevent the violation of a public right if he has no interest in the subject matter beyond that of any other member of the public; if no private right of his is interfered with, he has standing to sue only if he has a special interest in the subject matter of the action.'"

In this case, a shop assistant's trade union was held to have standing to challenge the lawfulness of a Government decision to extend Sunday trading hours in the Adelaide Central Business District.  Its special interest in the decision, although less direct than that of the post master in the post office closure decision, arose from the fact that its members employed in shops in the Central Business District would be directly affected by the decision to a greater extent than members of the general public because of the exigencies of their employment.

It is those decisions which bind me.  The statement to which Mr. Stanbridge referred me, by Lord Denning in R v Greater London Council; Ex parte Blackburn (1976) 1 W.L.R. 550, is not one which is consistent with those principles authoritatively stated and I therefore decline to apply it.

I should also say that if Mr. Stanbridge, who, according to what he has said from the Bar table today, has had fairly extensive experience as a litigant, had taken the trouble to get a basic text book on the ADJR Act from the library of this Court, to which he could readily have had access, the difficulties in his way, created by the decisions binding on me, to which I have referred, would have been manifest to him before he commenced this action.  It appears, however, that Mr. Stanbridge did not go to that trouble and confined himself to a perusal of just the text of the Act.

The written material and the matters raised in his oral submissions show very plainly indeed that Mr. Stanbridge, although no doubt much more concerned personally about the Minister's decision than many other Australian citizens, has no interest beyond that of all other Australian citizens in the decision, i.e., he has no sufficient interest at law, to enable him to invoke the Court's jurisdiction to challenge it.  His concerns are not matters which the law permits him to raise in the Courts.  They are concerns that can only be ventilated in the political forums, and in the forum of public discussion provided by the media, to both of which I understand Mr. Stanbridge has already had recourse.

I will therefore dismiss his application.

I mention one matter that concerns me.  Mr. Stanbridge appears to have the support in court today, as he had on the last occasion, of a number of persons.  While he stated that he represented a number of persons with similar views to his own, he frankly indicated that he, rather than they, had undertaken the burden of suing because he is in the position of being unemployed and without assets.  He is exempt, even, from having to pay the filing fees that ordinary litigants have to pay in order to commence proceedings in this Court. 

Where litigation is instigated by persons who do not, however, expose themselves to the risks of having to compensate in costs those who they compel to come before a court to answer their claims, if they lose the case, but who instead support a person of like opinion to their own but who is without means to institute the action, it needs to be noted by all concerned that the courts have power to ensure that such an action does not proceed, unless those provoking it expose themselves, directly or indirectly, to having to answer for the cost of the defendants, if the defendants ultimately succeed.

I will therefore declare that Mr. Stanbridge is not an aggrieved person within the meaning of s. 5 the ADJR Act and so is not entitled to challenge the decision of the Minister in question.  The Court orders that the application be dismissed against the respondents.

This is a case which, in my opinion, should never have been brought, there being absolutely no legal justification for Mr. Stanbridge to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court.  I make no comment upon the substantive issues he seeks to raise.  My comments are directed solely to the fact that he has no possible standing to bring anyone to court to ventilate this particular issue.  There is no reason, it seems to me, why I should not apply the usual rule in litigation to him, notwithstanding what he says about his lack of means, and I will therefore order that Mr. Stanbridge pay the costs of the respondents of these proceedings, to be taxed.

I certify that this and the preceding
six pages are a true copy of the
reasons for judgment herein of the
Honourable Justice Drummond.

Associate:
Date:        18 May, 1995

Applicant appeared in person.

Counsel for the first respondent:     Mr. D.J. McGill

Solicitors for the first respondent:  Australian Government

Solicitor

Solicitors for the second respondent: Corrs Chambers

Westgarth

Date of Hearing:  18 May, 1995