Stamatopoulos and Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2021] AATA 1790 (9 June 2021)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2020/2575
Re:Harry Stamatopoulos
APPLICANT
AndLinfox Australia Pty Ltd
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member
Date:9 June 2021
Place:Sydney
1. The reviewable decision dated 21 April 2020 is set aside. The matter is remitted for reconsideration in accordance with the Tribunal’s findings.
2. It seems appropriate to order the Respondent to pay the Applicant’s reasonable legal costs and disbursements as agreed or taxed. However, I will not make the order until seven days after the publication of this decision to allow the Respondent an opportunity to oppose the making of the order.
.........................................................[sgd]...............
Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member
Catchwords
COMPENSATION – workers compensation – major depressive disorder – section 19 claim – incapacity for work – whether incapacity is due to accepted psychological condition or due to termination of employment – decision under review set aside
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 34J
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4, 19
CASES
Bis Industries Ltd v Dale [2017] FCA 789
Bortolazzo v Comcare (1997) 75 FCR 385
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member
9 June 2021
Introduction
The parties agreed that this case was appropriately dealt with pursuant to s 34J of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). That is, the Tribunal should review the decision by considering the documents and material provided to it without holding a hearing.
The issue to be decided is whether the Applicant was, as a result of a psychological injury, “Major Depressive Disorder”, sustained on 11 July 2019 (the injury), incapacitated for work from 5 December 2019 when Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (the Respondent) terminated his employment. The Applicant had been employed by the Respondent since 2006, initially as a casual, and from 2007 as a permanent employee.
The parties addressed various refinements of the general issue which will be considered in detail later.
The events from 11 July 2019 until the reviewable decision made on 21 April 2020
The following chronology is based on the contemporaneous documents in evidence.
The Applicant described the circumstances in which the injury occurred in the incident report which was made on the day of the incident, 11 July 2019. He was driving a forklift loading a truck when a truck entered the yard and did a full U-turn “at speed”. The Applicant was facing the trailer he was loading with his back to the turning truck. He wrote:
I feel the truck came to [sic] close to me at speed. No indication was given (no horn or lights). Yard is under camera watch.
In the typewritten part of the Incident Report the nature of the injury was described as “Anxiety”.
On 9 August 2019, the Applicant attended his General Practitioner (GP). There was no reference to a work incident or conditions in the clinical record.
On 13 August 2019, the Respondent issued the Applicant with…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Stamatopoulos and Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (Compensation) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2021] AATA 1790
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal was required to determine whether the applicant's incapacity for work was a consequence of his accepted psychological condition, as contemplated by section 19 of the relevant Act, or if it stemmed from other factors, such as the termination of his employment. This involved assessing the definition of "suitable employment" and the principles governing the assessment of an employee's ability to earn in such employment, particularly when considering the interplay between an injury's effects and an employee's actions.
The Tribunal's reasoning focused on the statutory requirement that an employee must be incapacitated for work *as a result of an injury* to be entitled to compensation under section 19. It was held that while an injury may entitle an employee to compensation, the incapacity must directly flow from that injury, diminishing their capacity to earn for economic reward. The Tribunal distinguished this from a restriction on economic capacity imposed by an employee's own actions, separate from the consequences of the injury. The Tribunal noted that the provisions of section 19(4) aim to balance the impact of a work injury with an employee's obligation to seek suitable employment.
The decision under review was set aside, indicating that the Tribunal found the applicant's incapacity was not solely attributable to his accepted psychological condition in the manner required by the legislation.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In his Supplementary Report dated 19 January 2021, Dr Allan wrote that he had reviewed the statement of Mr Stamotopoulos and the certificates of capacity, as well as his own initial report, and that the opinions stated in his previous reports had not changed as a result of this information.Consideration I have the benefit of Statements of Facts, Issues and Contentions from each party, the Applicant’s Written Submissions and Written Submissions in Reply, and the Respondent’s Outline of Written Submissions. Section 19(1) relevantly sets out:(1) This section applies to an employee who is incapacitated for work as a result of an injury, other than an employee to whom ss.20, 21, 21A or 22 applies.” [Emphasis added] Section 19(2) provides:(2) Subject to this Part, Comcare is liable to pay to the employee in respect of the injury, for each week that is a maximum rate compensation week during which the employee is incapacitated, an amount of compensation worked out using the formula …”[Emphasis added] Section 19(4) in its chapeau provides the following: In determining, for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3), the amount per week that an employee is able to earn in suitable employment, Comcare shall have regard to …” [Emphasis added] “Suitable employment” is defined in s 4(1) of the Act:suitable employment, in relation to an employee who has suffered an injury in respect of which compensation is payable under this Act, means: (a) in the case of an employee who was a permanent employee of the Commonwealth or a licensee on the day on which he or she was injured and who continues to be so employed—employment by the Commonwealth or the licensed corporation, as the case may be in work for which the employee is suited having regard to: (i) the employee’s age, experience, training, language and other skills; (ii) the employee’s suitability for rehabilitation or vocational retraining; (iii) where employment is available in a place that would require the employee to change his or her place of residence—whether it is reasonable to expect the employee to change his or her place of residence; and (iv) any other relevant matter; and (b) in any other case—any employment (including self‑employment), having regard to the matters specified in subparagraphs (a)(i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). “Any other relevant matter” in section (a)(iv) of the definition of suitable work is an implicit reference to and includes the nature and extent of the employee’s injury and the effect of the injury upon the employee’s ability to work.[1][1] Bis Industries Ltd v Dale [2017] FCA 789 at [71]. (Bis Industries) I accept the Respondent’s submissions that:The provisions of section 19(4) of the Act clearly intend to strike a balance between the incapacitating result of a work injury and the obligation of an employee to exploit his economic worth for both his benefit and the benefit and preservation of the fund to which all injured workers may require access. It is not sufficient that an employee have an injury that may entitle him or her to compensation. Rather, the employee need be incapacitated for work as a result of that injury, thereby diminishing his or her capacity to work for economic reward, as opposed to a restriction on that economic capacity imposed by their actions, separate to the consequence of the injury. It is only then that competing interests may be balanced.[2][2] Respondent’s Outline of Written Submissions at [23].