Staker and Commissioner of Taxation
[2007] AATA 1442
•20 June 2007
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2007] AATA 1442
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No QT200600441
TAXATION APPEALS DIVISION ) Re CYNTHIA STAKER Applicant
And
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President P E Hack SC Date20 June 2007
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal:
(a) sets aside the respondent’s objection decision;
(b) substitutes a decision allowing the objection decision but only to the extent conceded by the Commissioner in the pre-hearing process and in the course of the hearing itself and as set out in these reasons;
(c) remits the matter to the respondent for the purpose of making an amended assessment;
(d) certifies that the proceedings have terminated in a manner favourable to the applicant.
...............Signed.............
Deputy President
CATCHWORDS
TAXATION – deductions – expenses incurred in gaining or producing assessable income – expenses claimed for expenses as fitness instructor – application of Edwards case – expenditure claimed for clothing not deductible as there was insufficient connection to employment – expenditure claimed for client gifts not deductible as applicant not self-employed – other incidental expenses not found to have sufficient relevance and connection to producing income – decision of respondent set aside – decision substituted allowing applicant’s objection to extent conceded by respondent in pre-hearing process and hearing – matter remitted to respondent for amended assessment
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 – ss 8-1(1)(a), 8-1(2)(b)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 – s51(1)
Commissioner of Taxation v Edwards (1994) 49 FCR 318
Commissioner of Taxation v Cooper (1991) 29 FCR 177
Lunney v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 100 CLR 478
W. Nevill & Co. Ltd. V Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1937) 56 CLR 290
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Payne (2001) 202 CLR 93
Mansfield v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) 96 ATC 4001
Case K28 78 ATC 276
REASONS FOR DECISION
20 June 2007 Deputy President P E Hack SC Factual Background
1.The applicant, Cynthia Joy Staker, is a fitness instructor. At all times during the 2005 income tax year she was employed in that capacity by a prestigious resort on the Gold Coast.
2.In her 2005 income tax return, prepared for her by a tax agent, Ms Staker claimed deductions as follows:
Label Description Amount
D3 Work related uniforms etc $ 4,950
D5 Other work related expenses $11,459
D8 Gifts or donations $ 131
3.The respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation, initially assessed Ms Staker’s return as lodged and thus allowed the claimed deductions. But the matter was the subject of an audit which lead to an amended assessment, evidenced by notice dated 2 June 2006, which disallowed all of the $4,950 “work related uniforms” claim (D3), all but $772 of the “other work related expenses” claim (D5) and allowed[1] a further claim of $50 for gifts and donations (D8).
[1]I suspect that this amount ought to have been disallowed, not allowed. In any event, the parties are now agreed on the correct amount to be allowed for gifts.
4.Ms Staker lodged an objection to the amended assessment on 5 July 2006.
5.As a consequence of considering Ms Staker’s objection the Commissioner allowed an additional $588 for the “other work related expenses” claim. In the result, on 7 September 2006 the Commissioner made an objection decision,
·denying entirely the claim at label D3 for $4,950,
·denying the claim at label D5 for other work related expenses except to the extent of $1,360.
6.Ms Staker lodged an application in the Tribunal on 17 November 2006 seeking a review of this decision.
Issues
7.In the course of the Tribunal’s pre-hearing processes further matters have been resolved between the parties. At the commencement of the hearing the matters in issue (and not in issue) between the parties were as set out in the table[2] that is annexed to these reasons.
[2]The table has been adopted from the Commissioner’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, Exhibit 7.
8.In the course of the hearing further concessions were made. Item 66 was
accepted by Ms Staker as being expenses incurred in the previous income year and thus not being deductible in the 2005 income year. Item 67 was, in essence, a balancing item; that is, it represented the difference between the amounts of expenditure evidenced by Ms Staker and the amount claimed at label D3. Ms Staker accepts that there is no evidence to support a claim for expenditure in the 2005 income year beyond the amount of $3,901.77 represented by items 1 to 65. Ms Staker no longer presses item 86, the $70 claim for orthotics, or the claim at item 102 for clothing alterations and dry-cleaning beyond the amount of $80 accepted by the Commissioner. The Commissioner now accepts the whole of the claim at item 94 for books and magazines and the parties are agreed that items 96 and 97, the telephone expenses, are not allowable to any greater extent than has been accepted in the table annexed. I should note however that the claims initially made by Ms Staker were for the whole of the costs of both of her mobile telephone and her home telephone. It is inconceivable that she could have reasonably believed that all of her telephone expenses were deductible and thus the making of a claim to that extent does not leave me with much confidence in the reliability of the other evidence that she gives.
9.Finally, the parties are agreed that item 103, the label D8 claim for donations and gifts, should be allowed at $81.00.
Evidence
10.In order to understand the basis upon which Ms Staker advances the claims that remain in issue, it is necessary to set out in greater detail her evidence. As I have already observed Ms Staker is employed at a resort as a fitness instructor. There are three facets of that work – fitness classes, rehabilitation and cardiac care, and personal training.
11.In her role of fitness instructor Ms Staker takes 8 to 10 classes per week at the resort in a variety of forms – yoga, deep water running, cross-training, weights and the like. The classes range between 45 minutes and 90 minutes. The rehabilitation and cardiac care classes involve personal attention to individuals undertaking fitness work in connection with rehabilitation. She does this for up to 9 hours per week on Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. As a personal trainer she works with individual clients.
12.In all of these activities Ms Staker is an employee; she describes herself as a permanent part-time employee. Her clients, individually or collectively, arrange to participate in her classes or personal training programs by referral from her employer. Ms Staker is, however, remunerated on a “piecemeal” basis for her personal training programs and thus receives wages on the basis of the number of clients that she sees.
13.In the course of any given day Ms Staker may participate in as many as three different activities. That means, she says, that she needs to wear different clothing for the different activities. Additionally, her work setting changes; sometimes she is working on the gym floor where she will wear a gym uniform partly supplied by her employer and at other times she may be undertaking activities outdoors where different clothing is required.
14.Ms Staker’s employer requires her to be “well presented”. I accept, by that, that she is required to be smartly but appropriately dressed, wearing clothing that is adapted to the particular activity, of a standard that befits a high quality resort and which meets appropriate safety requirements. Part of her personal presentation also requires her to shower between activities, on average between 2 to 3 times per day.
15.The case that Ms Staker advances is that the nature of her work requires her to change her clothing a number of times each day and puts her in a position similar to that of the taxpayer in Commissioner of Taxation v Edwards[3]. Ms Staker contends that the high quality of her employer’s resort requires her to maintain a high standard of personal presentation that entails much greater use of cosmetics and the like. So far as the claim for “other work related expenses” is concerned, her case was advanced by her accountant, Mr Green, on the basis that she was, in effect if not in substance, in business on her own account and that the various expenses claimed[4] were directed toward building client loyalty and good will.
[3](1994) 49 FCR 318 affirming the decision of Gummow J at (1993) 119 ALR 375; 27 ATR 293 which affirmed the decision of Deputy President Breen in Case 8858 (1993) 26 ATR 1181.
[4] Items 67 to 101 of the table annexed..
16.I should add, for completeness, that the Commissioner had raised as a “threshold” issue whether Ms Staker had discharged the onus of showing that she had incurred the various outgoings claimed. Her evidence satisfies me that, in relation to the matters that remain in issue, Ms Staker did incur the expenditure. I should add, in that regard, that while I generally accept the evidence that Ms Staker gives it suffered from two flaws – a tendency for exaggeration and a tendency for self-justification. I will deal with the effect of these tendencies upon the evidence that she gives when I analyse the evidence that needs to be scrutinized.
Legislation
17.What remains in issue in the case is whether Ms Staker satisfies s 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (“ITAA 1997”). This raises two issues:
·was the expenditure incurred “in gaining or producing [her] assessable income”[5]; and
·was the expenditure otherwise “of a private or domestic nature”[6].
[5] Section 8-1(1)(a) ITAA 1997.
[6] Section 8-1(2)(b) ITAA 1997.
18.The general principles that underlie the first of these issues are not in doubt. Speaking of s 51(1), the equivalent section in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, Lockhart J said in Commissioner of Taxation v Cooper[7]:
[7] (1991) 29 FCR 177 at 181-2.
“The phrase ‘incurred in gaining or producing assessable income’ in the first limb of s 51(1) has been construed to mean incurred in the course of gaining or producing assessable income: see Amalgamated Zinc (De Bavay's) Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1935) 54 CLR 295, per Latham CJ (at 303) and Dixon J (at 309); W Neville & Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1937) 56 CLR 290 at 305, per Dixon J; Ronpibon Tin NL v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1949) 78 CLR 47 at 56-57, per Latham CJ, Rich, Dixon, McTiernan and Webb JJ.
For expenditure to be an allowable deduction as an outgoing incurred in gaining or producing the assessable income, it must be incidental and relevant to that end: see Ronpibon (supra) (at 56). This test of deductibility has been explained in subsequent judgments of the High Court, so that to be deductible the expenditure must be incidental and relevant in the sense of having the essential character of expenditure incurred in the course of gaining or producing assessable income. This formulation of the test has its origins in the joint judgment of Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ in Charles Moore & Co (WA) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1956) 95 CLR 344 at 351. It has been applied subsequently in cases which include Lunney v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (supra) (at 497); Handley v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1981) 148 CLR 182 at 194; Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Forsyth (supra) (at 210); John v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1989) 166 CLR 417. The essential character test is also applied to determine if the expenditure is of a capital, private or domestic nature as these cases illustrate.”
His Honour also said:[8]
“The question whether the additional expenditure of the taxpayer is deductible under s 51(1) cannot be answered simply by a process of reasoning that, because expenditure of this kind is a prerequisite to the earning of the taxpayer's assessable income (in the sense that it is necessary if assessable income is to be derived), it must be incidental and relevant to the derivation of income. It does not follow that such expenditure is incurred in or in the course of gaining or producing the income. The deductibility of the expenditure depends upon determining the essential character of the expenditure itself and not upon the fact that, unless it is incurred, the taxpayer will not be able to engage in the activity from which his income is derived.”
[8] At 184.
19.In the same case Hill J said:[9]
“It will often, therefore, be necessary to analyse with some care what the operations or activities are that are regularly carried on by the taxpayer for the production of income, and to determine whether the outgoings (or where relevant the losses) are incidental and relevant to those operations or activities.”
[9] At 198.
20.It is also useful to make reference to the decision of the High Court in Lunney v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[10]. The question in issue in that case was the deductibility of fares to travel to and from the taxpayer’s place of employment. Lunney is authority for the proposition that it is not sufficient to show that the expenditure was an essential prerequisite to the derivation of income. An expenditure is not “incidental and relevant”, the expression used in W. Nevill & Co. Ltd. v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[11], merely because the expenditure was necessary in a “but for” sense. The judgement of Williams, Kitto and Taylor JJ. expressed the matter in this way[12]:
“But to say that expenditure on fares is a prerequisite to the earning of a taxpayer’s income is not to say that such expenditure is incurred in or in the course of gaining or producing his income. Whether or not it should be so characterised depends upon considerations which are concerned more with the essential character of the expenditure itself than with the fact that unless it is incurred an employee or a person pursuing a professional practice will not even begin to engage in those activities from which their respective incomes are derived.”
[10] (1958) 100 CLR 478.
[11] (1937) 56 CLR 290 at 305.
[12] (1958) 100 CLR at 499.
21.The principle to be applied here is one that limits deductibility to expenditure to that incurred in the course of deriving assessable income; it is not enough that the expenditure be incurred for the purpose of deriving assessable income[13].
[13] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Payne (2001) 202 CLR 93 at 102 para [16].
Application of Edwards Case
22.Given Ms Staker’s reliance upon Edwards it is necessary to examine what was decided in that case. Ms Edwards was employed as the Personal Secretary to Lady Campbell, wife of the then Governor of Queensland, his Excellency the Honourable Sir Walter Campbell. In the decision of the Full Court[14] reference was made to the following passage of the judgement of Gummow J.:
“The taxpayer was expected to dress on each engagement in a manner compatible with that of Lady Campbell, upon whom she attended. Thus if Lady Campbell wore hat and gloves, then the taxpayer was expected to do likewise. Particularly before travelling away from Brisbane, the taxpayer would discuss with Lady Campbell what attire might be required in order again to ensure that they dressed compatibly. There was no express condition of the taxpayer’s employment that she had to wear or purchase a particular outfit. However, she well understood that she was expected to dress in accordance with an appropriate standard for each occasion. The taxpayer appreciated that when attending Lady Campbell she was exposed to the public eye and scrutiny in a way quite different from that in her past life in private industry.
The taxpayer lived in at Government House in Brisbane. That is significant in understanding her evidence. The AAT described her employment as a ‘seven days a week occupation on a live-in basis of tenure’. The taxpayer said that her standard of clothing for personal use when ‘off-duty’ was casual in nature, being T-shirt, jeans, shorts or tracksuit. She said it was very seldom that she had an opportunity to wear for private use any of her official wardrobe, and she did not have a lot of ‘private time’. The taxpayer’s claim for deduction made allowance of one third for a ‘private use component’ of her expenditures on her wardrobe.”
Gummow J made particular reference[15] to the following factual findings of the Tribunal:
“There is nothing about the additional changes of clothes in a work day for this taxpayer which serve a private purpose. Her personal requirements of modesty, decency and warmth are met by her first set of clothes for the day. Her additional changes of clothing throughout the day solely serve work-related purposes which enable the taxpayer to attend the wife of her employer in the performance of her duties at many different types of functions as Personal Secretary. The expenditure on the additional clothing is incurred in the course of gaining the income. Although not determinative of the issue, it is a relevant consideration that she makes the additional changes of clothes because the employer requires her to wear them.”
[14] (1994) 49 FCR at 319-320.
[15] Ibid at 320.
23.I have set out considerable extracts from the decision in Edwards because of the reliance placed by Ms Staker upon the case however it is important to recognise that Edwards did not decide any new principle of deductibility, rather it is an example of the application of settled principles to somewhat unusual facts. The Full Court dismissed the Commissioner’s appeal saying[16],
“We are satisfied that no error of principle has been involved in the determination of this case before the AAT or the learned trial judge. The decision turns on its own special facts. It involves no new principle, nor does it depart from established tests as to deductibility under s 51(1).”
[16] (1994) 49 FCR 318 at 323.
24.In my view the case for Ms Staker, so far as the question of clothing is concerned, has only superficial parallels with that of Ms Edwards. It has, as well, evidentiary defects.
25.Despite the fact that Ms Staker was required to dress appropriately her income earning activities were not dependent upon that. A requirement to dress appropriately is not a test of deductibility[17]. Except for the occasions when she was wearing the gym uniform supplied by her employer, her daily clothing was not in the nature of a uniform which otherwise had no use to her. There was not about it any feature that took it beyond the provision of “modesty, decency and warmth” albeit on some occasions in differing settings and, on other occasions, in different settings on the same day.
[17] See e.g. Mansfield v Commissioner of Taxation(Cth) 96 ATC 4001 at 4009.
26.I am unpersuaded that the expenditure claimed in relation to clothing was incidental and relevant to Ms Staker’s employment.
27.But I am equally unpersuaded, in any event, by the evidence of Ms Staker that she incurred the expenditure claimed in acquiring clothing used in connection with her employment. I accept that it was incurred, it is the connection with employment that I doubt. By way of example, the list of equipment purchased shows 18 items described as “yoga top”, or similar. I am unable to accept that her employment requirements are such that she was required to purchase 18 yoga tops in the period of 12 months. It seems to me to be more likely that she has claimed all of her expenditure in the particular year, as she initially did in the case of her telephone expenses, rather than only that referable to her employment.
28.It follows that I do not accept Ms Staker’s claims so far as they relate to clothing. I include in that, items 1 to 65, 76-77 and 102 (to the extent that it remains in issue).
29.I turn then to a consideration of the claim to deduct the sum of $4,737.04 described as “client and staff gifts” and similar claims. Ms Staker was an employee; she was not operating a business as a self-employed person. Whilst the expenditure may have been incurred in connection with her employment it was not incidental and relevant to the derivation of her income. It is not enough that the expenditure may have increased goodwill towards Ms Staker from clients and staff; it must be incurred in the course of gaining or producing the assessable income[18].
[18] See e.g. Case K28 78 ATC 276 at 278.
30.Thus I reject the claim at item 68 and the similar claims at items 69, 73 and 74.
31.For the same reason I am unable to accept the claims at items 78 (photos and camera charger) and 90 (conference amenities). Ms Staker’s evidence was that the camera was purchased to take photographs of clients and to record their progress but that does not make it incidental and relevant. It is not shown how “conference amenities” expenses of $10.80, which apparently relate to food items consumed at a fitness conference in November 2004, have been incurred in gaining or producing assessable income.
32.The next claim relates to stationery where an amount of $234.29 remains in issue. There is no evidence upon which I could be satisfied that the necessary connection exists between this amount and the gaining or producing of assessable income. I do not know on what basis the Commissioner has allowed this claim in part; it is sufficient for me to say that I am not satisfied that any further amount, beyond the Commissioner’s concession, is deductible.
33.The final claim relates to item 70, the claim for $731.45 for “shower amenities”. The basis put forward for this claim is that Ms Staker is required to shower frequently, and thus use deodorant, shampoo and conditioner, in order to meet her employer’s requirements to be appropriately dressed on all occasions. But in my view her situation is no different to the flight attendant in Mansfield[19] whose claim to deduct the costs of hairdressing was rejected by Hill J. in these terms[20]:
“The fact that Mrs Mansfield was required by her employer to be well groomed and presentable does not of itself operate to confer deductibility. Expenditure on hairdressing is of a private nature. There is no additional feature which shows any relationship between the expenditure on the one hand and Mrs Mansfield’s employment as a flight attendant. The expenditure does not have the character of employment-related expenditure and in my view is not deductible.”
[19] 96 ATC 4001.
[20] 96 ATC at 4009.
34.So too, in my view, the claim made here for “shower amenities”.
Result
35.It follows that I would set aside the Commissioner’s objection decision of 7 September 2006 and substitute a decision allowing the applicant’s objection, but only to the extent conceded by the Commissioner in the pre-hearing process and in the course of the hearing itself. The matter will be remitted to the Commissioner for the purpose of making an amended assessment.
Annexure
Item
No.Date of purchase Supplier Item Description Amount
ClaimedAmount in issue D3 1 06 Jul 2004 Footlocker 1 x pair sports socks 39.95 39.95 2 13 Jul 2004 Tempt Yoga jumper 30.00 30.00 3 25 Jul 2004 City Beach 2 x Scarf @14.95 each 29.90 29.90 4 26 Jul 2004 X-Ice Design 3 x Yoga singlets/tops 50.00 50.00 5 28 Jul 2004 Rockwear Singlet 47.95 47.95 6 11 Aug 2004 Footlocker 2 x Gym Shoes 154.90 154.90 7 12 Aug 2004 Sobi clothing Pink jacket 59.95 59.95 8 25 Aug 2004 X-Ice Design 2 x Yoga tops 30.00 30.00 9 25 Aug 2004 Sunglass Hut Sunglasses 194.95 0.00 10 26 Aug 2004 City Beach Outdoor hiking shorts 99.95 99.95 11 11 Sep 2004 Lorna Jane Fitness wear 59.99 59.99 12 27 Sep 2004 Lorna Jane Fitness wear 175.98 175.98 13 06 Oct 2004 Sunburn Unknown item 70.45 70.45 14 10 Oct 2004 Esprit 1 x yoga pants 47.96 47.96 15 11 Oct 2004 Rockwear Singlet 39.95 39.95 16 14 Oct 2004 Rockwear Singlet 39.95 39.95 17 20 Oct 2004 Rockwear 1 x singlet & pants 71.90 71.90 18 23 Oct 2004 Rec Club Unknown item 32.80 32.80 19 23 Oct 2004 Change Alley Yoga top 20.65 20.65 20 04 Nov 2004 Rockwear 1 x singlet & pants 95.90 95.90 21 21 Nov 2004 Lorna Jane Unknown item 59.99 59.99 22 28 Nov 2004 Sobi clothing Yoga top 30.00 30.00 23 12 Dec 2004 X-Ice designs Yoga top 20.00 20.00 24 13 Dec 2004 Harbour town chemist Wrist brace 10.00 10.00 25 15 Dec 2004 Rebel Sport Yoga top 49.99 49.99 26 05 Jan 2005 Bros Neilsen Tracksuit pants 29.95 29.95 27 09 Jan 2005 Rebel Sport Water bottle 7.99 7.99 28 29 Jan 2005 X-Ice Designs Yoga top 20.00 20.00 29 20 Feb 2005 Lorna Jane 2 x unknown items 90.98 90.98 30 20 Feb 2005 Bros Neilsen Pants 60.00 60.00 31 22 Mar 2005 City Beach Pants 79.95 79.95 32 24 Mar 2005 Rockwear Pants 47.95 47.95 33 01 Apr 2005 City Beach Hooded jumper 89.95 89.95 34 03 Apr 2005 Covers Polo jumper 121.00 121.00 35 04 Apr 2005 Alphabet Design V-neck top 75.00 75.00 36 05 May 2005 Rebel Sport Top 19.96 19.96 37 11 May 2005 Just Jeans Leather belt 39.95 39.95 38 15 May 2005 Bros Neilsen Scarf & jumper 139.90 139.90 39 18 May 2005 Lorna Jane 3 x unknown items 129.97 129.97 40 24 May 2005 Lorna Jane 2 x unknown items 39.98 39.98 41 31 May 2005 Just Jeans Scarf 39.95 39.95 42 02 Jun 2005 Ride Clothing Yoga Top 30.00 30.00 43 07 Jun 2005 Athletes Foot Gym Shoes 249.95 249.95 44 07 Jun 2005 Athletes Foot Sports Socks 14.95 14.95 45 11 Jun 2005 Braddon Sports Sports Bra 25.00 25.00 46 11 Jun 2005 Braddon Sports Sports Socks 15.00 15.00 47 17 Jun 2005 Adidas Running Shorts/socks 35.00 35.00 48 22 Jun 2005 Adidas Yoga Pants 35.00 35.00 49 26 Jun 2005 Change Alley Yoga Top 40.50 40.50 50 26 Jun 2005 Shoo Biz Hiking boots 109.95 109.95 51 28 Jun 2005 Adidas Crop pants 35.00 35.00 Sub Total (credit card expenditure) 3,185.89 2,990.94 52 14 Oct 2004 Supre Yoga Top 10.00 10.00 53 18 Oct 2004 Myer Sports socks 9.95 9.95 54 28 Oct 2004 Wake –ski-snow Outdoor hat 9.00 9.00 55 30 Oct 2004 Wake-ski-snow Outdoor hat 29.95 29.95 56 03 Nov 2004 X-ice designs Yoga Top 10.00 10.00 57 13 Feb 2005 City Beach Outdoor jumper 79.95 79.95 58 17 Apr 2005 Sobi Clothing Outdoor jacket 79.95 79.95 59 02 May 2005 Rebel Sport Outdoor pants & Shirt running PT 104.98 104.98 60 05 May 2005 Rebel Sport Fitness wear 49.99 49.99 61 12 May 2005 Myer Yoga Top 26.20 26.20 62 20 May 2005 Lorna Jane Fitness wear 199.96 199.96 63 27 May 2005 Lorna Jane Fitness wear 60.00 60.00 64 14 Jun 2005 Adidas Sports socks 6.00 6.00 65 26 Jun 2005 Just Jeans Belt & hike shoes 39.95 39.95 Sub Total
(cash expenditure715.88 715.88 66 Incurred in the income tax year ended 30 June 2004 669.75 669.75 67 Unknown outgoing 378.48 378.48 Total D3 claim 4,950 4,755.05 D5 68 Client & Staff gifts 4,737.04 4,737.04 Fitness Equipment 69 Confectionery 52.30 52.30 70 Shower amenities 731.45 731.45 71 Music for classes 477.78 0.00 72 Music for Yoga 178.64 0.00 73 Class prizes 14.15 14.15 74 Classes –miscellaneous 20.89 20.89 75 Sun protection/skin care 117.85 0.00 76 Hair clips 34.91 34.91 77 Yoga clips 82.85 82.85 78 Photos & camera charger 149.90 149.90 79 Fitness equipment
206.44 0.00 80 Hire Vehicle & fuel 319.92 0.00 81 Work journal 20.00 0.00 82 Candles & Oil 63.23 0.00 83 Duradisc 85.00 0.00 84 Buddha 155.00 0.00 85 Medical Tape 15.50 0.00 86 Orthotics 70.00 70.00 87 CD player 85.45 0.00 88 Batteries & double adaptor 30.30 0.00 89 Videos 69.00 0.00 90 Conference amenities 10.80 10.80 91 Locker Keys 29.30 0.00 92 Sports Bag 111.00 0.00 Sub total
Fitness Equipment3,131.66 1,167.25 93 Stationery 328.96 234.29 94 Books & Magazines (Fitness,yoga,diet) 238.70 7.63 95 Postage 33.20 0.00 96 Mobile Phone 820.40 410.20 97 Home Phone 710.00 460.00 98 Course (St Johns Ambulance) 95.00 0.00 99 Memberships 105.00 0.00 100 Convention (Network 04 –November 2004) 299.00 0.00 101 Yoga Training sessions 900 0.00 102 Clothing alterations & drycleaning 230 150.00 Total D5 claim 11,628.96[21] 7,166.41 103 Total D8 claim Donations & Gifts
131 81 TOTAL 16,709.96 12,002.46 [21]Ms. Staker’s tax return for the year ended 30 June 2005 claims an amount of $11,459 at item D5. The items in the ‘cash book’ add up to $11,628.96 without the inclusion of the amount of $131 for ‘gifts’ at item D8.
I certify that the 35 preceding paragraphs and the annexure are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President P E Hack SC
Signed: ..................Signed........................................................ Lynne Stalley, Administrative Assistant
Date of Hearing 23 April 2007
Date of Decision 20 June 2007
Representative for the Applicant Peter Green Accountants
Solicitor for the Respondent ATO Legal Services
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