Stable v Workers' Compensation Regulator

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	Stable v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 274
PARTIES:	Stable, Laura (Appellant) v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Respondent)
CASE NO:	WC/2021/160
PROCEEDING:	Appeal against decision of Workers' Compensation Regulator
DELIVERED ON:	26 November 2024
HEARING DATES:	12 October 2022 to 14 October 2022, 20 October 2022
SUBMISSIONS:	Appellant's closing submissions: 4 August 2023 Respondent's closing submissions: 30 October 2023 Appellant's closing submissions in reply: 13 November 2023
MEMBER:	Power IC
HEARD AT:	Brisbane
ORDERS:	The appeal is dismissed. The decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator is confirmed. Failing agreement on costs, to be the subject of a further application to the Commission. Liberty to apply.
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS' COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION – psychiatric or psychological injury – whether injury excluded under s 32(5) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – where injury arises from management action – whether management action is reasonable – appeal dismissed.
LEGISLATION:	Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 32
CASES:	Briffa v Q-COMP (2005) 180 QGIG 70 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL) Davis v Blackwood [2014] ICQ 009 Hardy v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 027 Jones v Dunkel (1959) HCA 8 McDonald v Q-COMP (No. 2) (2008) 188 QGIG 180 Murphy v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 264 Qantas Airways Limited v Q-COMP (2006) 181 QGIG 301 Rossmuller v Q-COMP [2010] ICQ 4 Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey [2016] ICQ 010 Workers' Compensation Regulator v Langerak [2020] ICQ 2
APPEARANCES:	Ms M.J Brooks of Counsel instructed by Holding Redlich Mr S.P Gray of Counsel directly instructed by the Respondent

Reasons for Decision

Ms Laura Stable ('the Appellant') appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Respondent') to deny her application for compensation relating to an injury pursuant to s 32 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ('the Act').

Issue for determination

The issue to be determined is whether the Appellant suffered a personal injury within the meaning of s 32 of the Act. Section 32 of the Act provides:

32 Meaning of injury

(1)An injury is personal injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury.
(2)However, employment need not be a contributing factor to the injury if section 34(2) or 35(2)applies.
(3)Injury includes the following—
(a)a disease contracted in the course of employment, whether at or away from the place of employment, if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the disease;
(b)an aggravation of the following, if the aggravation arises out of, or in the course of, employment and the employment is a significant contributing factor to the aggravation—
(i)a personal injury;
(ii)a disease;
(iii)a medical condition, if the condition becomes a personal injury or disease because of the aggravation;

(c)loss of hearing resulting in industrial deafness if the employment is a significant contributing factor to causing the loss of hearing;
(d)death from injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if the employment is a significant contributing factor to causing the injury;
(e)death from a disease mentioned in paragraph (a), if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the disease;
(f)death from an aggravation mentioned in paragraph (b), if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the aggravation.

(4)For subsection (3)(b), to remove any doubt, it is declared that an aggravation mentioned in the provision is an injury only to the extent of the effects of the aggravation.
(5)Despite subsections (1) and (3),
injury does not include a psychiatric or psychological disorder arising out of, or in the course of, any of the following circumstances—
(a)reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with the worker's employment;
(b)the worker's expectation or perception of reasonable management action being taken against the worker;
(c)action by the Regulator or an insurer in connection with the worker's application for compensation.

Examples of actions that may be reasonable management actions taken in a reasonable way—
•action taken to transfer, demote, discipline, redeploy, retrench or dismiss the worker
•a decision not to award or provide promotion, reclassification or transfer of, or leave of absence or benefit in connection with, the worker's employment

This appeal to the Commission is by way of a hearing de novo upon which the onus of proof falls on the Appellant.[1] The Commission must be satisfied that the worker has suffered an injury within the meaning of the Act.[2]
[1] Rossmuller v Q-COMP [2010] ICQ 4
[2] McDonald v Q-COMP (No. 2) (2008) 188 QGIG 180; Qantas Airways Limited v Q-COMP (2006) 181 QGIG 301
The Appellant must prove, on the balance of probabilities,[3] that the claim is one for acceptance. That is, that the Appellant suffered an injury; the injury arose out of, or in the course of her employment with the employer; and the employment with the employer was a significant contributing factor to the injury.
[3] Briffa v Q-COMP (2005) 180 QGIG 70

The Appellant must also prove that her injury is not excluded by the reasonable management action provision of s 32(5) of the Act.
The parties are in agreement that the Appellant was a worker, that she sustained a psychological or psychiatric injury, and that the injury arose out of her employment with the employer.
After carefully considering all of the evidence in this matter, on the balance of probabilities, I find that the Appellant's injury is excluded due to the operation of s 32(5) of the Act.
My reasons follow.

Background

The Appellant commenced employment at the school in 2020 as a teacher working in Grade 1.[4]
[4] Name of school suppressed to protect identities of students.
The Deputy Principal that had management responsibility for the Prep and Grade 1 classes was Ms Kelly Uittenbosch and the Principal at the school during the relevant period was Ms Deborah Hansen.
The Appellant was advised towards the end of Term 4 in 2020 that the composition of her grade 1 class for 2021 included Student A, Student B, and Student C who had each previously displayed challenging behaviours.
The Appellant sought medical assistance at a visit to Dr Takako Kobayashi, General Practitioner, for symptoms related to irritable bowel syndrome ('IBS') on 8 January 2021.
The Appellant taught her allocated class, that being Class 1S, from 27 January 2021, the commencement of Term 1, until 12 April 2021.
On 25 March 2021, Dr Michele Calvird, Psychiatrist, provided a work capacity certificate providing a provisional diagnosis of adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood.
Dr Calvird described the mechanism of injury as:
Exposed to marked traumatic experiences in workplace due to students' aggression, without sufficient extra measures/support being put in place by school management for her/others' safety.[5]
[5] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [614].
On 12 April 2021, Dr Kobayashi issued a work capacity certificate diagnosing the Appellant's IBS as stress induced and her adjustment disorder as being due to anxiety and depression.
The Appellant lodged an application for compensation with WorkCover on 12 April 2021 for her diagnosed psychiatric/psychological injury.
The diagnosis of adjustment disorder due to anxiety and depression developed over the period from December 2020 to 12 April 2021 at which time Dr Kobayashi diagnosed the adjustment disorder.

It is common ground that the Appellant's injury arose from stressors related to both management action and non-management action.
The non-management action stressors can be summarised as matters relating to the Appellant having Students A, B, and C in her class. The management action stressors are associated with the support provided by the employer in assisting the Appellant to manage the challenging behaviour of those three students.
The Appellant contends that the injury is not excluded by the operation of s 32(5)(a) which provides that an injury does not include a psychiatric or psychological disorder arising out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with the worker's employment.
The Respondent's position is that the Appellant's injury arose out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way and so is not compensable.

Stressors

The Appellant outlined 65 stressors in her Statement of Facts and Contentions ('SOFC') with the stressors divided into stressors related to management action and those related to non‑management action.
At the commencement of the hearing, the parties advised the Commission that it was accepted that the Appellant's injury arose out of a combination of stressors involving both non-management action and management action.
The Appellant submits that the composition of her Grade 1 class and the lack of support she received from management were significant contributing factors to her injury, and that each of the management action stressors arose out of management action that was either not reasonable or not reasonably taken.
I have adopted the Appellant's characterisation of stressors into the following two categories[6]:
[6] Appellant's written submissions filed on 4 August 2023, [38].
1. Non-management action stressors related to:
·the behaviour of Students A, B and C (stressors 2-8, 10-54, 57-60);
·the Appellant receiving automated emails from OneSchool advising her of multiple major incidents involving the challenging students that had occurred in her absence (stressor 9);
·the parent teacher interviews (stressor 55);
·the Appellant was informed that Student A would no longer be participating in the LEAP program for the duration of term 1 and term 2 (stressor 56); and
·the reports from other students they felt unsafe in the classroom (stressor 63).
2. Stressors related to management action (stressors 1, 9, 56, 61, 62, 64 and 65):
·the Appellant learning that Student A, Student B and Student C would be in her Grade 1 class in 2021 (stressor 1);
·insufficient classroom support to prevent or mitigate against incidents caused by Student A, Student B or Student C occurring (stressor 61);
·insufficient classroom support to ensure a safe classroom for the students of 1S (stressor 62);
·insufficient classroom support to ensure a safe workplace for the Appellant (stressor 64); and
·insufficient support to ensure the Appellant was able to deliver teaching to an effective level while Student A, Student B and Student C were present in the classroom (stressor 65).

Evidence

The Appellant called the following witnesses to give evidence –
i)       Ms Laura Stable, the Appellant;
ii)      Dr Takako Kobayashi, general practitioner; and
iii)     Dr Michele Calvird, psychiatrist.
The Respondent called the following witnesses to give evidence –
i)       Ms Vanessa Miell, inclusion teacher at the school;
ii)      Ms Felicity Gill, a Grade 1 teacher at the school;
iii)     Ms Kelly Uittenbosch, Deputy Principal at the school; and
iv)     Ms Deborah Hansen, Principal at the school.

Appellant's evidence

The Appellant gave evidence that she had not received any special education training or any inclusion training, and that she has undertaken further training on her own initiative in the area of understanding students with autism and training in non-violent communication.[7]
[7] T 1 – 19, ll 29 – 31.
The Appellant also gave evidence that she had not received any specific training on the OneSchool program, which collected information on all students' personal information, results, incidents, and family information.[8]
[8] T 1 – 27, ll 11 – 14; T 1 – 25, ll 1 – 6.
The Appellant's evidence was that OneSchool behaviour records included both major and minor incidents, but that not all minor incidents were recorded due to the paperwork involved.[9]
[9] T 1 – 26, ll 9 – 10.
At the beginning of 2021, the Appellant took on a leadership role at the school at the request of Ms Hansen.[10]
[10] T 1 – 20, ll 27 – 40; T 1 – 68, ll 42 – 46; T 1 – 69, ll 1 – 10.
The Appellant outlined her understanding of the funding arrangement for students, stating that the school received additional funding to support students who were verified as having a diagnosed condition.[11]
[11] T 1 – 24, ll 32 – 44.
The Appellant stated that she worked closely with an inclusion teacher, Ms Miell, in 2020 because the Appellant's class contained a student with a verified autism diagnosis[12] and Ms Miell was able to support both the verified student and another unverified student throughout 2020.[13]
[12] T 1 – 20, ll 44 – 46.
[13] T 1 – 43, ll 15 – 21; T 1 – 43, ll 34 – 45.
The Appellant's evidence regarding the process of verification was broadly consistent with the evidence given by Ms Miell, Ms Uittenbosch, and Ms Hansen in that more funding is made available to the school to support students who are verified as having a diagnosis.[14]
[14] T 2 – 63, ll 3 – 16; T 3 – 29, ll 25 – 36; T 4 – 5, ll 9 – 15, 29 – 40; T 4 – 15, ll 41 – 46.
The Appellant gave evidence that she began to develop concerns in 2020 about her ability to manage her class for 2021, acknowledging the limited support available, and began to experience symptoms of IBS.[15]
[15] T 1 – 44, ll 1 – 32.
The Appellant gave evidence that after she learned that Students A, B, and C were to be in her class in 2021 she had a discussion with Ms Miell who reassured the Appellant that the class would be fine, that she would have support, and compared Students A and B to the challenging students the Appellant had in 2020.[16] The Appellant contends that Students A and B were 'nothing' like the challenging students she had in 2020.[17]
[16] T 1 – 30, ll 31 – 42.
[17] T 1 – 30, ll 44 – 47.
The Appellant gave evidence that she spoke with Ms Uittenbosch and Ms Hansen[18] regarding her proposed class for 2021 and was told that there would be support for her and that she was the best person for these students.[19]
[18] T 1 – 23, ll 1 – 24; T 1 – 32, ll 27 – 29.
[19] T 1 – 23, ll 1 – 5; T 1 – 32, ll 22 – 27; T 2 – 24, ll 42 – 46; T 2 – 25, ll 1 – 2.

The Appellant gave evidence that the impact of the behaviours of Student A, Student B, and Student C on her ability to teach was that her class was in a 'heightened' state constantly and that she would say to the administrative team that she could not do her job as the children could not learn if they did not feel safe.[20]
[20] T 1 – 65, ll 20 – 29.
The Appellant stated that she would regularly tell Ms Hansen and Ms Uittenbosch in casual conversations about the situation in her classroom[21], stating –
I would just go and speak to them and they would just say to me, you're doing a great job, you're the best person for this job, you – you know, you're – you know, you're so good with these kids and you know, you know, you – you just – you know, you're so good with these kids, you – you – you – you really – you're doing a really great job and that's all we can ask of you and, you know, you're doing great and like, they would just reassure me by, like, just that, like, giving me praise and I'm like, I said even, like, I don't want praise, like, I need help, like, I need some – I said what else could I do? And they're like, you know, you're doing everything right and I'm like, yeah, but give me another strategy, like, I even asked them, like, but what else could I do? Like, they didn't give me anything else.[22]
[21] T 1 – 65, ll 32 – 33.
[22] T 1 – 65, ll 33 – 43.

The Appellant gave evidence that she had sent a text message to Ms Hansen on 5 March 2021 stating that she was desperate to speak with Ms Hansen.[23]
[23] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [843].
The Appellant stated that in the subsequent conversation with Ms Hansen on 6 March 2021, she advised the following –[24]

·        all of the Grade 1 teachers were struggling;
·        she was starting to feel that the job was not worth her life;
·        she cared deeply for her students' welfare and needed more support to be able to do her job; and
·        the support she was getting was not enough.

[24] T 1 – 70, ll 28 – 38.

In response, the Appellant gave evidence that Ms Hansen stated –[25]
·        how wonderful the Appellant was and that she was doing a great job amongst a series of platitudes;
·        Student A would be going to LEAP three days a week in Term 2 which may alleviate some of her classroom stress; and
·        in response to the Appellant's comment about how poorly the students were doing and how this must reflect on her as a teacher, Ms Hansen stated "we can only do what we can do", and the Appellant should lower her expectations and in effect stop being a perfectionist.
[25] T 1 – 70, ll 40 – 47; T1 – 71, ll 1 – 15.
The Respondent submits that the Appellant overstated the severity of the conduct by Students A, B, and C in her SOFC and proceeded to exaggerate her oral evidence. The example given by the Respondent was the Appellant's response to questions regarding the number of times she had to evacuate the entire class in 2021. The Respondent notes that the Appellant initially stated that she could not recall how many times the class had been evacuated, and after being prompted as to whether it was two times, ten times, twenty times or a hundred times, the Appellant stated that 'it was probably getting close to 10 times. Probably around 10. Definitely, I mean, even not – if it wasn't a full evacuation, like, I was definitely having to move them to the safe area in the classroom almost daily.'[26] The Respondent submits that there were four occasions when the classroom had to be evacuated and students had to be moved to a safe area in the classroom on eight occasions.
[26] T 1 – 49, ll 31 – 34.
The Respondent further submits that the Appellant's evidence was prone to overstatement and as such it is appropriate to view her as an unreliable reporter. One example involved the Appellant stating the following –
… I just – they were in a position where they couldn't offer me any more support and because these kids didn't have [indistinct] like – they – they were not verified, so they didn't attract support so they could not give me any timetabled teacher aide or teaching time, so that means that the only support they could give me was if I called, they would come and get them and take them for a break, which means that I had to wait for an incident to happen, which meant I had to traumatise every student in my class every single day for that whole term because we couldn't afford for them to put another adult in my room, and that's okay because they still came when I called and I don't think that that's fair and – sorry.[27]
[27] T 1 – 66, ll 5 – 13.
Although the transcript is somewhat unclear, the reference to having traumatised 'every student' in her class 'every single day for that whole term' is an overstatement. The documentary evidence in OneNote does not support a determination that an incident occurred every single day, or that every student was traumatised every single day. Notwithstanding this somewhat overstated evidence, I accept that Appellant's evidence as generally truthful. The Appellant presented as an honest, open, and forthright witness. The Appellant gave detailed and helpful evidence to the Commission, and while there were occasions in which the Appellant overstated particular situations,[28] these were not significant enough to warrant a conclusion that the Commission should consider the Appellant's evidence to be unreliable.
[28] E.g., describing a student 'wrecking' a classroom when the OneNote records indicate less serious conduct.
Ms Vanessa Miell

Ms Miell was an inclusion teacher at the school who also gave open and forthright evidence to the Commission and made reasonable concessions where appropriate.
Ms Miell gave evidence that she had a discussion with the Appellant regarding Students A and B after the Appellant became aware of class allocations. Ms Miell stated that she could not specifically recall the contents of the conversation but confirmed that she would have let the Appellant know that she had every confidence in the Appellant being able to manage the students.
Ms Miell gave evidence that the system in place at the time in 2020 and 2021 was that funding was made available for additional support for verified students, confirming that the Department verifies students only after a diagnosis is provided.[29]
[29] T 2 – 62, ll 41 – 44; T 2 – 63, ll 1 – 6.
Regarding the funding arrangement, Ms Miell gave evidence that the support that she was timetabled to provide was a result of the funded support.[30]
[30] T 2 – 63, ll 18 – 29.
Ms Miell gave evidence that because the Appellant had a verified student in her class in 2020, support was timetabled for the Appellant's 2020 class in the form of Ms Miell's support as an inclusion teacher as well as inclusion teacher aide support.
In relation to the verification process, Ms Miell gave evidence that it is the Head of Inclusion who commences the verification process, usually upon information provided by a parent.[31]
[31] T 2 – 84, ll 35 – 46.
Ms Miell gave evidence that the Appellant was incredibly talented and capable and was viewed as being a very competent teacher.[32]
[32] T 2 – 54, ll 45 – 47; T 2 – 79, l 22.
Ms Kelly Uittenbosch, Deputy Principal
Ms Uittenbosch gave evidence that the Appellant approached her at the end of 2020 with concerns about the composition of her class in 2021.[33]
[33] T 3 – 31, ll 4 – 12.
In response to the concerns raised by the Appellant, Ms Uittenbosch stated that she told the Appellant that she was a very capable teacher, that she would be good for the students, that she would be ok, and they would do whatever they could to support her.[34]
[34] T 3 – 31, ll 4 – 30.
Ms Uittenbosch confirmed that the Appellant raised her concerns about the composition of the class with her several times[35] and gave evidence that the Appellant was a very capable teacher.[36]
[35] T 3 – 31, l 48; T 3 – 32, ll 1 – 14.
[36] T 3 – 31, ll 37 – 34.
Ms Uittenbosch gave honest and straightforward evidence about the relevant incidents.
Ms Deborah Hansen, Principal
Ms Hansen gave evidence that the Grade 1 teaching cohort included two beginning teachers and three experienced teachers. The Appellant was one of the experienced teachers.[37]
[37] T 4 – 8, ll 45 – 46; T 4 – 9, ll 1 – 9.
Regarding the provision of teacher's aide assistance, Ms Hansen stated that Prep classrooms typically have a teacher's aide for most of the day, but that in Grade 1 the teacher aides are deployed across the cohort for less time in each class.[38]
[38] T 4 – 8, ll 35 – 41.
Ms Hansen gave evidence that the Appellant was a good and dedicated teacher.[39]
[39] T 3 – 31, ll 27 – 34; T 4 – 4, ll 25 – 28.
Ms Hansen's evidence regarding class allocation was that no teacher was allocated until the classes were set,[40] at which point the best teacher for the class is chosen by the school leadership team "based on experience, based on relationships, based on a whole range of different things."[41]
[40] T 4 – 11, ll 30 – 39.
[41] T 4 – 11, ll 19 – 22.
Ms Hansen agreed under cross-examination that she had suggested to the Appellant that she limit or minimise the other things she was doing as a teacher, such as supporting junior teachers with their curriculum planning and taking on the 'equity leader' role in order to cope better with her class.[42]
[42] T 4 – 47, ll 1 – 29.

Ms Felicity Gill

Ms Gill was employed at the school as a Grade 1 teacher.
Ms Gill gave evidence that the Appellant had informed her of problems she was experiencing with Student B. Ms Gill confirmed that Student B was very disruptive, would pull things off walls including resources and the work of other students, was non-compliant, and did not follow instructions.[43]
[43] T 3 – 11, ll 7 – 12; T 3 – 11, ll 14 – 23.
Ms Gill gave evidence that the issue of student behaviour was raised in 2021 in collaborative learning meetings.[44]
[44] T 3 – 11, ll 25 – 29.
Ms Gill stated that she had discussed with the Appellant the issues they were having with their classes and had informal discussions about the lack of support they were receiving from the school.[45]
[45] T 3 – 20, ll 29 – 39.
Other witness matters
Ms Rowena Lewis and Ms Natasha Prince were each a Head of Inclusion at the school.
Ms Hansen gave evidence that the Head of Inclusion was involved in the process of composing the classes for 2021, including preparing the document that outlined the needs of the students across the school in terms of the number of different categories so the school could determine the range of students who had additional needs.[46]
[46] T 4 – 41, ll 13 – 47; T 4 – 42, ll 1 – 8.
The Appellant submits that a Jones v Dunkel[47] inference should be drawn following the Respondent's failure to call either Ms Lewis or Ms Prince to give evidence in this matter. Such an inference would be that the evidence of Ms Lewis or Ms Prince would not have assisted the Respondent.
[47] (1959) HCA 8; 101 CLR 298.
In circumstances where the ultimate decision maker, Ms Hansen, was called along with the Deputy Principal who was involved with class allocation, I am not of the view that it was expected that the Respondent called Ms Lewis or Ms Prince. Accordingly, no such inference will be drawn.
Medical evidence
Dr Takao Kobayashi, General Practitioner
Dr Kobayashi was the Appellant's treating general practitioner who had been treating the Appellant for anxiety and depression for a number of years.
On 29 October 2018, the Appellant attended upon Dr Kobayashi who referred her to Dr Calvird, a psychiatrist, for treatment.[48]
[48] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [75].
The Appellant attended upon Dr Kobayashi on 11 September 2020 and outlined to him that she was not sleeping well, was grinding her teeth and had been unable to open her mouth the day before.[49]
[49] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [453].
Dr Kobayashi gave evidence that the Appellant had previously suffered jaw pain and joint pain and that he thought it was stress related.[50]
[50] T 2 – 16, ll 1 – 5.
The Appellant attended upon Dr Kobayashi on 8 January 2021 with a stomach-ache and diarrhoea.[51]
[51] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [453].
On 18 January 2021, the Appellant attended upon Dr Kobayashi and described having good days and bad days and that she thought stress towards school was causing her more anxiety.[52]
[52] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [454].
Dr Kobayashi recorded on 2 February 2021 the following[53] –
History:
diarrhoea still
[53] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [455].
stress++ a teacher of year 1 two students already suspended
On 24 March 2021, Dr Kobayashi referred the Appellant to Dr Calvird, stating[54] –
The last few months, she has been suffering from chronic diarrhoea, stool check, blood test colonoscopy were all normal, it seems to be stress related. She has no support too much workload, it is hard [for] her to cope with. [emphasis added]
[54] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [281].
Dr Kobayashi noted on 15 April 2021 the following[55]-
This problem is not only her problem but also school problem
unless her school changes nothing change she needs somebody to change this situation
leagal [sic] action may be another option to do so, she has no energy at a moment
…
mentally distressed by her students and lack of support from the school
I think the lack of support is more cause of problem [emphasis added]
[55] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [457].
The evidence of Dr Kobayashi indicates that the actions of school management were a significant contributor to the Appellant's injury.
Dr Calvird, Psychiatrist
Dr Calvird's medical records include a Doctor's Admission Assessment from the Belmont Private Hospital dated 11 January 2020 recording a diagnosis (DSM-IV) of major depressive episode – post natal exacerbation.[56]
[56] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [40].
I accept the Appellant's submission that the pre-existing history provides some background evidence regarding her psychological medical history, but it is of limited relevance to the issues to be determined by the Commission. The Respondent concedes that the injury arose out of the Appellant's employment at the school and there is no contention by the Respondent that the injury is an aggravation of a pre-existing condition. I accept that the medical evidence indicates that the Appellant has been relatively stable in terms of her symptoms from 2014 onwards.

Dr Calvird's notes of the Appellant's attendance on 25 March 2021 outline a provisional diagnosis of an adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood and describe the mechanism of injury as follows[57] –
Exposed to marked traumatic experiences in workplace due to students' aggression, without sufficient extra measures/support being put in place by school management for her/other's safety. [emphasis added]
[57] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [143].

Dr Calvird gave the following evidence about an entry on 25 March 2021 –
--Which is essentially a significant contributor to the injury, was that she felt that her employer was not giving her sufficient support in her workplace? --- Well, like – I think, yes. There was several things, but the fact is there was the behaviourally disturbed children that were putting themselves – putting other children at risk, and the fact that the workplace was not supporting her by following due process and putting things in place to reduce the risk and to – to try and stop the behaviours of those children.[58] [emphasis added]
[58] T 2 – 46, ll 37 – 43.
Dr Calvird's evidence was that the injury was the result of multiple factors described as the Appellant's belief that management was not following due process, her belief that the employer was not giving her enough support, and particular events including the behaviour of the students occurring in the workplace.[59]
[59] T 2 – 47, ll 1 – 10.
Dr Calvird recorded the contributors to the Appellant's injury on 13 April 2021 as the following[60]-
·        Work stress+++
·        Work not following due process
·        The Appellant put in a vulnerable position at work with lack of help/support for aggressive/behaviourally disordered student
[60] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [147].
Dr Calvird's evidence confirms that the Appellant's belief that her employer had failed to appropriately support her in the workplace is closely linked to her claimed injury.
Date of injury
The evidence supports a conclusion that the injury developed over a period of time with symptoms commencing in December 2020.
I note that at the consultation with Dr Kobayashi on 8 January 2021, there was only reference made to IBS symptoms and a stomach ache, with no mention of mental health issues.[61] The consultations with Dr Kobayashi on 18 January 2021 and 2 February 2021 were again for IBS. The notes record the Appellant's stress towards school causing her anxiety and increased stress, although there was no diagnosis of a psychological or psychiatric injury at these consultations.[62]
[61] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [443].
[62] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [454].
At the Appellant's consultation with Dr Calvird on 25 March 2021, the Appellant provided a history of the issues at the school and reported that she could not cope and had been crying every night whilst debriefing with her husband.[63] Dr Calvird recorded a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with depression and anxious mood in the context of workplace stressors and not being supported by management.[64]
[63] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [143].
[64] Exhibit 1, Volume 1, Trial Bundle, [145].
I am satisfied that the Appellant's injury developed over the period from December 2020 to 25 March 2021 when the psychological injury was diagnosed by Dr Calvird.
Non-management action stressors
To be satisfied that the injury arose out of the non-management stressors outlined at [26], it must first be established that the stressors occurred as contended.
The Appellant's stressors are outlined in the SOFC as 65 individual stressors. The Appellant's submissions have separated the stressors into distinct categories as outlined below.
Stressors 2-8, 10-54, 57-60 - the behaviour of Students A, B, and C

Although the stressors outlined in the Appellant's SOFC outline individual incidents involving Students A, B, and C, these incidents will be considered under the broad heading of 'the behaviour' of Students A, B, and C.
The documentary evidence in the form of the OneNote Behaviour Records for Student A and Student B broadly reflect the behaviours outlined in the SOFC, albeit with some differences.

The types of behaviour include aggressive and physical contact towards other students, staff, and the Appellant. Although the Respondent submits that the Appellant has exaggerated the conduct in her description of the stressors, there is no suggestion that the OneSchool Behaviour Records are not accurate.
I am satisfied that the stressors outlined in the Appellant's SOFC relating to the behaviour of Students A and B occurred as demonstrated by the documentary evidence in the OneSchool Behaviour Records. The documentary evidence regarding the behaviour of Student C,[65] indicates that on the balance of probabilities, these actions occurred as outlined in the Appellant's SOFC.
[65] Including the Personalised Learning Plan and Students with Multiple Incidents Report.
I am not persuaded by the Respondent's submission that the Appellant used exaggeration and hyperbolic language, particularly in her description of these stressors. The Respondent referred to the Appellant's description in her SOFC that a student was 'wrecking the classroom' whilst the OneSchool note outlined that Student B "…walked around kicking some chairs or otherwise 'gently' tipping the chairs over. He then picked them all up."[66] Although using the term 'wrecking' may be more dramatic than the language used in the OneSchool note, the difference is not so significant as to conclude the stressor has been based on an exaggerated description of the event.
[66] Respondent's written submissions filed on 30 October 2023, [13].
The Personalised Learning document for Student A outlined the following –
[Student A] demonstrates significant difficulties interacting positively towards peers and adults. He is unsafe for himself and others; he throws objects, runs around the room, flips upside down when on the carpet, he knocks into peers as he moves about the classroom; spits at people and on the floor. [67]
[67] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [626].
The OneSchool Behaviour Records for Student B outlined regular acts of physical aggression. On example was described as follows–
Refused to follow instructions – packing up and getting organised for the afternoon. Stood on the jellybean table, kicked of the books, threw a chair. DP was called. [Student B] escalated and began tipping over desks and throwing water bottles. [Student B] removed. Returned calmer but after packing his bags and realising that he didn't have a full card of stamps he began throwing a teddy and hitting people with it. Teacher moved students away. After the bell, Teacher and Student B had a chat about starting again tomorrow. [68]
[68] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [680].
Student B's Risk Evaluation Form outlines the following assessment of Student B –
[Student B] will engage in Physical Misconduct eg. pushing peers, throwing objects around the room and at peers.
[Student B] will engage in physical misconduct during most transition periods.
[Student B] will engage in engage in unsafe behaviours, eg leaving the classroom, slamming the door, hiding around the corner,
[Student B] will engage in this behaviour multiple times per session.
[Student B] will engage in disruptive and threatening behaviours towards peers and adults in the classroom.
[Student B] will engage in this behaviour several times per session.
[69] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [701-703].
[Student B] will engage in defiant behaviours.[69]

Student C's Student Plan records that Student C had 52 negative behaviour incidences in 2021 including 23 major incidents.[70]
[70] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [707-710].
The Student Plan for Student C included the following –
Impact:Difficulties with self-regulation. Difficulties with peer problem solving. Displays aggressive behaviour towards others. Requires frequent re-direction and cues to follow instructions.[71]
[71] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [705].
I am satisfied that the documentary evidence of the OneSchool records and the summary of students with multiple incidents between 1 January 2021 and 2 April 2021 document created by Ms Hansen[72] demonstrates that the incidents nominated by the Appellant as stressors arising out of the behaviour of Students A, B and C occurred as contended.
[72] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [719].

The documentary evidence along with the medical evidence establishes on the balance of probabilities that the behaviours of Students A, B, and C occurred broadly as outlined in the Appellant's SOFC and these stressors contributed to the Appellant's injury.
I am satisfied that, on the whole, the stressors related to the behaviours of Students A, B, and C were significant contributing factors to the Appellant's injury.
Stressor 9 - The Appellant receiving automated emails from OneSchool advising her of multiple major incidents involving the challenging students that had occurred in her absence.
There was no evidence that the Appellant received automated emails from OneSchool whilst she was absent from work.
This stressor has not been substantiated; however, I note that the medical evidence does not indicate that this was ever referred to as a stressor by the Appellant.
Stressor 55 – The parent teacher interviews
The Appellant gave the following evidence regarding the purpose of the first term parent teacher interview, conducted in late March 2021 –
... It's not about their level of achievement, but it's about their progress. So it's – it's about how they're progressing and how they're heading toward – how well they're going towards assessment. So we are constantly doing assessment in class and constantly, you know, looking at where the kids are at. And so the whole idea of the term 1 progress report is to see where they're at, because we don't give results until the end of term 2, like, formal results until the end of term 2, but we have done assessments in term 1. Certainly, we can give results.[73]
[73] T 1 – 69, ll 36 – 45.
The Appellant gave evidence that she felt like a failure as a teacher during the parent teacher interviews because she had to tell multiple parents that they were going to have to focus on particular things and had to say placating things to parents.[74]
[74] T 2 – 33, ll 44 – 47.
There was no evidence that parents complained or took issue with the Appellant's performance, however I accept the Appellant's evidence that parent teacher interviews were a stressor for her.
Stressor 56 – The Appellant was informed that Student A would no longer be participating in the LEAP program for the duration of Term 1 and Term 2
The LEAP program was described by Ms Hansen as an intensive program run off-site for the most challenging children.
The Appellant gave evidence that Student A attended the LEAP program for seven weeks in the middle of Term 1 and that Ms Hansen had told her that Student A would attend LEAP three days per week in Term 2.[75]
[75] T 1 – 56, ll 9 – 12; T 1 – 70, l 47 to T 1 – 71, ll 1 – 3.
The Appellant stated that she was later told that Student A would not be attending the program in Term 2, describing this change as a massive stressor.[76]
[76] T 1 – 54, ll 24 – 34.

Ms Hansen confirmed that Student A was not going to be able to attend LEAP in Term 2 and that nothing could be done by the school as the decision had been made by Metropolitan Behaviour Services.[77]
[77] T 4 – 23, ll 24 – 41.
The evidence of the Appellant and Ms Hansen supports a conclusion that a decision was made that Student A would not attending the LEAP program in Term 2 and this was a stressor for the Appellant.
Stressor 63 - Reports from other students they felt unsafe in the classroom
The OneSchool Behaviour records for Student A record a major incident on 9 February 2021 involving Student A –
While students were bobbed down, [Student A] began stomping on hands, shoulders, backs and a head. All students were okay but upset by the incident.[78]
[78] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [621].
The Behaviour Records for Student B record that on 25 February 2021, a student stated, 'I am worried he is going to hurt us', prior to the Appellant moving students outside.[79]
[79] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [676].
The Behaviour Records for Student B record that following an incident on 5 March 2021 a student approached the Appellant and said that she was feeling unsafe.[80]
[80] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [672].
The documentary evidence supports the Appellant's contention that students had reported feeling unsafe in the classroom and I accept the Appellant's evidence that this was a stressor.
Management actions stressors
The Appellant submits that the following stressors can be categorised as arising out of management action –

Stressor 1: The Appellant learning that Student A, Student B and Student C would be in her Year 1 class in 2021;
Stressor 61: Insufficient classroom support to prevent or mitigate against incidents caused by Student A, Student B or Student C occurring;
Stressor 62: Insufficient classroom support to ensure a safe classroom for the students of 1S;
Stressor 64: Insufficient classroom support to ensure a safe workplace for the Appellant; and
Stressor 65; Insufficient support to ensure the Appellant was able to deliver teaching to an effective level while Student A, Student B and Student C were present in the classroom. [81]
[81] Appellant's written submissions filed on 4 August 2023, [14].

These management stressors will be considered below in the context of s 32(5).
Consideration of s 32(5)
The Appellant bears the onus of demonstrating that the injury is not excluded by reasonable management action provisions in s 32(5) of the Act. The parties are in agreement that there was no management action being taken by the school against the Appellant and accordingly there is no requirement to consider s 32(5)(b).
The Appellant submits that there are significant stressors that are not related in any way to management action that have played a more than significant role in giving rise to the Appellant's decompensation. In these circumstances, the Appellant submits that even if the Commission is satisfied that there are some aspects of the management action which have been taken reasonably, the Appellant is still entitled to succeed in light of the significant contribution to her injury made by the non-management action stressors.
I note the Respondent's submissions that the Appellant's SOFC outlined an extensive number of single incidents relating to non-management action stressors but summarised the stressors relating to management action. Whilst this may give the impression that the non‑management action stressors vastly outweigh the significance of the management-action related stressors, it is clear from the medical evidence that both the management action stressors and non-management action stressors were integral to the development of the Appellant's injury.
I also note that the agreement between the parties at the commencement of the hearing was that the injury arose from both management and non-management stressors.
In Davis v Blackwood,[82] ('Davis') Martin P stated the following –
The task of the Commission when applying s 32(5) does not involve setting out what it regards as the type of actions that would have been reasonable in the circumstances. There may be any number of actions or combinations of actions which would satisfy s 32(5). The proper task is to assess the management action which was taken and determine whether it was reasonable and whether it was taken in a reasonable way. Sometimes, that may involve considerations of what else might have been done but that will only be relevant to whether what was done was, in fact, reasonable.
…
I agree with the reasoning of Hall P in Q-Comp v Hohn where he said that the mere occurrence of reasonable management action will not insulate a disorder from characterisation as an "injury". In cases such as this the Commission will be aided by expert evidence which can assist in the assignment of weight to the various factors which go to the creation of maintenance of a psychiatric disorder. If the evidence supports a finding that the psychiatric disorder results from the employment being a significant contributing factor then, when one turns to consider s 32(5), it is important to determine to what extent, if any, there is an overlap of reasonable management action and other employment factors.[83]
[82] [2014] ICQ 009, 51.
[83] Davis v Blackwood [2014] ICQ 009, 51.
In Hardy v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator),[84] ('Hardy') the Appellant nominated 49 stressors, describing particular stressors as 'major stressors'. President Martin determined that such as description was not relevant, stating –
… Whether it is described as a major stressor or a primary stressor or just, simply, a stressor, it is still one of the matters relied upon by Ms Hardy as having caused her injury. The fact that Ms Hardy had nominated some stressors as being more important than others does not change the circumstance that all of them had been nominated as causative.[85]
[84] [2015] ICQ 027, 44.
[85] Hardy v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 027, 44.
Applying the principle outlined above in Hardy, I do not accept that the non-management action stressors in this matter contributed any more significantly to the Appellant's injury than the stressors related to management action. The medical evidence indicates that the injury arose out of both management and non‑management stressors that occurred broadly over the same time period. In these circumstances, it is not the case that the management stressors should be given any less weight as contributing to the injury given the extensive overlap with the other stressors.
The Appellant's submissions referred to Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey,[86] ('Mahaffey') in which President Martin wrote –
[86] [2016] ICQ 010.
What does s 32 require?
This section has been the subject of consideration on many occasions. In this case, there was conduct (the harassment) which was a cause of the disorder and which did not come within s 32(5) and there was conduct (the telephone answering issue) which was a cause of the disorder and which did come within s 32(5). Thus the following question arises:
If a particular stressor is held:
(a)to have been a cause of a psychiatric or psychological disorder, and
(b)to have arisen out of, or in the course of, reasonable management action reasonably taken, then
is the psychiatric or psychological disorder excluded from the definition of "injury" in s 32(1) no matter what else may have caused the disorder?
…
Section 32 (1) is concerned with consideration of an injury which arises out of, or in the course of, employment. In other words, it covers the whole gamut of the employment relationship. It does not confine its operation to particular aspects of the employment, rather, it emphasises that all of the employment is to be considered because an "injury" will only come within the definition "if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury".
A distinction can then be drawn with the provisions of s 32(5). Putting to one side s 32(5)(c), that section is concerned with "reasonable management action" which is actually taken or a worker's expectation of perception of such action. In other words, it is concerned only with a "slice" of the employment.
…
The question which arises in this case, and which has been set out above, could, if answered in the way proposed by the appellant, lead to circumstances where a worker who nominated two stressors would be denied compensation if one of those stressors was reasonable management action etc., even if the unchallenged expert evidence was that its contribution to the disorder was minimal. Similarly, the appellant's answer would also deny a worker compensation if a disorder was the result of ten stressors, each of equal importance, but where one fell within s 32(5).[87]
[87] Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey [2016] ICQ 10, 32.
The Appellant's submissions referred to consideration of beneficial legislation in Mahaffey,[88] however I note Martin J's comments regarding the approach to beneficial legislation -
It is only if more than one interpretation is available or there is uncertainty as to the meaning of the words that the beneficial interpretation approach arises – Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Brown.[89]
[88] Appellant's written submissions filed on 4 August 2023, [54].
[89] Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey [2016] ICQ 10, 43.
The facts of this matter can be distinguished from those of Mahaffey in which the relevant management action was quite distinct to the other stressors giving rise to the employee's injury. However, in this matter, the medical evidence and the Appellant's evidence demonstrate that the Appellant's assertion of alleged failures in management action to provide appropriate support relating to the other stressors contributed significantly to the development of the Appellant's injury.
In Workers' Compensation Regulator v Langerak,[90] President Martin wrote –
The ultimate question under s 32(5) is whether the injury, not any one stressor, arose out of, or in the course of, reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with the worker's employment. The determination made in respect of s 32(5)(a) is one made by weighing reasonable management action against other employment factors in light of the whole of the evidence.[91]
[90] [2020] ICQ 2, 86.
[91] Workers' Compensation Regulator v Langerak [2020] ICQ 2, 86.

The Appellant contends that to the extent that the injury arose out of management action, such action was not reasonable nor was it taken in a reasonable way.
After having regard to the cases discussed above, I am not of the view that it is appropriate to determine which of the stressors were the 'most significant' contributors to the injury. The whole of the evidence must be considered to determine whether the injury arose out of or in the course of management action. The medical evidence of Dr Kobayashi and Dr Calvird indicates that there was a significant overlap of management action with the other employment factors. I am satisfied that both the evidence of the medical practitioners and the Appellant demonstrates that the Appellant's symptoms arose from both management action and non-management action stressors.

Did the injury arise out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with the Appellant's employment?
Stressor 1 - The decision to allocate Students A, B and C to the Appellant's class

The Appellant had a pre-existing mental health history which she submits should have been taken into consideration when determining the composition of her class in 2021.
The Appellant refers to the email she sent to Ms Uittenbosch on 2 November 2020 indicating that she was suffering from severe anxiety.[92] However, the medical evidence supports the view that there had been a marked improvement in the Appellant's psychological functioning leading up to December 2020. I note that the Appellant's submission regarding her vulnerability was not outlined in her SOFC and was not a nominated stressor. I also accept the Respondent's submission that it was not put on notice that the vulnerability of the Appellant formed part of the appeal. Notwithstanding this submission, I am satisfied that the medical evidence indicates that the Appellant was stable in December 2020.
[92] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [744].
In Murphy v Workers' Compensation Regulator[93] it was determined that a decision regarding allocation of teachers to a classroom and the communication of such a decision was management action. Accordingly, the decision to allocate Students, A, B, and C to the Appellant's class was management action.
[93] [2022] QIRC 264, 200.
Students A, B, and C

Student A commenced attending the school towards the end of 2020 and since this time had a considerable number of negative behaviour incidents.[94] In the document prepared by Ms Hansen setting out the students with multiple incidents of misconduct/misbehaviour from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2020[95] Student A was not included because he had left the school and the school leadership no longer had access to his data in OneSchool.[96]
[94] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [633].
[95] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [718].
[96] T 4 – 43, ll 9 – 14.
The Student Plan for Student A outlines the following –

-        Difficulty with: self-regulation, engaging appropriately in unstructured environments
-        Limited understanding of action/consequence
-        Triggers: transition, change to routine
-        Requires frequent re-direction & cues to stay on task & follow instruction
-        Demonstrates disruptive, disrespectful behaviour[97]

[97] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [634].

Ms Miell gave evidence that she had given Student A in-class support in 2020 and had taken him out of the classroom to calm down.[98]
[98] T 2 – 55, ll 40 – 47.
Ms Uittenbosch gave evidence that Student A had difficulties with regulating his emotions and behaviour and his attendance was very poor.[99]
[99] T 3 – 28, ll 29 – 36.
Ms Hansen gave evidence that Student A was a highly complex child who was volatile, difficult, impulsive, highly intelligent, but dysregulated.[100]
[100] T 4 – 16, ll 24 – 30.

The Student Plan for Student B notes that Student B had a considerable number of negative behaviour incidents in 2020.[101]
[101] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [697].
The Student Plan for Student B outlines the following –
Difficulties with self-regulation and peer problem solving. Limited understanding of action consequence. Requires use of specific tools – Wriggle stool, headphones. Parental concerns with anxiety. Difficulty with emotional regulation.[102]
[102] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [699].
On 23 February 2021, a progress note records that there had been a 'significant increase in behaviours resulting in frequent office referrals and suspension'.[103]
[103] Ibid.
Ms Miell gave evidence that she had some involvement with Student B in 2020 involving her going to the classroom, talking with the teacher, setting up a space for him in the classroom, and using the 'Engine Room'.[104] The Engine Room is a regulation room where students who were heightened would go that would include sensory equipment for the students to use.[105]
[104] T 2 – 56, l 46 to T 2 – 57, l 2.
[105] T 2 – 56, ll 43 – 47; T 2 – 57, ll 1 – 2.
Ms Uittenbosch gave evidence that in Prep, Student B had a couple of behaviour incidents but that she did not work very closely with him in Prep.[106]
[106] T 3 – 30, ll 30 – 35.
Ms Hansen gave evidence that Student B could be oppositional, lacked attention span, and could become dysregulated and volatile.[107]
[107] T 4 – 17, ll 1 – 7.
Ms Hansen gave evidence that although the school management saw incidents from Student B, "didn't anticipate the escalation that [they] saw when Student B was in the [2021] class.'[108]
[108] T 4 – 17, ll 10 – 12.
The Student Plan for Student C notes that this student had a considerable number of negative behaviour incidents in 2020.[109]
[109] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [718].
Student C's Student Plan includes the following entry–
Impact: Difficulties with self-regulation.
Difficulties with peer problem solving.
Displays aggressive behaviour towards others.
Requires frequent re-direction and cues to follow instructions.[110]
[110] Exhibit 1, Volume 2, Trial Bundle, [710].
Ms Miell gave evidence that she had no concerns with Student C's behaviour in 2020 and had never been asked to have anything to do with Student C.[111]
[111] T 2 – 55, ll 5 – 9.
Ms Uittenbosch gave evidence that she had little to do with Student C during Prep in 2020 and was not aware of any concerns about Student C's behaviour.[112]
[112] T 3 – 30, ll 41 – 45; T 3 – 72, ll 1 – 7.
Ms Hansen gave evidence that Student C was a bit of an 'unknown' and had not displayed high levels of behaviour previously,[113] however, in 2021 it became clear very quickly that her behaviour escalated significantly.[114]
[113] T 4 – 19, ll 20 – 28.
[114] T 4 – 19, ll 25 – 36.
The Appellant gave evidence that towards the end of 2020 Ms Miell, brought Students A, B, and C up to meet her separately and they were prepared with a photo book to remind them of who the Appellant was.[115]
[115] T 1 – 19, ll 22 – 42.
The Covid pandemic had a significant impact on the school's ability to assess students due to online learning and high levels of absenteeism. Ms Uittenbosch was responsible for Prep and Grade 1 at the school during the relevant period. Ms Uittenbosch gave evidence that in 2020 Covid had a significant impact on the school's ability to assess children within the classroom, stating –
…Well, it's difficult to assess them when they're not there. Online learning – you know there were some changes, for example, in semester 1 reporting period. Their requirements for reporting were reduced for semester 1 2020. I know at [the school] they only reported on English, maths and science for that reason so, you know, like you can't assess someone on their reading if they're not at school consistently and another impact from COVID was really reduced attendance because, of course, no one is allowed to attend school when they have any symptoms so students' attendance was significantly affected.[116]
[116] T 3 – 26, ll 3 – 11.
Ms Hansen gave evidence was that it was difficult to ascertain whether specific students had behavioural issues in Prep in 2020 or were not coping as there were long periods in which the students were not at school. In response to a question as to any problems in being able to identify behavioural students in prep in 2020, Ms Hansen stated –
…
Well, given that while there – there was times where they were at school
…
there were also long periods where they weren't. The validity of the information that we received – and, I guess, there was also a lot of anxiety that we – we saw. So it was hard to ascertain regularly through our normal processes where students were not coping or whether they were. I mean, it – it – it manifests in a classroom in front of you.
…
[117] T 4 – 7, ll 2 – 12.
You see it. But, I guess, there were so many contributing factors that it – it was a very difficult year to utilise the processes that we normally put in place.[117]
The school leadership was aware that the significant impact of Covid on the attendance of students in Prep in 2020 made the data relating to progress unreliable, noting the very high rate of absenteeism. Ms Hansen also gave evidence about the impact on students' anxiety levels which manifests in behavioural difficulties. In these circumstances it was understandably difficult for the school leadership to rely upon the data obtained, particularly where they were aware that some of the anxiety and behavioural difficulties were connected to the irregular arrangements due to Covid. In these circumstances, the decisions regarding class composition were compromised by the unreliable data obtained in the 2020 year.

As outlined by President Martin J in Davis, the task of the Commission when applying s 32(5) is to assess the management action that was taken and determine whether it was reasonable and whether it was taken in a reasonable way.
I am satisfied that the evidence supports a determination that the school leadership acted reasonably in allocating class 1S to the Appellant and acted reasonably in supporting the Appellant in her role as a classroom teacher.
The actions of the school leadership in supporting the Appellant were reasonable and taken in a reasonable way in connection with her employment.
Conclusion
It is common ground that the Appellant suffered a personal injury, and that the injury arose out of her employment.
The Appellant's evidence and the medical evidence of Dr Calvird and Dr Kobayashi demonstrates that the Appellant's employment was a significant contributing factor to the injury.
Stressors 2 to 8, 10 to 54 and 57 to 60 (conduct related to Students A, B, and C) are accepted as evidence by the OneSchool records. It is accepted that these stressors contributed to the Appellant's injury on the basis of the Appellant's evidence and the evidence of Dr Calvird.
Stressor 55 (the parent-teacher interviews) is accepted, and the evidence of the Appellant is accepted regarding the impact of this stressor on the development of her injury.
Stressor 56 (the Appellant being informed that Student A would not be attending LEAP in Term 2) is substantiated and the evidence of the Appellant is accepted as supporting a conclusion that this stressor contributed to the Appellant's injury.
Stressor 63 (reports from students that they felt unsafe whilst in the classroom) is substantiated by the school records. The report of Dr Calvird of 2 September 2021 supports a finding that this stressor contributed to the Appellant's injury.
The medical evidence, particularly that of Dr Calvird, along with the Appellant's oral evidence demonstrates that the Appellant's injury arose out of the events associated with the students in her class (the non-management stressors) and the actions taken by the school leadership (management action stressors). The evidence does not support the submission made by the Appellant that the injury occurred notwithstanding management action.
Stressors 1, 61, 62, 64 and 65 arose out of management action. The evidence does not support a finding that the decision to allocate Students A, B, and C in the Appellant's Grade 1 class was unreasonable or taken in an unreasonable way. The evidence does not support a finding that insufficient classroom support was provided to mitigate against incidents caused by Student A, B, and C or to ensure a safe classroom and safe workplace. The evidence does not support a finding that insufficient support was provided to ensure the Appellant was able to deliver teaching to an effective level while Student A, Student B, and Student C were present in the classroom. For the reasons outlined above, I consider that the school leadership took reasonable management action in a reasonable way throughout the relevant period.
I note the Appellant's evidence that she had utilised all of the management strategies to address the students' behaviour, confirming that there was nothing else she could have implemented in the classroom.[173] On the basis of the evidence from the school leadership that the Appellant was an excellent, competent and dedicated teacher, I have no difficulty in accepting that the Appellant did use every strategy possible to address the students' behaviour. There was no evidence before the Commission that the Appellant could have adopted any other strategies to manage her classroom. The Appellant presented as a dedicated teacher who was committed to advocating for her students. At no point throughout these proceedings was it suggested that the Appellant could have done more for her students.
[173] T 2 – 28, ll 1 – 27.
The difficulty for the Appellant's claim is that not only was she stressed by the non‑management actions, but the medical evidence confirms that she was significantly stressed by her view that the support provided by the school leadership was insufficient.
The Appellant submits that management may have avoided the Appellant decompensating if they had taken 'proactive and timely action' when the Appellant first raised concerns.[174] Much of the Appellant's submissions on this point relate to the school taking action at an earlier stage. Notwithstanding the ongoing actions by the school to manage broader issues regarding Students A, B, and C, many actions relating to their classroom presence occurred within a number of weeks of the school year commencing. Noting the availability of immediate support in response to a request for assistance, I do not consider the time taken to source and establish proactive support to have been unreasonable.
[174] Appellant's written submissions filed on 4 August 2023, [527].
I also note that the school leadership's actions in working with the students' parents to obtain diagnoses would ultimately have led to increased funding and further support for the classroom teacher. These actions were appropriate and reasonable but could not yield an immediate result for the Appellant.
If it were not for the existence of stressors arising out of management action, the injury would be one for acceptance. However, the existence of s 32(5) requires consideration of whether the injury arose out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way. The medical evidence supports a determination that management action was a significant contributing factor, along with the other non-management action stressors. As outlined above, the evidence supports a conclusion that the injury arose out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with the Appellant's employment.

I am satisfied the management action taken in relation to the nominated stressors was reasonable. As a consequence, s 32(5) of the Act is enlivened to exclude the Appellant's claim. Accordingly, the Appellant did not suffer an injury within the meaning of the term pursuant to s 32 of the Act.
Orders
I make the following orders:
1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator is confirmed.

3. Failing agreement on costs, to be the subject of a further application to the Commission.

4. Liberty to apply.

[2024] QIRC 274

26 November 2024