Staats, S.J. v The Commonwealth of Australia

[1992] FCA 250

Re: STEVEN JOHN STAATS
And: THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
No. ACT G60 of 1991
FED No. 250
Appeal

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Gallop(1), Davies(1) and Higgins(1) JJ.

CATCHWORDS

Appeal - order dismissing application for declaratory judgment of right - relevant principles for summary termination of proceedings-correctly applied

Public Service Act 1922 (Cth), s.62(1), 62(6), 63D(2) Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B

Park Oh Ho v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 167 CLR 637

HEARING

CANBERRA

#DATE 22:4:1992

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms J. Bonsey

Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicito r

ORDER

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

JUDGE1

This is an appeal brought by Steven John Staats from an order made by a single judge of the Court (Neaves J.) that an application lodged by Mr Staats on 26 August 1991 be dismissed on the ground that the application disclosed no reasonable course of action.

1. As Neaves J. in his reasons for judgment dealt carefully and fully with the issues which were before him, and as the Court agrees with the views expressed by his Honour, the Court may be brief in these reasons for judgment.

2. An earlier proceeding, No. ACT G20 of 1989, had been commenced by Mr Staats against the Commonwealth on 7 April 1989. At the time of that proceeding, Mr Staats was an officer of the Australian Public Service occupying a position in the Australian Defence Force Academy. Mr Staats sought a declaration that he was not bound to comply with what he said were certain directions given to him by an officer of the Department of Defence. Mr Staats also claimed damages against the Commonwealth.
   At an early stage in those proceedings, Mr Staats sought by notice of motion an interlocutory injunction against an officer of the Department of Defence restraining him until the hearing and determination of the proceedings from holding an inquiry under s.62(1) of the Public Service Act 1922 (Cth). Counsel for the officer gave an undertaking to the Court that he would not proceed with such an inquiry founded upon certain documents purporting to charge Mr Staats with disciplinary offences. That undertaking was given because it was recognised that the purported charges were defectively drawn. Subsequently, further charges were drawn and Mr Staats was charged with disciplinary offences. Mr Staats then sought an interlocutory injunction restraining the inquiry into those charges. That motion was dismissed. Subsequently, the officer who held the inquiry, Mr L. Baxter, directed under s.62(6)(b) of the Public Service Act that Mr Staats be dismissed from the Australian Public Service.

3. Proceedings No. ACT G20 of 1989 were again before Neaves J. on a directions hearing on 30 June 1989. The matter came before him again on 10 July 1989 and orders were then made by consent which included the following orders:
   

"5. That until further order, no action be undertaken by the respondent prejudicial to the applicants continued employment with the Commonwealth;

6. That until further order, no action be undertaken by the respondent with respect to any report, disciplinary action or otherwise under the Public Service Act 1922 or otherwise"

Notwithstanding the making of these consent orders, Neaves J. expressed doubt whether the making of the orders would be effective to prevent the dismissal of Mr Staats taking effect and he suggested that urgent consideration be given by Mr Staats to lodging an appeal under s.63D(2) of the Public Service Act.

1. On the following day, 11 July 1989, Mr Staats under s.63D(2) of the Public Service Act gave notice of appeal to a Disciplinary Appeal Committee against Mr Baxter's direction that he be dismissed from the Australian Public Service. Steps were thereafter taken by officers of the Commonwealth to constitute a Disciplinary Appeal Committee and to prepare for the hearing of the appeal.
   

2. On 17 August 1989, Neaves J., by consent, ordered that the Disciplinary Appeal Committee be restrained until further order from proceeding to hear and determine the appeal lodged on 11 July 1989.

3. On 29 August 1989, in ACT G 20 of 1989, an amended substantive application and supporting affidavit were filed. Subsequently, the matter was fixed for hearing on 14 March 1990. On that date the hearing was adjourned until 16 March 1990 and, on that latter date, Neaves J. was informed that the matter had been settled. The terms of settlement were as follows:
   

"1. The respondent will retain one copy of the report and recommendations by Mr Baxter, the inquiry officer in this matter, on the applicant's discipline file held within the Department of Defence, and one copy on the file held by the Australian Government Solicitor;

2. Any other copies of Mr Baxter's report and recommendations known to the respondent will be destroyed forthwith and no other copies will be made;

3. The applicant's personnel file held within the Department of Defence will contain no reference to the discipline file referred to in paragraph 1;

4. The respondent confirms the letters to the applicant dated 28 September 1989, 4 October 1989 and 5 October 1989, copies of which are annexed to this agreement.

5. These proceedings in the Federal Court will be discontinued, with no order as to costs;

6. The applicant's appeal to the Disciplinary Appeal Committee against the recommendations of Mr Baxter will be cancelled upon the applicant's resignation taking effect;

7. The applicant will forthwith tender his resignation from the Australian Public Service.

8. The actions required to be taken by the parties under this agreement will be completed forthwith upon the signing of this agreement.

1. Neaves J. made the following orders:-
   

"1. Pursuant to Order 22, Rule 2(1)(d) of the Federal Court Rules, leave be granted to the Applicant to discontinue the Application herein; and

2. Each party bear his or its own costs of the Application."

Later, on 16 March 1990, Mr Staats filed a notice of discontinuance of the proceedings and subsequently he resigned from the Australian Public Service.

1. That should have been an end to the matter. But on 26 August 1991, Mr Staats filed an application, No. ACT G 49 of 1991 which was in the following terms:
   

"APPLICATION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF RIGHT

Pursuant to Section 21 (1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act (Cwth) 1976 and Section 39 (B) of the Judiciary Act (Cwth) 1903 and Section 32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act (Cwth) 1976 the Applicant applies for a Declaratory Judgment of Right.

The Applicant respectfully submits that accrued jurisdiction for this Application derives from the injunctions issued in the Federal Court of Australia in my action Myself vs Commonwealth of Australia ACT G 20 of 1989 on 30 June 1989 against a Commonwealth Office one L. Baxter and the subsequent Consent Orders in the Federal Court of Australia of 10 July

1989. This claim is made bona fide to invoke accrued jurisdiction. On the grounds appearing in the accompanying affidavit, the Applicant seeks a Declaratory Judgment of Right:

1. the Respondent by his conduct debarred himself from obtaining injunctions issued in the Federal Court of Australia in the aforementioned proceedings on 17 August 1989 restraining a Disciplinary Appeals Committee from hearing an Appeal lodged by the Applicant 11 July 1989, without this being unable to continue the litigation.

2. That the Applicants consent to these proceedings on 17 August 1989 were obtained by deception and the Applicant's consent therefore has no validity;

3. That the injunctions of 17 August 1989 are therefor null and void, and that the Respondent seriously breached the Consent Orders of 10 July 1989.

THE APPLICANT claims by way of relief:

1. Consequential thereto the terms of settlement of Myself vs Commonwealth of Australia ACT G 20 of 1989 of 14 March 1990 be struckout;

2. Judgment be entered for the Applicant and he be awarded compensation for all loss and damage claimed."

This was the application which was dismissed by Neaves J.

1. Mr Staats informed Neaves J. that he was seeking a declaration that the injunction granted on 17 August 1989 in proceeding ACT G 20 of 1989 had been improperly obtained, a consequential order setting aside the terms of settlement of 14 March 1990 and judgment for loss and damage suffered by him as a result of the Commonwealth's deceptive conduct. In support of this claim, Mr Staats submitted that the actions taken by officers of the Commonwealth in preparing for the appeal by the Disciplinary Appeal Tribunal were taken in breach of Order 6 made on 10 July 1989. That order is set out above and we need not repeat it.

2. We need not consider whether any of the actions taken in setting up the Disciplinary Appeal Tribunal and in preparing for the hearing by that Tribunal were actions which were in technical breach of Order 6, if the words of that order were given their literal meaning. As any such steps were taken as the result of the lodging by Mr Staats on 11 July 1989 of the appeal under s.63D(2) of the Public Service Act, the lodgment of which had been suggested by Neaves J. to protect the interests of Mr Staats, it is clear that any breach would have been a breach only in a most technical sense and not a substantive breach of the order.

3. Moreover, as Neaves J. pointed out in his reasons for judgment, any such breach would not provide a reason why the injunction should not have been granted on 11 August 1989 restraining the Disciplinary Appeal Committee until further order from proceeding to hear and determine the appeal. The action complained of could only have provided a reason for the granting of the order. There was no relevant non-disclosure to the Court. Nothing occurred which misled the Court.

4. And finally, nothing which occurred between 11 July 1989 and 17 August 1989 provided a reason for setting aside the terms of settlement of 11 March 1990. It was a term of that settlement that Mr Staats' appeal to the Disciplinary Appeal Committee be cancelled. The effect of the operation of that term was that the lodgment by Mr Staats of his appeal under s.63D(2) and the taking of steps thereafter by officers of the Commonwealth to constitute the Disciplinary Appeal Committee and to prepare for the hearing of the appeal were deemed to be of no effect.

5. We agree with the view of Neaves J. that the contentions of Mr Staats "provide no foundation whatsoever for having the injunction granted on 17 August 1989 or the terms of settlement dated 14 March 1990 set aside."

6. Moreover, there remains no issue between Mr Staats and the Commonwealth in respect of which the Federal Court of Australia could make an order granting him relief. The Federal Court is not a court of general jurisdiction. Its relevant jurisdiction for present purposes is that which arises under the Administrative Decisions judicial Review! Act 1977 (Cth) and under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Under neither of these provisions would the award of damages be an appropriate remedy. See e.g. Park Oh Ho v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 167 CLR 637 at 644-5. And in the absence of damages, there is no matter in respect of which an order would be made. Mr Staats has resigned from the Commonwealth Public Service and any issue which he had with respect to directions given to him whilst he was an officer of the Commonwealth Public Service, directions which were the subject of the original proceedings No. ACT G20 of 1989, has ceased to have any significance.

7. We therefore agree with the trial Judge that the proceedings before him disclosed no reasonable cause of action and we agree with his Honour's order that they be dismissed.

8. For these reasons, the appeal will be dismissed with The Appellant in person.