Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
St John v St. Vincent’s Hospital [2022] FedCFamC2G 669
File number(s): MLG 1931 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE MANSINI Date of judgment: 17 August 2022 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – FAIR WORK – cessation of employment in the context of the global COVID-19 pandemic – whether role no longer required to be performed by anyone due to alleged fundamental changes to it – whether contract repudiated by directing performance of another role – where repudiation affirmed by subsequent conduct – application dismissed Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss.12, 42, 50, 51, 365, 539, 542, 543, 545, 548
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 rr.1.06, 7.01, 16.5(3)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Nurses and Midwives (Victorian Public Health Sector) (Single Interest Employers) Enterprise Agreement 2016-2020 cl.12.7
Cases cited: CMP Manufacturing Limited v Barbieri (2018) 275 IR 465
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2014] HCA 32
Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2001] FCA 1613
Heymans v Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356
Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115
R v Industrial Commission of South Australia; ex parte Adelaide Milk Cooperative Ltd (1977) 44 SAIR 1202
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 158 Date of last submission/s: 9 May 2022 Date of hearing: 9 & 10 May 2022 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Hooper Solicitor for the Applicant: McDonald Murholme Solicitors Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Harrington Solicitor for the Respondent: K & L Gates ORDERS
MLG 1931 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MS CAROL ST JOHN
Applicant
AND: ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL
Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE MANSINI
DATE OF ORDER:
16 August 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.There be no orders as to costs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
IN SUMMARY [1] CONTEXT [6] Procedural context [6] Factual context [13] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT [77] THE REDUNDANCY CLAIM [80] The pleadings [80] The respective contentions [86] The relevant principles [99] Consideration [101] Was the Applicant entitled to redundancy pay? [123] THE REPUDIATION CLAIM [125] The pleadings [125] The respective contentions [132] The relevant principles [140] Consideration [143] CONCLUSION [158] REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge Mansini
IN SUMMARY
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read St John v St. Vincent's Hospital and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 669
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the legal principles surrounding redundancy and the meaning of "redundant" as it applied to St John’s situation. It noted that redundancy typically occurs when the duties of a particular position are no longer required to be performed by anyone. The Court found that St John’s role was not redundant, as her duties had merely been temporarily altered due to the pandemic. Moreover, the Court held that the Hospital had not repudiated the contract by directing St John to perform another role, as she had refused to do so. The Hospital’s conduct did not affirm any such repudiation, as St John did not accept the new role offered to her.
As a result, the Court dismissed St John's application. The Court concluded that St John’s role was not redundant, and the Hospital’s direction for her to perform another role did not amount to a repudiation of the contract. Since St John refused to perform the new role and did not affirm any repudiation, she was not entitled to redundancy pay. Therefore, the application was dismissed with no orders for redundancy pay.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In this respect, the relevant legal principles were not in dispute. The Applicant drew the Court’s attention to a series of propositions about the meaning of “redundant” or “redundancy” as derived from classic industrial case authorities: for example, R v Industrial Commission of South Australia; ex parte Adelaide Milk Cooperative Ltd (1977) 44 SAIR 1202 and Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2001] FCA 1613. The Hospital did not dispute those general principles, citing the following passage of CMP Manufacturing Limited v Barbieri (2018) 275 IR 465 per Bromberg J in the context of a claim arising under a contract of employment and the statute:The term ‘redundant’ is not a legal term of art and what is meant is often dependent on the context: Amcor Ltd v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (2005) 222 CLR 241 (Amcor) at [14] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). The usual case is where the duties which constitute a particular position are no longer required to be performed by anybody. That may arise because the need or demand for the performance of those duties has diminished to such an extent there is no longer a need for their performance at all. Alternatively, a restructuring or re-ordering of the duties or tasks required to be performed by employees within a particular business may result in a position or positions becoming redundant because the bundle of duties that did constitute a particular position are no longer required to be performed by anybody as a bundle of duties constituting the particular position. For example, where the duties of a position are distributed to other positions making the first position redundant, or where the duties of a position are so change or altered that a different position is created the result of which is that the original position is redundant…”[94][94] CMP Manufacturing Limited v Barbieri (2018) 275 IR 465 at [12] (Bromberg J).Consideration The case was run and defended on the basis that the “redundancy” pay component was for breach of clause 12.7 of the 2016 Enterprise Agreement (which, the Applicant said, incorporated the Policy’s 25-week severance pay entitlement by reference at clause 12.7). Contravention of an enterprise agreement is a civil remedy provision: s.50 of the Act. This Court has jurisdiction to determine an application alleging contravention of this provision made by an employee as defined: s.539 of the Act. Where satisfied that a person has contravened a civil remedy provision, the Court has jurisdiction to make an order awarding compensation for loss that a person has suffered because of the contravention: s.545 of the Act. There is no dispute in this case that the Applicant was an “employee” as defined by the Act and that the 2016 Enterprise Agreement covered and applied to the Applicant: within the meaning of ss.12, 42 and 51 of the Act.Was the Applicant’s role no longer required to be performed by anyone? The Applicant asked the Court to first determine this question in order to reach a finding of compensation by way of redundancy pay under the 2016 Enterprise Agreement.