Srour v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 33 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Srour v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1228

CORRIGENDUM

OSSAMA MOHAMAD SROUR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 2448 OF 2005

MOORE J
15 SEPTEMBER 2006 (CORRIGENDUM 21 SEPTEMBER 2006)
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 2448 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

OSSAMA MOHAMAD SROUR
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE:

15 SEPTEMBER 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

CORRIGENDUM

  1. In line four of paragraph 57 on page 17 of the reasons for judgment the words "Federal Magistrate" should be deleted and replaced with the word "Tribunal".

  2. On the cover page, the word "Mohammad" should be deleted and replaced with the word "Mohamad".

I certify that the preceding two (2) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Moore.

Associate:

Dated:       21 September 2006


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Srour v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1228

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Magistrates Court – application for spouse visa – where Tribunal not satisfied of spousal relationship and found no evidence to support alternative criteria including clause 100.221(4) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 – where evidence before Tribunal of child of relationship – whether evidence of informal access arrangements required to satisfy clause 100.221(4) – whether appellant satisfied criteria by reason of parental responsibility obligations under statute

WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘has custody or joint custody of, or access to’, ‘any other formal maintenance obligation’

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 clause 100.221(4)

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) s 3

Fitch v Migration Review Tribunal [2004] FCA 1673 applied
Yazbeck v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 458 discussed

OSSAMA MOHAMMAD SROUR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 2448 OF 2005

MOORE J
15 SEPTEMBER 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 2448 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

OSSAMA MOHAMAD SROUR
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 SEPTEMBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal is allowed.

2.    Subject to order 3, the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent's costs thrown away by the adjournment of 26 April 2006.

4. Order 1 of the Federal Magistrates Court on 22 November 2005 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a)    order in the nature of an order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal made on 3 September 2004;

(b)   order in the nature of a writ of mandamus…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Srour v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1228
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Srour v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant contested a decision by the Migration Review Tribunal denying his application for a Spouse (Migrant) (Class BC) visa. The Federal Magistrates Court was tasked with reviewing the Tribunal's decision, which was based on the lack of evidence supporting any of the alternative subclauses for the visa requirement. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to invite him to a hearing, relied on hearsay evidence, and did not allow him to respond to allegations against him. The Federal Magistrate found that the Tribunal had invited the appellant to a hearing and had provided him with the opportunity to provide additional information, thus dismissing the first ground of appeal. The remaining grounds were related to the Tribunal's handling of the sponsor's standing, which the appellant argued denied him natural justice. The Federal Magistrate determined that the Tribunal's decision on the sponsor's standing was likely approved or adopted by the Tribunal itself.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of statutory provisions concerning maintenance obligations and whether they constituted "formal" obligations under the relevant Act. The court found that the statutory provisions did not amount to formal maintenance obligations due to the absence of specific terms and the requirement of further processes to enforce them. The court also considered the principle of judicial comity and whether the Federal Magistrate had erred in not recognising the appellant's right to custody and the sponsor's formal maintenance obligation. The court concluded that the Federal Magistrate's approach was not plainly or clearly wrong but that Dowsett J's reasoning was marginally more compelling.

The Federal Magistrate's decision was set aside, and the court issued an order for a writ of certiorari to quash the Tribunal's decision and a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to hear and determine the appellant's visa application according to law. The appellant was granted costs of the appeal, subject to the payment of costs thrown away by the adjournment. The Migration Review Tribunal was joined as the second respondent in the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. Subject to order 3, the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs thrown away by the adjournment of 26 April 2006.

4. Order 1 of the Federal Magistrates Court on 22 November 2005 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) order in the nature of an order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal made on 3 September 2004;

(b) order in the nature of a writ of mandamus directing the Migration Review Tribunal to hear and determine the applicant's application for Spouse (Migrant) (Class BC) visa according to law.

5. The Migration Review Tribunal be joined as second respondent

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MOORE J
The Tribunal considered whether the appellant met any of the alternative subclauses for the purposes of fulfilling the requirement of subclause 100.221(1). The Tribunal noted that it had seen a Centrelink statement dated 23 May 2003 indicating that the sponsor had a child and had written to the appellant inviting him to provide certain information relating to his daughter, but that it had not received any response. The Tribunal found that there was no evidence to support a conclusion that any of subclauses 100.221(3), (4) and (4A) were satisfied, and affirmed the decision under review.THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE'S JUDGMENT By application filed 7 October 2004, the appellant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Magistrates Court. The grounds identified in the application were as follows:1.Failing to hold the hearing to which it had invited the unrepresented applicant.2.Taking what it claimed to be evidence from an unsworn hearsay account of a conversation between a counter staff member and the [sponsor].3.Failing to put the further allegations contained in the said unsworn hearsay account of a conversation between a counter staff member and the [sponsor] to the unrepresented applicant.4.Failing to allow the unrepresented applicant the opportunity to respond.5.Founding its decision partly or wholly upon the said unsworn hearsay account of a conversation between a counter staff member and the [sponsor]. In relation to the first ground, his Honour held that the Tribunal had duly invited the appellant to attend a hearing as required by s 425(1) of the Act. Even if the appellant had not become aware of that invitation, the letter was taken to have been given to him in accordance with s 441C because it had been given to him by one of the methods prescribed in s 441A. His Honour also found that the Tribunal had complied with its obligations under s 360 in relation to the information it obtained from Micaela Callan's conversation with the sponsor, by its letters dated 3 and 4 June whereby the appellant was invited to provide additional information. The remaining grounds centred on the minute of 27 May 2004. The appellant's then solicitor, Mr Newman of Newman & Associates, claimed that the minute evinced a denial of natural justice by the Tribunal. It was submitted that Ms Callan's advice to the sponsor that she no longer had standing was incorrect, because the sponsor was the legitimate representative of the appellant and was there to represent the appellant at the hearing. It was further submitted that Ms Callan had purported to exercise functions of the Tribunal by shutting out the sponsor's evidence, in possible breach of ss 354 and 357 of the Act. His Honour also observed that the decision in respect of the sponsor's standing was not necessarily made by Ms Callan, or at least not made in isolation or without the authority of the Tribunal member, since the Tribunal decision addressed the issue of standing at [26] of its reasons. The Federal Magistrate appeared to conclude that the Tribunal had approved of what had occurred or had adopted Ms Callan's decision, if it can be so described, as its own.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MOORE J

Although it was accepted that the statutory provisions relied upon by the appellant might be maintenance obligations, they were not "formal" ones. Two main reasons were advanced as to why the statutory provisions did not amount to formal maintenance obligations. First, there were no cogent and discernible terms of any such provisions, nor specific details as to amount or other arrangements. Secondly, the statutory provisions were not enforceable or ascertainable without some other process or order or explicit agreement between the parties under the Assessment Act. An application to a court or other body was required before the rights or obligations contained in any of the sections could come to fruition.Consideration It is well established that a judge of this Court should follow the earlier judgment of another judge unless satisfied that the earlier judgment was plainly or clearly wrong: Marr v Australian Telecommunications Corporations (1991) 34 FCR 82 at 85 per Hill J; Hicks v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 757 at [74]-[76] and Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 55 FCR 233 at 255. While not expressed in those terms, it must be assumed that Dowsett J took that view of the reasoning of Sundberg J. In my opinion, the approach of neither Sundberg J nor Dowsett J is plainly or clearly wrong. There is no principle of which I am aware which would guide me in deciding which of the earlier judgments should be preferred in order to maintain judicial comity. However, Dowsett J's judgment is the more recent judgment and for that reason is more likely, I would assume, to be the judgment on which decision-makers presently having to apply the relevant regulations, would base their decisions. Further, Dowsett J’s reasoning is, in my opinion, marginally more compelling. In its decision, the Tribunal indicated that it was aware that the appellant and the sponsor had a child. It said there was no evidence that the appellant had custody or joint custody of or access to a child in respect of which the sponsor had, amongst other things, a formal maintenance obligation. However, on the reasoning of Dowsett J, the appellant had a right to custody as incident of the statutory imposition of parental responsibility by operation of the Family Law Act and the sponsor had a formal maintenance obligation (though by operation of the Assessment Act rather than the Family Law Act). The Federal Magistrate fell into jurisdictional error in not recognising this. It may be accepted that this approach would result in the satisfaction of some of the relevant criteria in all circumstances where a visa applicant and the sponsor had a child in respect of whom Australian law operated. If that is an inconvenient or unintended result then the Regulations can be amended. I should add that in this case, there were arguably some procedural irregularities flowing from the sponsor's behaviour which meant that the appellant may not have been treated entirely fairly though whether any of this would have amounted to jurisdictional error is a question that was ultimately not raised for consideration.