Srikantha v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Srikantha v Commonwealth of Australia [2020] FCA 373

File number: VID 361 of 2019
Judge: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 20 March 2020
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – jurisdiction – cross-vesting – applicant’s interlocutory application to transfer proceedings from the Federal Court of Australia to the Supreme Court of Victoria – whether in the interests of justice to transfer proceedings – application dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – respondent’s interlocutory application to summarily dismiss application or, in the alternative, for the statement of claim to be struck out – whether the statement of claim raises a federal cause of action – application granted and statement of claim struck out – applicant granted leave to file and serve amended statement of claim

Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 16.21

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 50, 539, 562 and 570

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act1987 (Cth) ss 4 and 5

Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)

Superannuation Act 1990 (Cth) s 13

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170MT

Cases cited:

BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400

Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Residence Riverside Pty Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 248

McGowan v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2003) 129 FCR 118

Rana v Google Inc (No 2) (2017) 254 FCR 1

Transport Workers Union v Lee (1998) 84 FCR 60

Date of hearing: 16 March 2020
Registry: Victoria
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S J Moloney with Mr R A Millar
Solicitor for the Applicant: Draddy Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R Davern
Solicitor for the Respondent: Ashurst

ORDERS

VID 361 of 2019
BETWEEN:

ANTHONY SRIKANTHA

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

JUDGE:

SNADEN J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s interlocutory application lodged 12 March 2020 be dismissed.

2.The applicant’s statement of claim dated 8 April 2019 be struck out.

3.The applicant be granted leave to file an amended statement of claim by 4:00pm on Friday, 3 April 2020.

4.Costs relating to the applicant’s interlocutory application of 12 March 2020 and the respondent’s interlocutory application of 31 January 2020 be reserved.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SNADEN J:

  1. The applicant is a former employee of the respondent’s.  The present proceeding concerns, at its core, the circumstances surrounding the termination of his employment.

  2. Before the court presently are two interlocutory applications: one lodged by the respondent on 31 January 2020 for orders in the nature of summary judgment (or, alternatively, orders that the applicant’s statement of claim be struck out); and the other lodged by the applicant on 12 March 2020 for an order transferring the proceeding to the Supreme Court of Victoria pursuant…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 373
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Srikantha v Commonwealth of Australia, the applicant, Srikantha, sought an interlocutory application to transfer proceedings from the Federal Court of Australia to the Supreme Court of Victoria. The Commonwealth of Australia, the respondent, opposed the application and sought summary judgment on the basis that the applicant's statement of claim did not identify a federal cause of action sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction. The applicant's case was premised on a breach of contract, which the respondent argued was mischaracterised and did not sufficiently identify a federal cause of action.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's statement of claim raised a federal cause of action. The court had to determine whether the applicant's case was one that fell within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. The court also had to consider whether the respondent's interlocutory application to summarily dismiss the applicant's case or, in the alternative, to strike out the statement of claim, should be granted. Additionally, the court had to decide whether the applicant's interlocutory application to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court of Victoria should be dismissed.

The court found that the applicant's statement of claim did not raise a federal cause of action. The court held that the applicant's case was one for breach of contract, which was not sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction. The court further held that the applicant's case was mischaracterised and did not accurately summarise the nature of the controversy between the parties. The court found that the respondent's interlocutory application to summarily dismiss the applicant's case or, in the alternative, to strike out the statement of claim, should be granted. The court also found that the applicant's interlocutory application to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court of Victoria should be dismissed. The court granted the applicant leave to file an amended statement of claim.

The court dismissed the applicant's interlocutory application to transfer proceedings from the Federal Court of Australia to the Supreme Court of Victoria. The court struck out the applicant's statement of claim and granted the applicant leave to file an amended statement of claim. The court reserved costs relating to the interlocutory applications. The court held that the applicant's statement of claim did not raise a federal cause of action and that the applicant's case was mischaracterised. The court found that the respondent's interlocutory application to summarily dismiss the applicant's case or, in the alternative, to strike out the statement of claim, should be granted.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s interlocutory application lodged 12 March 2020 be dismissed.

2. The applicant’s statement of claim dated 8 April 2019 be struck out.

3. The applicant be granted leave to file an amended statement of claim by 4:00pm on Friday, 3 April 2020.

4. Costs relating to the applicant’s interlocutory application of 12 March 2020 and the respondent’s interlocutory application of 31 January 2020 be reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the respondent’s interlocutory application should be allowed in part; and that the applicant’s statement of claim should be struck out with leave to re-plead. The applicant’s interlocutory application should be dismissed.THE RESPONDENT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPLICATION The respondent seeks an order for summary judgment on the basis that the applicant’s statement of claim does not identify a federal cause of action sufficient to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. It characterises the applicant’s case in the proceeding as one for breach of contract. That simple summation reflects the equally simple (and flawed) manner in which the applicant’s case is pleaded. It does not, however, accurately summarise the nature of the controversy that exists between the parties. To explore that proposition further, it is convenient to set out the relevant parts of the applicant’s statement of claim. At [5], the applicant identifies certain “terms and conditions of the applicant’s employment”. The respondent construes that—not unfairly, although for reasons that will later become apparent, incorrectly—as a summary of terms that are said to have been contained, whether expressly or by implication, in the applicant’s contract of employment with the respondent. For the most part, the terms that are then enumerated (by means of 20 discrete subparagraphs) are lifted from various statutory or other instruments that are said to have had application to the applicant’s employment. Many derive from the terms of an enterprise agreement (within the meaning attributed to that term by the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (hereafter, the “FW Act”)) that is said to have applied; some from policy documents of the respondent’s that are also said to have applied; some from statutory provisions; and some as a matter of legal implication. It is appropriate to set out [5] of the statement of claim in full:5.Relevantly, there were terms and conditions of the applicant’s employment by the respondent to the effect that:(a) the respondent owed the applicant a duty of care to provide a safe place of work;(b) AUSTRAC must give prompt and genuine consideration to matters raised by a relevant employee about a major workplace change likely to result in termination of employment or diminution in job opportunities for an employee (cll 351, 353, 358 [AUSTRAC Enterprise Agreement 2012 – 2014 (hereafter, the “Enterprise Agreement”)]); (c) an employee whose services can no longer be effectively utilised in their current role will be provided with both support and options regarding their future career (cl 361);(d) AUSTRAC will consult for at least one month with any employee who is likely to become excess (cll 364, 366); (e) should an employee become excess to requirements, the CEO or their delegate will inform the employee in writing that they have been formally declared excess, and at the same time make the employee an offer of voluntary redundancy, with additional information and assistance for professional financial advice up to a maximum of $500.00, and allow a period of one month in which to consider the offer and advise of their decision (cll 367, 368);(f) should an employee not accept the offer of voluntary redundancy, the employee will commence their retention period from the date the employee was formally declared excess to requirements and offered voluntary redundancy in accordance with clause 367 (cl 382);(g) during the retention period, AUSTRAC will continue to take reasonable steps to redeploy the excess employee in accordance with applicable APS-wide redeployment principles, mechanisms and arrangements (cl 386(a));(h) an excess employee must not be terminated involuntarily by the CEO or their delegate under s 29 of the Public Service Act 1999 if they have not been invited to accept an offer of voluntary redundancy (cl 392);(i) the rights and remedies of an employee in relation to termination of employment under common law are preserved (cl 394(c));(j) an employee under the age of 60 who is a member of the [Public Sector Superannuation Scheme, (hereafter the “PSS Scheme”)] is not capable of being retired or otherwise terminated from their employment on the ground that, because of any mental or physical condition, the member is unable to perform his or her duties, unless the trustee of the PSS Scheme has certified in writing that, if the member is so retired, the member will be entitled to receive invalidity benefits under the PSS Scheme (s 13 Superannuation Act 1990 (Cth));(k) redundancy (excess staffing arrangements) must not be used as an alternative to dealing with underperformance (APS Redeployment Policy, Redeployment principle cl 1.2.3);(l) meaningful consultation with affected employees must continue through every stage of a downsizing process (APS Redeployment Policy, Redeployment principle cl 1.4.3);(m) the employer must ensure that downsizing does not unreasonably reduce the diversity of its workplace (APS Redeployment Policy, Redeployment principle cl 1.6);(n)excess employees should be provided with access to support in the form of career counselling and training in getting a job (APS Redeployment Policy, Redeployment principle cl 2.3);(o)the respondent must ensure that the applicant as its employee had knowledge of all benefits relevant and available to him;(p) alternatively to paragraph (o), where the applicant was injured or suffering disease caused or contributed to by his work, the respondent owed the applicant a duty of care to ensure that, as far as possible, the applicant could return to work with the respondent or otherwise could retire with maximum benefits available to him;(q) if any employee appeared unable to perform his or her duties on the ground of any mental or physical condition and wished to be assessed for retirement on the ground that they were unlikely to work again in a job for which he/she is reasonably qualified for or could be qualified for (invalidity), the employer would in good faith:(i) make application under the [rules establishing the PSS Scheme trust deed (hereafter, the “Rules”)] to the trustee of the PSS Scheme, or assessment of the employee’s incapacity and for application for retirement on the ground of invalidity; and(ii) otherwise do all things reasonably required of the employer or necessary under the Rules to facilitate and assist the fair and balanced assessment of the employee’s request to retire on the ground of invalidity;(r) if any employee were unable to perform his or her duties on the ground of any mental or physical condition and the employee requested retirement on the ground of invalidity, the employer would:(i) while those applications referred to in paragraph (q)(i) were being pursued, upon exhaustion of the employee’s leave entitlements, pay or procure payment to the employee of pre-assessment benefits: and(ii) not terminate the employee’s employment until the employee had been assessed for invalidity in accordance with the Rules;(s) further and in the alternative to paragraphs (q) and (r), the respondent must act in good faith in the exercise of its powers and discretions in respect of an employee unable to perform his or her duties on the ground of any mental or physical condition; and(t) the employer must do all things necessary on its part to enable the employee to have the benefit of the terms of the contract.ParticularsThe terms of paragraphs (b) - (i) are express terms of the Enterprise Agreement.The terms of paragraph (j) is an express requirement of statute that, as acknowledged by cl 6 of the Enterprise Agreement, is applicable to the employment of employees under the Enterprise Agreement.The terms of paragraphs (k) - (n) are express terms of Managing redeployment in the APS: Guidelines for agencies promulgated by the Australian Public Service Commission in April 2011 (APS Redeployment Policy). The requirement in paragraph (1) that consultation be meaningful is implied as a matter of law.The terms in paragraphs (a), (o) - (t) arise by virtue of the contract of employment or are to be implied from the need to give effect to the contract and so as to confer the benefit of the terms of the contract on the employee.Further, paragraph (p) arises from or is a correlative of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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