Srbinovska and Srbinovska and Anor

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FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SRBINOVSKA & SRBINOVSKA & ANOR [2015] FamCA 393
FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY SETTLEMENT – Application to set aside orders – Where the husband and the wife had entered into Consent Orders – Where the Consent Orders were subsequently set aside by orders made in the absence of the husband and the wife on the application of a third party prejudiced by the Consent Orders – Where the wife applied to set aside those orders – Where it was found the wife did not have an adequate explanation for her failure to participate in the proceedings where the Consent Orders were set aside – Where the Court was not satisfied that different orders would have been made had the wife appeared and presented her case in those proceedings – Where it was found that setting aside the orders would constitute significant prejudice to the third party respondent – Wife’s application to set aside the orders dismissed – Costs order made in favour of the third party respondent.
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 91
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 28, 79A, 93A, 94, 117
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rules 5.11, 7.02, 7.03, 7.12, 22.02, 22.03
Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172
Barbey & Tuttle [2013] FamCAFC 44
Botany Municipal Council v Secretary, Department of Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories (1992) 34 FCR 412
Buljubasic v Buljubasic (1999) FLC 92-865
Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225
In the Marriage of Kohan (1993) FLC 92
In the Marriage of Munday and Bowman(1997) FLC 92–784
JEL v DDF (Repayment on Appeal, and Costs) (2001) FLC 93–083
NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 11) [2001] FCA 480
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72
Srbinovska & Srbinovska and Anor [2014] FamCA 592
Starkey v Starkey(2009) 41 Fam LR 177
Mr Ss v Mr Ss(2010) 44 Fam LR 117
Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1
Wentworth v Rogers [1999] NSWCA 403
.
APPLICANT: Ms A Srbinovska
1st RESPONDENT: Mr S Srbinovska
2nd RESPONDENT: Mr R Srbinovska
FILE NUMBER: SYC 1484 of 2010
DATE DELIVERED: 18 May 2015
PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney
PLACE HEARD: Sydney
JUDGMENT OF: Le Poer Trench J
HEARING DATE: 27 February 2015

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Jackson
COUNSEL FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT: Mr Bevan
SOLICITOR FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT: OneGroup Legal
COUNSEL FOR THE 2ND RESPONDENT: No appearance
SOLICITOR FOR THE 2ND RESPONDENT: No appearance

Orders

  1. The application filed by Ms A Srbinovska on 3 September 2014 is dismissed.

  2. The applicant, Ms A Srbinovska, is to pay the costs of Mr S Srbinovska, the first respondent, associated with his defending the application so dismissed. Such cost to be as agreed or as assessed in the absence of agreement.

  3. Ms A Srbinovska and Mr R Srbinovska jointly and severally pay the costs of Mr S Srbinovska associated with his application filed in the Parramatta proceeding PAC 1824/2013 giving rise to the orders…

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Details
Case
[2015] FamCA 393
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Ms A Srbinovska to set aside orders made in her absence by Foster J on 30 July 2014. The application was heard by Le Poer Trench J in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the discretion to set aside orders made in default of a party's appearance had been exercised incorrectly by the Federal Magistrate. Specifically, the court considered whether the Federal Magistrate erred in dismissing Ms Srbinovska's application to set aside the previous orders, having regard to the explanation for her failure to appear, the possibility of a different outcome, and prejudice to the other party.

Le Poer Trench J, agreeing with the Full Court's reasoning, found that the discretion to set aside default orders is unfettered. The court applied the principles that regard must be given to the explanation for non-appearance, the potential for a different result, and prejudice to the other party. Ms Srbinovska failed to provide an adequate explanation for her absence or to demonstrate that a different outcome would likely have resulted had she appeared. Furthermore, she failed to address the significant prejudice to Mr Srbinovska, the first respondent. Consequently, the court found no error in the Federal Magistrate's approach and determined that Ms Srbinovska had not established a "miscarriage of justice" as required by s 79A(1)(a) of the relevant legislation.

The application filed by Ms A Srbinovska on 3 September 2014 was dismissed. Ms Srbinovska was ordered to pay the costs of Mr S Srbinovska in defending that application. Additionally, Ms A Srbinovska and Mr R Srbinovska were ordered to jointly and severally pay Mr S Srbinovska's costs associated with his application that led to the orders made on 30 July 2014.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application filed by Ms A Srbinovska on 3 September 2014 is dismissed.

2.

The applicant, Ms A Srbinovska, is to pay the costs of Mr S Srbinovska, the first respondent, associated with his defending the application so dismissed. Such cost to be as agreed or as assessed in the absence of agreement.

3.

Ms A Srbinovska and Mr R Srbinovska jointly and severally pay the costs of Mr S Srbinovska associated with his application filed in the Parramatta proceeding PAC 1824/2013 giving rise to the orders made on 30 July 2014. Such cost to be as agreed or as assessed in the absence of agreement.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Full Court found that the discretion to set aside orders made in default of a party’s appearance is unfettered, and that there was no error in the Federal Magistrate’s dismissal of the wife’s application to set aside the orders in the circumstances of that case. May J, with whom Kent and Murphy JJ agreed, outlined that (bold emphasis added): 90. The discretion to set aside orders made in default of a party’s appearance is unfettered. Regard should be given to the explanation for a failure to appear, the possibility of a different result, and prejudice to the other party (and how this may be addressed). His Honour did consider each of these matters, and did not err in his approach. He was not bound to give one matter more weight than another, and was correspondingly entitled to place significant weight on the wife’s failure to establish a reasonable explanation for her failure to appear or to participate in the proceedings.91. The arguable case consideration might have been established by contrary evidence in the wife’s material. That his Honour did not hear submissions on this did not prevent him from properly considering the point. The onus was on the wife to provide evidence, which she failed to do. No amount of submissions could have overcome the absence of evidence from the wife. 92. The evidence which formed the basis of the add-back, the only genuinely controversial matter in the updated response/orders sought by the husband, was from the wife’s own bank accounts, which had to be obtained under subpoena because of her own non-compliance. The wife gave no explanation for that expenditure in her affidavit in support seeking to set aside the orders. 93. It was not apparent on the material before his Honour, what alternative orders or distribution the wife sought, or would seek if successful in her application to set aside. Nor was it suggested in her material before the Federal Magistrate or before us on appeal that the 80/20 distribution was incorrect or manifestly unjust. 94. In these circumstances, His Honour could not have made, even with further oral submissions, a determination that the wife might obtain a different result, which the High Court expressed in Allesch v Maunz to be in effect a condition to the exercise of the discretion. He did, as was required of him, have regard to the issue. Accordingly, there can be no appealable error. 95. The issue of prejudice to the husband was not addressed at all by the wife. In the absence of evidence or argument from her, his Honour’s finding that the prejudice to the husband was significant and could not be sufficiently addressed by costs, was entirely justified in the circumstances of this case. In light of the abovementioned authorities, I find that, to make the orders sought by Ms A setting aside the judgement of Foster J, this Court must be satisfied, pursuant to s79A(1)(a) that there was a “miscarriage of justice” caused by the making of the Orders in her absence. The considerations informing my exercise of discretion will be whether Ms A has established:·there was an adequate explanation for her failure to appear before Foster J on 30 July 2014;·that different orders would have been made had she appeared and presented her case; and·there will be no significant or “irremediable” prejudice caused to Mr S in having the orders set aside.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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