SQUANCE
v
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
[2018] HCASL 144
P11/2018
The applicant requires an extension of time but it would be futile to grant the extension sought. The applicant identifies no question of principle of general importance which it would be in the interests of justice for this Court to consider. An appeal to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Buss P, Mazza and Mitchell JJA) would enjoy no prospect of success.
Pursuant to r 41.08.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.
G.A.A. Nettle
13 June 2018M.M. Gordon
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- Case
- [2018] HCASL 144
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the arguments presented by Squance and evaluated the likelihood of success of an appeal to the High Court. The Court found that the extension sought by Squance would be futile, as the appeal would enjoy no prospect of success. Additionally, the Court did not identify any question of principle of general importance that would warrant consideration by the High Court. As a result, the Court concluded that it would not be in the interests of justice to grant the extension sought by Squance.
In light of the findings, the High Court dismissed the application and directed the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order to that effect. The decision highlights the importance of demonstrating the futility of an extension of time and the need for applicants to identify questions of principle of general importance when seeking extensions in legal proceedings. The Court's decision also reinforces the principle that appeals to the High Court should only be entertained where there is a prospect of success.