Spry v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   SPRY -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2013] WASCA 69

CORAM:   McLURE P

BUSS JA
MAZZA JA

HEARD:   20 NOVEMBER 2012

DELIVERED          :   14 MARCH 2013

FILE NO/S:   CACR 84 of 2012

BETWEEN:   STEPHEN JOHN SPRY

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :STEVENSON DCJ

File No  :IND 1255 of 2011

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Burglary - Miscarriage of justice

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 40(1)(e)
Criminal Code (WA), s 401(2)(b)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 21, s 22

Result:

Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Blum v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2012] WASCA 40

TKWJ v The Queen [2002] HCA 46; (2002) 212 CLR 124

  1. McLURE P:  I agree with Mazza JA.

  2. BUSS JA:  I agree with Mazza JA

  3. MAZZA JA:  The appellant, who appeared in person, seeks leave to appeal against conviction. 

  4. The appellant was charged on indictment with two counts of burglary contrary to s 401(2)(b) of the Criminal Code (WA). Count 1 was said to have been committed between 21 and 24 May 1999 at Wembley Downs at a house belonging to Michelle Anne Zimmel. The second count was said to have been committed on 21 June 1999 at Woodlands, at the house of Patricia Pratt. Ms Pratt is now known as Ms Burnett, and I will refer to her by that name in these reasons.

  5. The appellant was charged with the offences in 2001 but fled the jurisdiction.  Ultimately, he returned to Western Australia, where he was tried before Stevenson DCJ and a jury.  On 14 March 2012, he was convicted of both offences. 

  6. The proposed four grounds of appeal are very general, but having regard to the appellant's written and oral submissions, it appears that he is alleging that a series of miscarriages of justice have occurred.  They are as follows:

    (1)His trial counsel was wrongly prevented from cross‑examining a prosecution witness, Mr Didier Delbost, about a prior inconsistent statement.

    (2)The learned trial judge allowed the jury to leave the jury room during its deliberations.

    (3)The prosecution did not disclose or lead evidence in respect of fingerprints said to have been found at the scene of the burglaries.

    (4)A prosecution witness, Detective Senior Sergeant Darren Taylor, gave hearsay evidence.

    (5)Ms Burnett, during the course of her evidence, impermissibly made certain assumptions of fact.

    (6)A video‑cassette recorder which he allegedly pawned and was identified as having been stolen from Ms Burnett was not proved to have been the machine stolen from her.

(7)Evidence given by Mr Delbost that the appellant held a security licence was incorrect. 

(8)Mr Delbost 'hindered' the police investigation.

The evidence

  1. There was…

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Details
Case
[2013] WASCA 69
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Spry v The State of Western Australia, the appellant appealed against his conviction for burglary, arguing that there was a miscarriage of justice. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the trial had been conducted in a way that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The court examined several arguments made by the appellant concerning the handling of evidence during the trial.

The court first addressed the appellant's complaint about hearsay evidence given by Detective Senior Constable Taylor. The appellant did not specify which evidence he objected to, but it was evident from the cross-examination that defence counsel aimed to demonstrate that the police had focused unduly on the appellant without considering other potential offenders. The court held that the defence counsel's decision to cross-examine in this manner was a rational forensic decision and, therefore, did not amount to a miscarriage of justice. The court further noted that the evidence given by Ms Burnett, including her assumptions about the source of the serial numbers of stolen items, was logical and not speculative. Since defence counsel did not object to this evidence, the court found no miscarriage of justice.

The court also considered the appellant's arguments regarding the jury being given a break and the handling of fingerprints at the crime scene. The appellant argued that the jury's short break to get fresh air could have led to corruption, but the court found no miscarriage of justice as the jury was directed not to discuss the case and the risk of corruption was deemed imaginary. Similarly, the appellant's claim that the results of fingerprint examination were not disclosed was not substantiated, as there was no evidence that fingerprints were lifted, examined, or matched in the first place. The court concluded that the absence of fingerprint evidence did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The court ultimately determined that none of the appellant's arguments demonstrated a miscarriage of justice. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction stood.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Hearsay evidence The appellant complains about hearsay evidence given by Detective Senior Constable Taylor. The appellant does not specify the evidence he complains of. Having read a transcript of Detective Senior Constable Taylor's evidence, it is clear that he was asked in cross‑examination by defence counsel, questions concerning information he received from other persons. The appellant's counsel pursued a line of cross‑examination consistent with his defence that the police were told of suspicions that the appellant was the offender and, from there, unduly focused on him without considering other possible offenders, in particular, other Solarvac employees. Generally, an accused is bound by the conduct of his or her counsel. Defence counsel has a broad discretion as to how an accused's defence is to be conducted: TKWJ v The Queen [2002] HCA 46; (2002) 212 CLR 124 [8], [24] ‑ [33], [43], [106] and [111]. Where inadmissible evidence is adduced for rational forensic reasons there will be no miscarriage of justice. See Blum v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2012] WASCA 40 [61]. Here counsel's decision to cross‑examine in the way that he did is capable of being seen as a rational forensic decision. It was possible, in theory, that another Solarvac employee could have committed the offences. It was open to the appellant to argue that the police had adopted a tunnel‑visioned approach towards him and ignored other possible offenders. There was no miscarriage of justice as a result of any hearsay evidence adduced from Detective Senior Constable Taylor. Assumptions made by Ms Burnett In the appellant's written submissions, he refers to evidence given by Ms Burnett in the trial before Schoombee DCJ and not the trial before Stevenson DCJ. What Ms Burnett said in the earlier trial cannot be a miscarriage of justice in the trial before Stevenson DCJ. However, in the second trial, Ms Burnett did give evidence of certain 'assumptions' she made. For example, Ms Burnett testified that she gave the police the serial numbers of the stolen television and VCR but because of the effluxion of time she was unable to remember from where she got those numbers. She said that she assumed she obtained the information from receipts and warranty documents for the items. Ms Burnett's process of reasoning as to how she came to source the serial numbers of the stolen items was logical and highly likely to be accurate. It was not, contrary to the appellant's submissions, speculative. Whether the evidence given by Ms Burnett was speculative or not, it was not objected to by defence counsel. One might reasonably infer that defence counsel understood that although Ms Burnett said she was making an assumption, she was in fact drawing a logical and reasonable inference. In oral argument and while making submissions on this point, the appellant made some criticism of the police being unable to produce where they had documented the serial numbers of the items stolen from Ms Burnett's house. Detective Senior Constable Taylor, in his evidence, said that the police report of Ms Burnett's burglary did not refer to the serial numbers. He explained that this did not mean that the police did not have that information. Ms Burnett testified that she gave this information to the police, and Detective Senior Constable Taylor said, in effect, that the police must have had it in order to retrieve the television and VCR from the pawn shops (ts 314).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The jury being given a break for its deliberations The trial transcript reveals that the jury retired to consider its verdicts at 3.11 pm on 14 March 2012 (ts 433). At 6.22 pm, the jury returned to the courtroom and his Honour inquired from the foreperson whether the jury wished to continue with its deliberations or return the following day. The foreperson did not answer the question directly but asked for 'a 10‑minute break' away from the jury room 'just to get fresh air' (ts 435). His Honour then said that earlier in the jury's deliberations he had received a message that there was a smoker in the jury and that he had allowed that juror to leave the jury room for a cigarette. When doing so, he directed that the jury must not deliberate in the juror's absence 'because they were not together' (ts 435). Neither counsel had any objection to the proposal that the jury take a short break to get some fresh air, nor was there any protest about the juror being allowed to leave the jury room to smoke a cigarette. The learned trial judge allowed the jury to leave the jury room for '10 or 15 minutes' for 'some fresh air'. He directed the jury not to discuss the case with anybody in that period (ts 435 ‑ 436). The appellant submitted that by letting the jury outside, there was a risk that it could have been corrupted by anyone outside the court with an interest in the proceedings and thus, a miscarriage of justice had occurred. In the absence of any objection by the appellant's trial counsel to the proposal to allow the jury to take a short break from their deliberations, there can be no miscarriage of justice, particularly when the permission given by his Honour was coupled with a direction that it was not to communicate with anyone else about the case. As to any possible corruption, the usual procedure is for the jury to be accompanied at all times by the sheriff's officer. If any attempt by any person had been made to communicate with the jury, it is highly likely that it would have been reported to his Honour. The risk of corruption referred to by the appellant was imagined rather than real. Further, there is nothing to indicate that anything untoward occurred during the break. Although it is not entirely clear from the appellant's submissions, it may be that he also alleges that there was a miscarriage of justice as a result of his Honour allowing a juror to leave the jury room during deliberations to smoke a cigarette. While the jury would not have been together for the short period it took the juror to smoke the cigarette, there can be no miscarriage of justice, especially as the jury was instructed to suspend its deliberations in the juror's absence. As regards the juror, the usual procedure is for the juror to be accompanied by a sheriff's officer. There was no realistic prospect or risk that the juror was corrupted and no evidence to suggest that he or she was improperly approached. Fingerprints The appellant's complaint is that the evidence of the result of any examination of any fingerprints lifted from the scene was not disclosed to the defence and was not given at trial. The argument assumes that fingerprints were lifted and were able to be matched. Detective Senior Constable Taylor testified that while the police report referred to a possible fingerprint or fingerprints, that does not mean that they could be lifted for examination or that they were successfully lifted and compared. There is nothing before this court or the court below to suggest that fingerprints were in fact lifted, examined and matched, and that the results of that process were not disclosed to the appellant. It was made clear to the jury that there was no forensic evidence linking the appellant to the burglary. The absence of fingerprint evidence does not give rise to a miscarriage of justice.