HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJSPRINGFIELD LAND CORPORATION (NO 2) PTY LTD
& ANOR APPELLANTSAND
STATE OF QUEENSLAND & ANOR RESPONDENTS
Springfield Land Corporation (No 2) Pty Ltd v Queensland [2011] HCA 15
11 May 2011
B39/2010ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland
Representation
D F Jackson QC with M D Hinson SC for the appellants (instructed by Russell and Company Solicitors)
D R Gore QC with J M Horton for the respondents (instructed by Clayton Utz Lawyers)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ. This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Keane and Fraser JJA and Atkinson J)[1], which affirmed that of the primary judge (McMurdo J)[2]. The appeal turns upon the construction of Queensland legislation respecting resumption of land by the State for statutory purposes and the assessment of compensation. The litigation was instituted in the Supreme Court after an award made under an arbitration agreement between the relevant parties in which they had agreed that the issues between them should be determined by the arbitrator as if the ordinary statutory processes had applied.
[1]State of Queensland v Springfield Land Corporation (No 2) Pty Ltd (2009) 171 LGERA 38.
[2]Queensland v Springfield Land Corporation (No 2) Pty Ltd (2009) 169 LGERA 284.
Section 38 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 (Q) ("the Arbitration Act") provides for an "appeal" to the Supreme Court "on any question of law" which arises out of an award, with the consent of all parties to the arbitration agreement, or with the leave of the Supreme Court where it considers there is "a manifest error of law on the face of the award". McMurdo J granted leave and varied an award made on 9 October 2008 by the arbitrator (the Hon WJ Carter QC) by substituting "nil" in place of the award of $1,468,806 in favour of the present appellants ("the Springfield companies")[3]. The award had been made against the State of Queensland "acting through" the Chief Executive of the Department of Main Roads. The reasons for this description of the State party will be explained below.
[3](2009) 169 LGERA 284.
The appeal by the Springfield companies to the Court of Appeal having been dismissed, in this Court the Springfield companies seek, in effect, the reinstatement of the award by the arbitrator. For the reasons which follow, the appeal to this Court should be dismissed.
McMurdo J referred[4] to the development since about 1992 by the Springfield companies from a greenfield site of a large residential development 24 kilometres to the southwest of the Central Business District of Brisbane and in the local government area of Ipswich City Council. The site contains 2,851 hectares and the development is expected to house at least 60,000…
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- Case
- [2011] HCA 15
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the purpose for which the land was acquired would result in an enhancement of the value of the appellants' adjoining land, and if so, whether this enhancement should be considered in the assessment of compensation. Specifically, the court had to interpret section 20(3) of the *Acquisition of Land Act 1967* (Qld), which mandates consideration of any enhancement in value of adjoining land arising from the carrying out of the works or purpose for which the land is taken.
The High Court reasoned that the "purpose for which the land is taken" referred to the actual purpose for which the land was acquired, not merely the potential uses to which it might be put. In this instance, the land was acquired for transport purposes, and the court found that the carrying out of these transport purposes would indeed enhance the value of the appellants' adjoining land. However, the court held that the statutory provision required the consideration of such enhancement in the assessment of compensation, meaning the compensation payable would be reduced by the amount of that enhancement.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ,