Spring Lake Holdings Pty Ltd v Ipswich City Council

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Spring Lake Holdings Pty Ltd v Ipswich City Council & Anor [2023] QCA 233

PARTIES:

SPRING LAKE HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 156 492 885) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE SPRING LAKE TRUST
(applicant)
v
IPSWICH CITY COUNCIL

(first respondent)
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE DEVELOPMENT, MANUFACTURING, INFRASTRUCTURE AND PLANNING
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 2994 of 2023
P & E Appeal No 1428 of 2021

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave Planning and Environment Court Act

ORIGINATING COURT:

Planning & Environment Court at Brisbane – [2023] QPEC 1 (McDonnell DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

24 November 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

11 August 2023

JUDGES:

Morrison and Dalton and Boddice JJA

ORDER:

Application dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING – PLANNING SCHEMES AND INSTRUMENTS – QUEENSLAND – GENERALLY – where the applicant owns land situated within the area subject to the Springfield Structure Plan (SSP) – where under the SSP the land is developed in line with an Area Development Plan (ADP) – where the applicant sought to expand the built environment on the land – where the applicant lodged a development application with the Ipswich City Council – where the Ipswich City Council refused the application because the application forms did not identify the application as an ADP application – where the applicant submitted a separate appropriate form in relation to the ADP – where there was an alleged deemed refusal of the development application and the ADP application – whether the primary judge erred in law in finding that the Planning and Environment Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal by the applicant

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING – PLANNING SCHEMES AND INSTRUMENTS – QUEENSLAND – GENERALLY – whether the primary judge erred in law in concluding that an application to change an ADP was a development application

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING – PLANNING SCHEMES AND INSTRUMENTS – QUEENSLAND – GENERALLY – whether the Planning and Environment Court had inherent or accrued jurisdiction to hear an application to amend an ADP

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 7(1)
Planning Act 2006 (Qld), s 18, s 20, s 49(1)(a), s 49(2), s 50, s 229(1), s 316, sch 1, sch 2
Planning and Environment Court Act 2016 (Qld), s 63
Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld), s 857

Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough (1935) 53 CLR 220; [1935] HCA 45, cited
Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd v Ipswich City Council [2020] QPELR 786; [2019] QPEC 62, cited
Springfield Land Corporation Pty Ltd v Cherish Enterprises Pty Ltd [2019] 3 Qd R 40; [2018] QCA 266, cited

COUNSEL:

D R Gore KC, with J D Houston, for the applicant
D P O’Brien KC, with J S Brien, for the first respondent

SOLICITORS:

Birch & Co Solicitors Pty Ltd Law for the applicant
Clayton Utz for the first respondent

  1. MORRISON JA:  I agree with Dalton JA.

  2. DALTON JA: This is an application for leave to appeal pursuant to s 63…

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Details
Case
[2023] QCA 233
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Spring Lake Holdings Pty Ltd v Ipswich City Council involved a dispute over the refusal of a development application by Ipswich City Council. The applicant, Spring Lake Holdings, sought to expand the built environment on its land, which was subject to the Springfield Structure Plan (SSP). The applicant lodged a development application with the council, which was refused because the application forms did not identify it as an Area Development Plan (ADP) application. After submitting a separate appropriate form in relation to the ADP, Spring Lake Holdings claimed that there was a deemed refusal of both the development application and the ADP application. The applicant appealed to the Planning and Environment Court, arguing that the delay in approval amounted to a deemed refusal of both applications.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in law in finding that the Planning and Environment Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal by the applicant, and whether the primary judge erred in law in concluding that an application to change an ADP was a development application. The court also considered whether the Planning and Environment Court had inherent or accrued jurisdiction to hear an application to amend an ADP.

In its judgment, the court found that the primary judge correctly proceeded on the basis that an appeal right derives only from statute, rather than common law, and that “the scope and effect of an appeal must in the end be governed by the terms of the enactment creating it.” The court also found that the primary judge correctly understood that the Planning and Environment Court is a court of statutory jurisdiction. The court rejected the applicant’s submission that the Planning and Environment Court had either inherent or accrued jurisdiction to deal with the refusal of the ADP application as part of its dealing with the rest of the appeal. The court determined that the Planning and Environment Court had inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes, but no other inherent jurisdiction. Further, the court rejected any notion of an accrued jurisdiction to hear the appeal against rejection of the ADP application.

The court dismissed the application with costs. The court found that the primary judge’s decision was correct and that no appeal was sought to be made from it. The court held that the Planning and Environment Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal from an application to amend the area development plan approved under the Springfield Structure Plan.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant appealed to the Planning and Environment Court claiming that the delay in approval amounted to:·a deemed refusal of the application to amend the ADP by reason of s 2.2.4.10 of the SSP, and·a deemed refusal of the development application and the operational works permit under provisions of the Planning Act.The appeal to the Planning and Environment Court asserted that “no lawful grounds exist for refusing” either application to Council, and asked that the court allow the applications subject to any lawful conditions.The Decision Below In the Planning and Environment Court an order was made facilitating the determination of a preliminary issue, namely whether the Planning and Environment Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal from an application for a new ADP.The Proceeding Below The judge below records that the parties agreed questions for determination. Unfortunately the way these are set out in the judgment is not clear. Secondly, the judge did not determine those questions in the conventional way, ie., by answering each of them yes, no, or unnecessary to answer. While the judge certainly discussed the questions and issues relevant to them, she simply concluded at [68] below, “The Planning and Environment Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal from an application to amend the area development plan approved under the Springfield Structure Plan.” The judgment itself, and the formal order of the Court, refer to this as an “order”. It is not an order, it is a declaration, and it ought to have specified the appeal and the ADP to which it referred. In an appropriate case preliminary questions can be a very efficient method of dealing with litigation. If the process is used, thought needs to be given to the form of questions asked of the Court, and they should be answered in their terms. In the event, the order sought by the applicant from this Court, should leave to appeal be granted, was “Declare that the Planning and Environment Court does have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal by the Applicant from a deemed refusal of an application to amend the Area Development Plan approved under the Springfield Structure Plan for the land the subject of the proceeding”. The primary judge correctly proceeded on the basis that an appeal right derives only from statute, rather than common law, and that “the scope and effect of an appeal must in the end be governed by the terms of the enactment creating it.”[3] She correctly understood that the Planning and Environment Court is a court of statutory jurisdiction. The primary judge rejected the applicant’s submission that, as the appeal related to the deemed refusal of the application to amend the ADP, but also related to the deemed refusal of the development application and operational works application, the Planning and Environment Court had either inherent or accrued jurisdiction to deal with the refusal of the ADP application as part of its dealing with the rest of the appeal. She determined that the Planning and Environment Court had inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes, but no other inherent jurisdiction. Further, she rejected any notion of an accrued jurisdiction to hear the appeal against rejection of the ADP application. In my view, those were correct decisions and no appeal is sought to be made from them.[3]Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough (1935) 53 CLR 220, 225.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established