SPKB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SPKB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2003] FCAFC 296

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah (1998) 80 FCR 543 applied
NAGV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 144 applied
Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 applied

SPKB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S 570 OF 2003

CARR, FINN and SUNDBERG JJ
18 DECEMBER 2003
MELBOURNE (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 570 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SPKB
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

CARR, FINN and SUNDBERG JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 DECEMBER 2003

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

3.No parts of the transcript of 17 November 2003 and 18 November 2003 of proceedings herein and in S816 of 2003 which disclose the contents of those portions of the affidavits of Andrew Albert Durston sworn on 20 May 2003 (in S426 of 2003) and 29 July 2003 (in S573 of 2003) or the affidavit of James Robert Williams sworn on 16 September 2002 (in S210 of 2002) which are the subject of confidentiality orders made on 23 May 2003 (as varied by orders made on 29 May 2003) (in S426 of 2003) and 8 August 2003 (in S573 of 2003) are to be published, without the leave of the Court, except to counsel and solicitors for the parties.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 570 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SPKB
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

CARR, FINN and SUNDBERG JJ

DATE:

18 DECEMBER 2003

PLACE:

MELBOURNE (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

Background

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq who arrived in Australia on 16 December 1999. He was placed in immigration detention as an unlawful non‑citizen pursuant to s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). He remains in detention. In March 2000 he applied for a protection visa claiming to have a well‑founded fear of persecution by the Iraqi authorities if he returned there, to be unable to return to Syria where he had lived from 1996 to 1999, and that he risked refoulement by Syria to Iraq if he returned to Syria. The visa application was refused by a delegate of the respondent, whose decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal found the appellant could return to, and remain in, Syria without the risk of being refouled to Iraq. Hence he was found not to be a person to whom Australia has…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCAFC 296
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case, SPKB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, involved an appeal against a decision that denied the appellant's application for habeas corpus, which sought to challenge the legality of their detention. The appellant contested the validity of their detention, arguing that it was unlawful due to the absence of a realistic prospect of their removal to Syria within the reasonably near future. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues the court needed to address included whether the primary judge's findings on the prospect of the appellant's removal to Syria were erroneous and whether the appellant was unlawfully detained. Specifically, the court had to determine if the primary judge correctly assessed the credibility of the evidence presented regarding the appellant's potential removal and if the appellant's detention was justified under the circumstances.

The court reviewed the primary judge's assessment of the evidence, particularly focusing on the credibility of the witness, Mr. Durston. The court concluded that the primary judge appropriately relied on Mr. Durston's evidence and did not misuse their advantage in hearing the testimony. The court also noted that the evidence supported the primary judge's conclusion that there was a realistic prospect of the appellant securing an entry visa to Syria. Consequently, the court found no basis to interfere with the primary judge's decision and dismissed the grounds of appeal related to the prospect of removal and the legality of detention.

In light of the dismissal of the substantive appeal, the court also addressed the issue of costs, noting that the appeal should be dismissed and that the costs order should remain as it was. The court emphasized that the appellant's "Syrian evidence" was poorly presented, suggesting that better preparation could have avoided unnecessary costs.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
3. No parts of the transcript of 17 November 2003 and 18 November 2003 of proceedings herein and in S816 of 2003 which disclose the contents of those portions of the affidavits of Andrew Albert Durston sworn on 20 May 2003 (in S426 of 2003) and 29 July 2003 (in S573 of 2003) or the affidavit of James Robert Williams sworn on 16 September 2002 (in S210 of 2002) which are the subject of confidentiality orders made on 23 May 2003 (as varied by orders made on 29 May 2003) (in S426 of 2003) and 8 August 2003 (in S573 of 2003) are to be published, without the leave of the Court, except to counsel and solicitors for the parties.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

3. No parts of the transcript of 17 November 2003 and 18 November 2003 of proceedings herein and in S816 of 2003 which disclose the contents of those portions of the affidavits of Andrew Albert Durston sworn on 20 May 2003 (in S426 of 2003) and 29 July 2003 (in S573 of 2003) or the affidavit of James Robert Williams sworn on 16 September 2002 (in S210 of 2002) which are the subject of confidentiality orders made on 23 May 2003 (as varied by orders made on 29 May 2003) (in S426 of 2003) and 8 August 2003 (in S573 of 2003) are to be published, without the leave of the Court, except to counsel and solicitors for the parties.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479 Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said:“a finding of fact by a trial judge, based on the credibility of a witness, is not to be set aside because an appellate court thinks that the probabilities of the case are against – even strongly against – that finding of fact. If the trial judge’s finding depends to any substantial degree on the credibility of the witness, the finding must stand unless it can be shown that the trial judge ‘has failed to use or has palpably misused his advantage’ or has acted on evidence which was ‘inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established by the evidence’ or which was ‘glaringly improbable’.”His Honour’s finding was based on Mr Durston’s evidence. There is nothing to suggest he failed to use the advantage given him by the fact that he heard the evidence as it was given. As appears above, his Honour gave close attention to the cross‑examination and formed a favourable view of the witness for the reasons he gave. The evidence was not inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established by other evidence. Nor was the finding glaringly improbable. Mr Durston’s evidence was in competition with a hearsay account of a telephone conversation between the appellant’s solicitor and a person at the Syrian consulate in Sydney, who said a visa to enter Syria could be granted only to the holder of a Syrian passport. The informant’s status within the consulate was not disclosed, nor was his authority to speak about Syria’s policy as to the return of people such as the appellant. His Honour was entitled to prefer Mr Durston’s evidence to this unsatisfactory hearsay material. His Honour’s conclusion, based on Mr Durston’s evidence, is supported by the evidence that between July 2002 and March 2003 a number of Iraqis in the position of the appellant were able to obtain Syrian visas after having obtained Australian Certificates of Identity. The appellant has obtained such a Certificate. In those circumstances we should not interfere with the primary judge’s finding that there was a realistic prospect of the appellant securing an entry visa to Syria. The first ground of appeal fails. It follows that there was no error in his Honour’s finding that there was a real prospect of the appellant being removed from Australia to Syria within the reasonably near future. It also follows that the appellant was not unlawfully detained. The fourth ground of appeal fails. So do the second and third. In view of the primary judge’s conclusion that there was a real prospect of the appellant being removed from Australia to Syria within the reasonably near future, it was unnecessary for him to consider the two issues the subject of those grounds, and he did not do so.Conclusion This appeal was heard together with an appeal from the decision of Lander J who dismissed a later application for the appellant’s release from detention. In the course of his reasons his Honour concluded, on the basis of evidence that was not before the primary judge on the instant appeal, that there was no realistic prospect of the appellant being removed to Syria within the reasonably foreseeable future. He went on to hold that the appellant’s detention was not unlawful because he “has not cooperated and will not cooperate in his removal to Iraq”. The relationship between the two appeals has given rise to considerable uncertainty as to the basis upon which the appellant wished the Court to proceed in the instant appeal. In his written submissions the respondent’s counsel said he understood the appeal was confined to the question of costs. The assumption appears to have been that the appeal would be dismissed. The appellant’s written submissions on this point were as follows:“The appeal … is confined to the question of costs. The appellant contends that, if it is successful in the substantive appeal, it follows that the earlier appeal should be allowed, for reasons given below.…Events occurring shortly after the judgment of Mansfield J demonstrated (as found by Lander J) that his Honour’s favourable prognosis of the prospects of removal to Syria was erroneous. In light of the true position, the costs order should not stand. The appeal should be allowed and the costs order below reversed. It may be that his Honour’s findings were justifiable on the evidence then before the Court. The appellant challenges them in his notice of appeal but, in light of supervening events such an enquiry would now be an arid exercise. It may be that the appellant’s first habeas application was premature in this respect, but that should not affect the appellant’s entitlement to costs of the first application (a) because the respondent would have resisted that application in any event and (b) the evidence, transcript and submissions on the first application were admitted in evidence and relied on at the hearing of the second application and to [that] extent the effort was not wasted or unnecessarily duplicated.”All that was said on this issue in oral argument was counsel for the appellant’s statement that if the appellant was successful on the second appeal, “it follows that we ought to be successful on the appeal from Mansfield J”, and that the costs orders ought to be reversed in both cases. There is no distinct advertence to the position that should obtain if the later appeal is dismissed, as it has been. In the light of that, we must deal with the appeal, which should be dismissed. Accordingly we do not need to deal with the submission as to the costs order before Mansfield J. In any event, there is no reason to disturb that order. The appellant’s “Syrian evidence” was poorly solicited and presented. His advisers could easily have made proper enquiries of the local Syrian representatives, and presented to the primary judge the material that was later put before Lander J.Confidentiality

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established