Spirits Product Int BV v FKP Sojuzpodoimport

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, WITH REASONS

Re:Directions in the matter of opposition by FKP Sojuzpodoimport to protection of International Registrations Designating Australia 932465, 932471 and 934031 - STOLICHNAYA ELIT trade marks - in the name of Spirits International NV.

Delegate: Terry Williams
Representation: Opponent: written submissions by Allens Arthur Robinson
Applicant: written submissions by Mallesons Stephen Jacques
Decision: 2007 ATMO 55
Relevance of court proceedings considered.  Distinction between administrative and judicial considerations.  Oppositions to remain suspended

Background

  1. On 27 July 2007 I issued a statement of the reasons for the decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks to suspend proceedings in the opposition by FKP Sojuzplodoimport (“FKP”) to the protection of International Registrations Designating Australia (IRDAs) 932465, 932471 and 934031.  Those reasons also related to a second decision, the refusal to lift that suspension.  The statement of reasons is attached, for the convenience of readers, and marked Annexure A.  It sets out the facts in the present matter and I will not repeat them.

  2. The consequence of those two decisions is that the Registrar of Trade Marks has deferred further conduct of the relevant oppositions at the Trade Marks Office while the Federal Court decides the outcome of rectification proceedings that were instigated by FKP and that have, as their target, certain earlier registrations owned by Spirits International NV (“Spirit”) who is also the holder of the IRDAs the subject of the suspended oppositions.

  3. Since then, Spirit has sought, again, to have the oppositions run their normal course, ie to have the suspensions lifted.  Responding to a matter I raised at paragraphs 57-59 of Annexure A, Spirit has now undertaken to restrict the time that it would require for preparing its own evidence in the event that, before the registrar was able to decide the oppositions, the Federal Court proceedings were to be finalized in a way that favours FKP. 

  4. I have therefore carefully considered the option of allowing the oppositions to run their course.  Or, to put the matter into its proper perspective, I have considered it in terms of “given all the facts presented to me, and the undertaking by Spirit, is there sufficient reason why the oppositions should not run their course?”

  5. However, even with the undertaking given by Spirit, the oppositions could not be decided until the completion of at least the evidentiary phase of the court proceedings, for reasons that I will set out below. 

  6. I have already set out, in Annexure A, my reasons for believing that the Court’s determination of the issues would be preferable to any administrative determination of the comparable issues.  I will explain, below, what I see to be the proper distinction between an administrative assessment of those issues and a necessarily judicial determination of them.  For the moment, it will suffice to say that, if the evidence that would be relevant to the oppositions is directly linked to that which would go before the Court, and since the Court’s…

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Details
Case
[2007] ATMO 55
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This decision concerned an application by Spirits Product Int BV (the applicant) to register certain International Registration Designations of Australia (IRDAs) as trade marks. The Registrar of Trade Marks (the Registrar) had refused to register the IRDAs on the grounds that their use would be contrary to law, specifically citing potential breaches of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar's decision.

The central legal issue before the court was the proper scope of the Registrar's power when considering whether the use of a trade mark would be "contrary to law" under the relevant provisions of the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth). Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Registrar was empowered to consider complex legislation, such as the Copyright Act, in making this assessment, or if the "contrary to law" ground was limited to more straightforward or easily determinable breaches.

The court, referencing *Advantage-Rent-A-Car Inc v Advantage Car Rental Pty Ltd* [2001] FCA 683 and *R v Quinn; Ex parte Consolidated Foods Corporation* (1977) 138 CLR 1, reasoned that the Registrar's role in assessing whether a trade mark's use would be contrary to law is administrative but requires a genuine consideration of the facts presented. The court held that the Registrar is not precluded from considering legislation beyond that which is simple or clear-cut, including the Copyright Act. While acknowledging the potential difficulty and onerous responsibility this might place on the Registrar, the court noted that the criterion is whether use "would" be contrary to law, not "could," and that the Registrar could seek legal advice. Furthermore, any opinion formed by the Registrar is limited to the refusal of registration and is subject to appeal de novo to the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The proper role of the Registrar of Trade Marks would, as I have said, be entirely administrative in nature. She is duty-bound to consider facts put to her for the sole purpose of deciding if a ground of opposition under either s 42 or s 58 is established and if, therefore, protection in Australia of particular IRDAs ought to be refused. This does not transgress the line separating administrative power from judicial. Of this, in Advantage-Rent-A-Car Inc v Advantage Car Rental Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 683, Madgwick J said at 26 (my own emphasis added):However, in my opinion the fact that the existence of any contrariety to law is to be exercised in some circumstances by an administrative body and, in other circumstances, by a judicial body does not mean that the phrase "if its use would be contrary to law" should have an ambulatory meaning, depending upon what kind of tribunal is to apply it. Nor can any reticence on the part of an administrative decision-maker to express an opinion on a matter of law be encouraged. The idea that "contrary to law" in the context of judicial proceedings means contrary to all laws, whilst in the context of proceedings before the Registrar it means contrary to laws which are easy for the Registrar to determine or which are "clear cut", is not sustainable. As a matter of practice, delegates of the Registrar have in some cases determined that a trade mark submitted for registration is contrary to law as a result of its being in breach of other legislation: see Re Application by Slaney (1985) 6 IPR 307 at 309 where a trade mark was found to be in breach of the Health Legislation Amendment Act 1983 (Cth) and Re Application by Athol Thomas Kelly (1987) 8 IPR 667 at 672 where it was found that the trade mark would infringe the Advance Australia Logo Act 1984 (Cth). I see no reason why some legislation should be able to be relied on before the Registrar to establish contrariety to law and other legislation such as the Copyright Act, albeit more complex, should not. Further, it is well-settled that a power granted to the Registrar and to a court can be at once administrative and judicial depending on who was exercising the power. The High Court so held in R v Quinn; Ex parte Consolidated Foods Corporation (1977) 138 CLR 1, of a power to remove a trade mark from the Register. Madgwick J further observed, at paragraph 28 of Advantage:I acknowledge the claim made by counsel for the Registrar that such an approach requires the Registrar to look at questions of law outside his or her expertise and that this can be difficult and may place a large and onerous responsibility upon the Registrar. However, the Registrar has the comfort that the criterion is that the use "would" not "could" be contrary to law. Further, there is no reason why the Registrar could not seek legal advice before forming his/her opinion. It should also be noted that what is required is that the Registrar form a view as to whether the use of a trade mark would be contrary to law. Such opinion does not have a similar effect to say, a judicial conclusion of law as to breach of copyright in copyright proceedings; the effect is limited to the refusal of registration. In any case, an appeal de novo lies from the Registrar's decision to this Court where any error of the Registrar may be corrected.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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