Spinks, John v Prentice, Maxwell William
[1998] FCA 1120
•10 SEPTEMBER 1998
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Constitutional Law – Federal judicial power – Territories power – investment in Federal Court of jurisdiction in civil matters under Territory Corporations law – whether constitutionally valid.
Constitution – ss 51, 76, 77, 122
Acts Interpretation Act 1901-1965 – 15A
Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court Act (1933-1960 (Cth) – s 13
Corporations Act 1989 – ss 5, 51, 82
Federal Court of Australia Act (1976) – s 23
Judiciary Act 1903
Territory Corporations Law – Ch. 5
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Limited v Merribee Pastoral Industries Pty
Limited, Full Federal Court, 23 July 1998, unreported - cited
Capital TV and Appliances Pty Limited v Falconer (1971) 125 CLR 591 – cons.
Federal Capital Commission v Laristan Building and Investment Co. Pty Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 582 - cited
Gould v Brown (1998) 72 ALJR 375 – cons.
Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226 – cons.
Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd v Barber (1994) 48 FCR 301 - cited
In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257 - cited
Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612- -cited
Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 - cited
Patrick Stevedores Operations No. 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (NO. 3) (1998) 72 ALJR 873 - cited
Porter v The King; Ex parte Yee (1926) 37 CLR 432 - cited
R v Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629 - cited
Re Compass Airlines Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 447 - cited
Re Excel; Worthley v England (1994) 52 FCR 69 - cited
The Queen and Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR - cited
Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 - cited
P H Lane, Lane’s Commentary on the Australian Constitution, 2nd ed.
JOHN SPINKS AND OTHERS V MAXWELL WILLIAM PRENTICE
NG 3100 OF 1998
JUDGES: BEAUMONT, BURCHETT, LEHANE JJ
DATED: 10 SEPTEMBER 1998
PLACE: SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 3100 of 1998
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN
JOHN SPINKS AND OTHERS
APPELLANTSAND:
MAXWELL WILLIAM PRENTICE
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
BEAUMONT, BURCHETT, LEHANE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
10 SEPTEMBER 1998
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
ORDERS:
Leave to appeal granted.
Appeal dismissed, with costs.
Interim stay ordered by the Full Court on 19 August 1998 lifted.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 3100 of 1998
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
JOHN SPINKS AND OTHERS
APPELLANTSAND:
MAXWELL WILLIAM PRENTICE
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
BEAUMONT, BURCHETT, LEHANE JJ
DATE:
10 SEPTEMBER 1998
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
By s 76 of the Constitution, the Parliament may make laws conferring original jurisdiction on the High Court –
“in any matter –
…
(ii) Arising under any laws made by the Parliament.”
By s 122 of the Constitution, the Parliament may make laws “for the government of any territory…”.
By s 77(i) of the Constitution, with respect to any of the matters mentioned in (inter alia) s 76(ii), the Parliament –
“may make laws -
(i)Defining the jurisdiction of any federal court other than the High Court…”
Take a law purportedly made by the Commonwealth under s 77(i) defining the jurisdiction of this Court by conferring upon it jurisdiction with respect to civil matters under another law made by the Parliament under s 122 for the government of a territory. If considered without the benefit of a knowledge of the course of authority in this general area of federal jurisdiction, it is by no means easy to understand why, or how, it could be seriously suggested that it could be beyond the powers of the Parliament to do this, bearing in mind that both the government of the territories and the vesting of jurisdiction in this Court are undoubtedly within the legislative competence of the Parliament. But, as this litigation illustrates, and as Patrick Lane has written, there are problems with the meaning of s 76(ii) that we must address:
“Section 76(ii), it is true, is concerned immediately with possible High Court jurisdiction. However, because s 77(i) on federal courts… incorporate[s] by reference the matter in s 76(ii)… the Federal Court has an ever-expanding jurisdiction… mostly in the s 76(ii) area. And the result: the problems associated with s 76(ii) remain. It is just that the problems have been now largely transferred to the Federal Court of Australia.”
(P H Lane, Lane’s Commentary on the Australian Constitution, 2nd ed. at 601-2.)
Section 5 of the Corporations Act 1989 (“the 1989 Act”) provides that the Corporations Law set out in s 82 thereof applies as a law for the government of the Australian Capital Territory. Section 82 contains the Territory Corporations Law (“the ACT Law”).
White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (“the Company”), a company taken to be incorporated under the ACT Law, was ordered to be wound up by this Court. The respondent was appointed liquidator of the Company, and the appellants include past officers of the Company.
The winding up order was made in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by s 51(1) of the 1989 Act which provides as follows:
“51(1) Jurisdiction is conferred on the Federal Court of Australia with respect to civil matters under the Corporations Law of the Australian Capital Territory”.
The appellants have been summoned for examination, and for production of documents in that connection, under Ch. 5 Pt. 5.9 of the ACT Law.
This is an application for leave to appeal from orders made by a Judge of the Court refusing applications by the appellants (1) for orders permanently staying their examinations with respect to the “examinable affairs” of the Company, and the production of documents in that connection; and (2) for orders setting aside those summonses.
No challenge has been made to the winding up order itself.
On behalf of the appellants, it is contended that two constitutional issues arise here:
Whether s 51(1) of the 1989 Act validly confers jurisdiction upon the Federal Court with respect to civil matters arising under the ACT Law.
Whether the Federal Court has power to make orders pursuant to s 596B (for examination) or s 597(9) (for the production of documents) of the ACT Law.
THE APPELLANTS’ CONTENTIONS
The appellants accept that, in this Court, the decision in Gould v Brown (1998) 72 ALJR 375 must be accepted as binding authority on the question of the investment under State legislation of like jurisdiction in this Court (see Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Limited v Merribee Pastoral Industries Pty Limited, Full Federal Court, 23 July 1998, unreported). But the appellants contend that the present situation is different, since it involves the position of a Territory rather than a State.
The appellants argue that the invalidity of s 51(1) flows from a well known line of authority in the High Court which limits the jurisdiction of Ch. III Courts and places territory jurisdiction outside Ch. III. On behalf of the appellant it is submitted (a) that s 51(1) is beyond power; and (b) that, even if it were valid, this Court can only exercise functions that are exclusively judicial or incidental to judicial functions; and the ACT Law purports to confer some powers which are non-judicial, e.g., the power to summon for examination an officer of a corporation not in the course of being wound up; and, as Gaudron J held in Gould v Brown (at 400-401), given the “seamless operation” of the legislative scheme intended, there is no room for severance.
LEAVE TO APPEAL
On the application for leave to appeal, we had the benefit of full argument from the parties, and from the Commonwealth Solicitor-General as an intervening party. In the result, we are of the view that leave should be given. It should be noted that, although the opportunity was available, no attempt was made to seek to remove the matter into the High Court. If they are good, the points raised by the appellants’ arguments are obviously important, not only for the parties, but for the purposes of other liquidations, and for the wider community. Further, if the appellants are correct in their contentions, they will have been subjected to a compulsive process without lawful justification. Moreover, although dicta in several of the decided cases support the respondent’s arguments, there appears to be no authority that is binding which squarely covers the present case. In the circumstances, it is appropriate that leave be granted.
CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPEAL
It will be convenient to deal with the issues raised separately.
The first (conferral of jurisdiction) issue: Did s 51(1) of the 1989 Act validly confer jurisdiction upon this Court?
We have difficulty accepting the appellants’ argument that s 51(1) is beyond the powers of the Parliament.
In Gould v Brown, although only the validity of the State legislation was in question, each member of the High Court made reference to the comparative position of the Territories in that context.
Brennan CJ and Toohey J said (at 384-5):
“[17] Jurisdiction conferred under the Territories power has been held to be non-federal. It may be vested by the Parliament in exercise of the power conferred by s 122, not in exercise of the powers conferred by Ch III. Chapter III and, in particular, s 73 does not prevent the vesting in this Court of appellate jurisdiction under s 122. Opinion has been divided on the question whether original jurisdiction under s 122 can be vested in this court, but it is settled law that Ch III deals only with federal jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. This Court has had no occasion to deal with the vesting of jurisdiction in a federal court to hear and determine matters arising solely under a State law.” [Emphasis added]
Gaudron J said (at 397-8):
“[63]… It is, however, necessary to say something of Territory courts and powers which they may exercise. The view was expressed by Taylor J in Spratt v Hermes that the provisions of Ch III have no application to those courts. And much the same view was taken by Dawson and McHugh JJ in Kruger v The Commonwealth. However, that view was questioned in a number of judgments in Spratt v Hermes. And in Kruger, Gummow J and I both noted that it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the decisions with respect to Territory courts with the terms of Ch III.
[64] As the constitutional position of Territory courts is of some relevance to my decision in this matter, it is necessary that I indicate my views in that regard. I think the better view is that courts created pursuant to s 122 are “courts created by the Parliament” for the purposes of s 72 of the Constitution. I also incline to the view that Territory courts may be invested with federal jurisdiction. There is, I think, no very compelling reason for treating the expression ‘such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction’ in s 71 as confined to State courts, notwithstanding what was said in Capital TV & Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer. Similarly, I think there is no very compelling view for reading the words ‘[a]rising under any laws made by the Parliament’ in s 76(ii) as not applying to laws in their operation in a territory, especially if, as in Spratt v Hermes, they are laws which operate generally throughout the country. [Emphasis added]
[65] If Ch III does apply to Territory courts in the manner I have indicated, it must, in my view, also operate in relation to those courts to prevent the contemporaneous vesting of federal jurisdiction and the conferral of powers inconsistent with the exercise of that jurisdiction. Subject to that qualification, there is, however, nothing in the language or structure of Ch III to preclude the conferral of non-judicial powers on Territory courts. …”
McHugh J said (at 412):
“[133] Bernasconi and Porter therefore stand for two propositions. First, although Ch III exhaustively describes the federal judicature, it does so by reference to the federal system, a system which they hold consists of the States and the Commonwealth. Second, the Territories are not part of the federal system, and the ‘legislative power in respect of the Territories is a disparate and non-federal matter’. The two later cases of Spratt and Falconer simply decide that ss 72 and 73 of the Constitution do not apply to courts created under s 122. In addition, in Falconer all members of the Court appeared to accept that Ch III is concerned with the federal system. In the present proceedings, however, the legislation at issue purports to deny that Ch III exhaustively defines the jurisdiction of the federal courts in respect of the federal system, a proposition that Bernasconi, Porter, Spratt and Falconer do not support and which Bernasconi and Porter in fact reject. [Emphasis added]
Gummow J said (at 431-2):
“[234]… Section 51(1) of the Commonwealth Act confers jurisdiction on the Federal Court with respect to civil matters arising under the Corporations Law of the ACT. It proceeds on the footing that a law which does not confer appellate jurisdiction on the High Court, but confers original jurisdiction on the High Court or another federal court with respect to matters arising under a law made for the government of a Territory, is itself such a law and does not conflict with Ch III. Support for that view as to the conferral of original jurisdiction is provided by dicta of Barwick CJ, Kitto J and Menzies J in Spratt v Hermes (Taylor J, Windeyer J and Owen J contra) and of Menzies J in Capital TV & Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer. The correctness of that view again may be assumed, without deciding the question.
[235] However that may be, it does not readily appear that a law such as s 56(2) of the Commonwealth Act, which states that the Federal Court may exercise jurisdiction with respect to matters arising under the Corporations Law of a State, is a law for the government of a Territory. The relationships between federal and State judicatures and judicial systems is essentially a federal matter. As indicated earlier in these reasons, the use of s 122 to support laws investing federal courts with jurisdiction with respect to disputes arising under Territory laws is supported by regarding the legislative power of the Parliament of the Commonwealth with respect to Territories as involving a disparate non-federal matter.” [Emphasis added]
Kirby J said (at 451):
“[308] …Although the States are not in the same relationship to the Commonwealth as the territories are, they are part of the Federation and, as sources of legislative power, just as ‘non-federal’ as is law-making for the territories under s 122 of the Constitution.
[309] Fourthly, this approach does not involve the Court in over-ruling its holdings in In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts or the Boilermakers’ Case. Those decisions stand for the matters essential to their respective determinations. It merely requires a reading of the passages referred to confining what was said to the “judicial power of the Commonwealth” and recognising that different rules will govern the endeavour to confer jurisdiction on federal courts in relation to territory courts or matters within a State’s legislative and judicial power.
[310] Fifthly, the approach not only fortifies and sustains the integrated judicial system of Australia which is such a important feature of our Constitution. As a practical charter of government it is unsurprising that the Constitution should provide a power to confer territory and State jurisdiction equally upon federal courts for which equally Ch III does not expressly provide.” [Emphasis added]
As these observations indicate, the decisions of the High Court in Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226 and Capital TV and Appliances Pty Limited v Falconer (1971) 125 CLR 591 need to be considered for present purposes. The context of both cases may be recalled.
The questions stated by the ACT Supreme Court for the decision of the High Court in Spratt were (a) whether the requirements of the provisions of s 72 of the Constitution applied to the appointment of an ACT magistrate (it was held that they did not); and, (b) whether the ACT Court of Petty Sessions had jurisdiction to hear and determine a charge under a Commonwealth statute intended to operate throughout the Commonwealth (it was held that it did).
A preliminary jurisdictional question also arose in Spratt. This was whether the High Court had original jurisdiction to entertain the case stated under s 13 of the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court Act 1933-1960 (Cth). Section 13 purported to invest the High Court with jurisdiction in any matter in which the Supreme Court had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court had the same jurisdiction in relation to the Territory as was formerly exercised by the Supreme Court of New South Wales; thus s 13 purported to extend the High Court’s original jurisdiction beyond the range of matters of the description specified in ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution.
It was held by five Justices of the High Court that, as the question raised by the case involved the interpretation of the Constitution in relation to a matter within s 76(i), it followed (whether with or without the aid of s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901-1964 (Cth) so as to restrict the operation of s 13) that the High Court had original jurisdiction.
On behalf of the appellants, it is now submitted that it was necessarily implicit in the reasoning of these five Justices (Barwick CJ, Kitto J, Taylor J, Windeyer J and Owen J at 239, 249, 265, 276-8 and 279-80 respectively) that a law for the government of a Territory under s 122 was not itself a law falling within s 76(ii).
We have difficulty in reading too much into their Honours’ reasoning for present purposes. Although the possible application of s 76(ii) was mentioned in argument and thus adverted to by the five Justices, the actual ground for their decision in each case was that the source of their jurisdiction was located in s 76(i) (see at 239, 249, 265, 278 and 280).
On the other hand, as the appellants’ argument fairly acknowledged, Menzies J did there hold (at 268) that s 76(ii) conferred jurisdiction:
“…s 13 of the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court Act is valid as a law under s 76(ii) of the Constitution whether Parliament’s power to legislate for the Australian Capital Territory arises under s 52 or s 122 of the Constitution. Furthermore, I am disposed to think that, by a law under s 122 of the Constitution, the Parliament could confer upon the High Court jurisdiction beyond that which could be conferred under s 76 of the Constitution. Section 13 of the Act confers jurisdiction upon this Court to hear and determine any matter referred thereunder as an exercise of original jurisdiction.” [Emphasis added]
Further, Kitto J went on to remark in Spratt (at 257):
“On [the] footing [that a departure from Bernasconi should not be contemplated], and being unable myself to see, or to find in any judgment a suggestion that anyone else has seen, a logical ground for distinguishing in principle between appellate and original jurisdiction as regards the power of the Parliament to give this Court jurisdiction outside Chap. III by means of a law operating under s 122, I am of opinion that we ought to hold as a corollary of Bernasconi’s Case, and in line with the decision in Porter v The King and all the cases that have followed it, that the power of Parliament under s 122, being unrestricted by anything expressed or implied in Chap. III, extends to conferring on the High Court original as well as appellate jurisdiction in any matter, provided that in doing so it is a law for the government of a territory.” [Emphasis added]
The context of Falconer, too, ought to be recalled. It was there held that since the ACT Supreme Court was not a federal court or a court exercising federal jurisdiction for the purposes of s 73 of the Constitution, no appeal lay as of right from that Court to the High Court. Menzies J, as the appellants’ argument again accepted, explicitly rejected (at 604-5) a contention that the reference in s 76(ii) to “laws made by the Parliament” ought to be read down so not to include laws made under s 122. His Honour said (at 605-6):
“The only basis for a restricted construction of s 76(ii) would be to find in R v Bernasconi, a general principle that, for the purposes of Ch III, ‘laws of the Commonwealth’ or ‘laws made by Parliament’ do not cover laws made under s 122. To reach this conclusion would, I think, be an extension – despite Lamshed v Lake – of the decision of the Court in R v Bernasconi. That decision should not, I think, be extended and it should be regarded as a decision which goes no further than to establish that, as a matter of construction, the words ‘any law of the Commonwealth’ in s 80 should be read as if they were followed by the words “other than law made under s 122”. While, therefore, I consider that the decision in R v Bernasconi should be allowed to stand as establishing the construction to be accorded to s 80, I do not regard it as affording any reason for restricting the words ‘any laws made by the Parliament’ in s 76(ii) to exclude laws made by the Parliament under s 122. It would hardly be sensible to read s 76(ii) as denying Parliament power to make laws conferring original jurisdiction upon this Court in a matter arising under the law made by Parliament under s 122 and then to read s 122 as conferring upon Parliament the power to make such a law. In my opinion there is no ground for inferring any limitation upon the ordinary meaning of the words used in s 76(ii).” [Emphasis added]
In our opinion, and as the Solicitor-General submitted, even if for present purposes it be assumed in the appellants’ favour (a) that Ch. III exclusively lays down what powers may be conferred on Ch. III courts; and (b) that s 122 is an independent head of power which authorises the creation of non-Ch. III courts to deal with a Territory - it simply does not follow that s 76(ii) does not operate, according to its terms, to pick up laws made by the Parliament for Territories under s 122. Moreover, as has been noted, one member of the High Court, Menzies J, has held that s 76(ii) does apply to s 122 laws.
In our view, s 5 of the 1989 Act was enacted in the valid exercise of the legislative power conferred by s 122; and it is also a law made by the Parliament within s 76(ii). At the same time, s 51(1) was enacted in exercise of the legislative power given by s 77(i).
So viewed, this case does not raise for consideration the difficult problems that were identified in the cases relied upon by the appellants, in particular, the observations made in In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257 at 265; in The Queen and Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 at 272 in the context of Ch. III; and in special aspects of the government of the territories in R v Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629; in Porter v The King; Ex parte Yee (1926) 37 CLR 432 at 438, 447; and in Federal Capital Commission v Laristan Building and Investment Co. Pty Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 582 at 584-5; and by McHugh J in Gould v Brown at 412-415.
It is true, as Gummow J has noted in Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 at 168-171, that a question may arise for future determination whether a s 122 law can confer original jurisdiction upon the High Court in contract or in tort. But for our purposes, the important point is that each member of the Court in Spratt did hold that a law enacted pursuant to s 122 may confer jurisdiction of the kinds identified in ss 75 and 76.
Section 51(1) is, in our opinion, valid.
The second judicial power issue: Are this Court’s powers under Ch. 5 to summons for examination validly conferred?
Again, we have difficulty accepting the appellants’ arguments on this issue.
It is true that, although there is no challenge to the winding up order made here, s 596A would permit an examination where there has been no winding up. But, given the long history of courts exercising such powers, we can see nothing foreign to the exercise of judicial power in this aspect of s 596A (see Re Compass Airlines Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 447 at 452-3; Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd v Barber (1994) 48 FCR 301 at 307-8; Re Excel; Worthley v England (1994) 52 FCR 69 at 79-81).
The appellants’ argument refers to the doubts expressed by Gaudron J in this connection in Patrick Stevedores Operations No. 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (NO. 3) (1998) 72 ALJR 873 (at 906). The appellants also rely upon s 447A of the ACT Law which provides that:
“The Court may make such order as it thinks appropriate about how this Part is to operate in relating to a particular company.”
In fact, s 447A has not been invoked here. Its meaning should be addressed in a specific context, which we do not have. At all events, it is arguable that s 447A does no more work than a provision such as s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, and that is clearly within power (see Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612).
Even if s 447A were to be regarded beyond power as an impermissible attempt at legislative delegation (see Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 at 486), it would, in the ordinary course, be capable of severance. It is true, as has been noted, that Gaudron J has spoken of the “seamless operation” of the scheme (at 401). But her Honour, who alone addressed the point, was there picking up a description of the scheme given in argument by one of the parties. It might have been more accurate to speak of a co-operative scheme. At all events, we cannot accept that it would not be appropriate to sever s 447A, if it be thought to be beyond power – a question that does not immediately arise.
In our opinion, Ch. 5 Pt. 5.9 is valid in all other respects. If s 447A were beyond power, Something we prefer not to decide in the abstract, it could be severed. The balance of Pt. 5.9 will stand whether s 447A is, or is not, severed; and s 447A is of no practical significance here.
It follows that both of the appellants’ arguments on the appeal fail.
THE OBJECTION TO COMPETENCY
For completeness, it should be noted that, as well as seeking leave to appeal on the footing that her Honour’s orders were only interlocutory, the appellants purported to appeal as of right, contending, alternatively, that her Honour’s orders were final. The respondent objected to the competency of the appeal. As has been said, we would propose to grant leave to appeal in any event, so that it is not necessary that we deal with this objection.
SECTION 78B JUDICIARY ACT 1903
Before her Honour, a question arose as to the application of this provision. Upon first making their application for leave to appeal, the appellants informed us that they proposed to give notices under s 78B in any event. This occurred upon the footing that it was done without prejudice to the respondent’s contention that the step was not, as her Honour held, required. Notices were given by the appellants on this basis, and, in the events that happened, the Commonwealth Attorney-General intervened. In these circumstances, it is not necessary that we take this aspect further.
ORDERS PROPOSED
We propose the following orders:
Leave to appeal granted.
Appeal dismissed, with costs.
Interim stay ordered by the Full Court on 19 August 1998 lifted.
I certify that this and the preceding ten (10) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Beaumont
Acting Associate:
Dated: 10 September 1998
Counsel for the Applicant: F M Douglas QC with R W White Solicitor for the Applicant: Mallesons Stephen Jaques Counsel for the Respondent: D E Grieve QC with K Smark Solicitor for the Respondent: Deacons Graham & James Counsel for Intervenor: D M J Bennett QC with M J Leeming Solicitor for Intervenor: Australian Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 26 August 1998 Date of Judgment: 10 September 1998
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