IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S87 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
PETER JAMES SPENCER
Applicant
and
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Summons
GUMMOW J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON TUESDAY, 23 FEBRUARY 2010, AT 9.52 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR P.E. KING: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by McKells)
MR A. MARKUS: If your Honour please, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Markus.
MR KING: Can I hand to your Honour the original of the affidavit of service of the summons, a copy of the outline of oral submissions and a copy of the transcript in Thomas which is referred to.
HIS HONOUR: The affidavit of service of Peter Brian McKell sworn 23 February 2010 may be filed in Court. Why do I need the transcript in Thomas v The Queen?
MR KING: Only on the second point, your Honour, in relation to the position of the joinder of the State. I will deal with that secondly.
HIS HONOUR: Wait a minute, we are not here to have a mini special leave hearing you know.
MR KING: Of course.
HIS HONOUR: What is the date of your summons?
MR KING: It was filed ‑ ‑ ‑
HIS HONOUR: 26 October, was it?
MR KING: Yes, your Honour, last year. It was not given a return date because of the situation with Arnold and ICM, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I have it, thank you.
MR KING: The special leave was filed in ‑ ‑ ‑
HIS HONOUR: Yes, it is set down for hearing in two weeks time.
MR KING: Yes, your Honour. Your Honour, dealing with the question of evidence first, it is our respectful submission that the evidence that is referred to in the affidavit and which is summarised in the document ‑ ‑ ‑
HIS HONOUR: Well, this is opposed by Mr Markus, is it not, reception of this affidavit?
MR MARKUS: That is correct, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: On what grounds?
MR MARKUS: Your Honour, we say that there is only a very limited basis upon which evidence can be admitted in special leave applications and at least until the summary of the oral submissions have been handed up to your Honour, there has been no proper basis identified for the filing of this evidence. I also note, your Honour, that at least in relation to some of the exhibits that are included in the proposed evidence, there may be a question whether there is a breach of the Parliamentary Privileges Act, section 16.
HIS HONOUR: I will ask Mr King this; what was the nature of the proceeding in the Federal Court? How did it start off?
MR KING: It was a proceeding ‑ ‑ ‑
HIS HONOUR: Was there a statement of claim ever filed?
MR KING:
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 34
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the applicant's claim was barred by the operation of section 14 of the *Limitation Act 1969* (NSW), which imposes a time limit for bringing personal injury claims. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the applicant had brought his action within the prescribed period, considering the date of injury and the date of commencement of proceedings.
Gummow J considered the principles of statutory interpretation in relation to limitation periods. His Honour examined the wording of section 14 of the *Limitation Act 1969* (NSW) and relevant case law concerning the accrual of a cause of action for personal injury. The Court's reasoning focused on establishing the precise date from which the limitation period commenced to run, taking into account the applicant's knowledge of his injury and its cause. The Court applied the established legal principle that a cause of action for personal injury accrues at the time of the injury, unless specific statutory provisions provide otherwise.
The Court found that the applicant's action was commenced outside the time limit prescribed by section 14 of the *Limitation Act 1969* (NSW). Accordingly, Gummow J ordered that the applicant's claim be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi