IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S87 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
PETER JAMES SPENCER
Applicant
and
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
HEYDON J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 12 MARCH 2010, AT 9.33 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR P.E. KING: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by McKells)
MR A. ROBERTSON, SC: If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.L. LENEHAN, for the respondent. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr King.
MR KING: Thank you, your Honour. Your Honours, in the matter of ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth, decided on 9 December last year, and followed in Arnold v Minister Administering the Water Management Act, decided in February of this year, this Court invigorated the principles that are founded in Magennis v The Commonwealth. Perhaps the most convenient reference to that principle and that decision can be found at paragraph [45] in the ICM judgment in the joint judgment of the Chief Justice and your Honour Justice Gummow ‑ ‑ ‑
GUMMOW J: Not just - a bipartite judgment, was it?
MR KING: ‑ ‑ ‑ paragraph [45] and Justice Crennan – [46].
GUMMOW J: Yes.
MR KING: In particular the three considerations that commence at paragraph [43] and following. Justices Hayne, Kiefel and Bell at paragraph [104] adopted a similar view, although without going into quite the detailed reasoning, and Justice Heydon at paragraph [184] referred to the breadth of the principle. Your Honours, on 6 May last year the Court stood over the decision in this matter – I beg your pardon, 5 June this year – I have a copy of the order that has been taken out – until after those two decisions are heard and determined.
GUMMOW J: Yes, we understand how it has come back, Mr King.
MR KING: Yes, thank you, your Honour.
GUMMOW J: We have a draft further pleading that you would be seeking to file if you have all the necessary steps in your favour to achieve that.
MR KING: Thank you.
GUMMOW J: Can you just help us though? At page 62 of the application book, which contains the reasons of Justice Emmett, paragraphs 171 and 172, what we want to ask you is, having regard to this further proposed pleading, would it answer the point, if it is a good point, made by Justice Emmett in those paragraphs, in particular, at about line 18:
More specifically, neither of the Commonwealth Statutes expressly requires, or refers to, the imposition of any prohibition . . . There is no apparent connection between the provision of funds . . . and the refusal by officers of New South Wales to grant development consent under –
et cetera.
MR KING: Yes, there are…
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 55
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the amendments to the *Native Title Act 1993* (Cth) made by the *Native Title Amendment Act 1998* (Cth) validly extinguished native title rights in relation to the land in question. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the amendments were consistent with the *Racial Discrimination Act 1975* (Cth) and, if not, whether they were nevertheless constitutionally valid under s 51(xxvi) of the *Constitution*.
The High Court held that the amendments to the *Native Title Act 1993* (Cth) were valid. The Court reasoned that the amendments, by providing for the extinguishment of native title in certain circumstances, did not discriminate on the ground of race in a manner prohibited by s 10 of the *Racial Discrimination Act 1975* (Cth). Furthermore, the Court found that the amendments were a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's legislative power under s 51(xxvi) of the *Constitution*, which permits the Parliament to make laws with respect to the people of any race, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws. The Court distinguished the present case from *Mabo v Queensland (No 2)* and *Wik Peoples v Queensland*, noting that the amendments were designed to provide a framework for the recognition and protection of native title, while also allowing for the extinguishment of such title in accordance with the Constitution.
The appeal was dismissed.
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