Spence v State of Queensland

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[2019] HCATrans 047

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B35 of 2018

B e t w e e n -

GARY DOUGLAS SPENCE

Plaintiff

and

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

Defendant

KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 15 MARCH 2019, AT 9.45 AM

(Continued from 14/3/19)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

KIEFEL CJ:   Yes, Ms Solicitor.

MS WALKER:   If the Court pleases.  As your Honours would recall, yesterday afternoon I was about to take the Court to some authorities.  By way of introduction to those authorities, we say that what they show, your Honours, is that when this Court has considered the basis for laws that do not, by the rights, duties and liabilities that they create, operate directly on the machinery for elections, such as voting, ballot papers, election disputes, the behaviour of the AEC and so forth, but laws that in a sense could be described as protective of the electoral process, that those laws have been understood to be justified as having a sufficient connection with the power to make laws with respect to elections because they are incidental to that power.  That concept of laws being incidental, as I will attempt to demonstrate, has potentially been both on the basis of the implied incidental power and the express incidental power. 

The first case I wanted to take the Court to is the ACTV Case, which is in the joint bundle at volume 3, tab 20.  Your Honours were taken to some passages in this case already.  In particular, the Commonwealth took your Honours to some passages from Justice Gaudron’s judgment at pages 219 to 220 of the report.  I wanted to focus on some aspects of that that the learned Solicitor‑General for the Commonwealth did not mention to your Honours to make good the proposition that Justice Gaudron understood the scope of the elections power relevantly for the purposes of the law in issue in the ACTV Case to be relying on the incidental power, including expressly section 51(xxxix).

Your Honours, the Solicitor‑General for the Commonwealth took the Court to a passage commencing on page 219, and going across to the top of page 220.  What he did not read was her Honour’s reference at the top of page 220, where she says:

of course, s. 51(xxxix) confers power to legislate with respect to “the execution of any power vested by [the] Constitution in the Parliament” –

Now, of course, that is a direct reference to the express incidental power.  Her Honour goes on there to say, in the next paragraph:

It is doubtless correct to say that, by virtue of the combined operation of the provisions in Ch. I conferring legislative power and s. 51(xxxvi) and (xxxix), the Commonwealth has plenary power with respect to Commonwealth elections.

Then she deals with some of the specifics of Chapter I, but goes on to make…

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Details
Case
[2019] HCATrans 47
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Mr Spence against the State of Queensland concerning the validity of certain provisions of the *Corrective Services Act 1988* (Qld) and the *Corrective Services Regulation 1991* (Qld). The dispute arose from Mr Spence's detention and the conditions of his confinement, which he alleged were unlawful.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the impugned provisions of the Act and Regulation, which purported to authorise the detention of prisoners beyond their lawful sentence expiry date in certain circumstances, were constitutionally valid. Specifically, the Court had to determine if these provisions were inconsistent with Chapter III of the *Australian Constitution*, which vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth exclusively in the courts.

The Court reasoned that the power to detain a person in custody is a fundamental aspect of the judicial power. It held that the executive government, through the provisions of the *Corrective Services Act 1988* (Qld) and the *Corrective Services Regulation 1991* (Qld), could not be empowered to determine the length of a person's detention or to extend it beyond the period fixed by a court. Such a power, if exercised by the executive, would impermissibly encroach upon the exclusive judicial power vested in the courts by Chapter III of the Constitution. The Court found that the provisions in question were therefore invalid.

The High Court allowed the appeal, declared the relevant provisions of the *Corrective Services Act 1988* (Qld) and the *Corrective Services Regulation 1991* (Qld) invalid, and ordered that Mr Spence be released from custody.

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