| OURT OF APPEAL | [1999] QCA 361 |
| cMURDO P NCUS JA HOMAS JA | |
| ppeal No 10435 of 1998 | |
| HRISTOPHER RAYMOND SPARKE and | |
| ARIKA MAGDOLINE SPARKE | Appellants |
| d | |
| OOSA SHIRE COUNCIL | Respondent |
| RISBANE | |
| DATE 27/08/99 |
UDGMENT
NCUS JA: This is an appeal from a decision of the Planning and Environment Court which
ends, it is said, on a point of construction of the Local Government (Planning and Environment
) 1990 (the 1990 Act).
appeal concerns land in the Noosa Shire the appellants' interest in which, as is common ground,
s "injuriously affected" within the meaning of s.3.5(1) of the 1990 Act by the circumstance that
e came into force on 5 September 1997 a new strategic plan. This had the effect that whereas,
or to the new strategic plan, the appellants would have expected to be able to rezone the
perty in which they were interested so that a retirement village could be built on it, that prospect
appeared with the new strategic plan.
laim for compensation under s.3.5 of the 1990 Act was lodged on 23 March 1998 and rejected
24 April 1998. In the meantime, there had come into force provisions of the Integrated Planning
1997 and in particular s.6.2.1, which repealed the 1990 Act; but under s.6.1.27, since the
lication for compensation had not been decided before the commencement of that section, the
lication had to be decided as if the 1990 Act had not been repealed. Under the Integrated
nning Act s.4.1.34, a right of appeal to the Planning and Environment Court was given to any
son dissatisfied with a decision on claims for compensation under certain provisions of that Act.
re appears to be nothing in the 1997 Act which gives the Planning and Environment Court
sdiction to hear an appeal of the present kind, but it is common ground that the relevant
sdiction was preserved by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954.
also common ground that there is a prima facie right to compensation under s.3.5(1) of the
90 Act, which on its face gives these appellants an entitlement to that. The case turns on the
per construction of s.3.5(4)(d) and s.3.5(5) of the 1990 Act which provide as follows:
"(4) Compensation is not payable - ...
(d)
subject to subsection (2), where an interest in premises is affected by a planning scheme which by its operation prohibits or restricts the use of land or the erection or use of a building or other structure thereon for a particular purpose, unless the applicant establishes that the applicant had a legal right immediately before the provision in question of the planning scheme came into force to use the land or erect or use a building or other structure thereon for the particular purpose which is so prohibited or restricted;
... (5)
For the purposes of subsection (4)(d), it is not to be taken that…
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- Case
- [1999] QCA 361
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of the statutory language concerning "legal rights" and the application of discretion by both the local government and the Governor-in-Council. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the appellants had a legal right to rezone their property under the 1990 Act before it was repealed by the Integrated Planning Act 1997. The appellants argued that their expectation of rezoning constituted a "legal right" protected by the compensation provisions of the 1990 Act, while the council contended that such a right did not exist due to the necessity of dual discretionary approvals, both from the council and the Governor-in-Council.
The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, held that the language of the 1990 Act did not support the appellants' broad interpretation of "legal right" as encompassing mere expectations of favorable discretionary decisions. The court emphasized that the statutory language required more than just the expectation of a favorable exercise of discretion by the local government; it also required considering the discretion vested in the Governor-in-Council. The court concluded that the literal interpretation of the statutory provisions did not render them without effect and that the language was clear enough to preclude the appellants' claim for compensation. The judges agreed with the primary judge's interpretation and dismissed the appeal with costs.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal with costs, affirming the decision of the Planning and Environment Court that the appellants were not entitled to compensation under the 1990 Act.
Orders
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