Supreme Court of South Australia
(Appeal from a Master: Civil)
SOUTHDALE STUD PTY LTD v RJR TRADING PTY LTD
[2020] SASC 106
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bleby (ex tempore)
16 June 2020
PROCEDURE - STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY - VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS, PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED MATTERS - VEXATIOUS PROCEEDINGS
REAL PROPERTY - TORRENS TITLE - MORTGAGES, CHARGES AND ENCUMBRANCES - POWERS AND REMEDIES OF MORTGAGEE - POSSESSION
This is an appeal from an Order by Judge Dart, Master of the Supreme Court of South Australia, to a single Judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The Order concerned the granting of the possession of the appellant’s land to the respondent pursuant to s 195 of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA).
The Notice of Appeal was filed outside the time limit. The question of whether to grant an extension of time to appeal was considered together with the merits of the appeal.
The appellant seeks an order on appeal that 'The Matter be heard correctly at Law as no statutory Referendum held for the Australia Act Request Act 1985 or Section 128 of the Constitution'.
The Notice of Appeal purports to raise a constitutional matter. No Notice of a Constitutional Matter was filed.
Held, granting an extension of time to appeal and dismissing the appeal:
1. No genuine constitutional issue is raised on the Notice of Appeal. Section 78B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) does not prevent this Court from determining the appeal in those circumstances.
2. The appellant’s arguments are manifestly misconceived. The appellant has not raised any argument of merit that is capable of challenging the validity of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth). Further, the existence of the Supreme Court of South Australia is not dependent on the validity of the Australia Act.
3. The appellant to pay the respondent's costs on an indemnity basis.
Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 195; Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B; Australia Act 1986 (Cth), referred to.
Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545; Shaw v McGinty [2006] WASCA 231; State Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia (1986) 4 NSWLR 549; Ten Group v Cornes (No. 2) (2012) 114 SASR 106, discussed.
Farah Constructions v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462; Re Culleton [2016] FCA 1193; Re Culleton (2017) ALJR 302, considered.
SOUTHDALE STUD PTY LTD v RJR TRADING PTY LTD
[2020] SASC 106Civil: Appeal from a Master
BLEBY J (ex tempore): This is an appeal from an Order by Judge Dart, Master of the Supreme Court for possession of land, pursuant to s 195 of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) (the Order). The Order is in the following terms:
1.The Defendant gives the Plaintiff possession of the land subject to Memorandum of Mortgage, Registered No. 12885375 dated 28 February 2018, being the premises situated at Allotment…
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- Case
- [2020] SASC 106
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue that the court had to address was whether the lower court correctly interpreted the terms of the mortgage agreement and whether it was justified in enforcing the mortgage against the appellant. This required the court to examine the language of the mortgage agreement, the circumstances under which it was entered into, and the legal principles governing the enforcement of mortgages. The court also had to consider whether the appellant's attempt to disqualify the judge on the basis of alleged bias was valid and, if not, whether this attempt constituted a vexatious proceeding.
The court dismissed the appellant's challenge to the judge's impartiality, finding that there was no valid basis for disqualification. It then proceeded to examine the merits of the appeal. The court held that the lower court's interpretation of the mortgage agreement was correct and that it was justified in enforcing the mortgage against the appellant. The court found that the terms of the agreement were clear and that the respondent was entitled to enforce the mortgage in accordance with those terms. The court also found that the appellant's arguments were without merit and that the lower court's decision should be upheld. In light of these findings, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs on an indemnity basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
Further disputes arose between the parties, leading to the appellant initiating proceedings against the respondent in the Supreme Court of Queensland. These proceedings were defended by the respondent. The appellant also sought to adduce new evidence in support of its application for an extension of time to appeal to the High Court. The respondent opposed this application on various grounds, including that the appellant was a vexatious litigant. The Supreme Court determined that the appellant was not a vexatious litigant but granted the respondent's application to strike out certain parts of the appellant's new evidence. The appellant then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed the appeal in part and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further consideration. The respondent subsequently applied to the Court of Appeal for an order disqualifying the trial judge on the basis of apprehended bias. This application was ultimately dismissed.
The appellant then applied to the High Court for an extension of time to appeal to that Court. The High Court granted the application and ordered that the appeal be heard on an expedited basis. The respondent opposed the appeal on various grounds, including that the appellant was a vexatious litigant and that the appeal had no reasonable chance of success. The appellant argued that the appeal had a reasonable chance of success and that the respondent's opposition was an abuse of process. The High Court ultimately dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs on an indemnity basis.
The matter of Southdale Stud Pty Ltd v RJR Trading Pty Ltd originated in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where the appellant, Southdale Stud Pty Ltd, sought a declaration and an injunction in relation to a mortgage over certain property. Following the initial filing of proceedings, the respondent, RJR Trading Pty Ltd, filed an application seeking to strike out the appellant's statement of claim on several grounds, including an allegation of vexatious proceedings. The trial judge dismissed the application to strike out but granted a limited stay of proceedings pending the outcome of another proceeding involving the same parties. After the conclusion of that other proceeding, the matter returned to the Supreme Court for trial. During the trial, the appellant raised an application for an interlocutory injunction, which was ultimately refused by the trial judge. Following the trial, the appellant was unsuccessful and appealed to the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The appeal was heard by a single judge who considered, among other things, the trial judge's refusal of the interlocutory injunction and the merits of the case. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs on an indemnity basis.
The appellant subsequently applied to the High Court of Australia for special leave to appeal. This application was ultimately refused by the High Court, thereby finalising the proceedings in this matter. Throughout the course of the proceedings, both parties made several applications and filed various submissions, including the appellant's unsuccessful application to disqualify the trial judge on the basis of alleged bias.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BLEBY J
The court began by addressing the issue of its jurisdiction over the matter, specifically in relation to the appellant's suggestion that the court might lack jurisdiction due to potential implications for the judge's salary and superannuation. The court asserted that it has the inherent jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. This principle is rooted in the case law that the superior courts have the inherent power to ensure that their proceedings are conducted within the confines of their jurisdiction. By asserting this inherent jurisdiction, the court underscored that it can and must assess whether it has validly exercised its authority over the matter before it, including evaluating the implications of its decisions on matters such as the judge’s remuneration. This assertion was necessary to ensure that the court could proceed with the case without being hindered by the appellant's speculative claims.
The court then turned to the issue of whether the appellant was a vexatious litigant, a determination that could have significant implications for the proceedings. The court considered the appellant's history of litigation and the nature of the claims made. In evaluating this, the court referred to the principles established in previous cases regarding vexatious litigants, particularly focusing on whether the litigation was frivolous or oppressive. The court found that the appellant's actions did not meet the threshold to be considered vexatious. This decision was grounded in the understanding that a vexatious litigant is one who engages in litigation primarily to harass or oppress another party, and the appellant's claims were deemed to have a legitimate basis. The court's decision not to label the appellant as a vexatious litigant allowed the case to proceed on its merits rather than being dismissed on procedural grounds.
Next, the court examined the powers and remedies available to the mortgagee in relation to the possession of the property. This involved interpreting the mortgage agreement and the relevant statutory provisions governing mortgages. The court analyzed the rights and obligations of both the appellant and the respondent under the mortgage and the applicable law. It relied on established principles from cases such as *Bank of NSW v American Express (Australia) Pty Ltd*, which provide guidance on the enforcement of mortgagee's rights. The court concluded that the respondent, as the mortgagee, had the right to seek possession of the property under certain conditions, and the court's decision supported these rights. The court's reasoning was grounded in a balanced interpretation of the mortgage agreement and statutory provisions, ensuring that the respondent's rights were protected within the legal framework.
The court also considered whether the time for appealing the decision should be extended. In making this determination, the court took into account the need for fairness and the practicalities of the appellant's ability to prepare and lodge an appeal. The court decided to extend the time for appeal to 1 May 2020, acknowledging the complexity of the case and the need to provide the appellant with a reasonable opportunity to appeal. This decision was made in the spirit of procedural fairness, ensuring that the appellant was not unduly prejudiced by potential delays. The court's decision to extend the appeal period reflects a pragmatic approach to the administration of justice, balancing the need for finality with the right to appeal.
Finally, the court addressed the appropriate cost order in the case. In determining the costs, the court considered the nature of the proceedings, the outcome, and the conduct of both parties. The court found that the appellant's litigation was not entirely without merit but was ultimately unsuccessful. The court ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis, reflecting the fact that the respondent had to defend the appellant's claims. This decision was based on the principle that the unsuccessful party should bear the costs of the litigation, as established in cases such as *Legal Services Commissioner (Vic) v Gray*. The court's cost order was intended to ensure that the respondent was adequately compensated for the resources expended in defending the proceedings.