South Melbourne Football Club Ltd v Football Federation Victoria Inc
[2010] VSC 355
•17 August 2010
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL AND EQUITY DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
LIST A
No. 4250 of 2010
| SOUTH MELBOURNE FOOTBALL CLUB LTD (ACN 102 241 252) | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| FOOTBALL FEDERATION VICTORIA INC (A0014492Y) | Defendant |
---
JUDGE: | Pagone J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 12 August 2010 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 17 August 2010 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | South Melbourne Football Club Ltd v Football Federation Victoria Inc | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2010] VSC 355 | |
---
CLUBS & ASSOCIATIONS – Decision of domestic disciplinary tribunal – Club penalised six championship points – Whether the Grievance Disciplinary and Tribunal By-law was misconstrued or misapplied – Natural justice – Club not given an opportunity to make submissions about penalty.
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr R. Knowles | GPZ Legal |
| For the Defendant | Mr P. Booth | Lander & Rogers Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
The South Melbourne Football Club (“the Club”) seeks urgent relief against the Football Federation Victoria (“the Federation”) to have declared void, invalid or otherwise of no effect a decision made on 18 May 2010 by the Appeals Board of the Federation (“the Appeals Board”) pursuant to which six championship points were deducted from the total number of championship points held by the Club in the Victorian Premier League. The bases of the application are that the Appeals Board misconstrued and misapplied certain provisions pursuant to which it exercised its powers and that it did not act in accordance with the principles of natural justice in reaching its decision on penalty. The Federation contended that the decision of the Appeals Board was final and that the decision could not, or should not, be set aside.
A. Jurisdiction
The Federation is an association incorporated pursuant to the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) and has in force a Constitution (“the Constitution”) pursuant to which it is conducted. Its rules, by virtue of s 14A of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic), constitute the terms of a contract between the Federation and its members for the time being. The Club is one of its members.
Rules 7 and 15 of the Constitution permit the Federation to make what are described as By-laws. The By-laws are subject to the Constitution, they must be consistent with the Constitution and are binding on all members as if they were provisions of the Constitution. One of the By-laws made by the Federation is described as a “Grievance Disciplinary and Tribunal By-law” (“the Grievance By-law”). Rule 8.2 of the Constitution provides that all grievances must be determined pursuant to and in accordance with the process set out in the Grievance Procedure which, the parties accept, is the procedure set out in the Grievance By-law.
The Constitution contemplates that the procedures and processes created by the Constitution and the Grievance By-law should govern the whole of any disputes which may arise. Rule 8.2(b) of the Constitution binds all parties to refer all grievances to the dispute resolution body established in accordance with the Grievance Procedure and must not “commence any suit or proceeding in any court or tribunal until the Grievance Procedure has been exhausted”. I have already referred to s 14A of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) and to rule 15.2 of the Constitution which together bind all of the parties to the Constitution and to the By-laws made pursuant to the Constitution. To this may be added clause 13.10(b) of the Grievance By-law which provides that (subject to a qualification not relevant to these proceedings) a decision of the Appeals Board “shall be final and binding on the parties and no party may take any action in any court or tribunal or other forum to challenge such decision or seek to have it varied in any way”. Notwithstanding these provisions, the Club contended that the decision of the Appeals Board cannot be supported by these provisions and ought to be set aside.
A court should be reluctant to interfere with a decision of a domestic tribunal. Domestic tribunals, like private dispute resolution agreements, further the public policy in having disputes resolved by processes controlled by the parties who are best able to judge how their disputes should be decided. The public interest is generally advanced by courts supporting and giving effect to dispute resolution by agreed processes and by discouraging the continuation of disputes by other means. There is an important public interest to be maintained by enforcing contractual agreements by which the finality of decisions of domestic tribunals is maintained. In Australian Football League v Carlton Football Club Ltd[1] Tadgell JA said:
A necessary question underlying the appeal concerns the extent to which the civil courts can and should interfere with the decision of the A.F.L. Tribunal, a domestic tribunal by whose decision the parties have agreed to abide. Counsel for the respondents sought to distinguish this case from a long line of decisions in which the courts have declined to interfere, save on a strictly limited basis, at the instance of parties affected by decisions of domestic tribunals to which there has been consensual submission. Examples are legion in which the courts have consistently refused to review on the merits decisions made by private or domestic tribunals that had been established to deal with disputes within organisations to which people had become voluntarily affiliated, by contract or otherwise. Typically, disputes have arisen between such an organisation and a person who has agreed to owe allegiance to it, either as a member or in some other capacity, or who wishes to become a member of it, or between members. The kinds of organisations with whose internal decisions the courts have declined to meddle include social clubs (Dawkins v Antrobus (1879) 17 Ch. D. 615), sporting clubs (Malone v Marr [1981] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 894), sporting associations (Shepherd v South Australian Amateur Football Association Inc. (1987) 44 S.A.S.R. 579), trades unions (Maclean v Workers’ Union [1929] 1 Ch. 602), professional associations, such as a stock exchange (Weinberger v Inglis [1919] A.C. 606), political parties (Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 C.L.R. 358 at 370, 373), friendly societies (Dickason v Edwards (1910) 10 C.L.R. 243), parochial councils and other church bodies (Macqueen v Frackelton (1909) 8 C.L.R. 673; Scandrett v Dowling (1992) 27 N.S.W.L.R. 483) and schools (Hayman v Governors of Rugby School (1874) L.R. 18 Eq. 28). The reasons for the courts’ declining to interfere in cases such as these have been various. For one thing, where the parties have agreed to have their disputes decided by domestic tribunals designated for the purpose, the courts have been in the habit of respecting the agreement or, one might say, not countenancing a breach of it by one party wishing to desert it and to resort to the civil courts for resolution of a dispute that the tribunal was designed to decide. For another thing, the courts have been prepared to recognise that there are some kinds of dispute that are much better decided by non-lawyers or people who have a special knowledge of or expertise in the matters giving rise to the dispute than a lawyer is likely to have. Again, the courts have been willing to understand that not every aspect of community life is conducted under the auspices of the State, that it is right that this should be so and that, sometimes, it is appropriate that State-appointed judges stay outside disputes of certain kinds which a private or domestic tribunal has been appointed to decide. The courts have not taken the view that a privately-founded, privately-managed organisation — even one with numerous adherents or devotees and enjoying widespread community popularity — is necessarily to be subject to control by the courts. That is certainly not to say that such an organisation may treat itself as above the law: it is merely to acknowledge that the courts will not discourage private organisations from ordering their own affairs within acceptable limits.[2]
[1][1998] 2 VR 546.
[2]Ibid 549 [5].
It follows from these observations, together with the important public policy objective of reaching finality of disputes, that the court’s role in reviewing the decision of the Appeals Board must be limited. In Australian Football League Tadgell JA went on to say that it was appropriate for courts to interpret the contracts under which disciplinary tribunals are established in order to determine whether they have properly interpreted the contract upon which the tribunal founded its jurisdiction.[3] This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision complained of to the extent that the domestic tribunal (the Appeals Board) has not acted within its contractual bounds.
[3]Ibid 553; see also 567-9 (Hayne JA) and 575 (Ashley AJA otherwise dissenting).
B. Construction and Application of the Grievance By-law
The Club contended that the Appeals Board misconstrued and misapplied the relevant provisions of the Grievance By-law in substituting a charge for that which had been the subject of appeal and then finding the Club guilty of the new charge.
The events which gave rise to the grievance occurred on 11 April 2010. On that day the Club’s team was playing in the Victorian Premier League against Heidelberg United Football Club (“Heidelberg United”) at the Bob Jane Stadium. Heidelberg United scored an early goal and led by one goal until the ninety-first minute of the match when the Club scored an equalising goal. About thirty to forty supporters of the Club thereupon invaded the pitch in what may charitably be described as an act of exuberance by the Club’s supporters but which was dangerous and unacceptable conduct. Some of the supporters approached opposition players and match officials during the invasion. The referee subsequently abandoned the match at the ninety-first minute.
The event on 11 April 2010 resulted in formal charges by the Federation against the Club pursuant to the grievance rules. A tribunal was convened to hear the charges which were heard on 21 April 2010 along with other charges which the Federation had brought against Heidelberg United. A number of findings were made against the Club and penalties were imposed. Four charges were considered by the tribunal against the Club and the tribunal found against the Club on two of them.
The Grievance By-laws contains a table listing offences for misconduct in respect of which there are fixed penalties. They are listed as “MFP” offences numbered 1 to 10 and the table contains a description of the charge together with minimum and maximum penalties applicable in each case. One of the offences found by the tribunal against the Club was the MFP 5 charge of failing to control Club Associates. On this charge the penalty imposed by the tribunal was the minimum fine of $1,000. The other charge found by the tribunal against the Club was the MFP 10 charge of misconduct which in the opinion of the Federation brings the sport or the Federation into disrepute but which was “not listed” in the preceding offences. On this charge the tribunal fined the Club $2,500. The tribunal also banned three members of the Club from attending any future matches for life and determined the match which had occasioned the relevant events to have been won by Heidelberg United with the award of three points in favour of Heidelberg United.
Unfortunately for the Club it decided to appeal the decision of the tribunal to the Appeals Board. The appeal was only against the finding of guilt against the Club in respect of misconduct under the MFP 10 offence.[4] The Appeals Board heard the appeal on 5 May 2010. The Appeals Board was constituted by a senior counsel and two other barristers. The Club was represented by Mr Galatas, a solicitor. The Appeals Board substituted a charge under MFP 9 for the MFP 10 charge which the tribunal had found proven against the Club and substantially increased the penalty. The Appeals Board also determined that the MFP 10 charge was not made out, that the final score of the match was to be one goal for each of the two teams. It also set aside the life bans on the two supporters who appeared to prosecute their appeals and substituted bans for one supporter to the end of season 2012 and the other to the end of the 2010 season. However, the Appeals Board found against the Club under the substituted MFP 10 charge and increased the penalty on the Club by deducting six championship points for the current season.
[4]The notice of appeal incorrectly referred to the misconduct charge as MFP 9 but this is plainly an error as was clear from the body of the notice of appeal and the tribunal’s formal determination of a finding of guilty on charge MFP 10 and with the tribunal finding the Club not guilty on another charge of misconduct under MFP 9.
The Club contended that what the Federation did revealed a misconstruction of the contractual terms binding the parties in the Constitution and By-laws. The pleading does not immediately elucidate what is said to be the misconstruction, but from the particulars to paragraph 43, and from the written and oral submissions, it is clear that what is said to be misconstrued (and then misapplied) is the meaning of the words “Other Misconduct” for the purposes of MFP 9. The construction argument is, simply, that by “Other Misconduct” in the table of charges which may be the subject of a charge under MFP 9 what is provided for is something which does not otherwise come within each of the preceding charges. That construction is supported by the word “other” and by the subsequent description of the MFP 10 charge as misconduct which in the opinion of the Federation brings the sport or the Federation into disrepute “which is not listed above”.
A fair reading of charges MFP 9 and MFP 10 does support the Club’s construction. It is not to be assumed that the charge in MFP 9 is merely the generality of some or all of the charges which precede it and the specific exclusion in the definition of MFP 10 of misconduct not previously listed reveals an intention that the listed charges in the table of charges should each be clear, separate and predictably applied. The charges preceding MFP 9 in the table may overlap to some extent in the sense that the evidence and particulars relevant to establishing one of them may also be relevant to establish another, but an MFP 9 charge is not simply an alternative for one of the charges which precede it: if the charge is one which is fully covered in any of MFP 1-8, it cannot simply be charged as MFP 9. By “other” misconduct, however, I do not consider it to have been intended to exclude from the details or particulars of a charge for an MFP 9 offence some fact or event which might also be relevant to establish one of the preceding charges. What is contemplated by the table of charges, rather, is to identify a series of broadly stated, but separate, offences. The charge described as “Other Misconduct” in MFP 9 is not intended to exclude evidence that might be used to establish one of the other charges but, rather, to ensure that there was a power to sanction where there was misconduct that was not otherwise specifically provided for.
The Club maintained that the Appeals Board’s error may be seen from the fact that its determination of the Club’s guilt of misconduct under MFP 9 was based in part upon the fact of the Club “failing to control its Club Associates”. This, it was maintained by the Club, could not come within MFP 9 as “Other Misconduct” because MFP 5 was specifically described as “failing to control Club Associates”. It may be accepted that “failing to control its Club Associates” could not be treated by the Appeals Board as falling within either MFP 5 or MFP 9 as a stand alone charge at its election or discretion. The Appeals Board, however, did not purport to do so. What it did, rather, was to regard the offence of MFP 9 as being constituted by the combination of facts of which the failing to control its Club Associates was an indivisible part of a combination of facts. The description of the offences are not to be construed with excessive technicality. It must be borne in mind what the offences are designed to achieve in the context of a sporting code for the enjoyment of the public. The Appeals Board was not, in my view, treating a failing to control the Club Associates as independent conduct chargeable under MFP 9 but, rather, as one element necessarily joined with three or four others which together and in combination justified in the Appeals Board’s view the determination that there was other misconduct within the meaning of MFP 9. Accordingly, I do not find that the Appeals Board misconstrued the relevant provisions or misapplied them to the facts.
C. Natural Justice / Procedural Fairness
The Club also contended that it had been denied natural justice in the hearing when determining the issue of what penalty might be imposed.
The Appeals Board has a discretion about what it may consider on appeal. It is required to re-hear a matter on appeal “on its merits as a new hearing”.[5] It may confirm, reverse “or modify the decision appealed from” and may make such orders and give such directions as it deems appropriate.[6] Specifically, in the case of a Fixed Penalty Offence, the Appeals Board at a hearing may find as proven the offence or the same offence at a different grading or a different offence from that which was the subject of appeal.[7]
[5]Grievance Disciplinary and Tribunal By-law, clause 13.8(f).
[6]Ibid clause 13.8(j).
[7]Ibid clause 13.8(l)(ii).
The Appeals Board, therefore, had the power to determine that a different offence was more appropriate than the one which had been the subject of appeal. The Club’s complaint, however, is that it had not been formulated sufficiently for the purposes of the Club making meaningful submissions about penalty. In paragraph 24 of its reasons the Appeals panel said:
Having made the findings of fact the Appeals Board has determined that a different offence, MFP9 was appropriate. The misconduct by the Club and the Club Associates is the conduct which was likely to bring the game of football and the FFV into disrepute by reason of a combination of the following facts:
(1) failing to control its Club Associates;
(2)failing to provide sufficient security at or near the area known as “Clarendon Corner”;
(3)exposing the referees and/or Heidelberg players to the risk of abuse, intimidation, vilification and assault;
(4)failing to control its Club Associates from entering the field of play which caused the game to be abandoned.
In paragraph 33(1) and in the summary at the end of its reasonings the Appeals Board added a fifth fact of “failing to control its Club Associates from abusing, intimidating and vilifying the Heidelberg players” as the offence charged and found against the Club. The Club maintained that it was not until the provision of the reasons that the details of the MFP 9 offence were articulated.
The Club maintained that the By-laws provided for a two part procedure to be followed such that the Club should have been asked for submissions on penalty or sanction only after having made findings about the offences. The Appeals Board is not bound by the rules of evidence or by the practices and procedures applicable to courts of record and may inform itself as to any matter and in such manner as it deems appropriate.[8] Clause 13.8(b)(i) specifically requires the Appeals Board to provide a reasonable opportunity to be heard to any person whose interest would be directly and adversely affected by its decision. Clause 13.8(g) provides that the Appeals Board may regulate any proceeding before it in such manner as it thinks fit but may only do so subject to the matters set out in the By-law. Clause 12 of the By-law deals with the procedures applicable to the tribunal. Clause 13.2 provides that those procedures apply to the Appeals Board with such modifications “as are necessary”. In that regard the provisions of clause 12 generally apply to the Appeals Board as though a reference to the tribunal was a reference to the Appeals Board.
[8]Grievance Disciplinary and Tribunal By-law, clause 13.8(i).
Some aspects of clause 12 contemplate the tribunal (and therefore the Appeals Board) hearing from the parties about penalties and sanctions after any finding of a charge being proven. Clause 12.7(a) gives the Appeals Board power to require the parties to leave the hearing room at the completion of the evidence if the Appeals Board wishes to do so. Clause 12.8 provides:
(a) If the [Appeals Board] finds that:
(i) the charge or charges have been proved; or
(ii)the party charged is guilty of the offence charged but, in the case of a Fixed Penalty Offence at a different grading or guilty of a different offence
then it may invite the parties to make submissions to the [Appeals Board] on the question of what penalty or sanction, if any, ought to be imposed.
(b) In addition [the Federation] or its representatives, may make submissions to the [Appeals Board] on the question of what penalty or sanction, if any, ought to be imposed.
Clause 12.10 also appears to contemplate the possibility that submissions “on the question of penalty” would be heard separately.
It will often be desirable for submissions about penalty or sanction to be heard separately from the hearing of a charge. It may frequently be the case that matters which are relevant to penalty or sanction are not led in evidence or submitted as part of the case against the charge because to do so might compromise the strength of the case against the charge. That said, however, I do not regard clause 12 as imposing upon the Appeals Board a fixed requirement to hear submission or evidence on penalties and sanctions separately from the evidence and submissions about the charges. It may be desirable to deal with them separately and a party may ask for that to occur, but whether any hearing about penalty or sanction should occur simultaneously with or later than the hearing on the charge is a matter for the Appeals Board depending upon the particular circumstances of each case. The Appeals Board was, in my view, entitled to require that there be submissions on behalf of the Club concerning penalties or sanctions at the same time as its consideration of the appeal on the charges.
The problem, however, was that the Club was not told with sufficient particularity what the charges were until after the decision was made. The transcript of the proceeding reveals clearly enough that it was seeking submissions from the Club on penalty and was not constraining the Club about what submissions should or could be put. That is clear from very early in the hearing when Mr Galatas was reminded that the appeal opened the whole of the events for reconsideration including the penalty to be imposed if a charge was found proven. The Appeals Board, however, never formally articulated a new charge along the lines set out in its reasons and summary. The closest counsel for the Federation was able to identify an articulation of the details of the charge was a passage at page 112 of the transcript where the Chairman said in argument with Mr Galatas on behalf of the Club:
No, I follow that, but I want to put to you something which I’m thinking about at this stage and therefore it’s only fair that you have a chance to consider this. If we start from the premise that a pitch invasion particularly in the Premier League as the showpiece of the Football Federation is unacceptable and the pitch invasion is never by the match officials, sorry the club officials or the committee. The fact is it never happens or should never happen because they’re generally marshalling trying to keep people behind the fences along with the security staff. So let’s start from those two premises. The third premise we’ve got to put in is that the pitch invasions happen, if I take the wording of a supporter, he says he’s had them ten times. The FFV have drafted a rule effectively which says on a zero tolerance what will stop these supporters thinking they have a right to run on the pitch. And one way of stopping it is the loss of points, that is you lose points, not only the match points but other points as well which is one of the scope of penalties. Because I’m thinking and it’s my thinking alone, night will follow day, now if you take away points there is nothing more than it hurts the supporters, than the fact that the supporters’ conduct has caused the club which they love, to suffer on the points table.
There are many other references in the transcript where members of the Appeals Board sought to elicit from the Club’s representative submissions about penalty and sanction. It is plain that the Club’s representative was well aware, and could be in no doubt, that the Appeals Board was considering penalty and sanction at the same time as it was considering whether a charge was proven. What does not emerge anywhere in the transcript, or in the papers up to the giving by the Appeals Board of its reasons, was any articulation of the charge such that the Club might have been able to focus its submissions in any meaningful way. This, in my view, is a breach of procedural fairness in failing to provide the Club with an opportunity to make submissions on penalty or sanction. Natural justice requires that a person know the substance of the case to be met.[9] It should not readily be assumed that a fair hearing would have made no difference to the outcome[10] and this is not a case in which it can confidently be said that the failure to identify the elements which the Appeals Board considered to constitute the charge “could have made no difference”.[11]
[9]Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 629 (Brennan J); Habib v Director-General of Security (2009) 108 ALD 478, 494 [63] (Black CJ, Ryan and Lander JJ).
[10]John v Rees [1970] Ch 345, 402 (Megarry J); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 1 AC 653, 675 [52] (Lord Steyn).
[11]Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; Lansen v Minister for Environment and Heritage (2008) 106 ALD 232.
That is not to say that the penalty imposed by the Appeals Board was not correct. Nor is it to say that it committed any error in finding that the Club had committed an MFP 9 offence. The Appeals Board, however, imposed penalties without the Club having had the opportunity to make submissions either on the hypothesis of a finding, or on the fact of there having been found misconduct in the terms expressed either in paragraph 24 of their reasons or paragraph 33(1) or as summarised on page 10 of their reasons. What was denied to the Club, and what the Appeals Board denied to itself, were submissions about what penalties or sanctions were appropriate upon findings on those terms. To state a charge simply by reference to the words in the table would, without facts, be meaningless. In this case there were many facts in evidence before the Appeals Board which, it may be accepted for argument, were not in dispute. However, the Club was entitled to know which facts were said to constitute the charge and which facts it should address on questions of penalty or sanction. Indeed, a comparison of the charge as identified in paragraph 24 of the Appeals Board’s reasons with that in paragraph 33(1) of the Appeals Board’s reasons shows why it is important for the charge to be articulated. The difference between the two descriptions is that the latter has the “failing to control its Club Associates from abusing, intimidating and vilifying the Heidelberg players” as part of the matters which is said in combination to make out the MFP 9 charge of misconduct. The Appeals Board must be understood as having considered the Club’s “failing to control” its supporters to be materially different from the earlier mentioned matter of “exposing” the Heidelberg players to the risk of abuse, intimidation and vilification. The Club’s failure to control its supporters from abusing, intimidating and vilifying the Heidelberg players was not part of the description of the misconduct in paragraph 24 as conduct which was likely to bring the sport or the Federation into disrepute. Unless and until stated as a matter comprising the misconduct there can be no meaningful occasion for the Club making submissions about penalty and sanction in relation to those facts (whether found or anticipated). It seems clear from paragraph 33(1) and the summary (on page 10 of the Appeals Board’s reasons) that the matters found against the Club included the failure to control its supporters from abusing, intimidating and vilifying the Heidelberg players but that was not part of the misconduct described in the Appeals Board’s reasons at paragraph 24. The absence of a fact in one place of the tribunal’s reasons and its presence in another highlights the significance of knowing what the Club needed to address: if the charge remained as it appeared in paragraph 24 the Club would not need to address what penalty might be appropriate in relation to a finding of a failure to control its supporters from abusing, intimidating and vilifying the Heidelberg players.
There was also criticism about other aspects of the Appeals Board’s reasoning and conclusions which I need not consider. There is, however, a curiosity in what is said in paragraph 22 of the reasons that should be mentioned. In that paragraph the Appeals Board said:
We conclude that on a strict reading of MFP10 the charge is not made out. Given the Club admitted to the tribunal a breach of MFP5 we find that the decision of the tribunal to find South Melbourne not guilty is unsatisfactory.
What is curious about this paragraph is that the tribunal did not find South Melbourne to be not guilty. The formal typed determination of the tribunal identified[12] the plea as having been “not guilty” but that its finding was one of “guilty” with a fine of $1000 which, it appears, was paid. There may have been some factual doubt about whether the determination was based upon a plea of guilty or of not guilty, but there was no doubt at any stage that the tribunal had found the Club to be guilty, that it imposed a fine and that the fine was paid. What the Appeals Board had in mind in what it said in paragraph 22 seems contrary to the facts. The conclusionary observation of the tribunal decision being “unsatisfactory” may well have reflected upon the penalty which the Appeals Board went on to impose. Whether it did so, and whether it should do so, are matters which may usefully be taken up at any subsequent hearing of the Appeals Board to consider what penalty or sanction should be imposed upon its finding that the Club was guilty on the substituted charge.
[12][Erroneously].
In the circumstances I propose to order that the determination of the Appeals Board that the Club have deducted six championship points be set aside and that the Appeals Board be reconstituted by the Federation for the purposes of hearing and determining what penalty or sanction should be imposed upon the Club on the findings of guilt that have been made subject to such submissions as the Club may wish to make.
---
0
10
0