SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
SOUTH AUSTRALIAN SUPERANNUATION BOARD (SUPER SA) v MCINTYRE
[2015] SASCFC 57
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Stanley and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)
28 April 2015
SUPERANNUATION - REVIEW OF DECISIONS
SUPERANNUATION - BENEFITS - MATTERS AFFECTING ENTITLEMENT TO AND PAYMENT OF - INCAPACITY
SUPERANNUATION - BENEFITS - MATTERS AFFECTING ENTITLEMENT TO AND PAYMENT OF - OTHER MATTERS
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court sitting in its Administrative and Disciplinary Division. The appellant is responsible for the administration of the Southern State Superannuation Scheme, established by the Southern State Superannuation Act 1994 (SA) to provide members, being State Government employees, with various financial benefits consequent upon their employment. The respondent became a member of the Scheme by virtue of his employment as a part-time school groundskeeper with the Department of Education and Child Development for a period of time from May 2005 onwards. As a member the respondent was entitled to a basic invalidity insurance benefit in the event that certain circumstances, as prescribed by the Act, came about.
As of 13 July 2008 the respondent ceased performing work as a groundskeeper for the Department due, in part, to ongoing complications with a heart condition. In 2010, the respondent lodged a claim with the appellant seeking payment of the basic invalidity insurance benefit. The appellant declined the respondent’s claim on the basis that he had not ceased working on account of invalidity, but rather his incapacity for work arose after he underwent heart surgery in March 2009, being well after he had ceased his employment.
The respondent successfully appealed to the District Court against the refusal. The Judge held that the respondent’s employment had ceased by virtue of incapacity, that the employment was terminated on 13 July 2008 on account of invalidity, that the respondent is presently incapacitated to the extent of 60 per cent or greater and that this incapacity is “likely to be permanent” within the meaning of the Act. The Judge ordered that the respondent be paid the basic invalidity insurance benefit. The appellant appealed to this Court against the Judge’s order.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
By Nicholson J (Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreeing):
1. The Judge erred in finding, on the evidence before him, that the respondent had satisfied all of the necessary requirements under the Act for the payment of the basic invalidity insurance benefit. The Judge failed to determine, and the respondent did not demonstrate, one of the essential legislative requirements, namely, that his employment was terminated by the employer as required by subsection 34(8)(a) of the Act.
2. The respondent satisfied all other requirements under the Act to entitle him to receive the basic invalidity insurance benefit. Nevertheless, the respondent’s failure to demonstrate that his employment was terminated by the employer would, ordinarily, be a sufficient basis on which to…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read South Australian Superannuation Board (Super SA) v McIntyre and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2015] SASCFC 57
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Full Court was whether the appellant, Super SA, should be permitted to raise for the first time on appeal the argument that Mr. McIntyre's employment had not been terminated by his employer, a point not pursued at trial. This question required the Court to consider the principles governing when an appellate court may entertain arguments not advanced in the court of first instance, particularly in light of the High Court's decisions in cases such as *The University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2)*, *Coulton v Holcombe*, and *Water Board v Moustakas*.
The Court reasoned that ordinarily, a party is bound by the conduct of their case at trial, and new arguments are only permitted on appeal in exceptional circumstances. The High Court has consistently held that if a point could have been met by calling evidence at trial, it generally cannot be raised on appeal. While appellate courts have discretion to entertain new points of law or construction where all facts are established, this discretion is exercised cautiously, balancing the interests of justice with the public interest in the finality of litigation. The Court noted that the threshold for raising a new argument on appeal is high, and the circumstances must be truly exceptional, such as those involving public law or the liberty of the individual, to justify departing from the general rule.
The Court concluded that the appellant should not be permitted to raise the question of whether Mr. McIntyre's employment was terminated by the employer for the first time on appeal. This was because the issue could have been addressed with evidence at trial, and the circumstances did not meet the high threshold for exceptionality required to allow a new argument. Consequently, the appeal was allowed on the basis that the requirement for termination of employment by the employer had not been made out.
Background
Background to the litigation
The court examined the legal principles surrounding the raising of new arguments on appeal, referencing several precedents. It noted that generally, parties are bound by their conduct at trial, and new arguments may not be introduced on appeal unless in exceptional circumstances. The court referenced High Court cases such as The University of Wollongong v Metwally, Coulton v Holcombe, and Water Board v Moustakas to underscore the principle that substantial issues should be resolved at the trial stage. However, exceptions exist where the point is one of law or construction, or where the facts are undisputed. In instances where the point could have been met by calling evidence below, the appeal court is unlikely to entertain it, except in the most exceptional circumstances. Examples of such exceptions include matters of public law or issues affecting individual liberty, status, and reputation. The court also considered whether the interests of justice warranted allowing the new argument, balancing the need for correct legal application against the principle of finality in litigation.
The matter of South Australian Superannuation Board (Super SA) v McIntyre originated in the South Australian Supreme Court, where it was initially heard as an appeal from a decision of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). The appeal was brought by Super SA, challenging a SACAT decision which upheld the respondent's entitlement to receive a basic invalidity insurance benefit. Super SA argued that the respondent's employment had not been terminated by the employer in accordance with the relevant statutory requirements, which was a prerequisite for the entitlement to the benefit. The Supreme Court of South Australia, in an earlier decision, found that the employment had not been terminated by the employer, but nevertheless held that the respondent satisfied all other requirements under the Act to entitle him to receive the benefit. Super SA then appealed to the South Australian Court of Appeal, seeking to argue for the first time that the employment had not been terminated by the employer, a ground not previously raised in the trial. The appeal was brought under the statutory framework allowing for the review of decisions made by SACAT and other administrative tribunals, with the Court of Appeal having the authority to review the correctness of the trial judge's decision. The appeal hinged on whether Super SA could raise the issue of the employment termination for the first time on appeal, in light of the well-established principle that parties are generally bound by the conduct of their case at trial.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KOURAKIS CJ,
The appeal court in South Australian Superannuation Board (Super SA) v McIntyre[1] considered whether the appellant, McIntyre, could raise for the first time on appeal the argument that his employment was not terminated by the employer. The court summarised the principles applicable to this issue, which had been established in prior High Court and appellate court decisions. According to these authorities, a party is ordinarily bound by the conduct of their case at trial, and it would be contrary to principle to allow a party to raise a new argument on appeal that they failed to put at trial when they had an opportunity to do so. The Court noted in Water Board v Moustakas[2] that a point cannot be raised for the first time on appeal if it could possibly have been met by calling evidence below.
However, the Court recognised that in the most exceptional circumstances, an appeal court may permit a party to raise a new argument on appeal, for example if the point is one of construction or of law, or if it is expedient and in the interests of justice to do so. The Court noted that the threshold for allowing a new point on appeal is high, and that the exercise of this discretion is informed by the proposition that a party will only be permitted to do so in the most exceptional circumstances.
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the court found that McIntyre's argument that his employment was not terminated by the employer could have been raised at trial, and that there was no exceptional circumstance that would warrant allowing him to raise it for the first time on appeal. The court concluded that ordinarily the appeal should be allowed unless McIntyre should not now be permitted to raise the question of whether the employment was terminated by the employer.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that ordinarily, a party will not be permitted to raise for the first time on appeal a ground or argument that they failed to put at trial when they had an opportunity to do so. However, in the most exceptional circumstances, an appeal court may permit a party to do so where it is expedient and in the interests of justice to do so. The court distinguished this case from cases where the new point was one of construction or of law, or where it touched upon issues of public law or affected the liberty of the individual. In this case, the court found that there was no exceptional circumstance that would warrant allowing McIntyre to raise the argument for the first time on appeal.