South Australian Superannuation Board (Super SA) v McIntyre

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN SUPERANNUATION BOARD (SUPER SA) v MCINTYRE

[2015] SASCFC 57

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Stanley and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)

28 April 2015

SUPERANNUATION - REVIEW OF DECISIONS

SUPERANNUATION - BENEFITS - MATTERS AFFECTING ENTITLEMENT TO AND PAYMENT OF - INCAPACITY

SUPERANNUATION - BENEFITS - MATTERS AFFECTING ENTITLEMENT TO AND PAYMENT OF - OTHER MATTERS

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court sitting in its Administrative and Disciplinary Division. The appellant is responsible for the administration of the Southern State Superannuation Scheme, established by the Southern State Superannuation Act 1994 (SA) to provide members, being State Government employees, with various financial benefits consequent upon their employment. The respondent became a member of the Scheme by virtue of his employment as a part-time school groundskeeper with the Department of Education and Child Development for a period of time from May 2005 onwards. As a member the respondent was entitled to a basic invalidity insurance benefit in the event that certain circumstances, as prescribed by the Act, came about.

As of 13 July 2008 the respondent ceased performing work as a groundskeeper for the Department due, in part, to ongoing complications with a heart condition.  In 2010, the respondent lodged a claim with the appellant seeking payment of the basic invalidity insurance benefit.  The appellant declined the respondent’s claim on the basis that he had not ceased working on account of invalidity, but rather his incapacity for work arose after he underwent heart surgery in March 2009, being well after he had ceased his employment.

The respondent successfully appealed to the District Court against the refusal.  The Judge held that the respondent’s employment had ceased by virtue of incapacity, that the employment was terminated on 13 July 2008 on account of invalidity, that the respondent is presently incapacitated to the extent of 60 per cent or greater and that this incapacity is “likely to be permanent” within the meaning of the Act.  The Judge ordered that the respondent be paid the basic invalidity insurance benefit.  The appellant appealed to this Court against the Judge’s order.

Held: Appeal dismissed. 

By Nicholson J (Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreeing):

1.  The Judge erred in finding, on the evidence before him, that the respondent had satisfied all of the necessary requirements under the Act for the payment of the basic invalidity insurance benefit.  The Judge failed to determine, and the respondent did not demonstrate, one of the essential legislative requirements, namely, that his employment was terminated by the employer as required by subsection 34(8)(a) of the Act.

2.  The respondent satisfied all other requirements under the Act to entitle him to receive the basic invalidity insurance benefit.  Nevertheless, the respondent’s failure to demonstrate that his employment was terminated by the employer would, ordinarily, be a sufficient basis on which to…

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Details
Case
[2015] SASCFC 57
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The South Australian Superannuation Board (Super SA) appealed a decision concerning Mr. McIntyre's entitlement to an invalidity insurance benefit. The dispute centred on whether Mr. McIntyre's employment had been terminated by his employer in accordance with the relevant superannuation legislation, a prerequisite for receiving the benefit. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia considered the appeal.

The primary legal issue before the Full Court was whether the appellant, Super SA, should be permitted to raise for the first time on appeal the argument that Mr. McIntyre's employment had not been terminated by his employer, a point not pursued at trial. This question required the Court to consider the principles governing when an appellate court may entertain arguments not advanced in the court of first instance, particularly in light of the High Court's decisions in cases such as *The University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2)*, *Coulton v Holcombe*, and *Water Board v Moustakas*.

The Court reasoned that ordinarily, a party is bound by the conduct of their case at trial, and new arguments are only permitted on appeal in exceptional circumstances. The High Court has consistently held that if a point could have been met by calling evidence at trial, it generally cannot be raised on appeal. While appellate courts have discretion to entertain new points of law or construction where all facts are established, this discretion is exercised cautiously, balancing the interests of justice with the public interest in the finality of litigation. The Court noted that the threshold for raising a new argument on appeal is high, and the circumstances must be truly exceptional, such as those involving public law or the liberty of the individual, to justify departing from the general rule.

The Court concluded that the appellant should not be permitted to raise the question of whether Mr. McIntyre's employment was terminated by the employer for the first time on appeal. This was because the issue could have been addressed with evidence at trial, and the circumstances did not meet the high threshold for exceptionality required to allow a new argument. Consequently, the appeal was allowed on the basis that the requirement for termination of employment by the employer had not been made out.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of South Australian Superannuation Board (Super SA) v McIntyre involves an appeal by Super SA concerning the eligibility of McIntyre for a basic invalidity insurance benefit under the Superannuation Act. McIntyre, a former employee, applied for the benefit on the grounds of incapacity. Super SA initially approved the benefit but later reversed its decision, leading McIntyre to appeal. The appeal hinges on whether McIntyre's employment was terminated by his employer, a requirement under the Act for entitlement to the benefit. The decision to terminate employment is a prerequisite under the Act, and it must occur before the Board considers the matter of incapacity. In this case, Super SA argued that McIntyre's employment was not terminated by his employer, thereby invalidating his claim for the benefit. The matter reached the court, which found that the requirement for employer-initiated termination had not been satisfied. Despite this, McIntyre met all other criteria for the benefit under the Act. The central issue in the appeal is whether Super SA is permitted to raise for the first time the question of employer-initiated termination, given that it was not argued during the initial trial.

The court examined the legal principles surrounding the raising of new arguments on appeal, referencing several precedents. It noted that generally, parties are bound by their conduct at trial, and new arguments may not be introduced on appeal unless in exceptional circumstances. The court referenced High Court cases such as The University of Wollongong v Metwally, Coulton v Holcombe, and Water Board v Moustakas to underscore the principle that substantial issues should be resolved at the trial stage. However, exceptions exist where the point is one of law or construction, or where the facts are undisputed. In instances where the point could have been met by calling evidence below, the appeal court is unlikely to entertain it, except in the most exceptional circumstances. Examples of such exceptions include matters of public law or issues affecting individual liberty, status, and reputation. The court also considered whether the interests of justice warranted allowing the new argument, balancing the need for correct legal application against the principle of finality in litigation.

The matter of South Australian Superannuation Board (Super SA) v McIntyre originated in the South Australian Supreme Court, where it was initially heard as an appeal from a decision of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). The appeal was brought by Super SA, challenging a SACAT decision which upheld the respondent's entitlement to receive a basic invalidity insurance benefit. Super SA argued that the respondent's employment had not been terminated by the employer in accordance with the relevant statutory requirements, which was a prerequisite for the entitlement to the benefit. The Supreme Court of South Australia, in an earlier decision, found that the employment had not been terminated by the employer, but nevertheless held that the respondent satisfied all other requirements under the Act to entitle him to receive the benefit. Super SA then appealed to the South Australian Court of Appeal, seeking to argue for the first time that the employment had not been terminated by the employer, a ground not previously raised in the trial. The appeal was brought under the statutory framework allowing for the review of decisions made by SACAT and other administrative tribunals, with the Court of Appeal having the authority to review the correctness of the trial judge's decision. The appeal hinged on whether Super SA could raise the issue of the employment termination for the first time on appeal, in light of the well-established principle that parties are generally bound by the conduct of their case at trial.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KOURAKIS CJ STANLEY J (dissent) NICHOLSON J (dissent)
Ordinarily, the Board will come to consider this question of incapacity and its likely permanence at a time no less than six months after a claiming member’s employment has been terminated.[25] It would seem that the basic structure of the process envisaged by subsection 34(8) is that employment must first be terminated by the employer in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (a). At this stage, the level of incapacity that might trigger such a termination is at large. However, the requirements of paragraph (b) of subsection 34(8) and subsection 34(2) must also be satisfied but at a later time, being at least six months after the termination. In the present case, had there been a termination of employment by the employer, in accordance with paragraph (a) of subsection 34(8), and given the appellant’s waiver of the six months notice requirement in subsection 34(9), the requirements of paragraph (b) of subsection 34(8) and subsection 34(2) would have been satisfied had the appellant addressed them sometime after 3 March 2009.[25] See paragraph (b) of ss34(8) and ss34(9).Preliminary conclusion To this point I have found that the requirement for the employment to have been terminated by the employer has not been made out on the evidence available to the Judge. However, the respondent has satisfied all other requirements under the Act to otherwise entitle him to receive the basic invalidity insurance benefit. Nevertheless, as a result of the former finding, the appeal should, ordinarily, be allowed unless the appellant should not now be permitted to raise for the first time the question of whether the employment was terminated by the employer.Should the appellant be allowed to rely on a finding that the employment was not terminated by the employer? The law concerning the circumstances in which a party will be entitled to raise on appeal a ground or argument not pursued at trial was summarised by this Court in Lucke v Cleary & Ors.[26][26] [2011] SASCFC 118 at [43]-[50], Stanley J with whose reasons Gray and David JJ agreed.In The University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2),[27] the High Court enunciated the principle relevant to the determination of an application to raise on appeal an argument not put at trial. The Court said:[28][27] (1985) 59 ALJR 481.[28] (1985) 59 ALJR 481 at 483.It is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of his case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against him, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, he failed to put during the hearing when he had an opportunity to do so.In Coulton v Holcombe,[29] the High Court explained the underlying principles justifying this approach:[30][29] (1986) 162 CLR 1.[30] (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7-8.It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish. The powers of an appellate court with respect to amendment are ordinarily to be exercised within the general framework of the issues so determined and not otherwise. In a case where, had the issue been raised in the court below, evidence could have been given which by any possibility could have prevented the point from succeeding, this Court has firmly maintained the principle that the point cannot be taken afterwards.The High Court reaffirmed the position in Water Board v Moustakas:[31][31] (1988) 180 CLR 491 at 497.More than once it has been held by this Court that a point cannot be raised for the first time upon appeal when it could possibly have been met by calling evidence below. Where all the facts have been established beyond controversy or where the point is one of construction or of law, then a court of appeal may find it expedient and in the interests of justice to entertain the point, but otherwise the rule is strictly applied.(Footnote omitted)Examples of the High Court allowing a new point to be raised for the first time on appeal can be found in Coulton v Holcombe,[32] National Australia Bank Ltd v KDS Construction Services Pty Ltd (In Liq),[33] and Fingleton v The Queen.[34]The threshold test to be met by a party which seeks to raise an argument for the first time on appeal is high. An appeal court will only permit a party to do so in the most exceptional circumstances. Where all the facts have been established beyond controversy or where the point is one of construction or of law, the appeal court may, in the exercise of its discretion, entertain the point where it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so but, even in those circumstances, the exercise of the court’s discretion is informed by the proposition that a party will only be permitted to do so in the most exceptional circumstances. By way of illustration, in Coulton v Holcombe[35] the High Court permitted the appellants to raise a point for the first time on appeal as the point touched upon issues of public law which affected the wider community including executive government and the Parliament, all of whom had an interest in the clarification of statutory duties and the observance of law by statutory office holders. The Court distinguished the case from one of private litigation inter partes. In Fingleton v The Queen,[36] Kirby J noted that in criminal appeals the rule is tempered by the focus of the relevant statute upon issues of miscarriage of justice and by the heightened concern of the law with questions of the liberty of the individual, status and reputation.[37] These authorities emphasise the exceptional nature of the case.On the other hand, in National Australia Bank Ltd v KDS Construction Services Pty Ltd (In Liq),[38] the Court upheld an argument that the appellant was entitled to relief based on the existence of a lien notwithstanding that point had not been raised in the courts below. It did so on the basis there was nothing in the evidence or in the relationship of the parties that pointed to the possible existence of an agreement or of circumstances which would have negated the existence of the lien. Accordingly, the Court gave effect to the appellant’s submission that it had a lien and allowed the appeal on that basis. Plainly, this involved the exercise of a discretionary judgment.In Skorpos & Anor v United Petroleum Pty Ltd[39] Kourakis CJ (with whose reasons David and Peek JJ agreed), after quoting part of the above passage from Lucke, continued:In a common law adversarial trial the Court determines the issues submitted to it by the parties for resolution. Moreover, the judicial determination of an action at trial is a final, not preliminary, resolution of the legal controversy. Appeal proceedings are not a continuation or extension of the trial. The issue on appeal is whether the judgment given at trial is vitiated by error.[40]Plainly enough there are both semantic and substantive difficulties in the proposition that a judgment is attended by error if the issue which it is contended was wrongly adjudicated was never submitted to the court. Nonetheless, the interests of justice may on occasion demand a reversal of the decision. It is not possible to be prescriptive about the conditions and considerations which will bring about that result. In ascertaining where the interests of justice lie it should be recognised that there are competing considerations. On the one hand it is in the interests of justice that the orders of courts reflect the correct application of the law to the facts as found. On the other hand, the public interest in the finality of litigation demands that parties be bound by the conduct of their case at trial. To say that a judgment will be set aside on a point not taken at trial only in exceptional circumstances should be understood as an observation about what will commonly be the result of the evaluation of those competing principles and not as a presumptive rule.[32] (1986) 162 CLR 1.[33] (1987) 163 CLR 668.[34] (2005) 227 CLR 166 at 218-219.[35] (1986) 162 CLR 1.[36] (2005) 227 CLR 166.[37] (2005) 227 CLR 166 at 218.[38] (1987) 163 CLR 668.[39] [2013] SASCFC 117 at [33]-[34].[40] Da Costa v Cockburn Salvage & Trading Pty Ltd (1970) 124 CLR 192, 208-209 (Windeyer J).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KOURAKIS CJ,

The appeal court in South Australian Superannuation Board (Super SA) v McIntyre[1] considered whether the appellant, McIntyre, could raise for the first time on appeal the argument that his employment was not terminated by the employer. The court summarised the principles applicable to this issue, which had been established in prior High Court and appellate court decisions. According to these authorities, a party is ordinarily bound by the conduct of their case at trial, and it would be contrary to principle to allow a party to raise a new argument on appeal that they failed to put at trial when they had an opportunity to do so. The Court noted in Water Board v Moustakas[2] that a point cannot be raised for the first time on appeal if it could possibly have been met by calling evidence below.

However, the Court recognised that in the most exceptional circumstances, an appeal court may permit a party to raise a new argument on appeal, for example if the point is one of construction or of law, or if it is expedient and in the interests of justice to do so. The Court noted that the threshold for allowing a new point on appeal is high, and that the exercise of this discretion is informed by the proposition that a party will only be permitted to do so in the most exceptional circumstances.

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the court found that McIntyre's argument that his employment was not terminated by the employer could have been raised at trial, and that there was no exceptional circumstance that would warrant allowing him to raise it for the first time on appeal. The court concluded that ordinarily the appeal should be allowed unless McIntyre should not now be permitted to raise the question of whether the employment was terminated by the employer.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that ordinarily, a party will not be permitted to raise for the first time on appeal a ground or argument that they failed to put at trial when they had an opportunity to do so. However, in the most exceptional circumstances, an appeal court may permit a party to do so where it is expedient and in the interests of justice to do so. The court distinguished this case from cases where the new point was one of construction or of law, or where it touched upon issues of public law or affected the liberty of the individual. In this case, the court found that there was no exceptional circumstance that would warrant allowing McIntyre to raise the argument for the first time on appeal.