South Australian Housing Authority v Rossiter

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN HOUSING AUTHORITY v ROSSITER

[2021] SASCA 113

Judgment of The Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Lovell and the Honourable Justice Stanley)

14 October 2021

LANDLORD AND TENANT - RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES LEGISLATION - OBLIGATIONS, PROHIBITED MATTERS AND PROTECTION FOR LESSEES - INSPECTION AND REPAIR

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES - CONSTRUCTION

This is an appeal by the South Australian Housing Authority of a decision made by a Deputy President of the South Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

The respondent, James Rossiter, entered into a residential tenancy agreement with the appellant to occupy a unit on premises owned by the Crown and managed by the appellant in May 2016.  In May 2020 the appellant wished to undertake works to upgrade the premises including replacing existing windows with new double glazed windows.  The respondent refused access to the appellant’s contractors to replace the windows.

The appellant brought an application to the SACAT seeking an order for access.   On 10 December 2020, SACAT made an order requiring the respondent to provide access for the replacement of the windows.  The respondent sought a review of that order.  A deputy president of the SACAT granted leave to seek a review of the decision, set that decision aside, and dismissed the appellant’s application for an order requiring the respondent to allow the appellant access.

The issue on appeal to the Court of Appeal is whether the ordinary meaning of the word “repair” should be rejected in favour of a broader meaning so as to enable the appellant to undertake improvements.  The appellant says that the ordinary meaning of the word “repair” is displaced by the statutory context under which it grants tenancies.

The appeal is dismissed:

1.      The ordinary grammatical meaning of “repairs” does not include the improvement or refurbishment of that which is not damaged or broken.

2.      The factual condition which enlivens the right of the tenant to carry out repairs is that the premises are in a state of disrepair likely to cause injury to person or property or undue inconvenience to the tenant.  To extend the meaning of “repairs” in that clause to include carrying out improvements or refurbishments is unlikely to have been intended.  The windows in the respondent’s unit did not require “repair”.  They were not broken, decayed, damaged or unserviceable. 

3. It is not open to the appellant to seek recourse to freestanding grants of statutory power in the SAHT Act to found a right to enter Trust premises for the purposes of undertaking improvement works where that power is not conferred by the terms of the tenancy agreement between the appellant and the tenant.

4. The appellant’s contention that there is an implied term in the tenancy agreement which empowered it to enter the respondent’s premises for the purposes of discharging its statutory functions and obligation is not accepted. There is no need to imply such a term in…

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Details
Case
[2021] SASCA 113
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The South Australian Housing Authority (the appellant) appealed a decision concerning its right to enter a tenant's premises to replace existing windows with double-glazed windows. The respondent, James Rossiter, had refused access to his unit for these works, which the appellant considered part of a renewal project. The dispute centred on the interpretation of the tenancy agreement and the appellant's statutory powers.

The court was required to determine whether the tenancy agreement, specifically clause 6(g), granted the appellant the right to enter the respondent's premises to carry out window replacement as an "improvement" or "refurbishment." It also had to consider whether the appellant could rely on freestanding statutory powers under the South Australian Housing Trust Act to justify entry for such works, or if an implied term in the tenancy agreement would permit such entry.

The court reasoned that the ordinary grammatical meaning of "repairs" does not encompass improvements or refurbishments to items that are not damaged or broken. It found that the windows in the respondent's unit were not in a state of disrepair likely to cause injury, property damage, or undue inconvenience, and therefore did not require "repair" in the sense contemplated by the tenancy agreement. The court held that the appellant could not rely on general statutory powers to enter the premises for improvement works if such a right was not conferred by the tenancy agreement itself. Furthermore, the court rejected the contention that an implied term existed, finding no necessity for such an implication given the appellant's ability to set the terms of tenancy agreements, including provisions for improvements.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is dismissed:

1. The ordinary grammatical meaning of “repairs” does not include the improvement or refurbishment of that which is not damaged or broken.

2. The factual condition which enlivens the right of the tenant to carry out repairs is that the premises are in a state of disrepair likely to cause injury to person or property or undue inconvenience to the tenant. To extend the meaning of “repairs” in that clause to include carrying out improvements or refurbishments is unlikely to have been intended. The windows in the respondent’s unit did not require “repair”. They were not broken, decayed, damaged or unserviceable.

3. It is not open to the appellant to seek recourse to freestanding grants of statutory power in the SAHT Act to found a right to enter Trust premises for the purposes of undertaking improvement works where that power is not conferred by the terms of the tenancy agreement between the appellant and the tenant.

4. The appellant’s contention that there is an implied term in the tenancy agreement which empowered it to enter the respondent’s premises for the purposes of discharging its statutory functions and obligation is not accepted. There is no need to imply such a term in circumstances where the appellant is empowered by the SAHT Act to enter into tenancy agreements on terms fixed by it which includes the statutory power to undertake improvements.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow the appellant’s contentions should be rejected and the appeal dismissed.Background On 18 May 2016 the respondent, James Rossiter, entered into a residential tenancy agreement (described as Conditions of Tenancy) with the appellant to occupy premises at an apartment complex, Bonython Court, at Sussex Street, Hawthorn, owned by the Crown and managed by the appellant. In May 2020 the appellant wished to undertake works described as building upgrades at Bonython Court. Those works included replacing existing windows with new double‑glazed windows. For that purpose the appellant issued a circular to the residents of Bonython Court dated 11 May 2020, advising tenants of this upgrade work and notifying them that they would need to vacate their home from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. on an allocated day for that window replacement work to occur. An officer of the appellant wrote to the respondent on 21 September 2020 seeking access to his unit to allow the windows to be replaced as part of the renewal project being undertaken at Bonython Court. The letter informed the respondent that the window replacement would take a full working day and due to the noise and the need for workers to enter the property, he was required to vacate the unit during the course of Friday, 25 September 2020. The letter informed him that his conditions of tenancy stated in clause 6(g):THE TENANT AGREES TO:-…allow the Trust or any person authorised by it to enter the premises at any time in case of an emergency and at other times by arrangement with the tenant, to inspect any part of the premises, to carry out such repairs as the Trust considers appropriate, to remove rubbish or to move or prune any tree or shrub which is causing damage. The letter warned the respondent that failure to provide access would result in the appellant making an application to the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) for an Order of Access. The respondent refused access to the appellant’s contractors for the purpose of replacing the existing windows in his unit with double‑glazed windows. On 8 October 2020 the appellant served on the respondent a letter together with a notice of termination. The letter noted that according to the appellant’s records, the respondent had not complied with his conditions of tenancy by refusing to allow contractors to access the premises to replace windows as part of the renewal project at Bonython Court. It continued:A tenant cannot be allowed to breach their Conditions of Tenancy and, in fairness to other tenants who comply with these conditions, arrangements have been made for the service of a Notice to Remedy Breach of Agreement and Notice of Termination on you and other tenants who have refused access to the property.Together with this letter, you will be served with a Notice to Remedy Breach of Agreement and Notice of Termination. If, within 14 days from service of this letter, you do not contact your housing officer…to arrange a date and time for the work to be carried out, or if you fail to meet this appointment, then eviction proceedings will be initiated against you in the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

We do not accept this submission. The submission fails because the notion of necessity is central to the rationale for the implication of an implied term at law. There is no need to imply such a term in circumstances where the appellant is empowered by the SAHT Act to enter into tenancy agreements on terms fixed by it which includes the statutory power to undertake improvements. While we accept that it might be implied in a tenancy agreement between the appellant and a tenant that the appellant enjoy a right of entry for such a purpose if the right of entry was not expressly included in the tenancy agreement, but only on the basis that the agreement included the express right to undertake improvement works. That is not this case.Conclusion We would dismiss the appeal. We would hear the parties as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.