FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Sorrenti v Lenovo (Aust & NZ) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC2G 485
File number(s): SYG 2317 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE HUMPHREYS Date of judgment: 21 June 2022 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Summary Dismissal – orders made for the matter to be disposed of by summary dismissal pursuant to 13.13(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 143
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 13.13
Cases cited: Kassis v Republic of Lebanon [2014] FCCA 155
Masters v Cameron [1954] HCA 72
Morris v Baron and Company(1918) AC 1, 35
Sorrenti v Lenovo (Aust and NZ) Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 256
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 36 Date of last submission/s: 8 June 2022 Date of hearing: 8 June 2022 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Banasik Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Mahendra ORDERS
SYG 2317 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: TANIA SORRENTI
Applicant
AND: LENOVO (AUST & NZ) PTY LTD
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE HUMPHREYS
DATE OF ORDER:
21 JUNE 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed pursuant to r 13.13(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE HUMPHREYS
INTRODUCTION
This matter has a somewhat unusual history. It is appropriate to set the history out in some detail. On 16 December, Ms Sorrenti (“the applicant”) made an Application to the Court under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“the Act”), alleging a contravention of a general protection.
In the Points of Claim attached to the application, the applicant alleged bullying and harassment by members of staff of Lenovo (Aust & Nz) Pty Ltd (“the respondent”). The applicant alleges that on 15 December 2020, she lodged a complaint about bullying and harassment with the respondent’s Human Resources Department. The applicant contends that the complaint was investigated and found the applicant was ‘partly bullied”.
The applicant alleges that as a result of the complaint the respondent took adverse action against the applicant by (a) delegating the investigation to the respondent’s “World Wide Ethics and Compliance Team” who undertook the investigation from India and (b) failed to conduct the investigation under and according to Australian law.
It…
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- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 485
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue for the Court to determine was whether the points of claim in the plaintiff's application were sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court. The defendant argued that the points of claim did not stand alone and were an attachment to the form for a claim under the Fair Work Act. The defendant further contended that the plaintiff's claims were an abuse of process as they had already been the subject of a conciliation conference where a settlement agreement had been reached. The Court had to decide whether the plaintiff's claims were frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and whether the defendant had no reasonable prospects of successfully defending the proceeding.
The Court found that the points of claim were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court as they were an attachment to the form for a claim under the Fair Work Act. However, the Court noted that bullying could be an adverse action under the Act. The Court further found that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment as the plaintiff's claims were an abuse of process, given that a settlement agreement had been reached during the conciliation conference. The Court held that the agreement reached during the conciliation conference was binding on the parties, and the plaintiff's refusal to sign the Deed of Release meant that she could not re-agitate the same matters in Court. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant must first seek specific performance of the agreement before it could be relied upon.
In conclusion, the Court found in favour of the defendant and granted summary judgment in its favour. The plaintiff's claims were dismissed, and the defendant was not required to defend the proceeding. The Court held that the agreement reached during the conciliation conference was binding on the parties, and the plaintiff's refusal to sign the Deed of Release meant that she could not re-agitate the same matters in Court. The defendant was not required to seek specific performance of the agreement before it could be relied upon.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to the jurisdiction issue, the points of claim do not stand alone. It is an attachment to the form for headed “Claim under Fair Work Act 2009 alleging a contravention of a general protection”. Under Part G the Form states (inter ailia): “Specify the “adverse action” and “if relying on s 340 specify the workplace right”. At [8] and [9] of the points of claim, specifies the workplace right and that10], [13] and [16]-[17] pleads the adverse action (including the causative link). Bullying can be an adverse action: (see; Kassis v Republic of Lebanon [2014] FCCA 155 at [37]).CONSIDERATION The Court’s power to order Summary Judgement is set out in s 143 of the FCFCOAAct. Relevantly it is as follows:(2) The Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Division 2) may give judgement for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of the proceeding if:(a) the first party is defending the proceeding or a part of the proceeding: and(b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3) For the purposes of this section, a defence or a part of a proceeding need not be:(a) hopeless: or(b) bound to fail:for it to have a reasonable prospect of success.Rule 13.13 of the Rules reads as follows:The Court may order that a proceeding be stayed, or dismissed generally or in relation to any claim for relief in a proceeding, if the Court is satisfied that:(a)The party prosecuting the proceeding or claim has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or claim: or(b)The proceeding or claim for relief is frivolous or vexatious; or(c)The proceeding or claim for relief is an abuse of the process of the Court Based on an assessment of the entirety of the transcript of the Fair Work hearing, as set out in the Affidavit of Mr Goonery sworn 26 January 2022, the Court is satisfied that a Masters v Cameron Category 2 agreement was reached during the course of the conciliation conference. That is clearly the understanding of Commissioner Ryan. The effect of that Category 2 agreement was that the parties reached a complete agreement as to the terms of settlement, with the payment agreed-upon to be subject to the execution of a Deed of Release to be prepared by the respondent’s solicitors. For whatever reason, Ms Sorrenti has refused to sign the Deed of Release. Should she do so, then the respondents would be bound to make the payment that was agreed to her. Notwithstanding that the agreement was in place, Ms Sorrenti sought to agitate in this Court, the same matters that were the subject of the conciliation conference. The Court is of the view that the agreement that was reached at the conciliation conference is binding upon the parties and accordingly, those matters cannot be re-agitated in this Court. The suggestion by Counsel for Ms Sorrenti that in order to rely on the Masters v Cameron agreement it is the respondent who must first seek that specific performance is misconceived. It is not the respondent that has sought to repudiate the agreement. It was submitted, and the Court accepts, that the respondent has at all times has been willing to be bound by the agreement, subject to Ms Sorrenti signing the deed of release as she agreed to in the conciliation conference. That this was the situation, cannot be clearer than the answer that was given by the applicant’s legal representative Mr Gu to the question from Commissioner Ryan “… Does that reflect the agreement that your client has agreed to and agrees to be bound by? Mr Gu: That’s correct, Commissioner. Yes”.