Sopikiotis v Owners Corporation RP017740

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sopikiotis v Owners Corporation RP017740 [2013] FCA 353

Citation: Sopikiotis v Owners Corporation RP017740 [2013] FCA 353
Parties: MARIA SOPIKIOTIS v OWNERS CORPORATION RP017740 and PETER ROBERT VINCE (AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MARIA SOPIKIOTIS)
File number: VID 149 of 2013
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 18 April 2013
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – Application for leave to appeal from decision of a Federal Magistrate refusing an extension of time to seek review of Sequestration Order of a Registrar – Decision of Federal Magistrate not attended by sufficient doubt – Application refused

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – Consideration of meaning of the phrase ‘within…the period of 6 months commencing on the date of issue’ in Regulation 4.02A of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth).

Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Amendment Act 2011 (Cth)
Federal Magistrates Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006 (Cth) Federal Magistrates Rules 2001 (Cth)
Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic)
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic)

Pearce, DC and Geddes, RS, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (7th edition, 2011, LexisNexis Butterworths)

Cases cited: Sopikiotis v Owners Corporation RP017740 & Anor [2013] FMCA 122
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 59
Morton v Hampson [1962] VR 364
Susiatin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 83 FCR 574
Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261
Olivieri v Stafford & Ors (1989) 24 FCR 413
Re Longo: ex parte Longo (1995) 57 FCR 523
Bank of Melbourne v Hannan (1997) 78 FCR 249
Date of hearing: 22 March 2013
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: R Harris
Solicitor for the First Respondent: LMS Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent C F Gobbo
Solicitor for the Second Respondent Maddocks

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 149 of 2013

BETWEEN:

MARIA SOPIKIOTIS
Applicant

AND:

OWNERS CORPORATION RP017740
First Respondent

PETER ROBERT VINCE (AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MARIA SOPIKIOTIS)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 APRIL 2013

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 149 of 2013

BETWEEN:

MARIA SOPIKIOTIS
Applicant

AND:

OWNERS CORPORATION RP017740
First Respondent

PETER ROBERT VINCE (AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MARIA SOPIKIOTIS)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE:

18 APRIL 2013

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. Maria Sopikiotis applies for leave to appeal from the judgment of a Federal Magistrate delivered on 22 February 2013 refusing to extend the time…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 353
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Sopikiotis v Owners Corporation RP017740, the primary issue before the court was whether the applicant, Ms Sopikiotis, should be granted leave to appeal against a decision made by a Federal Magistrate. This decision had refused her request for an extension of time in which to apply for a review of a sequestration order made against her. The respondents opposed the grant of leave to appeal, relying on affidavits sworn by Richelle Berman and Ned John Mahony.

The legal issues the court was required to decide included whether the Federal Magistrate's decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by an appellate court, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court had to examine the arguments presented by Ms Sopikiotis, which included claims that the bankruptcy notice was used as an abuse of process, the debt amount was incorrect, the order by VCAT was not final, and the Federal Magistrate erred in rejecting her explanation for the delay in seeking review.

The court's reasoning focused on the well-established two-part test for granting leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment. The court concluded that the decision was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by an appellate court. The court held that it was open to the Federal Magistrate to conclude that there were insufficient prospects of success to justify an extension of time. The court also noted the principles of statutory interpretation and found that the service of the bankruptcy notice complied with the regulations. For these reasons, the court refused the application for leave to appeal.

The final orders of the court were to refuse the application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Federal Magistrate.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondents oppose the grant of leave to appeal. They rely on the affidavit of Richelle Berman sworn on 20 March 2013. There is a further affidavit bearing this proceeding number but apparently intended to be filed in proceeding VID 1046 of 2012. This is an affidavit of Ned John Mahony sworn on 20 March 2013. BACKGROUND On 5 July 2011, in the Federal Magistrates Court, a Registrar made a sequestration order against the estate of Ms Sopikiotis. The second respondent, Peter Robert Vince, was appointed trustee of her bankrupt estate. On 26 September 2012, Ms Sopikiotis applied for a review of the Registrar’s decision out of time. She also sought an extension of time in which she might make her review application. On 22 February 2013, a Federal Magistrate refused to grant the extension of time that Ms Sopikiotis sought. I discuss his Honour’s reasons below. On 4 March 2013, Ms Sopikiotis filed an application for leave to appeal against his Honour’s decision in this Court. For the reasons stated hereafter, I would refuse this application for leave to appeal.DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE The learned Federal Magistrate set out part of the lengthy history of this matter in his reasons for judgment: see Sopikiotis v Owners Corporation RP017740 & Anor [2013] FMCA 122 (“FMC 2013 Reasons”) at [3]-[8]. In this Court, Ms Sopikiotis did not challenge his Honour’s account. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:Relevantly, on 16 December 2009 the petitioning creditor issued proceedings in VCAT. What was sought was payment of body corporate debts, some of which clearly predated 16 December 2003. However, it is clear on the materials filed that over $8,000 worth of debt had arisen during the period from 2003 to 2009. It is clear there has been a long-running dispute between the applicant and the creditor going back at least to 1995, as is apparent from the applicant’s affidavit filed on 29 November 2012 and the materials exhibited to it.On 21 April 2010, Mr Davies, Member of VCAT, made orders in favour of the creditor for $16,691.22 together with interest and costs. The applicant did not attend. A Bankruptcy Notice based upon that order was issued on 18 August 2010 and served on 18 February 2011. It is clear from the affidavit material filed that the creditor had had great difficulty serving Ms Sopikiotis. Indeed, the applicant denies ever having been served with the Bankruptcy Notice but it should be noted that after the Petition was filed on 13 April 2011, the applicant must have become aware of the Bankruptcy Notice as she attended the hearings before Registrar Caporale. As I have already stated, the Sequestration Order was made by the Registrar on 5 July 2011.The applicant did not file a statement of affairs and as a result on 21 February 2012 her Trustee in Bankruptcy filed a proceeding in the Federal Court. That sought, relevantly, that the applicant be ordered to provide a statement of affairs and vacant possession of the property where she lives. Bromberg J had ordered the applicant to file a statement of affairs. It is, however, clear that the applicant has still, even now, not adequately complied with that obligation.On 21 May 2012, the applicant applied to VCAT to review the decision of Member Davies given on 21 April 2010. That application was dismissed by VCAT on 21 June 2012, as is apparent from exhibit RB-9 to the affidavit of Richelle Berman, solicitor, sworn on 10 December 2012.I note that at paragraph 26 of her affidavit, Ms Berman deposes that she was present at the hearing at VCAT and that the presiding Member was not satisfied with the applicant’s excuses for not having been at the original hearing, and the member also expressed a view that the application had insufficient merit to succeed. On 18 July 2012, the applicant applied to the Supreme Court to review the decision of VCAT and on 10 August 2012, Lansdowne AJ refused the application. The decision is at RB-11 to Ms Berman’s affidavit. It should be noted that from that decision it is clear that the applicant knew of the VCAT decision of Member Davies from at least May 2011 when she received the Petition. I further note, as this is a matter also referred to in some detail in the materials, that Lansdowne AJ accepted that VCAT had sent documents to the wrong address for the applicant.On 21 November 2012, Bromberg J ordered vacant possession of the property but that order has been appealed. This application for review, of course, had already been filed on 26 September 2012.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons stated hereafter, I would refuse this application for leave to appeal.DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE The learned Federal Magistrate set out part of the lengthy history of this matter in his reasons for judgment: see Sopikiotis v Owners Corporation RP017740 & Anor [2013] FMCA 122 (“FMC 2013 Reasons”) at [3]-[8]. In this Court, Ms Sopikiotis did not challenge his Honour’s account. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:Relevantly, on 16 December 2009 the petitioning creditor issued proceedings in VCAT. What was sought was payment of body corporate debts, some of which clearly predated 16 December 2003. However, it is clear on the materials filed that over $8,000 worth of debt had arisen during the period from 2003 to 2009. It is clear there has been a long-running dispute between the applicant and the creditor going back at least to 1995, as is apparent from the applicant’s affidavit filed on 29 November 2012 and the materials exhibited to it.On 21 April 2010, Mr Davies, Member of VCAT, made orders in favour of the creditor for $16,691.22 together with interest and costs. The applicant did not attend. A Bankruptcy Notice based upon that order was issued on 18 August 2010 and served on 18 February 2011. It is clear from the affidavit material filed that the creditor had had great difficulty serving Ms Sopikiotis. Indeed, the applicant denies ever having been served with the Bankruptcy Notice but it should be noted that after the Petition was filed on 13 April 2011, the applicant must have become aware of the Bankruptcy Notice as she attended the hearings before Registrar Caporale. As I have already stated, the Sequestration Order was made by the Registrar on 5 July 2011.The applicant did not file a statement of affairs and as a result on 21 February 2012 her Trustee in Bankruptcy filed a proceeding in the Federal Court. That sought, relevantly, that the applicant be ordered to provide a statement of affairs and vacant possession of the property where she lives. Bromberg J had ordered the applicant to file a statement of affairs. It is, however, clear that the applicant has still, even now, not adequately complied with that obligation.On 21 May 2012, the applicant applied to VCAT to review the decision of Member Davies given on 21 April 2010. That application was dismissed by VCAT on 21 June 2012, as is apparent from exhibit RB-9 to the affidavit of Richelle Berman, solicitor, sworn on 10 December 2012.I note that at paragraph 26 of her affidavit, Ms Berman deposes that she was present at the hearing at VCAT and that the presiding Member was not satisfied with the applicant’s excuses for not having been at the original hearing, and the member also expressed a view that the application had insufficient merit to succeed. On 18 July 2012, the applicant applied to the Supreme Court to review the decision of VCAT and on 10 August 2012, Lansdowne AJ refused the application. The decision is at RB-11 to Ms Berman’s affidavit. It should be noted that from that decision it is clear that the applicant knew of the VCAT decision of Member Davies from at least May 2011 when she received the Petition. I further note, as this is a matter also referred to in some detail in the materials, that Lansdowne AJ accepted that VCAT had sent documents to the wrong address for the applicant.On 21 November 2012, Bromberg J ordered vacant possession of the property but that order has been appealed. This application for review, of course, had already been filed on 26 September 2012.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ms Sopikiotis further argued that:(1)the bankruptcy notice was used as a debt collection mechanism and that this use was an abuse of process;(2)the total debt amount as stated in the bankruptcy notice was incorrect and the actual amount was less than the statutory minimum imposed by s 41 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Bankruptcy Act”);(3)the order made by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“VCAT”) was not a final order or judgment as required by s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act; and(4)the Federal Magistrate erred in rejecting her explanation for the delay in seeking review.CONSIDERATION The parties accepted that the judgment that Ms Sopikiotis sought to appeal in this Court was an interlocutory judgment that required leave to appeal: see Federal Court Act, s 24(1A). In respect of a grant of leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment, the two-part test is well-established. Leave should be granted if: (1) in all the circumstances the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant being reconsidered by an appellate court; and (2) substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398–399. For the reasons I am about to state, I do not consider that the Federal Magistrate’s decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by an appellate court. Leaving aside the inadequacy of her proffered explanation, to which I refer below, it was clearly open to the Federal Magistrate to conclude that there were insufficient prospects of success to justify an extension of time. Ms Sopikiotis’ best point raised the question of whether or not the bankruptcy notice had been served within the requisite time. Pursuant to regulation 16.01(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Regulations, the bankruptcy notice was served on Ms Sopikiotis by being left at her last-known address on 18 February 2011. Ms Sopikiotis argued that, since the notice had issued on 18 August 2010, the notice was not served within the time allowed by regulation 4.02A of the Bankruptcy Regulations. Regulation 4.02A provides:A bankruptcy notice must be served within:(a)the period of 6 months commencing on the date of issue of the bankruptcy notice; or (b)any further period that the Official Receiver allows (whether within or outside that period of 6 months).Ms Sopikiotis contended that the bankruptcy notice was not served on her with a 6-month period commencing on the date of issue of the notice, as regulation 4.02A required; and that the Federal Magistrate was wrong to reach the contrary conclusion. (Paragraph (b) is not presently relevant because no extension of time has ever been sought from the Official Receiver.) The principles of statutory interpretation relating to Acts of Parliament are ordinarily applicable to delegated legislation, such as regulations: see, for example, Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 59 at 65; Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth), s 13; Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (“Acts Interpretation Act”), s 46. Section 13(1) of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) provides that:(1) If enabling legislation confers on a rule-maker the power to make a legislative instrument, then, unless the contrary intention appears:(a)the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 applies to any legislative instrument so made as if it were an Act and as if each provision of the legislative instrument were a section of an Act; and (b)expressions used in any legislative instrument so made have the same meaning as in the enabling legislation; and (c)any legislative instrument so made is to be read and construed subject to the enabling legislation, and so as not to exceed the power of the rule-maker.