FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sopikiotis v Owners Corporation RP017740 [2013] FCA 353
Citation: Sopikiotis v Owners Corporation RP017740 [2013] FCA 353 Parties: MARIA SOPIKIOTIS v OWNERS CORPORATION RP017740 and PETER ROBERT VINCE (AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MARIA SOPIKIOTIS) File number: VID 149 of 2013 Judge: KENNY J Date of judgment: 18 April 2013 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – Application for leave to appeal from decision of a Federal Magistrate refusing an extension of time to seek review of Sequestration Order of a Registrar – Decision of Federal Magistrate not attended by sufficient doubt – Application refused
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – Consideration of meaning of the phrase ‘within…the period of 6 months commencing on the date of issue’ in Regulation 4.02A of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth).
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Amendment Act 2011 (Cth)
Federal Magistrates Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006 (Cth) Federal Magistrates Rules 2001 (Cth)
Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic)
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic)Pearce, DC and Geddes, RS, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (7th edition, 2011, LexisNexis Butterworths)
Cases cited: Sopikiotis v Owners Corporation RP017740 & Anor [2013] FMCA 122
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 59
Morton v Hampson [1962] VR 364
Susiatin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 83 FCR 574
Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261
Olivieri v Stafford & Ors (1989) 24 FCR 413
Re Longo: ex parte Longo (1995) 57 FCR 523
Bank of Melbourne v Hannan (1997) 78 FCR 249Date of hearing: 22 March 2013 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 44 The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: R Harris Solicitor for the First Respondent: LMS Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent C F Gobbo Solicitor for the Second Respondent Maddocks
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 149 of 2013
BETWEEN: MARIA SOPIKIOTIS
Applicant
AND: OWNERS CORPORATION RP017740
First RespondentPETER ROBERT VINCE (AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MARIA SOPIKIOTIS)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 APRIL 2013
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 149 of 2013
BETWEEN: MARIA SOPIKIOTIS
Applicant
AND: OWNERS CORPORATION RP017740
First RespondentPETER ROBERT VINCE (AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MARIA SOPIKIOTIS)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE:
18 APRIL 2013
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
Maria Sopikiotis applies for leave to appeal from the judgment of a Federal Magistrate delivered on 22 February 2013 refusing to extend the time…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Sopikiotis v Owners Corporation RP017740 and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] FCA 353
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court was required to decide included whether the Federal Magistrate's decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by an appellate court, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court had to examine the arguments presented by Ms Sopikiotis, which included claims that the bankruptcy notice was used as an abuse of process, the debt amount was incorrect, the order by VCAT was not final, and the Federal Magistrate erred in rejecting her explanation for the delay in seeking review.
The court's reasoning focused on the well-established two-part test for granting leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment. The court concluded that the decision was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by an appellate court. The court held that it was open to the Federal Magistrate to conclude that there were insufficient prospects of success to justify an extension of time. The court also noted the principles of statutory interpretation and found that the service of the bankruptcy notice complied with the regulations. For these reasons, the court refused the application for leave to appeal.
The final orders of the court were to refuse the application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Federal Magistrate.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Sopikiotis further argued that:(1)the bankruptcy notice was used as a debt collection mechanism and that this use was an abuse of process;(2)the total debt amount as stated in the bankruptcy notice was incorrect and the actual amount was less than the statutory minimum imposed by s 41 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Bankruptcy Act”);(3)the order made by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“VCAT”) was not a final order or judgment as required by s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act; and(4)the Federal Magistrate erred in rejecting her explanation for the delay in seeking review.CONSIDERATION The parties accepted that the judgment that Ms Sopikiotis sought to appeal in this Court was an interlocutory judgment that required leave to appeal: see Federal Court Act, s 24(1A). In respect of a grant of leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment, the two-part test is well-established. Leave should be granted if: (1) in all the circumstances the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant being reconsidered by an appellate court; and (2) substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398–399. For the reasons I am about to state, I do not consider that the Federal Magistrate’s decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by an appellate court. Leaving aside the inadequacy of her proffered explanation, to which I refer below, it was clearly open to the Federal Magistrate to conclude that there were insufficient prospects of success to justify an extension of time. Ms Sopikiotis’ best point raised the question of whether or not the bankruptcy notice had been served within the requisite time. Pursuant to regulation 16.01(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Regulations, the bankruptcy notice was served on Ms Sopikiotis by being left at her last-known address on 18 February 2011. Ms Sopikiotis argued that, since the notice had issued on 18 August 2010, the notice was not served within the time allowed by regulation 4.02A of the Bankruptcy Regulations. Regulation 4.02A provides:A bankruptcy notice must be served within:(a)the period of 6 months commencing on the date of issue of the bankruptcy notice; or (b)any further period that the Official Receiver allows (whether within or outside that period of 6 months).Ms Sopikiotis contended that the bankruptcy notice was not served on her with a 6-month period commencing on the date of issue of the notice, as regulation 4.02A required; and that the Federal Magistrate was wrong to reach the contrary conclusion. (Paragraph (b) is not presently relevant because no extension of time has ever been sought from the Official Receiver.) The principles of statutory interpretation relating to Acts of Parliament are ordinarily applicable to delegated legislation, such as regulations: see, for example, Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 59 at 65; Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth), s 13; Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (“Acts Interpretation Act”), s 46. Section 13(1) of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) provides that:(1) If enabling legislation confers on a rule-maker the power to make a legislative instrument, then, unless the contrary intention appears:(a)the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 applies to any legislative instrument so made as if it were an Act and as if each provision of the legislative instrument were a section of an Act; and (b)expressions used in any legislative instrument so made have the same meaning as in the enabling legislation; and (c)any legislative instrument so made is to be read and construed subject to the enabling legislation, and so as not to exceed the power of the rule-maker.