Soosaipillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Case

[2000] FCA 1323

30 AUGUST 2000


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Soosaipillai v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1323

YOVAN SOOSAIPILLAI AND RITAMMA SOOSAIPILLAI V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 310 OF 2000

JUDGE:  BEAUMONT J

DATE OF ORDER:     30 AUGUST 2000
PLACE:  SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 310 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

YOVAN SOOSAIPILLAI
FIRST APPLICANT

RITAMMA SOOSAIPILLAI
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 AUGUST 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 310 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

YOVAN SOOSAIPILLAI
FIRST APPLICANT

RITAMMA SOOSAIPILLAI
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE:

30 AUGUST 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEAUMONT J:

  1. Before the Court is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 14 March 2000, affirming a decision not to grant a protection visa to the applicants. 

  2. The short history of the matter is that the first applicant, who is a citizen of Sri Lanka, arrived in Australia on 11 July 1996.  On 9 January 1997 he lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”).  His wife, the second applicant, was included in the application.  On 19 February 1998 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant a protection visa.  On 18 March 1998 the applicant applied for a review of that decision.  As has been said, on 14 March 2000 the Tribunal affirmed this decision. 

  3. The grounds of review are several and in order to understand them in their context it would be necessary to refer at a little length to the reasons of the Tribunal. 

  4. The Tribunal commenced its reasons with a discussion of the well-settled principles which govern the operation of the Refugees Convention.  The Tribunal did not err in this connection, and nor is it suggested that it did.

  5. The Tribunal next described the claims and evidence before it.  The Tribunal noted that before it were the Department’s file, written submissions in support of the application for review and there was also oral evidence given to the Tribunal.

  6. As mentioned, the applicants are Sri Lankan citizens.  They are elderly Tamils from Jaffna.  All but one of their seven children have left Sri Lanka.  The applicants have not been in contact for many years with the first applicant’s eldest son who remains in Sri Lanka.  The other children are resident in Europe and in Australia.  The applicants travelled to Australia on Sri Lankan passports issued in their own name.

  7. The Tribunal, in describing the claims and evidence before it, noted that the applicants claimed that should they return to Sri Lanka, they are at risk of persecution by the local authorities because they are Tamils and are suspected of supporting the LTTE.  The primary reason for this suspicion, according to the claims as noted by the Tribunal, is that an anonymous person described as FFFF, for whom the applicants act as guardians, is an LTTE activist.

  8. The Tribunal noted the evidence and claims that FFFF is a son of the second applicant’s sister and that in 1988 that sister died, having previously requested that the applicants take care of her three children, including FFFF.  In 1990 FFFF joined the LTTE, although the applicants did not approve.  However, they reluctantly maintained their guardian relationship.  The Tribunal  noted that the applicants claimed that anyone who has relatives in the LTTE is at risk of harm from the army.

  9. The Tribunal noted that in 1995 the Sri Lankan army captured Jaffna and the applicants claim that from then they were at risk.  The Tribunal further noted the claim that recently FFFF had been involved in attacks on an army base and that this had been reported in local newspapers.  The Tribunal noted that the applicants believe that they will be harmed because of their connection with FFFF.

  10. The Tribunal also noted that the applicants had been issued with passports in 1995 and that in 1996 had passed through check points when travelling from Vavuniya to Colombo;  they had no apparent difficulty in doing either, notwithstanding that FFFF had been in the LTTE since 1990.  The Tribunal said that when the applicants were asked why they would be at greater risk of harm now than they were then, the applicants responded that there were now more informers from anti-LTTE Tamil organisations who are assisting the Sri Lankan authorities by identifying those Tamils with LTTE relatives or similar connections.  They said that at the time the passports were issued, the authorities were not searching for people much, but they now are.

  11. The Tribunal noted the claim that since the applicants had left Sri Lanka the army had retaken their village and that it is only now that the army are seeking out the LTTE and relatives in the area.  The applicants claim that they themselves had been displaced for some months in late 1995 and early 1996.  The Tribunal noted that the applicants’ son had given evidence to the Tribunal that he had wanted the applicants to come to Australia to assist him and his wife in looking after his children.

  12. The Tribunal went on to note the claim of the applicants that in late 1994 their eldest son was taken away by the LTTE, on the suspicion of being associated with a former senior politician who had fallen out with the LTTE.  They claim that their nephew, who was a priest, had secured their son’s conditional release and he had been given a pass to go to Colombo for one month.  The applicants claim that when their son did not return as arranged, the first applicant was detained by the LTTE and held for two weeks in unsanitary conditions where he became ill.  Their nephew then secured his release as well. 

  13. The applicants have now been advised, they claimed, that their house in their village has been destroyed.  It appears that most of the houses and the church in that village have been destroyed and the Sri Lankan army is searching in that area for LTTE members and their relatives, killing them.

  14. The Tribunal noted that the applicants were asked if they could return to another part of Sri Lanka, for instance, Colombo.  The Tribunal noted that the response of the applicants was that they do not believe that they could return to Colombo as they have no relatives or support there.  They do not speak Singhalese or English and without children or relatives it is not possible to survive in Colombo.

  15. Property owners are reluctant to rent premises to Tamils, the applicants claimed, and they would languish there.  The applicants claim that they would have problems with the police and the army and that there are many people in Colombo who extort money from Tamils.  They claim that most of the lodge owners are Muslim and that some of them have arrangements with the police so that when Tamils are taken in by the police, money is paid and the lodge owners and the police share the proceeds.

  16. The Tribunal turned next to express its findings and its reasons.  This is a lengthy treatment but I will attempt to summarise its essential features. 

  17. The Tribunal said that it was satisfied that the applicants are Sri Lankan nationals and that they are Tamils from the north of Sri Lanka;  that the first applicant is sixty-nine and the second sixty-two years of age;  that the first applicant had been a fisherman in his village;  that they speak only Tamil;  and that they have never lived in Colombo.

  18. The Tribunal noted that the applicants had come to Australia at the invitation of their son who said he needed their assistance with a difficult domestic situation.  The Tribunal found that, at least in the eyes of their son, their trip to Australia was “made in order to assist him, rather than to flee persecution”.  The Tribunal went on, however, to say:

    “I note that this is not necessarily inconsistent with the Applicants having a genuine fear of persecution.  It may be, for instance, that they have such a fear, but were waiting for an opportunity to leave Sri Lanka.  That opportunity may not have arisen until their son had need for their assistance in Australia.”

  19. The Tribunal further said that, given the number of children the applicants have overseas and the relative wealth of their son in Australia, the foregoing “does not seem an especially likely explanation.  One would expect if the applicants were living in fear of persecution that their children would have done more for them than send money”.  The Tribunal then said “I did not find the Applicants’ evidence to be particularly persuasive as to their claims to have a genuine fear of persecution, or generally, for that matter”.

  20. However, the Tribunal went on to say that it would give the applicants the benefit of some doubt and the Tribunal expressed its satisfaction that the applicants had a genuine fear that they will be persecuted should they return to Sri Lanka and that it is for the reasons of that fear, at least in part, that they are unwilling to return to Sri Lanka.

  21. The Tribunal noted that some of the applicants’ children have been associated with the LTTE but that all, except one, of those children are now out of Sri Lanka and that the applicants have had no contact for many years with the first applicant’s remaining son.  The Tribunal found that the applicants’ home had been visited by the LTTE and that the applicants had been forced to provide financial and other assistance to the LTTE.  The Tribunal found that the applicants were, for a time, guardians for FFFF who was a relative and that they believe he remains in Sri Lanka as an active member of the LTTE. 

  22. The Tribunal observed that they made no claim that the Sri Lankan authorities had harmed them or identified them with the LTTE in the past.  The Tribunal said:

    “I am satisfied that the Sri Lankan authorities had not connected the Applicants with the LTTE at the time of their departure.  I am not satisfied that this position has changed in their absence.  I am satisfied that no pro-LTTE political opinion[s] have been imputed to the Applicants by the Sri Lankan authorities.”

  23. The Tribunal noted the evidence that FFFF had recently been involved in an attack on an army base and that he had been active in the LTTE since 1990, but the Tribunal said:

    “I am not persuaded that the Applicants connections with FFFF will place them at greater risk now than in the past.”

  24. The Tribunal further said:

    “I am not satisfied that the Applicants are at any real risk of persecution because of their association with FFFF.  Nor am I satisfied that any political opinion will be imputed to the Applicants.  I note that all their connections with the LTTE are of long standing.  I am satisfied that if anything was to be made of these connections, by the Sri Lankan authorities or anyone else, it would already have happened.”

  25. Noting that the applicants’ house and much of their village had been destroyed in the conflict, the Tribunal accepted that “it may well be impractical for the Applicants to return to their village”.

  26. I interpolate at this stage to note that it was common ground before me in the argument that this observation by the Tribunal should be accepted as an acknowledgment that the Tribunal regarded it as unreasonable to expect the applicants to return to the north.  However, the Tribunal went on to say that it had noted the evidence of the applicants and their son that it would be unreasonable for them to relocate to Colombo;  and in any event that they would be at risk of persecution there.  The Tribunal said that it was not satisfied that this was so.  The Tribunal said in this connection that it noted a number of considerations;  these were then set out.

  27. What then appears is a lengthy consideration of the position in Sri Lanka, and in Colombo in particular, picking up at various points of the consideration, extracts from independent country information in the possession of the Tribunal.  It is not practicable for me to attempt to even summarise that material.  Some of its detail is in the public domain.  For instance, the Tribunal commences its consideration of the subject with a description of the three phases of the conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE over the past sixteen years.  These facts and the tragic loss of life and terrorism that accompany this conflict are well known and, indeed, not at all controversial.

  28. Having described this appalling situation, the Tribunal then turned to the specific position in Colombo.  It noted that security measures in Colombo take two forms.  First, when an attack is thought to be imminent, or immediately after one has taken place, the security forces, the Tribunal found, conduct large scale arrests of Tamils in operations known as round-ups or “cordon and search” operations.  Examples of that were then given, including one instance where 1,000 people were detained until their bona fides were established.  The Tribunal stated that those at particular risk of being detained in round-ups or cordon and search operations are young Tamil men and women recently arrived from the north and the east. 

  29. The second form of security measure in Colombo mentioned by the Tribunal is that there are check points throughout Colombo where everyone is required to produce evidence of their identity.  According to the Danish Immigration Service, as cited by the Tribunal, at a check point everyone is stopped and asked to show his or her identity card.  Those who lack identity cards or other proof of identity, who have no relatives in Colombo or speak only Tamil, the Tribunal found, are at particular risk of being detained at check points.

  30. The Tribunal stated, again citing the Danish Immigration Service, that Tamils not originating from Colombo will be questioned about the purpose of their stay in Colombo and whether they are registered with the local police.  The Tribunal said that as with the round-ups, young Tamil men and women form a particularly vulnerable group, especially those who have just come from the north.  The Tribunal went on to say that a report from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“DFAT”) in September 1988 stated that mass arrest of Tamils and large scale round-ups had ceased since April 1998, partly because there had been no major security incidents in Colombo since March 1998.

  31. However, the Tribunal went on to cite more recent advice from DFAT, given in June 1999 as follows:

    “Human rights groups and Tamil politicians maintain that arbitrary arrests are still occurring and that arrests at check points are often based on little more than suspicion or the inability of Northern and Eastern Tamils to explain their presence in Colombo.  In Colombo, cordon and search operations can still occur, especially after major security incidents.  Recent bombings in Colombo have promoted multiple arrests in some Tamil areas of the city.  The most recent such operation took place on 16 May after a bomb was detonated in the down-town market area of Colombo.  22 Tamils were arrested but released after 48 hours.  A similar operation was carried out after another bombing on 14 May.  Around January 26, security forces conducted a search and detained over 200 people after a bomb was found down-town.  (DFAT Country Information Report No. 193/99, dated 4 June 1999, CX36118).”

  32. The Tribunal went on to say that the Department had advised that of those arrested, around 95 per cent are released within twenty four hours.  Of the 5 per cent who remain in detention, some may be released within days, the Tribunal said, while others may be held for a much longer period of time.  The Tribunal noted that human rights groups had advised that around 40 per cent of those detained under the Emergency Regulations and the Prevention of Terrorism Act in Colombo had complained of being tortured or showed signs of being tortured.

  33. The Tribunal said that physical mistreatment not amounting to torture was not uncommon in Sri Lankan law enforcement.  The Tribunal said that overall the majority of people arrested under the Emergency Regulations and the Prevention of Terrorism Act are Tamils detained in connection with LTTE activities.  The Tribunal then cited a report from the US State Department in 1998 as follows:

    “Impunity remains a serious problem.  Since April 1995 at least 740 persons have been killed extrajudicially by the security forces or have disappeared after being taken into security force custody and are presumed dead.  With the exception of the six security force personnel convicted in the 1996 killing of Krishanthi Kumaraswamy, no member of the security forces has been convicted for any of these crimes.  In the vast majority of cases where military personnel may have committed human rights violations, the Government has not identified those responsible and brought them to justice.”

  34. The Tribunal further noted that DFAT, in the country information report dated September 1999, had stated that there was no age limit on arrest during cordon and search activities in Colombo, but had noted that it is Tamils in the higher risk profile (that is, young males from the north and east) that are generally more likely to be detained.  The Tribunal noted that the report also stated that older Tamils who cannot speak Singhalese may find it difficult to organise the necessary clearances to relocate to Colombo.

  35. As previously mentioned, the Tribunal noted that relocation to Colombo would not be without difficulty for the applicants.  The Tribunal said “[o]f course, after spending their life in a village, any relocation would have some difficulty”.

  36. The Tribunal went on to note that the applicants had no relatives in Colombo and did not speak Singhalese or English.  The Tribunal said that they would need to find accommodation and to register with the authorities.  The Tribunal said:

    “This process will no doubt be stressful and difficult.  They may need financial or other assistance from their children.  I note that the Applicants have already proved themselves able to organise a journey from Vavuiniya to Colombo, passing through, and to travel on to Australia.”

  37. The Tribunal said:

    “The Applicants may be exposed to some extortion by ruthless members of their own and other communities.  I also note that there are many Tamils who have relocated to Colombo, and who have managed to find accommodation and to register with the authorities.”

  38. The Tribunal said that it was satisfied “with some assistance from their children,     that the Applicants could overcome the difficulties involved in relocating to Colombo”.  The Tribunal proceeded to note there are differing assessments of the situation for Tamils in Colombo, although there seems to be general agreement that many Tamils are arrested and detained as a result of attempts by the government to prevent terrorist activities by the LTTE.  The Tribunal said that most of those arrested are released quickly without being harmed and that some of those who are suspected of assisting the LTTE are subject to torture and severe mistreatment.  The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility that the applicants will be stopped at check points or have their papers checked in sweeps conducted by the Sri Lankan authorities and noted also that the applicants were elderly Tamils.

  39. The Tribunal said, for the reasons previously given, it was not satisfied “that they are connected, in the eyes of the authorities, with the LTTE”.  The Tribunal said that the chance that the applicants would be arrested by the authorities and caused such serious harm as to amount to persecution is “remote”.  However, the Tribunal noted that the first applicant was detained and mistreated by the LTTE in 1994 but that his nephew had secured his release and that the applicants do not allege that they have had any problems from the LTTE since.  The Tribunal therefore said that it was not satisfied that the applicants were at any risk of persecution from the LTTE and, accordingly, that the Tribunal was not satisfied that their fear of persecution was well-founded. 

  1. As has been said, the application for judicial review is brought on several grounds.  Given the length of this judgment already, I will annexe to these reasons a copy of the further amended application for review.

  2. In support of the application for review, Mr Karp, with his customary thoroughness, has developed the grounds in a very careful and detailed way.  I have read the submissions again, having reserved in the matter.  I have read the transcript of Mr Karp’s oral submission and I have read the parts of the green book to which I have been taken. 

  3. I add at this stage that the green book consists of more than 300 pages and I have also read the extracts from the transcript of the proceedings before the Tribunal to which I was referred.  Given the size and potential complexity of the matter it is not practicable to engage in a line by line refutation of Mr Karp’s submission and I will deal with the matter in a way that, in my view, is appropriate in all the circumstances. 

  4. The first ground of review, as will be seen, is that it is alleged that the Tribunal erred in law.  The first particular given of this error, as alleged, is that it is claimed that the Tribunal erred in its consideration of whether the applicants faced persecution in Colombo for a Convention reason, both in the context of their landing in Colombo to try to return to Jaffna, and in the context of their attempting to settle in Colombo.

  5. As has been earlier noted, it is common ground now between the parties, and correctly so, in my view, that the Tribunal’s process of reasoning proceeds upon the footing that it would be unreasonable to expect the applicants to return to the north.  The position which emerges from the consideration of the particular passages in the Tribunal’s reasons, to which I have referred, together with a reading of those reasons as a whole, indicates that the Tribunal’s reasoning proceeds upon that premise.

  6. The argument advanced by Mr Karp, in this connection, is put first at a general level and some specific matters are also raised.  At the general level I can see no specific error of law at all.  I can appreciate that the weight to be attributed to the various factors relied upon before me on behalf of the applicants on the one hand, and on behalf of the Minister on the other, are matters about which views may be expressed with relative degrees of cogency but there is no claim of Wednesbury unreasonableness in this matter.  Mr Karp’s earnest submissions were in truth no more, as I saw them, than an attempt to seek judicial review on the merits.  In other words, they sought to attack the Tribunal’s approach to what were not only factual matters, but matters involving questions of assessment or judgment in a strictly factual context.  I reject that branch of the argument. 

  7. Some specific matters were mentioned.  In particular, in para 7 of Mr Karp’s written submission, dated 20 June 2000, Mr Karp picked up a reference appearing in the green book at p 330 to the citation of a DFAT cable.  I have already mentioned this in passing in my summary of the Tribunal’s reasons.  The context of this reference, it may be recalled, is the Tribunal’s description of the first kind of security measure taken in Colombo when an attack is thought to be imminent, or immediately after one has taken place.  In that connection the Tribunal stated:

    “Those at particular risk of being detained in round-ups or cordon and search operations are young Tamil men and women recently arrived from the north or the east (see DFAT cable CL38234 dated 15 December 1995).”

  8. Mr Karp took me to the full text of that cable which appears as an annexure to an affidavit sworn by Mr Fergus, solicitor in the employ of the applicants’ solicitors, on 19 June 2000.  At p 5 of that cable the following appears:

    “As noted above the extensive security the government has imposed in response to actions by the LTTE includes arrests and detention of persons suspected of being LTTE members or associates.”

  9. The cable goes on to say:

    “In this context, it is obvious that the family members of known LTTE cadres would come under greater suspicion than other members of society.”

  10. Reference is made in the cable then to the position of the LTTE commander, Karikalan, and in particular, to Karikalan’s brother, a government employee who had been detained without charges for two years and who, after losing his job with government, commenced a fundamental rights case against the authorities, which is now before the Supreme Court.  The cable went on to say:

    “Karikalan’s brother’s case is an example of how security forces may suspect someone by reason alone of their family relationship, but it also illustrates that there are legal avenues open to challenge actions taken by authorities on this basis.  It should also be noted that our sources believe such cases are rare.”

  11. I have only cited from p 5 of the cable but, in my view, that is sufficient to dispel the suggestion that the Tribunal failed to give proper weight to the whole of the tenor of the message emanating from the Department.

  12. A particular point was sought to be made by Mr Karp, in particular (b), of the first ground of review, the argument being that the Tribunal had failed to address the issue of whether the applicants faced a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of their race upon their return to the north of Sri Lanka.  As has been said, that point evaporates once the concession, correctly made on behalf of the Minister, is acknowledged that the only relevant consideration given by the Tribunal was the position in Colombo.

  13. The next particular ground relied on is particular (c) and that is that the Tribunal erred in consideration of the issue of internal relocation.  Again, the comments I have previously made are applicable here.  This was essentially not only a question of fact, but one of assessment and judgment.  The issue, of course, being whether internal relocation was “reasonable” within the meaning of the well-settled line of authority in this area.  This was a classic area of factual judgment and assessment for the Tribunal in which the referred branch of government has no right or authority to intervene.

  14. The next matter relied upon, particular (d), is that there was a breach of s 424(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”).  Under that provision the Tribunal is permitted to obtain relevant information of its own accord whereupon it is specifically obliged to “have regard to that information in making a decision on the review”.  The matter was propounded as a ground by Mr Karp in the context of a submission that the Tribunal had not had regard to information in its possession in connection with the danger to the applicants because of their adopted son’s LTTE connections.

  15. Reference is then made to the DFAT cable dated December 1995.  Reference is also made to the material at p 11 of the annexure to Mr Fergus’ affidavit, being a DFAT cable dated March 1999 referring to the pattern of large scale arrests after a major security incident that also applies in the north and the east.  So far as the material appearing at p 5 of the annexure is concerned, I have already indicated that, in my view, no ground for judicial intervention has been established.  So far as the material at p 11 is concerned, it is, of course, referable to the position in the north and the east and not in Colombo and may, for that reason, be put to one side given the concession made on behalf of the Minister. 

  16. The second group of grounds relied upon on behalf of the applicants is, first of all, a failure by the Tribunal to make a finding of fact as to whether they could return to the north.  I have already dealt with this as immaterial.

  17. The next aspect of this ground relied upon is a failure to give reasons for the Tribunal’s lack of satisfaction that the authorities had connected the applicants with the LTTE since their departure from Sri Lanka. This is said to constitute a breach of s 430 of the Act. The principles in this area are now authoritatively settled by virtue of the decision of the majority of the bench of five members of the Full Court in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 845. The case is authority for the following propositions:

    l a failure to comply with s 430(1) is a failure to observe procedures required by the Act to be observed in connection with the making of a decision and therefore constitutes a ground of review under s 476(1)(a): see [43];

    ·s 430(1) does not impose any obligation on the RRT to prepare a statement disclosing a satisfactory process of reasoning leading to the decision it reached, although the RRT is obliged to set out its findings on any material questions of fact: see [44] and [47];

    ·there is no specific requirement in s 430(1) for the RRT to give reasons for rejecting, or attaching no weight to, evidence or other material which would tend to undermine any finding it made, although if one of the reasons which actually induced the RRT to come to its decision was that it decided to reject or place no weight on particular material, then s 430(1)(b) would require disclosure of that element of the RRT’s actual reasoning process: see [46];

    ·the RRT is under a duty to make, and to set out, findings on all matters of fact that are objectively material to the decision it is required to make.  Consequently, it must make findings on questions of fact ‘that are central to the case raised by the material and evidence before it’ or upon which the ‘decision, one way or the other, turns’, having regard to the process of reasoning the RRT has employed as the basis for its decision: see [48], [56] and [57];

    ·a requirement to set out findings on material questions of fact, and refer to the material on which the findings are based, is not to be translated into a requirement that all pieces of conflicting evidence relating to a material fact must be dealt with: see [56]. Accordingly, a failure to comply with s 430 is not made out by reason only of the failure on the part of the RRT to explain why it had not accepted and acted upon material which was contrary to the findings which it had made on an issue: see [56] and [64];

    ·fundamentally, on a fair reading, the reasons of the RRT need to reveal to the parties why the decision went the way it did: see [62].”  (See Najarian v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 933)

  18. I have previously endeavoured to summarise a good deal of the Tribunal’s reasons.  I have not, of course, exhaustively stated the terms of the Tribunal’s decision, but it will be manifestly apparent from that summary that there has been, within the meaning of the Singh explanation, no breach of s 430 in the present case.

  19. The next specific ground, again in the context of s 430, is that it is said that there has been a failure by the Tribunal to refer to other evidence, or other material upon which it relied, in failing to be satisfied in the matter just mentioned. Again, there is no substance in this submission. Other matters were argued in this connection to similar effect and they are covered by my previous reasoning. They are without foundation.

  20. I should, however, mention a particular matter relied upon in particular (d) of the second group of grounds. It is alleged that the Tribunal failed to conduct a “review” as required by the Act, in that it failed to consider all substantial claims and evidence and material put forward. Again, it was obvious that, given the size of the book of relevant documents, supplemented as it was by affidavit evidence providing even further material, the Tribunal was bound to reduce its reasons to some manageable and practicable proportions. The summary I have given of its process of reasoning has satisfied me that it has discharged its statutory duty in this connection.

  21. I can detect no error of law and no failure to observe the statutory functions imposed upon the Tribunal and, for those reasons, I order that the application be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty (60) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Beaumont.

Associate:

Dated:             October 2000

Solicitor for the Applicant: L Karp, McDonnells
Counsel for the Respondent: R Beech-Jones
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing: 28 June 2000
Date of Judgment: 30 August 2000
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