CITATION: SONDA v. SIGNORELLI [2004] NSWCA 134 HEARING DATE(S): 03/03/2004 JUDGMENT DATE:
6 May 2004JUDGMENT OF: Beazley JA at 1; Santow J at 62; Howie J at 69 DECISION: 1. Appeal allowed; 2. Orders made by Gibson DCJ on 19 August 2003 be set aside; 3. An order that the answer of the jury to the questions asked of them on 9 July 2003 be the verdict of the Court; 4. Judgment for the appellant in the proceedings accordingly; 5. An order that the respondent pay the appellant's costs of this application and the proceedings in the court below CATCHWORDS: DEFAMATION - Section 7A of Defamation Act (NSW) 1974 - "Jury trial" - Trial process. - NEW TRIAL - Section 126(2) of District Court Act (NSW) 1973 - Test to be applied - Whether the verdict is one at which no reasonable jury could have arrived - Trial judge not to question correctness of jury verdict. LEGISLATION CITED: Defamation Act 1974
District Court Act 1973CASES CITED: Beran v Channel Seven [2003] NSWCA 272
Channel Seven Sydney Pty Limited v Parras [2002] NSWCA 202
Costains (Australia) Pty Limited v Atkinson (5 October 1995, unreported)
John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin (2003) 201 ALR 77
Nationwide News Pty Limited v Warton [2002] NSWCA 377PARTIES :
Tracie Sonda (Appellant)
Paul John Signorelli (Respondent)FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40797/2003 COUNSEL: S. Wheelhouse SC/M. Richardson (Appellant)
T. Hale SC/T. Thawley (Respondent)SOLICITORS: Corrs Chambers Westgarth (Appellant)
Solari Legal (Respondent)
LOWER COURTJURISDICTION: District Court LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DC8847/2002 LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :Gibson DCJ
CA 40797/2003
6 May 2004BEAZLEY JA
SANTOW JA
HOWIE J
The appellant was Mayor of the Council of Sutherland Shire. The respondent was the owner or manager of a function centre in the Shire in respect of which he had made a development application to construct a disabled lift. The Mayor, concerned at the representations alleged to have been made by the respondent as to the Council’s purported rejected of the application, wrote to him in strong terms about the matter. The Mayor subsequently sent her letter to persons who had signed a petition supporting the respondent’s wish to have a disabled lift.
The respondent commenced proceedings for defamation claiming that the letters carried the imputation that the respondent deliberately misled patrons of the function centre to induce them to sign a petition. The proceedings were conducted pursuant to s.7A of the Defamation Act (NSW) 1974 which provides for a jury trial. The jury found that the imputation that the respondent had deliberately misled patrons of his function centre was not conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader.
Immediately upon the jury withdrawing, the respondent made an application under s.126 of the District Court Act (NSW) 1973 for a new trial on the basis of the perversity of the verdict. That application was heard and determined by the trial judge in the respondent’s favour.
HELD per Beazley JA (Santow JA and…
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- AGLC
- Sonda v Signorelli [2004] NSWCA 134
- Case
- [2004] NSWCA 134
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the trial judge had erred in ordering a new trial, and if so, what the correct verdict should be. Specifically, the court had to determine the correct test to be applied when considering whether to grant a new trial on the grounds that the jury's verdict was unreasonable, and whether the trial judge had improperly substituted their own assessment of the evidence for that of the jury.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the trial judge had misapplied the test for ordering a new trial under section 126(2) of the *District Court Act 1973* (NSW). The court held that the test requires the judge to determine whether the verdict reached by the jury was one at which no reasonable jury could have arrived, rather than questioning the correctness of the verdict itself. The trial judge's actions were found to have involved an impermissible re-evaluation of the evidence presented to the jury. Consequently, the Court of Appeal concluded that the jury's original verdict should stand.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the District Court judge were set aside. The Court of Appeal ordered that the jury's answers to the questions posed at trial constitute the verdict of the Court, and entered judgment for the appellant. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceedings in the court below.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed; 2. Orders made by Gibson DCJ on 19 August 2003 be set aside; 3. An order that the answer of the jury to the questions asked of them on 9 July 2003 be the verdict of the Court; 4. Judgment for the appellant in the proceedings accordingly; 5. An order that the respondent pay the appellant's costs of this application and the proceedings in the court below
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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