Somerset v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 13 min read

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

[1992] QCA 169

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

BETWEEN

Appeal No. 660 of 1988

E.J. SOMERSET

Appellant

v.

ESANDA FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED

Respondent

Appeal No. 4727 of 1987

BETWEEN:

E.J. SOMERSET

Appellant

AND:

G.M. AND N.M. HILLENBERG & ORS.

First Respondent

AND:

JALBIGA PTY. LTD.

Second Respondent

AND:

THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF TOOWOOMBA

Third Respondent

AND:

ELLIS M. BLANCH

Fourth Respondent

AND:

C.J. BLANCH

Fifth Respondent

AND:

ESANDA FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED

Sixth Respondent

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Delivered the 26th day of June, 1992

The appellant, Elsie Joy Somerset, has appealed to this

Court from judgments delivered on 30 June 1989, 4 October
1989 and 30 January 1990 in action 4727 of 1987 and on 12
February 1990 in action 660 of 1988. Esanda Finance
Corporation Limited is a respondent to the appeals in both
actions, and there are a number of other respondents to the
appeals in action 4727 of 1987. Mrs Somerset is a bankrupt.

On 13 November 1991, a sequestration order was made against

her on the petition of the National Australia Bank Limited
and the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy was appointed the
trustee of her estate. The current applications before the
Court are applications by Esanda to strike out or stay Mrs
Somerset's appeals or alternatively for orders that she give
security for its costs and that the appeals be stayed until
she does so. Esanda's application in action 4727 of 1987 is
supported by a number of the other respondents to the appeal

in that action.

Both actions relate to a building consisting of six

accommodation units constructed on land which Mrs Somerset
owned in Toowoomba. Two of the units had ceiling heights
slightly less than those specified in the building plans and
slightly less than the minimum prescribed under the Standard
Building By-Laws. In action 4727 of 1987, Mrs Somerset sued
a variety of persons associated in one form or another with
the construction of the building, including Esanda which
provided the finance under a mortgage. In the later action,
660 of 1988, Esanda sued Mrs Somerset for possession of the
property, and all of the units have now been sold and
transferred either by Mrs Somerset or by Esanda as
mortgagee. There is no possible basis upon which Mrs
Somerset could now regain possession, and counsel for Mrs
Somerset accepted that there is no purpose in proceeding
with the appeal in action 660 of 1988, at least unless the
appeals in action 4727 of 1987 are continued.

It is convenient, therefore, to concentrate on action 4727 of 1987 in which Mrs Somerset claimed damages. All of the orders to which the appeals relate were made by Ambrose

J. who having, on various dates, refused leave to amend the Statement of Claim to add a cause of action based upon the Trade Practice Act 1976 (as amended) Commonwealth, made declarations that, in effect, determined that the Council of the City of Toowoomba had validly reduced the minimum permissible…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Somerset v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1992] QCA 169
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Somerset v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd involved an appeal from the decision of the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary issue was whether an extension of time should be granted for the appeal to proceed, given that the official trustee had purported to assign its rights of appeal to the applicant two years after the final judgment. The bankruptcy appeal was brought under the Bankruptcy Act 1966, specifically sections 60 and 33. The fundamental legal issues before the court were whether the assignment of the appeal rights constituted a valid assignment within the confines of the statutory framework and, if so, whether an extension of time should be granted for the appeal.

The court examined the statutory provisions and the timelines involved, determining that the assignment of appeal rights did not fall within the 28-day period stipulated by the legislation. The court held that the assignment was not effective, and as a result, the appeal was deemed abandoned. However, the court also considered whether an extension of time ought to be granted despite the abandonment. The court noted the discretion available under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act and evaluated the circumstances surrounding the delay and the merits of the appeal. Ultimately, the court concluded that granting an extension of time was appropriate in the specific circumstances of the case, taking into account the delay in the assignment and the potential merits of the appeal.

In its judgment, the court granted the extension of time for the appeal to proceed. This decision acknowledged the procedural complexities and the potential for injustice if the appeal were not permitted to move forward. The final orders of the court included the extension of the time limit for the appeal, allowing the applicant to pursue the appeal on the merits. This ruling underscores the importance of statutory compliance and the discretionary powers of the court in balancing procedural fairness with the overarching objectives of the Bankruptcy Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.