Socasen Pty Ltd v Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Socasen Pty Ltd v Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 997

TRADE PRACTICES – claim of unconscionable conduct under s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) – application for interlocutory relief concerning notice of termination of franchise – case for relief not strong – damages an adequate remedy – Held: application refused

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51AC, 80, 87

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 229 ALR 457 applied
CPSU,The Community and Public Sector Union v Commonwealth of Australia (2006) 157 IR 470 referred to

SOCASEN PTY LTD ACN 001 985 208 v CALTEX AUSTRALIA PETROLEUM PTY LTD ACN 000 032 128

NSD 304 OF 2007

BRANSON J
28 JUNE 2007
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 304 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

SOCASEN PTY LTD ACN 001 985 208
Applicant

AND:

CALTEX AUSTRALIA PETROLEUM PTY LTD
ACN 000 032 128
Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 JUNE 2007

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for further interlocutory relief concerning a notice of termination served on the applicant be refused.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 304 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

SOCASEN PTY LTD ACN 001 985 208
Applicant

AND:

CALTEX AUSTRALIA PETROLEUM PTY LTD
ACN 000 032 128
Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE:

28 JUNE 2007

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd conducts a franchise system for the operation of a network of retail service stations in Australia using the Caltex trademark.  Since at least 1 July 2000 Socasen Pty Ltd has operated a retail service station in North Richmond, New South Wales as a Caltex franchisee.

  2. Socasen instituted this proceeding on 2 March 2007 claiming to have suffered loss or damage by conduct of Caltex that was done in contravention of s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘the TPA’) and in breach of its franchise agreement. The application additionally sought an order that Caltex be restrained from terminating Socasen’s franchise. No claim was made for interlocutory relief.

  3. A first directions hearing was held on 27 March 2007.  On that day Gyles J ordered Socasen to file and serve an amended statement of claim before 2 April 2007.  This order was not complied with.  The time within which Socasen was to file and serve an amended statement of claim was subsequently extended to 10 May 2007.  An amended statement of claim was filed on 9 May 2007.

  4. On the same day (ie 9 May 2007) Caltex gave Socasen a notice of termination of its franchise agreement effective on 31 May 2007.

  5. The matter came before Madgwick J as duty judge on 18 May 2007.  Socasen made an oral application for interlocutory injunctive relief in respect of the notice of termination.  His Honour adjourned consideration of the application…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 997
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Socasen Pty Ltd, a franchisee of Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd, brought an application to the court seeking an interim injunction against the termination of their franchise agreement. The dispute centred on the strained relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee, which led to operational issues and the franchisor's decision to terminate the agreement. The court had to determine whether the applicant had made out a prima facie case and if the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The court examined whether Socasen had demonstrated a serious question to be tried regarding their entitlement to relief, if they would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction, and if the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction. It noted that the strength of the probability of success required depends on the nature of the rights asserted and the practical consequences likely to flow from the interlocutory order sought. The court considered the strained relationship between the parties and the risk that granting the injunction might result in the court being drawn into a supervisory role concerning the business relationship. Given the evidence before the court, the relationship between the parties was strained to near breaking point, and operational problems had already occurred, leading to fuel supply issues for Socasen.

The court held that Socasen had not satisfied the threshold of demonstrating a serious question to be tried and that damages would be an adequate remedy if Socasen proved their entitlement to relief at trial. Additionally, the court was not convinced that the strength of Socasen's case was sufficiently strong to justify the grant of the relief sought, considering the practical consequences of the order. Therefore, the application for further interlocutory relief was refused.

ORDERS:
1. The application for further interlocutory relief concerning a notice of termination served on the applicant is refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for further interlocutory relief concerning a notice of termination served on the applicant be refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

The discretion under s 80(2) to grant an interim injunction is conferred in wide terms. In this regard it is analogous to the discretion vested in the Court by s 838 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). It is therefore appropriate to note the following observations of the Full Court in CPSU,The Community and Public Sector Union v Commonwealth of Australia (2006) 157 IR 470, 473 at [14]-[18]:‘14The Court’s discretion under s 838 of the WR Act to grant an interim injunction is conferred in wide terms. Nonetheless, the discretion must be exercised judicially; that is, ‘not arbitrarily, capriciously or so as to frustrate the legislative intent’ (Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 per Gaudron and Gummow JJ at [22]). Additionally, as the discretionary power to grant interlocutory injunctions has a long history, the discretion is to be exercised according to established principles (Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Limited (2001) 208 CLR 199 per Gleeson CJ at [10]).15It is well established that a proper purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to maintain the status quo until the rights of the parties can be determined at final hearing (ABC v Lenah Game Meats per Gleeson CJ at [9]‑[10]).16The principles governing the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions have recently been confirmed in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 229 ALR 457 (‘O’Neill’). Gleeson CJ and Crennan J at [19] observed:“… in all applications for an interlocutory injunction, a court will ask whether the plaintiff has shown that there is a serious question to be tried as to the plaintiff's entitlement to relief, has shown that the plaintiff is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate remedy, and has shown that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction. These are the organising principles, to be applied having regard to the nature and circumstances of the case, under which issues of justice and convenience are addressed. We agree with the explanation of these organising principles in the reasons of Gummow and Hayne JJ, and their reiteration that the doctrine of the court established in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd [(1968) 118 CLR 618] should be folIowed.’ (footnotes omitted)”17In O’Neill Gummow and Hayne JJ at [65] stated:‘The relevant principles in Australia are those explained in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd. This Court (Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ) said that on such applications the court addresses itself to two main inquiries, and continued:“The first is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief ... The second inquiry is ... whether the inconvenience or injury which the plaintiff would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted.”By using the phrase “prima facie case”, their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. … With reference to the first inquiry, the court continued, in a statement of central importance for this appeal:“How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights [the plaintiff] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks.”(footnotes omitted)18At [70] Gummow and Hayne JJ make clear that they (like Gleeson CJ and Crennan J) have no objection to the use of the phrase ‘serious question’ if it is understood as conveying the notion that the seriousness of the question depends on the considerations emphasised in Beecham Group Limited v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd. At [71] their Honours emphasise that the governing consideration is that the requisite strength of the probability of ultimate success depends upon the nature of the rights asserted and the practical consequences likely to flow from the interlocutory order sought.’THE FACTS

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRANSON J
If the interlocutory order sought is made, the Agreement is likely to remain on foot notwithstanding that the evidence before the Court suggests that the relationship between Caltex as franchisor and Socasen as franchisee is strained to near breaking point. It seems likely that in this circumstance operational problems of the kind to which Mr Simpson has deposed in recent affidavits will reoccur. Those problems have resulted in Socasen having no supplies of fuel for weekend sale on two consecutive weekends. I am not confident that Socasen will not again find itself in breach of the Agreement. There is a risk that the interlocutory order sought might result in the Court being drawn into a supervisory role concerning the business relationship between the parties.CONCLUSION As I am not satisfied that damages will not be an adequate remedy should Socasen prove an entitlement to relief at trial, the application for interlocutory relief fails. Even if I were satisfied that damages will not be an adequate remedy, I would nonetheless refuse the interlocutory relief sought on the basis that the strength of the Socasen’s case for relief in respect of the notice of termination is insufficiently strong to justify the grant of the relief sought having regard to the practical consequences likely to flow from the order sought. I am, however, satisfied that this is a matter appropriate for early trial. I am willing to make direction accordingly should the parties invite me to do so.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRANSON J