Snow and Secretary, Department of Social Services

[2020] AATA 417

Snow and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2020] AATA 417 (5 March 2020)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2018/3716

Re:Christoper Aslin Snow

APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Social Services

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Dr N A Manetta, Senior Member

Date:5 March 2020  

Place:Adelaide

For the reasons given orally at the conclusion of the hearing of the interlocutory application, the Tribunal:

1.Refuses the Applicant’s application for recusal or reconstitution of the Tribunal; and

2.Grants liberty to the Applicant to reargue the question of my continuing to hear this matter through an advocate if he retains one.

..........................[sgnd]........................................

Dr N A Manetta, Senior Member

Catchwords

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for recusal or reconstitution of the Tribunal – application refused

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

REASONS FOR DECISION

5 March 2020  

Dr N A Manetta, Senior Member

1. On 12 February 2020, I gave oral reasons for my decision not to recuse myself or to reconstitute the Tribunal as requested by the Applicant. On 14 February 2020, the Applicant requested written reasons, which I provide below.  Written reasons on interlocutory applications are not always given, but I am content to do so on this occasion. 

2. This is an interlocutory application by Mr Snow seeking an order that I no longer hear the substantive application he has made to this Tribunal. Mr Snow’s substantive application to the Tribunal concerns the rate at which his age pension has been paid to him in the past. The circumstances surrounding the interlocutory application need to be set out in some detail.

3. The history of this matter has been unfortunate in that there have been delays in progressing it to hearing.  In my opinion, however, it is quite clear that the delays, such as they have been, have not been the Tribunal’s responsibility.

4. Mr Snow’s substantive application was the subject of a conciliation conference between the parties. As I explained to Mr Snow at the hearing of the interlocutory application, the member that is assigned to preside at a hearing (i.e., at a hearing that becomes necessary because a matter has not resolved at conference) does not usually read the conference papers or notes. This ensures that the member does not have any knowledge of what the parties have put to one another on a “without-prejudice” basis in order to settle the matter. But a member will know − precisely because the matter is before him or her − that the conciliation conference has not led to a resolution.  That is all that was known by me.

5. A hearing of the substantive matter was listed by the Registry to take place before me on 3 June 2019. That hearing was listed, as I say, as a substantive hearing on the merits as the conciliation conference had not led to a settlement of the matter. On 27 May 2019, almost a week before the hearing, both parties advised the Tribunal that the hearing should not take place on 3 June 2019. The correspondence on the file shows that Ms Odgers, for the Respondent, contacted the Tribunal and indicated that Mr Snow had provided a statement to her on 6 May 2019. The matters raised in his statement required the Respondent, in Ms Odgers’, view to lodge an amended statement of facts, issues, and contentions. Ms Odgers further advised that Mr Snow had contacted her to advise that he would be providing further documents to her on that same day (i.e., 27 May 2019). The email says that Mr Snow had indicated that he had no objection to the hearing being vacated for a short period to enable all documentation to be provided and responded to by the Respondent.

6. Mr Snow indicated his agreement with the request for a telephone directions hearing. He indicated in the body of his email the further documents that he was preparing.

7. The matter came before me on 3 June 2019.  It came before me as a directions hearing only given the correspondence the Tribunal had had with the parties. Mr Morris appeared for the Respondent on that occasion and Mr Snow appeared for himself. The directions hearing lasted 20 minutes according to my notes. Orders were made as follows:

   1.The Applicant was to file and serve any further written material including written submissions by Tuesday 11 June; and

   2.The Respondent was to file and serve further written material including written submissions by Monday 24 June; and

   3.The matter was to be listed for hearing on Friday, 5 July 2019.

8. The direction mentions that the orders were being made by consent. The direction followed on from the advice of the parties approximately one week earlier that they did not wish the hearing to proceed on the assigned day as further time was needed.

9. The matter was, I note, listed for hearing on 5 July 2019. On Monday, 1 July 2019 Ms Odgers wrote to the Tribunal. I shall not set out her correspondence but she advised that the Respondent would not be in a position to proceed on the listed date of 5 July 2019. She noted that it might be appropriate for a brief telephone directions hearing to be called. On file is a letter from Mr Snow to Mr Hay, the District Registrar, dated 2 July 2019. That letter refers to an email that Mr Snow had earlier sent (which is not on the file, however) agreeing to the Respondent’s proposal for the hearing on 5 July to be converted to a directions hearing. It is noted in paragraph 13 of that letter that if the Department’s proposal for a directions hearing is granted, the Applicant will be seeking adequate time to enable a number of things to occur that are listed in bullet points as follows: first, advice to be prepared by JusticeNet; secondly, further evidence to be submitted about the status of the Trust; thirdly, possible witnesses to be arranged to give evidence about the Trust’s status; fourthly, further evidence to be submitted about financial data including pension calculations. It is clear from that letter that Mr Snow agreed to vacating the hearing date, and he himself needed further time for consideration and preparation.

10. On Tuesday, 2 July 2019, Mr Gade, a team leader in the Registry advised, Mr Snow and Ms Odgers that he had spoken to me and, I quote, “the Senior Member was reluctantly prepared” to vacate the hearing and in lieu substitute a telephone directions hearing. It is clear, therefore, that at that point the hearing on 5 July 2019 was not to go ahead. 

11. I conducted a telephone directions hearing on 5 July 2019 for 20 minutes. I made orders on that occasion by consent. The two orders I made were that the hearing fixed for today (that is, 5 July 2019) be vacated (to reflect formally what had been earlier agreed between the parties and approved by me), and, secondly, that the matter be returned to conference on a date to be fixed by the Registrar not earlier than Friday, 23 August 2019 and avoiding certain dates that one or other of the parties had indicated was inconvenient. That order was, as I say, made by consent.

12. I would mention here expressly that it has never been my practice to return a matter to conference unless both parties desire that course of action. My notes indicate that there was some discussion at the directions hearing about the merits of a conference versus a hearing and that Mr Snow did query the utility of a further conference given his previous experience. Nevertheless, Mr Snow did agree to the matter going back to conference.  The date of “not earlier than Friday 23 August” was approved by Mr Snow.

13. From then on, the matter did not return to me until some time later. The conference took place in the meantime and, obviously, was not successful as the matter did come back before me eventually. Some time after the conference, a notice was sent out by the Registry advising that the date of 23 March 2020 had been set for the hearing of the matter.  I note here that Mr Snow desired that date according to the correspondence on file, notwithstanding it was many months off, because he wished to earn money in the interim.

14. On 28 October 2019 Mr Snow wrote to Mr Hay, the District Registrar. I shall not set out that letter. The upshot was a response on 30 October 2019 to Mr Snow that the matters raised in his letter would be referred to the Senior Member assigned to preside at the hearing (namely, me) so that I might conduct a directions hearing to deal with the matters Mr Snow had raised. The matter was listed before me at 12 noon on 27 November.

15. The matter came before me on 27 November 2019. Although the matter was listed for directions only, the hearing lasted one and a half hours. I deliberately allowed extra time to ensure that the matter, which had now been at conference twice, could proceed to hearing once and for all. There was a very large and open exchange of views between Mr Snow and Ms Odgers on that occasion in respect of their various positions. Mr Snow emphasised that he maintained he was owed arrears and that the Department’s concessions to that point on the facts surrounding the Trust meant that they could make at least a part-payment to him. Ms Odgers for her part was not agreeable to any order being made to direct the Respondent to make a part-payment. Ms Odgers raised before me a possible jurisdictional issue as to the extent of Mr Snow’s right to claim arrears under the application that was before the Tribunal. Mr Snow also requested certain data be provided to him. Ms Odgers opposed the making of orders that would require extensive calculations and workings to be given to Mr Snow over a multi-year period.

16. Mr Snow, for his part, indicated that he wanted those calculations so he could refer them to his accountant. Ms Odgers offered detailed workings in relation to part of the overall multi-year period and an overall figure (but no detailed workings) for the earlier years. 

17. Having heard the parties, I made the following orders.

    1.The respondent shall file and serve a detailed calculation of arrears for the period from 15 August 2017 onwards by 24 January 2020. The calculation is to be on two alternate bases; i.e., the first that the income from the former shareholding in the Meldick Trust is an exempt’s lump sum/exempt income and the second that it is not so exempt;

    2. The respondent shall file and serve a document that gives the calculation of arrears but without detailed workings for the period from 2010 to 14 August 2017 by 24 January 2020. The calculation is to be on the alternate bases mentioned in order one.

    3.The Tribunal defers consideration of the Applicant’s application for further data until the Applicant has considered the information to be provided under Orders 1 and 2 above.

    4.The parties are at liberty to apply to the Tribunal for further directions; and

    5.The matter is relisted for a further directions hearing on 14 February 2020.

18. As I say those directions were made at the end of a very lengthy directions hearing.

19. On 28 November 2019, Mr Snow wrote to the District Registrar Mr Hay requesting an urgent directions hearing to have the directions made the previous day varied. Mr Snow wanted the directions to bring forward the date of compliance from 24 January 2020 to 13 December 2019. He also expected the Respondent to include a negotiable offer of part-payment of arrears. He also requested other orders.

20. He referred in that correspondence to the severe financial hardship the matter was causing him.

21. Mr Snow received from my assistant a response. The response noted correctly that the assistant had spoken with me about the request for an immediate or urgent telephone directions hearing and that I had declined the application. It indicated, however, that I was open to a further directions hearing if Mr Snow still wished to have one but it would not be listed on an immediate or urgent basis. The email noted that I was interstate hearing other matters and would not return for at least a week.

22. A letter dated 5 December 2019 was addressed by Mr Snow to his Honour Justice White, in his capacity as a Deputy President of the Tribunal. It was not addressed to his Honour in his capacity as a judge of the Federal Court nor was the letter filed in the Federal Court so far as I am aware. The letter referred to the considerable distress Mr Snow was suffering because of delays resulting from actions of the Tribunal and the Respondent in his matter.  It asked for an urgent hearing to consider various requests. A principal request was that I should be replaced. There was also a request for replacement directions for those directions I made on 27 November 2019.

23. The letter asserts that I was not aware on 3 June 2019 (at the first directions hearing before me) that the primary argument in Mr Snow’s claim had shifted. Whilst acknowledging that he did not expect a Tribunal member at a directions hearing to be aware of all details of the matter, Mr Snow maintained I should be aware of what he maintained were the major issues from his perspective. He maintained that that indicated a lack of required diligence on my part as required by the “Guide to Members”. There is a complaint about the fact that the directions that were issued by me at the 5 July directions hearing did not include other directions he would have liked.  Mr Snow further complains that at the directions hearing on 27 November 2019, I was unaware that the primary claim in the matter was that the Trust had been extinguished. It is said that I rejected his plea for a part-payment of the arrears. He maintains that the financial hardship he was suffering was treated with contempt. There is a further reference to part-payment being provided for in the model-litigant obligations and that this discovery changed his earlier request that a hearing be listed for the last week of March 2020 to allow him to seek income-earning work. Mr Snow refers to my declining his request for a further directions hearing as off-handed, and he notes that I am insufficiently aware of the key facts of the matter and of the obligation to resolve the matter according to the Tribunal’s objectives; and he further refers to his increasingly perilous financial position. Directions were sought then from his Honour Justice White that I be replaced as the member hearing the matter, and that the member who replaces me investigate all aspects of the matter with the objective of determining a fair, just, economical informal, and quick resolution of the matter.

24. The letter was referred to me by the Registry.  I decided to treat the letter as an application by Mr Snow to have me disqualify myself. Mr Snow was written to at my direction. The correspondence was sent by the associate. It is as follows:

    “Senior Member Manetta has requested that I write to you. Your latest letter dated 5 December 2019 addressed to his Honour Justice White in his capacity as a presidential member of the Tribunal was passed to the Senior Member as the tribunal member to whom your application is been allocated. So far as I am aware the letter has not been forwarded to his Honour Justice White because his Honour is not the member of the Tribunal to whom conduct of the file has been assigned. Your letter raises your concerns about the Senior Member’s conduct and your wish that he not continue to hear the matter. Your letter also seek certain orders from the tribunal that are detailed in your letter.

    Although your letter is directed to his Honour Justice White the Senior Member will treat your letter as an application that he disqualify himself from further involvement in the matter. The Senior Member will hold a directions hearing to fix a time for the hearing of the application and to make any ancillary orders. The directions hearing will take place on Tuesday, 17 December 2019 at 9 AM. You may attend in person or by telephone if you prefer. A copy of this letter and a copy of your letter to his Honour Justice White will be provided to Ms Odgers representing the respondent. if you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.”

25. Mr Snow responded to the Registrar on 13 December 2019 indicating amongst other things his preference for me to disqualify myself or to be replaced before the hearing listed on 17 December 2019. Mr Snow indicated in his further correspondence with the Tribunal that because of what he considered a further delay, he wanted the matter dealt with on the papers.

26. On 17 December 2019, I conducted a directions hearing. I explained to Mr Snow that the matter had been treated by me as, in effect, an application by him that I recuse myself. I made three orders on that occasion after hearing the parties. The first was that the Applicant was to file and serve any submissions he wish to make in respect of his application that I recuse myself by close of business on 27 December 2019. The second order was that the Respondent was to file and serve a submission to assist the Tribunal in respect of the legal principles governing recusal together with any other submission the Respondent was minded to make by close of business on 6 January 2020 and the matter was listed for a further directions hearing on 7 January.

27. Mr Snow agreed to the deadlines but was unable in the event to meet his own obligation to comply with the filing and serving of his submission by 27 December 2019.  He filed his submission on 6 January, and the Respondent needed, accordingly, additional time to file its submission in reply.  On 7 January, I conducted a directions hearing at which I ordered the Respondent to file its response to the Applicant’s submission by 13 January and ordered that there be a further directions hearing on 14 January. I noted in paragraph 3, that the Applicant’s application for further information was to be deferred until a decision was made on the recusal application, and I vacated the directions hearing listed on 14 February 2014 as it appeared unnecessary in the circumstances.

28. On 14 January 2020, I held a directions hearing where the Applicant was ordered to file and serve any response he wished to make to the Respondent’s submissions on the application for recusal by 17 January 2020. The Applicant’s interlocutory recusal application was listed for hearing at 2:45 PM on 23 January 2020. I note that at the directions hearing Mr Snow indicated that he wished to put an offer to the Department and/or to correspond with the Department generally. Ms Odger’s response was that any correspondence sent to her would receive an “appropriate reply”. I summed up the position at the end of the directions hearing and referred to the fact that any correspondence Mr Snow sent would receive “an appropriate reply”.  Mr Snow indicated that he thought that response by Ms Odgers was, to use his expression, “public-service speak”. On that occasion, I corrected Mr Snow firmly and indicated to him that it was inappropriate for him to denigrate what was a reasonable and civil response by Ms Odgers to one of his own suggestions at the directions hearing.

29. Finally, I note that Mr Snow has also written independently, as I understand matters, to Deputy President Britten-Jones requesting that I be removed and that the Tribunal be reconstituted.

30. On 23 January, the Applicant’s interlocutory application was argued before me. I deal with the principal arguments that Mr Snow has made both in writing and orally before me as follows.

31. The first argument that I need to consider is that Mr Snow maintains I ought not to be involved in hearing the application to have myself removed from the Tribunal. I indicated to Mr Snow at the hearing that it is quite customary for tribunal members (and judges in Courts) to hear applications that they recuse themselves on the basis of apparent bias. Mr Snow accepted that, but maintained that the rule is not invariable and that a different Tribunal member should hear the application. I indicated at the hearing that I would rule on that submission. I see no reason why I should not determine in the first instance Mr Snow’s application. It is a well-settled principle of judicial administration and of this Tribunal’s own practice that applications for disqualification for apprehended bias should be first considered by the person in relation to whose conduct the submission is made.

1. Mr Snow also made the point that he did not believe it was appropriate that this matter be dealt with by way of a formal application by him. He referred to his preference for a more informal procedure (where a conference could be held and his views could be expressed). Mr Snow used the expression several times of “wanting to have a yarn about the matter”.  I indicated to Mr Snow at the hearing, and I repeat here, that an application to have a member disqualify himself or herself must be conducted with formality. Formality is not the enemy of proper administration in circumstances like this. It would not be appropriate, in my opinion, that the question of my continuing to hear the matter be negotiated in some way at a conference.  Rather, I must rule on the application.

2. So far as Mr Snow’s principal submissions before me are concerned, Mr Snow maintained that there had been no compliance with the objectives of the Tribunal by the Respondent. I  indicated to Mr Snow in the course of the interlocutory hearing that even if he is correct in that submission, I could not see how it would follow that I should cease to hear the matter. Mr Snow maintained that I had not held the Respondent to account for its poor behaviour at the conferences. Mr Snow maintains that I ought to have detected that the Respondent was not acting appropriately during the conference process.

3. I reject this submission for several reasons. It is not the role of a Tribunal member at a directions hearing to monitor the behaviour of the parties except to ensure that they adhere to orders made by the Tribunal and are otherwise behaving ostensibly in an appropriate and co-operative manner. I have not detected anything in Ms Odgers’ behaviour or submissions that would suggest to the contrary.  Further, I was not able to “monitor” the Respondent’s behaviour at the conferences since I was not the member of the Tribunal tasked with conducting the conference. In this matter, I have been responsible so far for directions hearings only.  I have no knowledge of what transpired at the conferences.

4. Mr Snow pressed me with a submission that I conducted the directions hearings in June and July and November last year inappropriately. His principal submission in that regard is that I was not aware of the significance of the extinguishment of the Meldick Trust. In this regard, I would make two points. It is up to a member presiding at a directions hearing to use his or her discretion in advance in deciding what degree of familiarity with the issues of a file needs to be had by that member in order to conduct the directions hearing fairly and appropriately. A member must always try to be efficient with time, and a member may be unnecessarily “over-prepared”, so to speak, for a directions hearing. Equally, of course, a member may inadvertently overlook what a particular party may think is an important point that needs to be made at a directions hearing.

5. It is important to bear in mind, however, that a directions hearing is a short hearing designed to provide further procedural directions to the parties. It is not a substantive hearing on the merits of the matter. So far as the earlier hearings are concerned, I would note that both parties had agreed in advance that the main hearing was not to take place and had virtually agreed the orders that needed to be made.

6. It was not necessary in my opinion for a Tribunal member to have entered the directions hearings in this matter in June and July with any knowledge of the issues that might end up being germane at a hearing.

7. The next point I would make is that even if an Applicant feels that a presiding Member has overlooked an important point, that is exactly the stage at which he or she should make known the relevant facts that he or she wishes the Member to take into account so far as these impinge upon the making of appropriate directions at the directions hearing. It is up to the Applicant and Respondent to articulate their submissions and concerns.  Mr Snow had an extensive opportunity at the very lengthy November directions hearing to make all the points he wished to make. He used that occasion to make his points clearly.

8. Finally, even if a member has overlooked a matter in his or her review of a file before a directions hearing, that is not a basis for the member to recuse himself from further involvement in my opinion.

9. In this connection, I would note that I believe that my responsibility is to recuse myself if I have demonstrated, objectively speaking, that I may be predisposed to deciding the matter against Mr Snow. Mr Snow’s suggestion that I had insufficient knowledge of the matter does not indicate that I had any particular view one way or the other about the outcome or that I had a view against him.

10. For these reasons, I do not believe therefore that Mr Snow’s criticisms, even if they could be objectively justified in respect of my conduct of the directions hearings, would provide a basis for my recusing myself.

11. Mr Snow further submitted to me that on 27 November I displayed a further lack of diligence.  I reject that submission for the reasons earlier given in respect of the June and July directions hearings.

12. Mr Snow is dissatisfied clearly with the fact that the matter has dragged on. But I would emphasise that all the adjournments occurred with Mr Snow’s agreement, including the return to conference. Moreover, the hearing date that Mr Snow has at the end of March 2020 was one that is acknowledged on the file material to have been requested by him.  I appreciate that he may now have a different view of the wisdom of his having requested that date. But it seems to me that he cannot complain about the date since it was responsive to his own wishes at the time.

13. If Mr Snow now wishes to have an earlier hearing date, he should make that application but I note he has an application for data/information that has been deferred pending the delivery of data on 24 January 2020 by the Respondent and pending disposition of the application that I no longer hear the matter.

14. Mr Snow also suggested to me that I ought to have ordered a part-payment of arrears of his pension. I put to Mr Snow at the directions hearing on 27 November 2019 that a part- payment could only be ordered at a directions hearing with the Respondent’s consent (since I had not heard full argument on the issue) and that otherwise I would have to list another hearing in order to determine that issue, which did not seem to me advisable. I repeat that observation here.  But, in any event, Mr Snow’s submission is really that he disagrees with my decision on this point.  That is not a basis for my not continuing to hear the matter.

15. Mr Snow indicated to me that he believes that his financial circumstances have not been taken into account when orders have been made. As I have said, however, Mr Snow has requested or acquiesced in the various adjournments and the order to return the matter to conference. I do not see, therefore, that the Tribunal has acted unfairly in this regard. 

16. Mr Snow maintained that his difficult financial state is a matter that ought to be taken into account by the Tribunal. It seems to me, however, that the Tribunal cannot make orders simply out of sympathy with an Applicant and without consideration of the Respondent’s position.

17. At the 27 November 2019 directions hearing, Ms Odgers submitted a timeline of 24 January 2020 which, in the circumstances, seemed to me to be reasonable given the Christmas break, various absences in her client’s office, and the general pressures that the Respondent faces.  I made directions accordingly.

18. Finally, I do not think that there has been anything in my manner or in my actions or words that conveys contempt or offhandedness, and I believe I properly corrected Mr Snow for his inappropriate behaviour at one directions hearing (to which I have referred above).

19. Mr Snow also maintained that I had a power to reconstitute the Tribunal. Mr Snow maintains that as a delegate of the President of the Tribunal, I should exercise the President’s powers in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to reconstitute the Tribunal. I accept for these purposes that I am a delegate of the President. I am, however, a sessional Senior Member and do not regularly act to reconstitute the Tribunal. That task would fall normally to the full-time Deputy President (DP Britten-Jones) who heads the Adelaide Registry.

20. A more fundamental issue arises, however, in respect of the exercise of that power. I should not exercise that power, in my opinion, unless I believe that there is a proper ground for my not hearing the matter. In this regard I note that the apparent bias test requires the Tribunal to evaluate carefully its own conduct. Where an objective observer would perceive that a Tribunal member has given the impression, however inadvertently, that he or she may not decide the matter fairly, the member may properly disqualify himself or herself and, in fact, ought to do so. However, it is also the case that unless a member is so satisfied, he or she should not disqualify himself or herself simply to appease a party, so to speak, or to take an easy course. That is also a disservice to the impartial administration of justice. There are cases where the matter is, so to speak, “line ball” and a member may act on those occasions out of an abundance of caution. But leaving those cases aside, a member must be honest and clear in his or her assessment of the objective circumstances. I do not see anything in my conduct of this matter that would suggest I should recuse myself for apparent bias. As I do not perceive a proper basis that I should recuse myself, I see no basis on which I should exercise the power that I may technically have as a delegate to reconstitute the Tribunal.

21. Mr Snow also suggested I had failed to disclose to him that I knew Ms Odgers.  I do not know Ms Odgers: I have not met her or spoken with her outside the Tribunal hearing rooms.  Mr Snow indicated that I ought to have indicated to him that Ms Odgers was appearing before me in other matters as a departmental advocate.  I reject this submission quite firmly.  That departmental advocates appear before the Tribunal in multiple matters is a commonplace.

22. Mr Snow addressed me orally at some length, as was of course his right, and also in very detailed written submissions. I have read the submissions and I wish to say that if I have not analysed a particular matter, it is because I have formed the view that the matter is not of real substance. I have also tried to confine myself to the main points that Mr Snow has made and to deal with them as plainly as I can to keep these reasons within bounds.

23. Finally, Mr Snow indicated that he felt it was unfair that the hearing of the interlocutory application was not delayed until he had secured the services of an advocate. He has been unable to secure the services of one to date, I note.  I believed that it was important for the question of recusal to be dealt with promptly, and not delayed, and in the absence of Mr Snow’s being able to find an advocate to represent him− I understand he is waiting on possible AGD funding− it was appropriate to proceed in my opinion. 

24. I am content, however, to grant Mr Snow liberty to re-argue the question of my continuing to hear this matter through an advocate if and when he retains one.

25. My orders are:

    1.To refuse the Applicant’s application that I recuse myself or reconstitute the Tribunal;

    2.To grant liberty to Mr Snow to re-argue the question of my continuing to hear the matter through an advocate if he retains one.

26. Finally, I note that after I delivered my reasons orally, I drew Mr Snow’s attention to the question of his deferred application for additional data.  He informed me that his accountant had gone on maternity leave, and he was not in a position to advise the Tribunal if the deferred application would be pressed.  As matters presently stand, the substantive hearing on the merits is listed to take place on 23 March 2020.

58.     I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr N A Manetta, Senior Member.  

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Administrative Assistant Legal

Dated 5 March 2020

Date of hearing:	23 January 2020
Applicant:	In person
Representative for the Respondent:	Ms L Odgers, Department of Human Services