Snook v Department of Housing - [2025] WASC 84

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   SNOOK -v- DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING [2025] WASC 84
CORAM:   LUNDBERG J
HEARD:   12 & 14 MARCH 2025
DELIVERED          :   17 MARCH 2025
FILE NO/S:   CIV 1251 of 2025
PIPPA SNOOK
Plaintiff

AND

EX PARTE

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
Defendant

Catchwords:

Interlocutory injunctions - Relief sought arising out of residential tenancy agreement under the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA) - Notice of abandonment given to tenant by Housing Authority pursuant to s 76A of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA) - Magistrates Court vested with exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to s 12A of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA) - Whether Supreme Court has jurisdiction to grant relief - Proceedings seeking substantially the same relief on foot in the Magistrates Court

Legislation:

Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), s 36
Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA), s 12, s 12A, s 13, s 15, s 20, s 26, s 76A, s 77

Result:

Proceedings dismissed.

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff	:	In Person
Defendant	:	No Appearance

Solicitors:

Plaintiff	:	In Person
Defendant	:	No Appearance

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen’s Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd [1911] HCA 31; (1911) 12 CLR 398
Miles v Campus Living Villages Murdoch Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 350
Ng v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police [2019] WASCA 195
PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd [2015] HCA 36; (2015) 258 CLR 1
Re Culleton [2017] HCA 3; (2017) 91 ALJR 302
Re Nash [No 2] [2017] HCA 52
Snook v Magistrate Trevor Darge [No 2] [2024] WASC 91
Snook v Magistrate Trevor Darge [No 3] [2024] WASC 487
Snook v Roberts [2022] WASC 196

Table of Contents

A. Overview and summary

B. The plaintiff's claims in this Court

C. Pending proceedings in the Magistrates Court

D. Jurisdiction

Overview

The dispute is not a 'prescribed dispute'

Right of review to the Supreme Court

Challenge to the decision of a Registrar of the Magistrates Court

Relief is said to be supportive of the District Court proceedings

E. Conclusion

ATTACHMENT A Notices and letters issued by the Department of Communities

LUNDBERG J:

A. Overview and summary

The first duty of a Court is to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction.[1]
[1] Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd [1911] HCA 31; (1911) 12 CLR 398, 415 (Griffith CJ); Re Culleton [2017] HCA 3; (2017) 91 ALJR 302 [23] (Gageler J); and Re Nash [No 2] [2017] HCA 52; (2017) 263 CLR 443 [16] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ).
In the present case, which has been heard ex parte, it has been urged by the plaintiff that this Court has jurisdiction to grant injunctive and other relief in her favour, in connection with the residential tenancy agreement between the plaintiff and the Housing Authority, concerning premises in Beldon. That agreement is subject to the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA) (RTA).
The plaintiff is well-acquainted with the legal system, but is not a lawyer and is unrepresented. The Housing Authority, which is the lessor, is a body established under the Housing Act 1980 (WA), which forms part of the Department of Communities. The plaintiff has named the Department as the defendant, but nothing turns on this presently.
The plaintiff and the Housing Authority have some history together.
The plaintiff had previously challenged an application by the Housing Authority under the RTA for an order to terminate her tenancy agreement and for an order for possession. An order in favour of the lessor was obtained in the Magistrates Court in July 2023. The plaintiff then initiated review proceedings in this Court, which were ultimately successful.[2] Seaward J found the decision in the Magistrates Court was infected by a jurisdictional error and quashed the orders.[3] Seaward J issued her decision on 20 December 2024 and remitted the matter to the Magistrates Court. That dispute has been scheduled to again be heard in the Magistrates Court on 25 March 2025, which is only days away.
[2] This Court has jurisdiction to hear review proceedings from the Magistrates Court, in accordance with s 26 of the RTA and s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) (MCA)).
[3] Snook v Magistrate Trevor Darge [No 3] [2024] WASC 487 (Seaward J).
As it happens, in the wake of Seaward J's decision, the Housing Authority issued further notices under the RTA, contending that the plaintiff had abandoned the subject premises. Those notices were issued in January 2025 and, unless the notices are properly challenged, they can lead to termination of the tenancy agreement. The plaintiff denies she abandoned the premises. Rather, she was on holidays and says she had so informed the Housing Authority prior to the notices being issued.
Consistent with the legislative schema, by which the Magistrates Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine claims which can be brought under the RTA in respect of residential tenancy agreements, where the claim involves less than $10,000,[4] the plaintiff's first step was to file proceedings in the Magistrates Court to challenge the notices and the conduct of the lessor.
[4] RTA, s 12A(1).
The plaintiff initially filed a proceeding in that Court on 12 February, which was rejected by a Registrar of that Court. The plaintiff filed again on 18 February. The latter proceeding was accepted for filing and was served on the Housing Authority. It has been listed for a status conference, also on 25 March.
The plaintiff contends the urgency of this dispute demands an earlier hearing. The plaintiff has accordingly filed an originating motion in this Court seeking substantially the same relief as is claimed in the Magistrates Court.[5]
[5] Notice of originating motion dated 10 March 2025.
The matter was heard before me last week, on an urgent basis. At those hearings, the plaintiff communicated to this Court what appear to be genuine grievances arising from the conduct of the Housing Authority. In support of her grievances, the plaintiff filed extensive material including affidavit evidence. The plaintiff also made lengthy submissions.[6] The plaintiff has explained that the circumstances have had a serious impact on her personal interests and her property, and on her mental health.
[6] I refer to the emails received from the plaintiff as follows: email dated 11 March 2025, sent at 15:50pm; emails dated 12 March 2025, sent at 8:52am, 11:35am, 12:52pm, 12:56pm and 14:59pm; emails dated 13 March 2025, sent at 08:17am, 10:59am, 12:03pm and 12:55pm; and emails dated 14 March 2025, sent at 8:26am, 13:02pm, 14:02pm, 14:06pm, 14:11pm and 14:13pm.
On the evidence presented by the plaintiff, it is difficult not to have sympathy for her current predicament and the continuing impact of recent events. That sympathy, however, is no substitute for the absence of jurisdiction. As I indicated to the plaintiff at both hearings, I harboured significant doubts about this Court's jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by the plaintiff.
Having considered the submissions advanced by the plaintiff, I have formed the view that the plaintiff's claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court and the relief which is sought is, in my view, beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to grant.
Even if I am wrong about that, I would not exercise the discretion to grant relief in circumstances in which there is an extant proceeding between the same parties in another Court, seeking substantially the same relief, which is due to be heard in the near future. Indeed, at the hearing today, prior to delivery of these reasons, the plaintiff explained that she had commenced further proceedings in the Magistrates Court to protect her position.
I will therefore dismiss the matter.
The dismissal of the proceeding should not be taken as any criticism of the plaintiff. The matter will be dismissed by reason of an absence of jurisdiction, not because of a conclusion that the plaintiff's grievances lack merit. Indeed, on the material before me, the conduct of the Housing Authority and the Department calls for an explanation.
I will therefore direct that a copy of these reasons be provided to the State Solicitor's Office for provision to the Department, and I express the hope that the plaintiff's challenge to the most recent notices, which was filed in the Magistrates Court on 18 February and which is due to be heard on 25 March, is not rendered nugatory in the intervening period.

B. The plaintiff's claims in this Court

The plaintiff in the present proceeding is, or at least has been, a party to a tenancy agreement with the Housing Authority, in respect of a property in Beldon, which is subject to the provisions of the RTA. There is a considerable history to the disputes between the plaintiff and the Housing Authority and the Department, which can be found in the decisions of their Honours Justice Solomon and Seaward,[7] among other decisions of this Court.
[7] Snook v Roberts [2022] WASC 196 (Solomon J); Snook v Magistrate Trevor Darge [No 2] [2024] WASC 91 (Seaward J); and Snook v Magistrate Trevor Darge [No 3] (Seaward J).
The plaintiff has applied to this Court for urgent interlocutory relief which, at its core, challenges a notice issued by the Housing Authority under s 76A(1) of the RTA. Pursuant to s 76A(1), if a lessor suspects on reasonable grounds that a tenant has abandoned the residential premises, the lessor may give a written notice to the tenant terminating the agreement.
The material adduced by the plaintiff reveals that the Housing Authority issued a notice under s 76A(1) of the RTA on 22 January 2025, having earlier issued a notice under s 77(1) of the RTA. The latter notice purported to permit the Housing Authority to enter the premises on the basis it did not hear from the plaintiff within 24 hours after issuing that notice.
I have not heard from the Department at this stage. However, the circumstances in which these notices were issued strikes me as somewhat unusual. I make this observation because the notices were issued in the wake of the favourable decision obtained by the plaintiff from Seaward J just prior to Christmas last year. On 20 December 2024, on finding there had been a jurisdictional error, her Honour quashed an earlier decision made in the Magistrates Court arising from an application by the Housing Authority under s 71 of the RTA for an order to terminate the tenancy agreement and for an order for possession of the premises in Beldon.
Those proceedings in the Magistrates Court had been commenced in 2023, with orders ultimately made in favour of the Housing Authority. Those orders have now been quashed and the matter remitted to the Magistrates Court for hearing according to law on the bases identified at [163] of her Honour's reasons. It appears the proceedings have been set down for hearing on 25 March 2025, which is only a fortnight away.
At least on the materials available to me, following the delivery by Seaward J of her reasons and orders being made by her Honour to remit the matter, the plaintiff advised the Department in writing that she would be on holidays for much of January.[8] The plaintiff also informed the Department she intended to proceed with her proposed purchase of the Beldon property. That proposed purchase appears to have a long history.
[8] Letter to the Department of Communities dated 22 December 2024.
A flurry of activity then appears to have taken place, instigated by representatives of the Department. The plaintiff has adduced copies of the several notices and letters which were issued to the plaintiff over the 6 week period between 30 December 2024 and 3 February 2025. I have set those documents out in Attachment A to these reasons.
The plaintiff says that, having been away from the property, representatives of the Housing Authority have accessed the premises and changed the locks, undertaken work at the property including spraying, with the house having been damaged in the process and her personal items removed.
As I have said, the process of issuing these various notices to the plaintiff, and asserting control over the property to the exclusion of the plaintiff, so soon after the decision of this Court to quash the earlier decision and remit the matter for further hearing, appears unusual. I have not yet heard from the Department by way of explanation about these events as this matter has been heard ex parte.
By her present proceedings filed in this Court, the plaintiff seeks orders and relief along the following lines:[9]
[9] Noting that the motion itself is silent as to the orders sought and the grounds on which those orders are sought. The orders are set out in the minute of orders filed on 12 March 2025.
(a)to reinstate the locks on her personal property and her carport;
(b)to allow the plaintiff to reside at the premises pending the determination of matters in the Magistrates Court;
(c)to require the lessor to abide by the quiet enjoyment requirement in the RTA;
(d)alternatively, to require the lessor to give the plaintiff the keys to the property so she can attend to maintenance etc;
(e)to prevent removal of things from the property including the plaintiff's goods, trees, shipping container, etc;
(f)to preclude workman attending without 14 days' notice;
(g)to restrain or stay demolition or remediation works at the property, and precluding any access by representatives or employees of the Department;
(h)to require that all goods removed from the property be returned immediately, including the trailer;
(i)to order that, 'if the actions prove to be illegal and unfounded that they not use any records collected by the illegal entry'; and
(j)to prevent the 'utilities being changed to a business name not associated with the Department or any other name than' the plaintiff.

C. Pending proceedings in the Magistrates Court

On 12 February 2025, the plaintiff sought to commence proceedings in the Magistrates Court to challenge the actions of the Department, and in particular to set aside the notice of abandonment issued under s 76A of the RTA. The plaintiff attempted to file an application to set aside or vary an order (being a Form 16), which was rejected by a Registrar of that Court on 17 February 2025.[10] It was rejected, correctly in my view, because the incorrect form had been used and there were no extant proceedings in the Court to set aside or vary.
[10] Notice of Registrar's Refusal to Accept Documents – Form 61.
The plaintiff then filed fresh proceedings in the Magistrates Court on 18 February 2025, supporting by a detailed affidavit sworn by the plaintiff on the same date. By those proceedings, the plaintiff sought to challenge the notice of abandonment. In her supporting affidavit filed in the Magistrates Court, the plaintiff deposed that:[11]
I returned home recently to find that, in my absence, the Dept, with no grounds whatsoever, had decided to do an end run around the Supreme Court Orders, and retake the property, claiming it is abandoned. On return home from a holiday of which I had informed the Department, I found I was locked out of my home of 17 years at [address] in Beldon, with locks changed and notices that the house was repossessed due to abandonment. I had recently, yet again, won in the Supreme Court as detailed below and Dept knew that my occupancy was continuing and that I intended to complete the purchase of the property as previously agreed to in writing by [name] CEO Communities.
[11] Affidavit sworn by the plaintiff on 18 February 2025 [4].
The plaintiff informed me that the fresh proceedings filed by her were brought on for hearing on 5 March 2025, before a Registrar of the Magistrates Court, with a non-legal representative of the Department of Communities also present. Despite the plaintiff's submission to have the matter referred to a Magistrate for urgent determination, the Registrar ordered that the matter be adjourned to a status conference on 25 March 2025, the same date as the hearing of the remitted matter.
In the meantime, the plaintiff remains very anxious as to the state of the property in the Beldon and the possible deterioration of her legal position, as well as the asserted impact of all of these matters on her personal well-being.
With the context of the matter explained, I now turn to address whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the matter.

D. Jurisdiction

Overview

The jurisdiction of this Court, as a superior court of record, is wide and includes the conferral of power to make such orders, at least against the parties to the proceeding against whom final relief might be granted, as are needed to ensure the effective exercise of its jurisdiction.[12]
[12] PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd [2015] HCA 36; (2015) 258 CLR 1 [37] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ): Ng v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police [2019] WASCA 195 [25] (Murphy and Mitchell JJA).
That jurisdiction remains subject to statutory limitations. One such limitation relates to matters under the RTA. Section 12A(1) of the RTA provides that:
The Magistrates Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine a prescribed dispute and such disputes are not justiciable by any other court or tribunal.
The term 'prescribed dispute' is defined in s 12 of the RTA to mean:
…any matter that may be the subject of an application under this Act, other than an application made under this Act that is, or involves, a claim for an amount over the prescribed amount, but includes an application made under clause 8 of Schedule 1, irrespective of the amount claimed.[13]
[13] The sum of $10,000 is the 'prescribed amount' as defined in s 12 RTA. There is no basis to conclude the relief sought exceeds this amount.
By s 13(1) of the RTA, where a claim made under the legislation is for an amount over the prescribed amount, then 'any court that is competent to hear and determine a claim founded on contract for the amount of that claim has jurisdiction to hear and determine the application'.
Further, orders made by the Magistrates Court under the RTA are final and binding on the parties, and no appeals shall lie.[14] There are limited rights of review against orders made by the Magistrates Court under the RTA, where the 'Supreme Court is satisfied the Magistrates Court had or has no jurisdiction conferred by or under this Act in respect of the proceedings or that a party to the proceeding has been denied natural justice'.[15]
[14] RTA, s 26(1).
[15] RTA, s 26(2). See the review process set out in s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA).
At the conclusion of the hearing on 12 March 2025, I informed the plaintiff I was not then satisfied this Court had jurisdiction to grant the relief she sought. I allowed the plaintiff a further opportunity to file materials on the question of jurisdiction and adjourned the matter to the afternoon of 14 March 2025, for a further hearing. I also acceded to the plaintiff's application that the proceedings remain ex parte.
I received further, detailed material from the plaintiff on 13 and 14 March 2025, and listened attentively to her arguments at the resumed hearing on 14 March 2025. I remain unpersuaded this Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief which is sought, which I consider falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court.
The plaintiff has identified various bases on which this Court might find jurisdiction. It is, with respect, unnecessary to address all of the specific arguments raised by the plaintiff. I will deal with the principal contentions in turn.

The dispute is not a 'prescribed dispute'

The plaintiff has contended that the dispute which she agitates in this Court is not a 'prescribed dispute', by reason that it involves a claim in excess of the 'prescribed amount'. The 'prescribed amount' is $10,000. The plaintiff points to her claim for compensation against the Housing Authority, which she says would exceed this quantum. I am not, even arguably, satisfied that the quantum reaches this level.
The compensation claim, which lacks specificity, is found in the documents which the plaintiff lodged with the Magistrates Court. Within those documents, the plaintiff claimed an order 'for compensation (costs to be submitted) for loss and consequential costs and loss'.[16] No equivalent order can be found in the minute of proposed orders lodged with this Court on 12 March 2025. The plaintiff nonetheless says that is one of the claims she wishes to agitate in this Court.
[16] Order 15 of the orders lodged with the Magistrates Court.
In substance, the dispute raised by the originating motion filed in this Court concerns the plaintiff's challenge to the notices issued by the Department in January 2025. It is in this respect that the plaintiff seeks urgent interlocutory relief. Any attempt to convert these proceedings into a compensation claim would be strained and artificial, in my view. Given the course of matters, I consider such an approach would be a colourable attempt to secure jurisdiction. In any event, as noted, I am not persuaded this matter exceeds the prescribed amount. I therefore reject the plaintiff's contention that the proceeding does not involve a 'prescribed dispute'.

Right of review to the Supreme Court

As earlier noted, there are limited rights upon which parties may seek to review decisions of the Magistrates Court, through proceedings in the Supreme Court.
There are no evident circumstances here which would even arguably suggest the plaintiff could exercise a right of review pursuant to s 36 of the MCA.
Had I been satisfied an arguable basis for review was available, it would have been open for this Court to consider whether to grant relief on the merits, subject to the plaintiff commencing the correct proceedings. As to which, I refer to the pragmatic approach adopted by Pritchard J in Miles v Campus Living Villages Murdoch Pty Ltd.[17]

Challenge to the decision of a Registrar of the Magistrates Court

[17] Miles v Campus Living Villages Murdoch Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 350 (Pritchard J).

To the extent to which the plaintiff wishes to challenge the decision of a Registrar of the Magistrates Court, any such decision is amenable to an appeal to a Magistrate pursuant to s 13B of the RTA. No such appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. Filing an appeal would be the most appropriate course to follow.
In any event, I see no basis upon which the Registrar's orders made on 5 March 2025, or the earlier refusal to accept documents on 17 February 2025, might be amenable to challenge, whether by review in this Court pursuant to s 36 of the MCA or otherwise.

Relief is said to be supportive of the District Court proceedings

The plaintiff also points to her proceedings in the District Court of Western Australia. I understand the plaintiff filed proceedings against the Director General of the Department in the District Court.[18] Among other things, the plaintiff sought an order for specific performance of a contract to buy the Beldon property, which the plaintiff says came into existence through an exchange of correspondence.
[18] District Court No. CIV 98 of 2023.
The plaintiff has submitted that this Court may have jurisdiction to grant the relief she has sought in the present proceedings on the basis that such relief would be ancillary or supportive of the ultimate relief the plaintiff claims in the District Court proceedings.
The plaintiff's reliance on the proceedings in the District Court, to afford this Court jurisdiction, is problematic. I say this because those proceedings were dismissed in November 2024 on the basis the case had been inactive for at least 6 months. Admittedly, it appears the plaintiff has since then applied to set aside the dismissal. That application is due to be heard by a Registrar of the District Court on 3 April 2025.
The fact those proceedings have been dismissed, albeit subject to an application to resuscitate them, renders any attempt to rely on those proceedings to afford this Court jurisdiction as hopeless, in my respectful view.
In any event, to the extent to which the plaintiff seeks relief which is ancillary to those proceedings, the proper venue for any such interim or interlocutory relief is in the District Court. It is that Court which is (or may be) seized of the dispute and which will have full visibility of the issues arising.

E. Conclusion

Fundamentally, the relief which the plaintiff now seeks from this Court, as the facts recited in these reasons make clear, are matters which should properly be pursued in the Magistrates Court in the first instance. That Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a notice issued under s 76A of the RTA and, further, such disputes 'are not justiciable by any other court or tribunal'.
A Magistrate hearing such a matter is vested with broad powers under s 15 and s 20 of the RTA, including to restrain conduct in breach of the tenancy agreement.[19]
[19] RTA, s 15(2)(a) and s 15(3).
I am thus not persuaded this Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief which is sought, which I consider falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court.
In any event, even if I was persuaded this Court had the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the relief sought by the plaintiff (and I am not), the existence of pending proceedings in the Magistrates Court, which are due to be heard on 25 March 2025, at the same time as the remitted proceedings, represents a weighty factor against the intervention by this Court and the grant of any such relief.
It is entirely more appropriate that all of these matters be heard by a single judicial officer, seized of all issues, rather than having them fragmented across different Courts and different judicial officers. That is simply inefficient and wasteful of resources.
I will therefore dismiss the proceedings and will order accordingly.

ATTACHMENT A
Notices and letters issued by the Department of Communities

Date	Notice or Letter
30 December 2024	Notice of proposed entry to premises, being a Form 19, issued by the Department indicating an inspection would be undertaken on 22 January 2025.
31 December 2024	Letter sent by the Department to the plaintiff stating that her rent would be unchanged.
31 December 2024	Letter sent by the Department to the plaintiff outlining the rental arrears owed by the plaintiff, in the amount of $10,965.93, noting that a failure to complete the enclosed form would result in full market rent being applied and 'the continuation of Court and Eviction proceedings' (to which the plaintiff appears to have responded by letter dated 12 January 2025).
21 January 2025	Notice to the tenant of abandonment of premises, issued by the Department, being a Form 12 issued under s 77 of the RTA.
22 January 2025	Notice of termination to the tenant of premises abandoned, being a Form 13, issued by the Department under s 76A of the RTA.[20]
22 January 2025	Letter from the Department to the plaintiff indicating that representatives of the Department had attended the property on 22 January 2025 and gained access, and thereafter changed the locks and secured the property.
29 January 2025	Letter sent by the Department to the plaintiff indicating the matters on the property requiring attention and maintenance, stating that a further visit would be undertaken on 26 February 2025.
3 February 2025	Letter sent by the Department to the plaintiff stating that the plaintiff was responsible for various items of maintenance on the property with a total amount of $1,489.80 charged to her account (referring to a decision made in this regard on 30 January 2025 which was internally reviewed on 31 January 2025).

[20] The Department issued the notice under cover of a letter dated 22 January 2025 stating that the Housing Authority was now proceeding with action to terminate the tenancy, and informing the plaintiff she had 7 days to apply to the Court to dispute the notice, failing which she would be taken to have abandoned the premises.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
IR
Associate to the Hon Justice Lundberg
17 MARCH 2025