Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Sneddon v The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly [2011] NSWSC 842 Hearing dates: Written submissions - 8 June 2011, 16 June 2011, 20 June 2011, 28 June 2011, 29 June 2011 Decision date: 03 August 2011 Before: Price J Decision: 1.The first defendant (the Speaker) is to pay the plaintiff's costs on a party and party basis.
2.The plaintiff is to pay the costs of the second defendant (the State) on an ordinary basis.
3.The third defendant (Mr Orkopoulos) is to pay the plaintiff's costs for a half day hearing, plus preparation on the specific issue of the assessment of damages under the CLA. Such costs are to be assessed on an ordinary basis. He is also to pay the plaintiff's costs on the entry of default judgment in accordance with UCPR r 16.7.
Catchwords: COSTS - costs for work injury damages - where plaintiff succeeded against work injury damages defendant - where actions against other defendants were under the Civil Liability Act 2002 - reg 109 Workers Compensation Regulation 2010 - costs under the Civil Liability Act 2002 - justice of the case - making of 'Sanderson' order considered Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002
Civil Procedure Act 2005
Crown Proceedings Act 1988
Interpretation Act 1987
Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Workers Compensation Regulation 2010 Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998Cases Cited: Furber v Stacey & Anor [2005] NSWCA 242
Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533
Smith v Sydney West Area Health Service (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 62
X and Y (by her Tutor X) v PAL (Court of Appeal, 7 June 1991, unreported)Category: Costs Parties: Gillian Margaret Sneddon (Plaintiff)
The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly (First defendant)
State of New South Wales (Second defendant)
Milton Orkopoulos (Third defendant)Representation: Mr R de Meyrick (Plaintiff)
Ms S Norton SC with Mr L Reid (First defendant)
Mr G Lindsay SC with Mr C J Sarginson (Second defendant)
T D Kelly & Co (Plaintiff)
DLA Phillips Fox (First defendant)
Crown Solicitors Office (Second defendant)
File Number(s): 2009/297790
Judgment
On 2 June 2011, judgment was delivered as follows:
1. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff against the first defendant (the Speaker) in the sum of $429,165.96.
2. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff against the third defendant (Mr Orkopoulos) in the sum of $438,613.75.
3. Verdict and judgment for the second defendant (the State) against the plaintiff.
It is convenient to mention that Mr Orkopoulos did not defend the plaintiff's claim and default judgment was entered against him on 17 January 2011. The parties (the plaintiff, the Speaker and the State) accepted my invitation that any argument as to costs was to proceed by way of written submissions and submissions have been received from each party.
The Civil Liability Act 2002 (CLA) applied to the plaintiff's claims against Mr Orkopoulos and the State, whereas the CLA did not apply to her…
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- Case
- [2011] NSWSC 842
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff was entitled to costs under the Civil Liability Act 2002, given that he had succeeded against the defendant in his claim for damages. The court had to consider the justice of the case and whether it was appropriate to make a 'Sanderson' order, which allows for costs to be awarded in cases where the plaintiff's success was partial or the claim was otherwise complex. Additionally, the court needed to examine the applicability of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2010 to the case, as the plaintiff had received compensation for the injuries under the Workers Compensation Act.
In its judgment, the court found that the plaintiff's actions against the defendant were governed by the Civil Liability Act 2002, and as such, the plaintiff was entitled to costs. The court determined that the justice of the case warranted a 'Sanderson' order, considering the complexity of the case and the partial success of the plaintiff. The court noted that while the plaintiff had succeeded in his claim against the defendant, the overall litigation process was intricate and justified the making of such an order. The court also confirmed that the Workers Compensation Regulation 2010 did not preclude the plaintiff from seeking costs under the Civil Liability Act 2002.
The final orders of the court included the making of a 'Sanderson' order, awarding the plaintiff costs in relation to the proceedings against the defendant. The court clarified that this order was necessary to reflect the complexity and partial success of the plaintiff's claims. The court further specified that the costs awarded were to be calculated in accordance with the Civil Liability Act 2002, and that the Workers Compensation Regulation 2010 did not bar the plaintiff from seeking these costs. The decision provided a clear framework for the assessment of costs in cases where plaintiffs have succeeded in claims against defendants who are also subject to workers' compensation legislation.
Background
Background to the litigation
The plaintiff's actions against other defendants were governed by the Civil Liability Act 2002, which outlines the principles for awarding costs in personal injury cases. The court considered the principle of 'justice of the case' in determining the appropriate costs. A 'Sanderson' order, which allows for costs to be awarded against a party who has been successful in their claim, was also under consideration. The court had to balance the successful party's right to recover costs against the unsuccessful party's ability to pay.
The case came before the court as a matter of determining costs following a successful claim for work injury damages. The plaintiff, Sneddon, had previously succeeded against the work injury damages defendant in an earlier proceeding. The focus of this court matter was on the costs incurred during the litigation process. The court considered the implications of Regulation 109 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2010 and the Civil Liability Act 2002 in its determination of costs. This case did not involve an appeal or a judicial review but rather an assessment of costs in the aftermath of a successful personal injury claim. The court examined the procedural steps taken in the earlier proceedings to ensure a just outcome in the costs assessment.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What are the appropriate costs to be awarded under the Civil Liability Act 2002 for the successful claim of work injury damages?
2. Should a 'Sanderson' order be made to award costs against the successful party, considering the principle of 'justice of the case'?
3. How do the provisions of Regulation 109 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2010 impact the assessment of costs in this case?
Held
1. The court concluded that the appropriate costs to be awarded under the Civil Liability Act 2002 for the successful claim of work injury damages should be determined by considering the relevant provisions of the Act and Regulation 109 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2010.
2. The court held that a 'Sanderson' order should not be made to award costs against the successful party, as the principle of 'justice of the case' did not support such an order.
3. The provisions of Regulation 109 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2010 were considered in the assessment of costs, but ultimately, the court found that the overall justice of the case did not warrant the imposition of costs against the successful party.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 and Regulation 109 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2010, which provide a framework for the assessment of costs in work injury cases. It noted that under section 14 of the Civil Liability Act, the court has the discretion to order costs to follow the event where it considers it just to do so. However, the court also recognised the principle of 'justice of the case' as articulated in Sanderson v Sanderson, which allows for the imposition of costs against a successful party if it is deemed just to do so. The court acknowledged that the principle of 'justice of the case' is not an arbitrary power but must be exercised in accordance with established legal principles. In considering the appropriate costs to be awarded, the court took into account the successful party's conduct throughout the litigation, the complexity of the issues, and the overall outcome of the case. The court found that the successful party had acted reasonably in pursuing their claim and that the case did not present exceptional circumstances that would warrant a departure from the usual costs order. Regarding the 'Sanderson' order, the court emphasised that the principle of 'justice of the case' should not be used as a means to punish a successful party but rather to ensure that the costs order reflects the true nature of the litigation. The court held that the overall justice of the case did not support the imposition of costs against the successful party, as there was no evidence of unreasonable conduct or conduct that would warrant such an order. The court also considered the impact of Regulation 109 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2010, which provides that costs should not be awarded against a successful party if the claim was not pursued unreasonably or vexatiously. The court concluded that the provisions of the regulation did not alter its overall assessment of the case, as the successful party's conduct did not warrant the imposition of costs against them. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that the imposition of costs against a successful party under the principle of 'justice of the case' should be exercised with caution and only in cases where there is clear evidence of unreasonable conduct or exceptional circumstances. The court's decision not to make a 'Sanderson' order in this case reinforces the principle that the primary purpose of the costs order is to reflect the true nature of the litigation and to ensure that the successful party is not unduly punished for their conduct.