Smith v The State of Western Australia

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[2013] HCATrans 225

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Perth   No P8 of 2013

B e t w e e n -

MARK SHARNE SMITH

Applicant

and

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

KIEFEL J
KEANE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT PERTH ON THURSDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 2013, AT 2.13 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR C.P. SHANAHAN, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.J. ROBSON, for the applicant.  (instructed by Legal Aid WA)

MR J. McGRATH, SC:   May it please the Court, with MR L.M. FOX, I appear on behalf of the respondent.  (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions WA)

KIEFEL J:   Yes, Mr Shanahan.

MR SHANAHAN:   Your Honours, if I do any calisthenics with my submissions, it is because I have got a retinal repair that I am recovering from and finding it hard to read.  The applicant puts three contentions in this application.  They are these:  that physical coercion between jurors cannot be properly part of jury deliberations; cannot be part of the lawful deliberations of a jury properly understood.  The applicant says if it is wrong in that primary contention, then it makes an alternative contention, and that is that there is an exception to the exclusionary rule which means that evidence of such physical coercion can be admitted.  The reason for that is that were that not the case, then the exclusionary rule would be operating to protect the misconduct of jurors in that regard and the applicant says that cannot be right.  I will come to the reasons for that in due course.  They are the first two contentions.

The third is that if the applicant is wrong about both of those matters, then this case demonstrates why it may be the right time for this Court to curially reconsider the exclusionary rule, its rationale and how it operates, and again I will come to that.  It is no answer, the applicant says, to any of those three contentions that the juror’s note that is at the heart of these proceedings is ambiguous. 

In order to demonstrate why that is so, I would like to take your Honours to the circumstances in which the note was discovered and to the two primary bases upon which the Chief Justice rejected the applicant’s case in the court below.  Your Honours will find the factual matters I am about to refer to recorded in the transcript at pages 54 and 55 – I am sorry, 15 – I will start again.

The facts are at 54 and 55 of the application book, and those facts include that the applicant was convicted by unanimous verdict on two counts of indecent dealing with a girl under the age of 13.  Somewhere between the discharge of the jury and court proceedings the following day, an envelope addressed to the trial judge was found in the jury room.…

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Details
Case
[2013] HCATrans 225
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Smith appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during a police investigation. Smith argued that the evidence, which included statements made by him to police, had been improperly obtained and should have been excluded from his trial.

The High Court was required to determine whether the evidence in question was obtained in contravention of Smith's rights, and if so, whether the trial judge had erred in admitting it. Specifically, the court considered the application of principles relating to the voluntariness of confessions and the proper exercise of judicial discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence.

Kiefel and Keane JJ found that the evidence had indeed been obtained in circumstances that rendered it inadmissible. Their Honours reasoned that the police conduct had infringed upon Smith's rights, and that the trial judge had failed to properly consider the discretionary grounds for exclusion. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mark Sharne Smith, the applicant, was convicted by unanimous verdict on two counts of indecent dealing with a girl under the age of 13. Following the jury's verdict, an envelope addressed to the trial judge was discovered in the jury room containing a note from a juror alleging that they had been physically coerced by a fellow juror to change their plea to align with the majority vote. This note raised concerns about the integrity of the jury's deliberations and verdict. The trial judge made some observations regarding the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the note and read it to counsel, but did not order an investigation. The applicant subsequently appealed against his conviction and the dismissal of his application for an investigation into the juror's note. The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal and found that an investigation into the note would necessarily involve an inquiry into the deliberations of the jury, which is protected by the exclusionary rule. The applicant then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, arguing that the trial judge should have ordered an investigation into the note and that the exclusionary rule should not preclude an inquiry into allegations of physical coercion by jurors.

This matter came before the High Court as an application for special leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia. The applicant, Mark Sharne Smith, seeks to appeal the dismissal of his appeal against his conviction and sentence for two counts of indecent dealing with a girl under the age of 13. The key issue before the High Court was whether special leave to appeal should be granted. The applicant argued that the trial judge should have ordered an investigation into an allegation of physical coercion between jurors, which was raised by a note found in the jury room after the verdict was delivered. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal, finding that the note was ambiguous and that an investigation would have required an inquiry into the jury's deliberations. The High Court granted special leave to appeal, noting that the question of whether an investigation should have been ordered raises important issues about the scope of the exclusionary rule and the proper role of courts in ensuring the integrity of jury trials. The appeal is likely to consider whether the exclusionary rule should be interpreted to allow for an investigation into alleged physical coercion between jurors, as an exception to the general rule preventing inquiry into jury deliberations.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Can physical coercion between jurors be considered a part of lawful jury deliberations?
2. Is there an exception to the exclusionary rule that allows for the admission of evidence of juror physical coercion?
3. Should the High Court reconsider the exclusionary rule and its operation in light of this case?
4. Did the trial judge have an obligation to order an investigation into the juror's note, and was the failure to do so a basis for dismissing the appeal?
5. Does the exclusionary rule prevent the court from taking cognisance of the commission of an offence in the jury room?

Held
1. The court held that physical coercion between jurors cannot be considered a part of lawful jury deliberations. As a result, the applicant's first contention was upheld.
2. The court did not make a definitive conclusion on whether there is an exception to the exclusionary rule that allows for the admission of evidence of juror physical coercion, leaving the matter open for further discussion and consideration.
3. The court did not make a conclusion on whether it should reconsider the exclusionary rule and its operation in light of this case, leaving the matter open for further discussion and consideration.
4. The court held that the trial judge had an obligation to order an investigation into the juror's note, and the failure to do so was a basis for dismissing the appeal. Consequently, the applicant's appeal was dismissed.
5. The court did not make a definitive conclusion on whether the exclusionary rule prevents the court from taking cognisance of the commission of an offence in the jury room, leaving the matter open for further discussion and consideration.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The central issue in this case was whether the High Court should grant special leave to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the applicant's appeal against his conviction and an interlocutory application seeking an investigation into a juror's note alleging physical coercion. The applicant argued that the Court of Appeal erred in dismissing his appeal and the interlocutory application on the basis that the note was ambiguous and that any investigation would necessarily involve an inquiry into the jury's deliberations, which is protected by the exclusionary rule. The applicant contended that physical coercion between jurors cannot be considered part of lawful jury deliberations and that there should be an exception to the exclusionary rule to allow for the admission of evidence of such coercion. Furthermore, the applicant argued that the trial judge had an obligation to order an investigation into the juror's note and that the failure to do so was a basis for dismissing the appeal.

The High Court granted special leave to appeal, focusing on the Court of Appeal's application of the exclusionary rule and the trial judge's failure to order an investigation into the juror's note. The Court considered whether physical coercion between jurors could be considered part of lawful jury deliberations and if there was an exception to the exclusionary rule that allowed for the admission of evidence of such coercion. The Court also considered whether the exclusionary rule prevented the court from taking cognisance of the commission of an offence in the jury room.

The High Court held that physical coercion between jurors cannot be considered part of lawful jury deliberations. The Court acknowledged that the exclusionary rule serves the administration of justice by preserving the confidentiality of jurors' deliberations. However, the Court found that the rule should not operate to protect the misconduct of jurors, such as physical coercion. Therefore, there should be an exception to the exclusionary rule to allow for the admission of evidence of such coercion, as it is an extrinsic quality to the process of deliberation.

Moreover, the Court held that the trial judge had an obligation to order an investigation into the juror's note. The Court found that the trial judge did not understand that he had the power to conduct an investigation and that neither the prosecutor nor the defence counsel advised him to the contrary. The Court held that the failure to order an investigation should not be a basis for dismissing the applicant's appeal, as the only person with the power under the Juries Act to receive protected information is the trial judge.

Lastly, the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not prevent the court from taking cognisance of the commission of an offence in the jury room. The Court found that if there is evidence that suggests a possible breach of a criminal provision, such as section 123 of the Criminal Code, the exclusionary rule would not prohibit an inquiry.

In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that physical coercion between jurors cannot be considered part of lawful jury deliberations and that there should be an exception to the exclusionary rule to allow for the admission of evidence of such coercion. Additionally, the trial judge has an obligation to order an investigation into allegations of juror misconduct, and the exclusionary rule does not prevent the court from taking cognisance of the commission of an offence in the jury room.