JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: SMITH -v- THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PERTH & ANOR [2001] WASC 86
CORAM: MASTER SANDERSON
HEARD: 23 MARCH 2001
DELIVERED : 3 APRIL 2001
FILE NO/S: CIV 2588 of 2000
BETWEEN: CARMEL SMITH
Plaintiff
AND
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PERTH
First DefendantFATHER EDWARD PATRICK HEWITT
Second Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Application to strike out statement of claim - Sexual relationship alleged between priest and parishioner - Claim against Archbishiop who appointed parish priest - Claim alleging breach of duty and breach of fiduciary duty - Relationship between Archbishop and parishioner in relation to appointment
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Statement of claim struck out
Leave to replead refused
Judgment for first defendant against plaintiff
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr E V Gregoriadis
First Defendant : Mr J C Yeldon
Second Defendant : No appearance
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Corsers
First Defendant : Phillips Fox
Second Defendant : No appearance
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71
Clark v The Corporation of the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Brisbane (1998) 1 Qd R 26
Holgate v Lancashire Mental Hospitals Board (1937) 4 All ER 19
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41
Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256
Case(s) also cited:
Birtchnell v Equity Trustees, Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 384
Brunninghausen v Glavanics (1999) 46 NSWLR 538
Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609
Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112
Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia (2000) 174 ALR 97
Farrington v McBride & Partner [1985] NZLR 83
FWM v Mombourquette and Roman Catholic and Episcopal Corporation of Antigonish (1995) 28 CCLT (2d) 157
Illuzzi v Christian Outreach Centre [1997] QCA 204
Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549
Moses v The Diocese of Colorado 863 P 2d 310 (Colo 1993)
Paramasivam v Flynn (1998) 160 ALR 203
Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106
MASTER SANDERSON: This is the first defendant's application to strike out the plaintiff's statement of claim. During the course of submissions it became apparent that the plaintiff conceded that the statement of claim in its present form was defective and could not stand. The issue was whether the plaintiff should be given leave to replead or whether the action against the first defendant ought be struck out.
The statement of claim alleges that the plaintiff was at all material times a parishioner in the Maddington Parish of the Archdiocese of Perth. The second defendant was appointed by the first defendant as the parish priest at the Maddington Parish. It is pleaded (by par 4.1) that the first defendant "had control over the Second Defendant's employment status and workplace location…
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- Case
- [2001] WASC 86
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether a duty of care existed between the plaintiff and the Archbishop in relation to the appointment of the priest. This was a novel issue, as there were few cases that directly addressed whether a duty of care arose between a parishioner and an Archbishop. The court also needed to consider whether the Archbishop had a duty to control the priest's actions to prevent harm to the plaintiff.
The court found that no duty of care existed between the plaintiff and the Archbishop in relation to the appointment of the priest. The court relied on the decision in Clark v The Corporation of the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Brisbane, where it was held that there was no common law duty on a Bishop of the Catholic Church to give advice to a communicant on spiritual matters. The court further noted that generally, no one is under a duty to control another's actions to prevent harm to a third party. The court held that the Archbishop did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff in relation to the appointment of the priest.
The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the Archbishop and ordered the plaintiff to pay the Archbishop's costs. The court found that the Archbishop had no duty to control the priest's actions, and therefore, no breach of duty or breach of fiduciary duty occurred. The court held that the plaintiff's claim was without merit and dismissed it with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There have been only a limited number of cases where the question of whether or not a duty of care arises as between a parishioner and an Archbishop or Archdiocese has been considered. The most relevant of these is Clark v The Corporation of the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Brisbane (1998) 1 Qd R 26. The facts in that case and the cause of action propounded were materially different from the present. What was alleged against the Archdiocese was that certain representations had been made about ecclesiastical matters which were wrong. The action brought by the plaintiff sought damages for negligent misstatement. Williams J was not satisfied that the pleading (the case involved the return of a pleading summons) disclosed a cause of action. His Honour said (at 35):"The alleged breach of duty in this case clearly relates to a spiritual matter. All the 'advice' referred to in the proposed statement of claim is advice on a spiritual matter - intercommunion - and necessarily involves the proper construction of the constitution and rules (Canons) of the Catholic Church. There is clearly no common law duty on a Bishop of the Catholic Church to give advice to a communicant on spiritual matters. If any such duty does exist it is derived from Canon law alone; that is undoubtedly why Canon law is incorporated extensive into the proposed pleading.There is always a temptation to say that there is a general duty not to give negligent advice which foreseeably could cause psychiatric injury to the recipient. But as noted above the law still requires the existence of a duty situation before the tort is established. If one were to hold that there was a relevant duty situation recognised by the common law in circumstances such as exist here, one would also have to recognise that such duty situation carried wider implications. If, as the plaintiff asserts here in the proposed statement of claim, the duty encompassed an obligation to direct the plaintiff to particular Canons and a continuing obligation to offer further explanation and clarification of advice previously given, it must follow that the courts would have jurisdiction to enforce those obligations and to grant relief where there was a threatened breach. That would be tantamount to secular courts enforcing Canon law." What is significant about this case is that the plaintiff seeks to render the first defendant liable for the actions of the second defendant. In other words, it is said that, the first defendant breached his duty to the plaintiff by not controlling the actions of the second defendant. As a general rule, no one is under a duty of controlling another to prevent his doing damage to a third. In Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256 Dixon J (as he then was) put the position as follows (at 262):"The general rule is that one man is under no duty of controlling another man to prevent his doing damage to a third. There are, however, special relations which are the source of a duty of this nature. It appears now to be recognised that it is incumbent upon a parent who maintains control over a young child to take reasonable care so to exercise that control as to avoid conduct on his part exposing the person or property of the others to unreasonable danger. Parental control, where it exists, must be exercised with due care to prevent the child inflicting intentional damage on others or causing damage by conduct involving unreasonable risk of injury to others. …The standard of care is that of a reasonably prudent man, and whether it has been fulfilled is to be judged according to all the circumstances including the practices and usages prevailing in the community and the common understanding of what is practicable and what is to be expected."