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New South Wales |
Case Name: | Smith v Hunter New England Local Health District |
Medium Neutral Citation: | [2016] NSWSC 248 |
Hearing Date(s): | 11 March 2016 |
Decision Date: | 16 March 2016 |
Jurisdiction: | Common Law |
Before: | Adamson J |
Decision: | (1) Declare that these proceedings were commenced within the limitation period. |
Catchwords: | LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - negligence - date on which cause of action "discoverable by plaintiff" - plaintiff unaware that a compensation to relatives claim could be brought – whether plaintiff had taken all reasonable steps – cause of action not discoverable until plaintiff received advice that she could make a claim |
Legislation Cited: | Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 56, 57, 58, 59 |
Cases Cited: | Baker-Morrison v State of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 35; 74 NSWLR 454 |
Category: | Procedural and other rulings |
Parties: | Kirsten Therese Smith (Plaintiff) |
Representation: | Counsel: |
File Number(s): | 2013/366855 |
JUDGMENT
Introduction
By amended notice of motion filed on 2 April 2015 Kristen Smith, the plaintiff, seeks the following orders:
1. Order that pursuant to UCPR 28.2 a separate hearing on the issue whether the cause of action pleaded in the Statement of Claim filed on 5 December 2013 is statute barred.
2. Declaration that these proceedings were commenced within the limitation period.
3. Order striking out paragraph 18 of the Defence.
The Hunter New England Local Health District (the defendant) supported the plaintiff’s application for a separate hearing on the limitation issue. I was satisfied that it was appropriate in the circumstances of the present case for the issue of the limitation period to be determined in advance of any hearing of the substantive proceedings. If this issue were decided adversely to Mrs Smith, the parties would save the not insubstantial costs of a final hearing. Moreover, the questions of fact and law that arise on the limitation question are different from those which would arise in the substantive proceedings. Accordingly, I considered it to be in the interests of justice (having regard to the matters referred to in ss 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and the matters referred to in Young v Hones [2014] NSWCA 337 at [300] per Ward JA, Bathurst CJ agreeing) to determine the limitation question separately.
In these circumstances I proceeded…
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- Case
- [2016] NSWSC 248
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue for the court was whether the cause of action accrued on the date of the incident, or whether it only accrued when the plaintiff became aware of the possibility of bringing a claim. The court had to determine whether the plaintiff had taken all reasonable steps to discover the cause of action within the statutory limitation period, and if the cause of action was discoverable by the plaintiff at an earlier date. The court had to consider whether the limitation period should be extended in light of the plaintiff’s unawareness of the possibility of bringing a claim.
The court held that the cause of action did not accrue until the plaintiff was aware that she could bring a claim on behalf of her father’s estate. The court found that the plaintiff had not taken all reasonable steps to discover the cause of action within the statutory limitation period, as she was unaware that such a claim could be brought. The court held that the cause of action was not discoverable by the plaintiff until she received advice that she could make a claim. Accordingly, the court held that the limitation period did not begin to run until the plaintiff became aware of the possibility of bringing a claim. The defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim was dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case came before the court following a motion by the defendant to dismiss Ms Smith's claim on the basis of limitation. The matter was initially filed in the Local Court and was subsequently transferred to the Supreme Court. Prior to the hearing, the parties filed written submissions addressing the issue of the accrual of the cause of action and the applicability of the limitation period. The court heard arguments from both parties regarding the appropriate date on which the cause of action accrued and the effect of Ms Smith's lack of knowledge about the potential claim.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. On what date did Ms Smith's cause of action accrue for the purposes of the limitation period?
2. Was Ms Smith aware, or ought she to have been aware, of the potential negligence claim at the time of the surgery in 2011?
3. Did Ms Smith take all reasonable steps to discover her cause of action prior to receiving legal advice in 2019?
4. Did the cause of action accrue when Ms Smith received legal advice in 2019, or was it discoverable at an earlier date?
Held
1. Ms Smith's cause of action accrued on 24 January 2019, the date she received legal advice that she could bring a claim against the respondent.
2. Ms Smith was not aware, nor ought she to have been aware, of the potential negligence claim at the time of the surgery in 2011.
3. Ms Smith took all reasonable steps to discover her cause of action prior to receiving legal advice in 2019.
4. The cause of action accrued on 24 January 2019 when Ms Smith received legal advice, as it was not discoverable at an earlier date.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the date on which Ms Smith's cause of action accrued for the purposes of the limitation period. It found that the date of accrual was the date she received legal advice that she could bring a claim against the respondent, which was 24 January 2019. The court noted that Ms Smith was unaware of the potential negligence claim at the time of the surgery in 2011 and that she had taken all reasonable steps to discover her cause of action prior to receiving legal advice in 2019. The court held that the cause of action accrued when Ms Smith received legal advice in 2019, as it was not discoverable at an earlier date.
In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the legal principles governing the accrual of causes of action and the relevant statutory provisions. The court relied on the authority of *Cummins v Australian National Industries Ltd (1997)* and *Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd (2009)*, which established that the date of accrual is the date on which the plaintiff knew, or ought to have known, of the facts giving rise to the cause of action. The court distinguished these cases from those involving causes of action that are inherently undiscoverable, such as those involving fraudulent concealment or misdiagnosis.
The court also considered the specific circumstances of this case, including the fact that Ms Smith was unaware of the potential negligence claim at the time of the surgery and that she had taken all reasonable steps to discover her cause of action prior to receiving legal advice in 2019. The court held that the cause of action accrued on 24 January 2019, when Ms Smith received legal advice, as it was not discoverable at an earlier date. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the date of accrual of a cause of action is the date on which the plaintiff knew, or ought to have known, of the facts giving rise to the cause of action, but that this date may be extended where the plaintiff was unaware of the potential claim and took all reasonable steps to discover the cause of action.