Smith v Farren-Price

Case [2004] QDC 225


DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Smith  v Farren-Price [2004] QDC 225
PARTIES:

KEITH SMITH

Plaintiff

and

JOHN FARREN-PRICE

Defendant    

FILE NO: 1168/2001
PROCEEDING: Claim
ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court Southport

DELIVERED ON: 23 April 2004
DELIVERED AT: Southport
HEARING DATE: 18, 19, 22, 23 & 29 March  & 1 April 2004
JUDGE: Robin QC DCJ  
ORDER: Claim and counterclaim dismissed
CATCHWORDS:

DEFAMATION – cross claims by lot owners in a faction-ridden body corporate - defamatory material published only within body corporate on occasions of qualified privilege – absence of good faith not shown

Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1977

Defamation Act 1889

Cases cited:

Anthony v Rockett [1999] QCA 434

Associated Newspapers Ltd v Dingle [1964] AC 371; (1962) 2 All ER 737
Body Corporate for “Surfers Waters” v M & G Angland, Appeal 761 of 1999, 10 March 2000; [2000] QDC 034
Mayes v Hodson (1993) 79 LGERA 65, Appeal (1993) 173 LSJS 2000

Sorenson v MacNamara [2004] 1 Qd R 82
Television New Zealand Limited v Ah Koy [2002] 2NZLR 616

COUNSEL: Mr P Morrow for the plaintiff, self-represented from
29 March 2004    
Self-represented for the defendant   
SOLICITORS: Czaus Lawyers for the plaintiff, until 29 March 2004 
Self-represented for the defendant
  1. These are the detailed reasons for orders made on 1 April 2004 at the conclusion of a six-day trial dismissing both the plaintiff, Mr Smith’s claim and the defendant, Mr Farren-Price’s counterclaim.  The latter was self-represented throughout, although he had lawyers until some time before trial.  Mr Smith (having expended at least $25,000, as he told the Court) dispensed with legal representation after the fourth day.  In consequence, closing addresses were devoid of legal argument.  Fortunately, the lawyers’ efforts had resulted in the respective claims and responses being effectively pleaded, so that the issues were properly identified.  Once both sides had come to be self-represented, arguments about admissibility of evidence boded to become unmanageable.  The expedient was resorted to of receiving all the evidence tendered, on the basis that any necessary determination of the admissibility of particular evidence or documents could be made in due course by the Court.  (The most troublesome category was material tendered by Mr Smith in a “rebuttal” case which his Counsel had earlier reserved a “right” to present, calculated to discredit Mrs Jill Peters, who was not merely a witness for the defendant: she was obviously the person seen by          Mr Smith and his supporters as the cause of just about everything that went wrong, at least in the sense that her alleged deficiencies in controlling the on-site caretaker/managers, and otherwise, justified the making of numerous complaints and challenges.)

  1. The plaintiff was quick to court, filing his claim and statement of claim in his defamation action based on publications by the defendant dated 10 November 2001, 14 November 2001 and 20 November 2001 on 28 November 2001.  The context is “unhappy differences” among the owners of lots in the Kings Row South Community Title Scheme 11397, which is the…

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AGLC
Smith v Farren-Price [2004] QDC 225
Case
[2004] QDC 225
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter involved a dispute between two lot owners within a body corporate, Smith and Farren-Price, over alleged defamatory statements made during a heated dispute over the management of the body corporate. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining the validity of cross claims of defamation made by both parties. Smith alleged that Farren-Price defamed her by circulating emails within the body corporate, while Farren-Price counterclaimed that Smith had similarly defamed him. The court was required to determine whether the alleged defamatory statements were indeed defamatory, whether the publication of these statements was protected by qualified privilege, and whether the privilege was abused by the absence of good faith.

The court addressed whether the statements in question were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. It found that the alleged defamatory statements did indeed have the potential to lower the plaintiffs in the estimation of right-thinking members of the body corporate. The court then examined whether the publication of these statements fell within the scope of qualified privilege, specifically the occasion of absolute or qualified privilege. The court concluded that the occasion of qualified privilege was applicable, as the statements were published within the context of the body corporate's management and operations. Furthermore, the court held that there was no evidence presented to demonstrate that the privilege was abused by the absence of good faith.

As a result of the court's findings, both the claim and counterclaim were dismissed. The court determined that the alleged defamatory statements were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, but their publication was protected by qualified privilege and there was no evidence of an abuse of that privilege. The court's decision highlights the importance of the absence of good faith in defamation cases involving the publication of allegedly defamatory material within a body corporate.

Orders

Orders of the court

Claim and counterclaim dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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