SMITH and VILLAGE MANAGEMENT PTY LIMTED
[2019] WASAT 70
•11 SEPTEMBER 2019
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: RETIREMENT VILLAGES ACT 1992 (WA)
CITATION: SMITH and VILLAGE MANAGEMENT PTY LIMTED [2019] WASAT 70
MEMBER: MS R PETRUCCI, MEMBER
HEARD: DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS
FINAL WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FILED ON 20 AUGUST 2019
DELIVERED : 11 SEPTEMBER 2019
FILE NO/S: CC 457 of 2019
BETWEEN: YVONNE BARBARA SMITH
Applicant
AND
VILLAGE MANAGEMENT PTY LIMTED
Respondent
Catchwords:
Retirement village - Standing - Preliminary issue - Jurisdiction - Resident - Residence contract - Service contract - Statutory interpretation - Whether residency deed is a service contract for the purposes of s 56(1)(b) - Whether dispute arises between parties to a service contract - Payroll tax
Legislation:
Retirement Villages Act 1992 (WA), s 3, s 47(2), s 56, s 56(1), s 56(1)(b), s 56(4), s 57A, s 57A(2), s 57A(4)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 39(1), s 39(1)(d), s 39(1)(e), s 60(2)
Result:
Answer to preliminary question the matter raised by the application found not to be within jurisdiction
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | Mr Mark Smith (acting as representative) |
| Respondent | : | In Person |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | N/A |
| Respondent | : | N/A |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Hewitt and Dalesun Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] WASAT 5
Jones and Settlers Ridgewood Village Limited [2005] WASAT 62
Timberside Villas Management Pty Ltd v Parker [2005] WADC 246
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Introduction
In the early 1980s LLP WA Village Holdings Pty Ltd (LLP WA), prior to its acquisition by the Lendlease group, developed land located at 5254 Liege Street, Woodlands into the Parkland Villas Woodlands (Village), a retirement village subject to the provisions of the Retirement Villages Act 1992 (WA) (RV Act). The Village is made up of 185 units, 36 apartments and various communal amenities.
For reasons set out below the Tribunal accepts that the applicant in these proceedings is Ms Yvonne Barbara Smith (the applicant) and that Mr Mark Smith is the applicant's representative. Further, the Tribunal accepts that the respondent in these proceedings is Village Management Pty Limited (the respondent).
In or about 2010, the scheme by which the Village operates was updated by an undated document entitled 'Parkland Villas Woodlands Trust Deed' (the trust deed) between LLP WA, Mr Keith Roddick Bales as 'Trustee' and the respondent as the 'Manager'.
When a person comes into the Village, that person enters into a residency deed. The parties to that residency deed are LLP WA, the person coming into the Village, and the respondent.
For the 2018/19 financial year, the respondent has sought to pass on payroll tax (or at least a portion of the payroll tax) in the recurrent levies charged to residents of the Village. In previous years, the respondent did not seek to pass on the payroll tax.
The applicant disputes that the respondent can pass on the payroll tax in the recurrent levies charged to residents of the Village.
Procedural history
On 26 March 2019, the applicant's representative lodged an application on behalf of the applicant with the Tribunal seeking an order under s 57A(4) of the RV Act requiring the respondent to 'stop charging (and refund) payroll tax as an ongoing levy in our operating account'.
At the first directions hearing, the applicant's representative confirmed with the Tribunal that the residents of the Village had not passed a special resolution authorising the application to the Tribunal as required by s 57A(2) of the RV Act.
The Tribunal adjourned the proceeding to allow the applicant and her representative to consider their position.
On 15 April 2019, the applicant through her representative sought to amend the application to an application under s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act for a dispute arising between the parties to a service contract as follows:
I am now requesting that my Application now be considered under -
Retirement Villages Act 1992 S 56(1)(b) Application. Dispute between parties to a 'Service Contract'. Either party to a service contract may make an application in relation to the matter to SAT.
It will be my contention that our Residency Deed represents a 'service contract' and that with Lendlease Retirement Living imposing Payroll Tax and how they did it breaches the terms of this 'service contract'.
At the next directions hearing on 13 May 2019, the Tribunal ordered for the application to be amended as an application under s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act. Further, the usual orders were made programming the matter to a final hearing on 20 June 2019.
Preliminary issue
At the commencement of the final hearing, on 20 June 2019, the Tribunal directed that the following issue be determined as a preliminary issue (entirely on the documents pursuant to s 60(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act)):
Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction under s 56(1)(b) of the Retirement Villages Act 1992 (WA) to determine whether the respondent can include payroll tax in the recurrent charges payable by residents of the Parkland Villas - Woodlands Retirement Village?
Orders were made for the filing of written submissions by the parties on the preliminary issue.
Written submissions were duly filed by the applicant's representative and by the respondent. The final submission was received on 16 July 2019 at which time the Tribunal reserved its decision.
The applicant's representative's submissions supported the view that the application concerns a service contract to the extent required by s 56(1) of the RV Act, and therefore is within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
The respondent submitted that the answer to the preliminary issue is 'no', namely that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction and that the application should therefore be dismissed by the Tribunal.
Standing of the parties
Following the Tribunal reserving its decision on 16 July 2019, the Tribunal received further information via emails from both parties. The last of those emails was received on 29 July 2019.
It became clear from those emails that there was an issue of standing for both parties in the current proceeding. This was resolved on 20 August 2019, when the parties filed a proposed order by consent for the Tribunal to amend the proceeding to reflect the applicant as being 'Yvonne Barbara Smith' (rather than Mark Smith) and to reflect the respondent as being 'Village Management Pty Limited' (rather than Lend Lease Retirement Living). The Tribunal made orders on 21 August 2019 amending the names of the parties to reflect the parties' proposed order by consent.
Finally, the Tribunal accepted Mr Smith as the applicant's representative in these proceedings. The reasons for this are as follows.
It is clear from the residency deed filed by the respondent on 4 July 2019 that Mr Smith is not a party to that residency deed. Further, there is no other residency deed in place between the respondent and Mr Smith. That was acknowledged in a letter dated 11 July 2019 from Mr Bales to the applicant and Mr Smith, a copy of which was provided to the Tribunal.
The Tribunal finds that Mr Smith has particular knowledge or experience relevant to the matter as he is advocating the payroll tax issue on behalf of the applicant and other residents of the Village. The Tribunal accepts therefore for Mr Smith to be a representative for the applicant in these proceedings pursuant to s 39(1)(d) and (e) of the SAT Act. Relevantly, that provision includes:
(1)At a hearing in a proceeding before the Tribunal a party to the proceeding may appear in person or may be represented by another person, but a party cannot be represented by a person other than a legal practitioner unless –
…
(d)the person has particular knowledge or experience relevant to the matter that is being dealt with (other than experience obtained as or representing a party in another Tribunal proceeding); or
(e)the Tribunal agrees to that person representing the party, and any conditions imposed by the Tribunal are satisfied[.]
Documents before the Tribunal
In addition to the application, the Tribunal had the following documents before it:
(a)application for an estate by the applicant dated 18 August 2009;
(b)Parkland Villas Woodlands' sale contract dated 31 August 2009 between the applicant (Buyer) and Ms Irene Waters (Seller) for Villa 1 being more particularly described as one undivided 240th share in portion of Swan Location 2495 and Perth Shire Locations At and Au and being part of Lot 102 on Diagram 64086 and being the whole of the land described in Certificate of Title Volume 2117 Folio 229 (the Villa) together with the exclusive right to reside in the Villa pursuant to the residency deed;
(c)Parkland Villas Woodlands' residency deed between Fini Villages Pty Ltd, the applicant and the respondent dated 31 August 2009 (the residency deed).
(d)Parkland Villas Woodlands' residency deed template;
(e)the trust deed;
(f)Parkland Villas Woodlands' various draft budgets for 2018/19 and 2019/20;
(g)Lendlease retirement living corporate structure diagram abridged to show relevant entities as at 10 May 2018;
(h)letter from Mr Bales to the applicant and Mr Smith dated 11 July 2019;
(i)various emails between Mr Smith and respondent dated 16 July 2019 to 29 July 2019; and
(j)various emails between Mr Smith and the respondent and to the Tribunal dated 15 August 2019 to 21 August 2019.
The law
Section 56 of the RV Act deals with disputes in relation to service contracts. Relevantly, s 56(1) and (4) of the RV Act includes:
(1)Where
(a)a party to a service contract proposes a variation or cancellation in relation to any of the terms of a service contract, whether during or on the expiry of its term; or
(b)a dispute arises between the parties to a service contract,
either party to the service contract may make an application in relation to the matter to the State Administrative Tribunal.
….
(4)The State Administrative may upon application made under this section order
(aa)the variation or cancellation of any of the terms of the service contract, as specified in the order;
(a)specific performance of the service contract;
(b)the payment of a sum of money,
and make such orders as the State Administrative Tribunal considers appropriate and may declare that the order applies to such service contracts as are specified in the order and the order shall have effect accordingly.
Section 3 of the RV Act contains certain definitions. Relevantly, here a 'service contract' means:
… a contact between an administering body or former administering body of a retirement village and a resident for the provision to the resident of
(a)hostel care; or
(b)infirmary care; or
(c)medical or nursing services; or
(d)meal; or
(e)administrative and management services; or
(f)maintenance and repair services; or
(g)recreation services or amenities or entertainment services or amenities; or
(h)any other services
and any collateral agreement or document relating to the provision of any such service[.]
A 'residence contract' is taken to mean:
… a contract, agreement, scheme or arrangement which creates or gives rise to a right to occupy residential premises in a retirement village, and may take the form of a lease or licence[.]
An 'administering body' in relation to a retirement village means:
… the person by whom, or on whose behalf, the retirement village is administered and includes a person (other than a resident) who is the owner of land within the retirement village[.]
A 'retirement village' means:
… a complex of residential premises, whether or not including hostel units, and appurtenant land, occupied or intended for occupation under a retirement village scheme or used or intended to be used for or in connection with a retirement village scheme[.]
A 'retirement village scheme or scheme' means:
… a scheme established for retired persons or predominantly for retired persons, under which
(a)residential premises are occupied in pursuance of a residential tenancy agreement or any other lease or licence[.]
The applicant's case for the Tribunal having jurisdiction
The applicant submitted that the application can be considered by the Tribunal under s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act and that therefore the preliminary question is to be answered 'yes', that is, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the matter.
Much of the applicant's representative's submissions were based on Mr Smith being a party to a residency deed with the respondent. Those submissions are now not relevant, as the Tribunal accepted (for reasons set out earlier) that Ms Smith, who is a party to a residency deed with the respondent, is the applicant in these proceedings.
In summary, the applicant's submissions, as are now relevant to the preliminary issue, may be summarised as follows:
(a)The 'Village Scheme' is made up of the trust deed, residency deed and carport licence which stipulates, amongst other things, specific obligations, services, actions, performance and procedures for the Manager, Trustee and residents. Therefore, by their very nature, these documents represent the service contract.
(b)The residency deed and carport licence was signed by the applicant.
(c)The title was changed from the applicant solely to reflect both the applicant and Mr Smith as joint tenants. As owners of a tenancy in common share in the Village, the applicant and Mr Smith have the right to occupy the whole of the Village, subject to the exclusive rights of occupation of their Villa. This exclusive right of occupation arises by the power of attorney granted by cl 2.3 of the residency deed. Therefore the only relationship between the applicant and the respondent is that of a contract to provide services, or a 'services contract' as that term is defined in s 3 of the RV Act.
(d)The payroll tax is assessed and levied on the respondent's conduct of its own business. Whether that passing on of that payroll tax is recoverable by the respondent from the applicant and other residents of the Village via recurrent levies is the 'dispute' which falls within the criterial set out in s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act.
(e)There is no wording that limits, defines or speculates on the definition of 'dispute'. In this case, the respondent is seeking to arbitrarily pass on the payroll tax in the recurrent levies charged to residents of the Village.
(f)The decision in Hewitt and Dalesun Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] WASAT 5 (Hewitt) is relevant as that case concerned a service contract with reference to amenities fees. In that case, the Tribunal rejected the respondent's arguments that the Tribunal did not have power to determine threshold issues of the existence and enforceability of the service contract and that the claimed variations did not relate to the any service contract.
(g)The decision in Timberside Villas Management Pty Ltd v Parker [2005] WADC 246 (Parker) is also relevant as Crisford DCJ stated at [68]:
The fact that the residency deed may also touch upon matters relating to a right to occupy residential premises in a village does not preclude the deed being categorised as a service contract.
(h)In reply to the respondent's rejection of the importance of the trust deed, the applicant says cl 19.8 of the residency deed provides that that respondent must comply with the provisions of the trust deed which applies to it. The application was made after complying with cl 8.2(d) of the trust deed which provides in part: 'The Manager has certified to the Trustee that the Manager has contested any assessment or levy and has legal advice that it has reasonable grounds to do so'.
The respondent's case for the Tribunal lacking jurisdiction
The respondent submitted that the substance of the application cannot be considered by the Tribunal under s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act and therefore the application should be dismissed.
According to the respondent, in order for the applicant to bring an application under s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act, the applicant must establish that the applicant is a party to a 'service contract' in which a dispute has arisen. The respondent submitted this requires two questions to be answered:
(1)Is there a 'service contract' between the applicant and the respondent?; and
(2)If the answer to question (1) is 'yes', then has the dispute arisen under that service contract?
The respondent in its written submissions accepted that:
(a)The applicant occupies the Villa with Mr Smith and has done so since about 1 October 2009.
(b)The applicant submitted an 'Application for an Estate' wherein she was specified as the 'first and only applicant'.
(c)The applicant entered into a sale contract dated 31 August 2009 to purchase a purple title share in the Village together with the exclusive right to reside in the Villa. The applicant is the sole buyer. The applicant became registered on the purple title for the Villa as sole proprietor. Subsequently, in or about April 2010 the applicant transferred her interest as sole proprietor to herself and Mr Smith so that the title is held jointly.
(d)On or about 31 August 2009 a residency deed was entered into between Fini Villages Pty Ltd (now known as LLP WA Village Holdings Pty Ltd), the respondent as 'Manager' and the applicant as the 'resident'. Mr Smith is not a party to the residency deed at the time it was entered into nor is there a separate residency deed. Following the hearing, on 16 July 2019 the respondent offered to add Mr Smith as a resident by way of deed of variation to the residency deed.
(e)Mr Smith is able to occupy the Villa as cl 12.1(b) of the residency deed provides that 'boarders' may reside with the resident.
(f)The respondent accepts that Mr Smith is a 'resident' for the purposes of the RV Act as the term 'resident' includes the spouse of a person who has been admitted into occupation of residential premises in accordance with a retirement village scheme.
In relation to question (1), the respondent provided written submissions that Mr Smith, whilst a resident of the Village, is not a party to a residency deed or any other service contract and therefore had no standing in the current proceeding. Those submissions, are now not relevant, as the Tribunal accepts (for reasons set out earlier) that Ms Smith is the applicant in these proceedings.
In relation to question (2), the respondent submitted that if the Tribunal finds the applicant is a party to a service contract, the question raised by the applicant, as to whether the respondent can include or pass on payroll tax in the recurrent levies charged to residents of the Village is a far broader question and goes beyond a 'dispute' between parties in respect of a service contract.
The respondent's submissions in relation to question (2) may be summarised as follows:
(a)In reply to the applicant's assertion that the trust deed comprises a service contract, the respondent submitted that is incorrect as the trust deed establishes the retirement village scheme for the Village. In any event, the applicant is not a party to the trust deed and therefore it is not a 'contract between an administering body or former administering body of a retirement village and a resident for the provision to the resident of services' which is required for a service contact under the RV Act. As the trust deed is not a service contract, the trust deed is not relevant.
(b)The Tribunal should be limited to the 'dispute' between the parties to the relevant service contract (although the respondent appreciates that a decision relating to a particular service contract will have implications for other residents in the Village).
The Tribunal's consideration
The objective of the RV Act is to regulate retirement villages and the rights of residents in such villages and for related purposes. Crisford DCJ explained this in Parker at [33] as follows:
… It is clear from a reading of the RV Act and the residency deed that the regulation of a retirement village is not a simple matter and there is obvious potential for dissatisfaction and disputes. The legislation is designed to protect residents' occupancy rights and also to resolve likely disputes. Additionally, and quite simply put, it is essential that there be effective regulation of retirement villages so older people in the community who desire to reside in such a village are treated justly and fairly in respect of their rights.
As stated by the Tribunal in Hewitt at [25] and in Jones and Settlers Ridgewood Village Limited [2005] WASAT 62 at [34], the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited by the terms of the SAT Act and the enabling Act, in this case the RV Act.
The RV Act gives the Tribunal power to determine disputes. For example, relevant to the present matter, s 56 of the RV Act specifically deals with disputes arising between the parties to a service contract.
Is the residency deed a 'residence contract' under the RV Act?
As explained by Crisford DCJ in Parker, the starting point for understanding the RV Act is that it must be read in its entirety and that the apparent scope of a section may be limited or expanded upon by other sections in the RV Act. Further, Crisford DCJ stated at [39]:
… Different sections must be read in such a way that they will fit in with one another. This may require a section to be read more narrowly than it would if it stood on its own (Chikonga v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 47 ALD 49 at 51).
The term 'residence contract' is defined in s 3 of the RV Act to mean a contact, agreement, scheme or arrangement which creates or gives rise to a right to occupy residential premises in a retirement village, and may take the form of a lease or licence.
The Tribunal finds that the residency deed grants to the applicant occupancy rights by way of a licence for the exclusive use and occupation of the Villa and for the use of common areas in the Village. On that basis, the Tribunal concludes that the residency deed, in so far as it relates to the resident's (the applicant's) occupancy rights it is to be construed as being a 'residence contract' for the purposes of the RV Act.
This leaves the question as to whether all or certain provisions of the residency deed constitutes a 'service contract' for the purposes of s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act.
Is the residency deed a 'service contract' for the purposes of s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act?
The applicant submitted that the combination of the trust deed, the residency deed and carport licence (which the applicant says set out the obligations, services, actions, performance and procedures for the Manager, Trustee and resident) represent the service contract between the applicant and the respondent.
The respondent in its email of 29 July 2019 wrote that it has not stated that the residency deed is a service contract for the purposes of these proceedings. The Tribunal understands this to mean that the respondent refutes that the residency deed is a service contract for the purposes of s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act.
The respondent submitted that the question of 'whether the [r]espondent can include payroll tax in the recurrent levies or charges payable by residents …' is a far broader question and goes beyond a 'dispute' between parties in respect of a service contract for the purposes of s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act. Further, the respondent submitted that the Tribunal should limit itself to a 'dispute' relating to the service contract.
The applicant rejected the respondent's submissions stating that the word 'dispute' is not limited. The applicant reiterated that what is in dispute is the respondent's arbitrary imposition of payroll tax on residents of the Village through the recurrent levies or charges.
The Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant's dispute about pay roll tax is a 'dispute' that arises in relation to the provision of services or amenities under a service contract. The reasons for this are as follows.
The term 'service contract' is defined in s 3 of the RV Act to mean a contact between an administering body of the Village (that is, the respondent in the current proceeding) for the provision of services or amenities to the resident (that is, the applicant in the current proceeding). The definition of 'service contract' lists various services and amenities including the provision of recreation services and amenities, maintenance services and amenities, administration and management services, and any other services.
In Parker a question arose as to whether certain provisions in a document named the 'Residency Deed' constituted a service contract. Crisford DCJ in upholding the decision of the then Referee of the Retirement Villages Disputes Tribunal, explained at [68]-[69]:
The fact that the residency deed may also touch upon matters relating to a right to occupy residential premises in a village does not preclude the deed being categorised as a service contract.
The definition of service contact in the RV Act includes after subs (8) … 'and any collateral agreement or document relating to the provision of any such service'. This broadens the definition of a service contract to include a collateral agreement or document relating to the provision of any such service.
The Tribunal in Hewitt at [38] stated:
To say that a residence contract is also a service contract, or contains terms of a service contract, accords with the intention of the RV Act that a wide range of disputation in relation to the provision of services to residents of retirement villages be dealt with by the Tribunal.
The question therefore requiring determination by the Tribunal, is whether, a provision or provisions in the residency deed provides for the provision of services or amenities to constitute a 'service contract' as that term is defined in s 3 of the RV Act.
In Parker, Crisford DCJ concluded there was a dispute concerning material variations to and cancellations of some of the provisions of the residency deed relating to the provision of services to the resident (Mrs Parker) and that therefore the residency deed as far as it related to the dispute was a service contract.
In Hewitt, the question was whether the amenities fee provision as set out in cl 3.4 of the residency lease as '… the consideration you pay to us for your right to use the Common Property including the Community Facilities' being the right provided by cl 2.1(b) of the same residency lease is a term of a service contract.
The Tribunal in Hewitt found that a term of the residency deed, in particular cl 3.4, was a term of a service contract and therefore fell within s 56 of the RV Act. The reasons given by the Tribunal were set out in [57] as follows:
1)The provision of facilities for which the amenities fee is paid, including workshop, swimming pool, gymnasium, bowling green and children's play equipment area, amounts to the provision of 'recreational services' for the purposes of the service contract definition.
2)[The respondent] provides other services in connection with the provision of the facilities … such as the management, operation, cleaning and maintenance, the cost of which is covered by the amenities fee. These services also come within the definition.
3)The Brand letter is, arguably, a collateral agreement or document relating to the provision (or more accurately, the nonprovision) of the recreational services so identified to residents.
(emphasis added by the Tribunal)
In the present case, the residency deed at cl 6.1 requires the Manager (the respondent) in return for payment of the recurrent levies (provided for in cl 5 of the residency deed) to provide to the residents of the Village the following services and amenities/facilities (listed in Schedule 2 to the residency deed):
For Villas and Apartments the following standard services are provided:
1.24 hour a day manned emergency call system.
2.Comprehensive insurance cover on all buildings in Village.
3.Provision and maintenance of common facilities including Lounges, Dining Rooms, Library, Billiard Room, Heated Swimming Pool, Heated Spa Pool, Workshop, Craft Room, Gym, BBQ area, all weather Bowling Green.
4.Administration and management of Village.
5.Maintenance of Common Areas, Village buildings and common facilities.
6.Lawn mowing, gardening, maintenance of landscaping and reticulation of grounds.
7.Security Patrols.
The Tribunal finds that the applicant as a resident of the Village, pursuant to the terms of the residency deed, agrees to pay for the provision of certain services (e.g. 24 hour a day manned emergency call system) and amenities/facilities (e.g. common areas, Village buildings and common facilities) and that the Manager (the respondent) promises to perform certain services and to provide certain amenities/facilities in return for payment. Further, the Tribunal finds that those parts (or terms) of the residency deed, in so far as they are for the provision of services and amenities to residents of the Village are to be construed as being terms of a service contract for the purposes of s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act.
In conclusion, the Tribunal is of the view that the applicant's dispute about payroll tax does not arise in relation to the Manager's (the respondent's) provision of services and amenities or in the words of Crisford DCJ in Parker at [70], the dispute between the applicant and respondent does not arise in relation 'to actual proposed changes to services or facilities which may involve increased cost to or a loss of amenities by a resident'.
Finally, the Tribunal observes that question of whether the administering body (the respondent in this case) can include payroll tax in the recurrent charges or levies payable by the residents of the Village is an important question and requires determination. It is open for the residents of the Village to make an application to the Tribunal under s 57A of the RV Act in respect of a dispute concerning an increase in recurrent charges or the imposition of a levy payable by residents provided that the residents of the Village pass a special resolution (s 57A(2) of the RV Act) that authorises such an application to be made to the Tribunal.
Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal therefore answers the preliminary question in the negative. That is, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with the application under s 56(1)(b) of the RV Act.
As the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction, the proceeding will therefore be dismissed.
Orders
1.The Tribunal has determined, as a preliminary issue, that it does not have jurisdiction to deal with the application under s 56(1)(b) of the Retirement Villages Act 1992 (WA).
2.The application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
MS R PETRUCCI, MEMBER
11 SEPTEMBER 2019
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