Smith and Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs
[2006] AATA 1122
•22 December 2006
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 1122
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No W2005/395
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re MAREE SMITH Applicant
And
SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Ms L R Tovey, Member Date22 December 2006
PlacePerth
Decision The decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal dated 13 October 2005 is set aside and there is substituted decision that the applicant owes a debt of $2,433.01 in respect of Family Tax Benefit overpayments received in the 2002/2003 financial year, but that $1,047.63 of that debt is waived.
........(Sgd. Ms L R Tovey).............
Member
CATCHWORDS
FAMILY ASSISTANCE – family tax benefits – overpayment due solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth – waiver of recovery of debt – whether payments received in good faith – special circumstances
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth) ss. 22, 22A, 58, Schedule 1 clause 7.
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth), ss. 3, 71, 94, 97, 101
Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1985) 7 ALD 670
Dranichnikov v Centrelink (2003) 75 ALD 134; [2003] FCAFC 133
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Re Fuller and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2004) 83 ALD 152; [2004] AATA 615
Haggerty v Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs (2000) 31 AAR 529; [2000] FCA 1287
Jordan v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2004) 86 ALD 256; [2004] FCA 1582
Kertland v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 95 FCR 64
Kirkbright v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281
Re Reardon and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2002] AATA 33.
Ryde v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] FCA 866
Secretary, Department of Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs v Prince (1997) 152 ALR 127
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Allan (2001) 116 FCR1
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Chamberlain (2002) 116 FCR 348
REASONS FOR DECISION
22 December 2006 Ms L R Tovey, Member 1. This is an application for review instituted by Ms Maree Smith ("the Applicant") in respect of a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal ("the SSAT") made on 13 October 2005. The decision related to an overpayment of Family Tax Benefits ("FTB") for the period from 1 July 2002 to 12 February 2004.
BACKGROUND
2. The Applicant is the mother of four children, the oldest of whom was born in February 1985.
3. It is not in dispute that, at all material times, the Applicant was entitled to receive FTB. Under s. 58(1) of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth) ("the Act"), the rate of FTB is calculated in accordance with the rate calculator in Schedule 1 to the Act. One component of that calculator is the "standard rate", which is calculated in accordance with clause 7 of that Schedule by reference to each "FTB child" of the person entitled to the payment. Another component is the "large family supplement" which is payable where a person has 4 or more FTB children.
4. The term "FTB child" is defined in s. 22(1) of the Act, subject to exceptions contained in s. 22A of the Act.
5. It is common ground between the parties that the Applicant's oldest child was, at all material times, not an FTB child of the Applicant because her adjusted taxable income exceeded the relevant cut-out amount. It follows that the Applicant was not entitled to any FTB payment in respect of her oldest child, or to a large family supplement, after 1 July 2002.
6. Up until 24 July 2002 the Applicant had been receiving fortnightly instalments of FTB. At that time she requested that her FTB fortnightly payments be cancelled, as she preferred to be paid FTB at the end of the financial year. However, it appears that claims for FTB were not lodged at the end of the 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 financial years.
7. On 15 July 2004 the Applicant and her former husband separated. Shortly prior to that separation, the Applicant contacted Centrelink to find out what sort of payments she would be entitled to once her former husband left. The Applicant was informed that she was entitled to FTB, including payments in arrears, and was sent forms to claim those entitlements.
8. On 31 July 2004 the Applicant completed FTB claim forms for the 2002/2003, 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 financial years. In the 2002/2003 claim form the Applicant listed all four of her children, including her oldest child. The Applicant indicated that her oldest child's adjustable taxable income for the 2002/2003 financial year was "$10,000, unsure". A note on that part of the claim form indicated:
"If your child's income for the 2002-2003 income (financial) year was more than $8,346 then they are not a dependant child for the entire 2002-2003 income (financial) year and you cannot receive Family Tax Benefit for that child."
9. The Applicant's oldest child was not mentioned on the claim forms for the 2003/2004 or 2004/2005 financial years.
10. In her evidence before me, the Applicant indicated that she left her oldest child off the claim forms for the 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 financial years because her oldest child was not at school at those times. The Applicant said that she included her oldest child in the 2002/2003 form, although she knew she wasn't entitled to FTB for her oldest child, because a lady at Centrelink had advised her to fill out the form to test her eligibility. I note that, by including her oldest child with her income in the 2002/2003 claim form, the Applicant was doing what the form asked her to do, and completed the form in a manner that made it clear that she was not entitled to FTB in respect of her oldest child.
11. On 27 August 2004 the Applicant received a payment of $4,370.59 from the Respondent, being arrears of FTB for the period 24 July 2002 to 16 August 2004. It is this payment, together with an amount of $176.87 paid between 1 and 24 July 2002, which is the subject of the Respondent's claim for overpayment.
12. On 26 May 2005 the delegate of the Respondent determined that the Applicant had been overpaid FTB of $2,433.01 for the 2002/2003 financial year and $914.81 for the period 1 July 2003 to 12 February 2004. An Authorised Review Officer ("ARO") of the Respondent affirmed this decision on 12 August 2005. These decisions were made on the basis that the above amounts had been paid on the incorrect basis that the Applicant's oldest child was a FTB child for those financial years.
13. On 13 October 2005 the SSAT set aside the decision of the ARO and substituted a new decision which, in effect, varied the ARO's decision by waiving part of the debt. The amount waived, $2,256.14, represented the amounts said to have been overpaid in the 2002/2003 financial year, other than the $176.87 paid in respect of the period 1 to 24 July 2002. The amount was waived by the SSAT under s. 97(1) and s. 97(3) of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ("the Administration Act").
14. The Applicant now applies to this Tribunal for a review of the SSAT decision. The substance of her claim for review relates to the amount of overpayment of $914.81 assessed for the 2003/2004 financial year. However, the position of the Respondent, both in his Statement of Facts and Contentions and submissions before me, was that:
(a)On 13 September 2005 the Respondent received all relevant parties' annual taxable income for 2003/2004, and "re-reconciled" the Applicant's FTB for that financial year, determining that she had in fact received less FTB than she was entitled to for that financial year; and
(b)The SSAT erred in finding that the whole of the payments of FTB in respect of the period 24 July 2002 to 30 June 2003 were received in good faith for the purposes of s. 97 of the Administration Act.
15. At the commencement of the hearing the representative of the Respondent quite properly advised the Applicant that the result of this position was that proceeding with the application for review may result in a more detrimental outcome for the Applicant. After a short adjournment, the Applicant indicated that, while she understood that the course of action may be more detrimental to her, she felt that she needed to fight the case from a point of principle.
16. In dealing with this application, it is convenient to separately consider the payments in respect of the periods 1-23 July 2002 and 1 July 2003 to 12 February 2004, before returning to the payments made in resect of the period 24 July 2002 to 30 June 2003.
OVERPAYMENT 1 TO 23 JULY 2002
17. The Respondent's records, which were produced before me, indicate than an amount of $176.87 was paid to the Applicant in respect of her oldest child for the period 1 to 23 July 2002. It was common ground before me that this amount was repayable to the Commonwealth. The Applicant accepted that she had delayed contacting the Respondent on 1 July 2002, and had already been paid when she called the Respondent's delegate to arrange the cancellation of her fortnightly payments. She told me that she knew when it came to reconciliation she owed $176 and so "I never had a problem with that at all". On the basis of that evidence, there is clearly no basis for waiving the debt under s. 97 of the Administration Act or otherwise.
18. I therefore find that an amount of $176.87, being an overpayment of FTB made to the Applicant for the period 1 to 23 July 2002, is a debt owing to the Commonwealth which should not be written off or waived.
PAYMENTS RECEIVED 1 JULY 2003 TO 12 FEBRUARY 2004
19. The ARO and SSAT found that an amount of $914.81 was overpaid to the Applicant for the period 1 July 2003 to 12 February 2004. It appears that this debt was determined on the basis of the estimates of income of the Applicant and her former husband on the claim form.
20. I accept the contention of the Respondent that, on 13 September 2005, the Respondent re-reconciled the Applicant's payments after receiving the annual taxable income for the Applicant and her former husband. This showed the Applicant to be entitled to $3,400.14 in FTB for the 2003/2004 financial year. She had received only $3,110.81 in that year, including the amount of $914.81 paid for the period 1 July 2003 to 12 February 2004.
21. As a result, I find that there is no debt in respect of the period 1 July 2003 to 12 February 2004.
PAYMENTS RECEIVED 24 JULY 2002 TO 30 JUNE 2003
22. The records of the Respondent show, and I accept, that the Applicant received $2,256.14 in FTB payments that were a result of her payments being calculated on the incorrect assumption that the Applicant's oldest child was an FTB child of the Applicant during this period.
23. Section 71(2) of the Administration Act provides that:
"If:
(a) an amount (the received amount) has been paid to a person by way of assistance; and
(b) the received amount is greater than the amount (the correct amount) of assistance that should have been paid to the person under the family assistance law;
the difference between the received amount and the correct amount is a debt due to the Commonwealth by the person."
24. The term "family assistance law" is defined in s. 3 of the Administration Act to include the Act.
25. I am satisfied that the Applicant received family assistance in the amount of $2,256.14 more than she was entitled to receive under the Act, by reason of the Applicant's oldest child being included as an FTB child for the period 24 July 2002 to 30 June 2003. Under s. 71(2) of the Administration Act, that amount is a debt due to the Commonwealth.
26. It is then necessary to consider whether the debt, or any portion of the debt, should be waived.
27. The applicable waiver provisions are those found in Part 4 Division 4 of the Administration Act. There are, in my view, two provisions in that Division which are potentially applicable to the present case. The first is section 97 of the Administration Act, which provides:
(1) The Secretary must waive the right to recover the proportion (the administrative error proportion) of a debt that is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth if subsection (2) or (3) applies to that proportion of the debt.
(2) The Secretary must waive the administrative error proportion of a debt if:
(a)the debtor received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to the administrative error proportion of the debt; and
(b)the person would suffer severe financial hardship if it were not waived.
(3) The Secretary must waive the administrative error proportion of a debt if:
(a)the payment or payments were made in respect of the debtor’s eligibility for family assistance for a period or event (the eligibility period or event) that occurs in an income year; and
(b)the debt is raised after the end of:
(i)the debtor’s next income year after the one in which the eligibility period or event occurs; or
(ii)the period of 13 weeks starting on the day on which the payment that gave rise to the debt was made;
whichever ends last; and
(c)the debtor received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to the administrative error proportion of the debt.
(4)For the purposes of this section, the administrative error proportion of the debt may be 100% of the debt.
28. Before me the Respondent accepted that the whole of the overpayment of $2,256.14 was attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth. The Respondent did not dispute that the requirements of s. 97(3)(a) and (b) of the Administration Act were satisfied in respect of that amount. However, the Respondent took issue with the finding of the SSAT that the whole of that amount was received in good faith by the Applicant. The Respondent contended that an amount of $1,208.51 was not received in good faith. This amount related to the FTB paid in respect of the oldest child, and excluded the balance of "large family supplement" which was received during that period. The Respondent conceded that the balance of the amount of $2,256.14, being $1047.63, was received in good faith.
29. In Secretary, Department of Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs v Prince (1997) 152 ALR 127 the Federal Court was concerned with whether a debt arising from an overpayment of Austudy allowance should be waived. Mr Prince was aware that he was not entitled to continue to receive Austudy payments but, having taken steps to cancel the payments, was not aware that he was continuing to receive them. The question which arose under s. 289(2)(b) of the Student and Youth Assistance Act 1973 (Cth) ("the SYA Act") was whether "the person received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to the debt". As to this provision, Finn J said of the concept of "good faith" at 152 ALR 130:
"The section asks that quite a specific question be addressed: was the payment received in good faith? It is quite unconcerned, for example, with whether, after 22 December, Mr Prince acted in good faith towards DEETYA. Its sole concern is with whether a particular state of affairs exists at the time a payment (or payments) is received …
The burden of the formula can vary significantly given the purpose it is intended to serve in a given setting. In one context it can focus inquiry upon a person's reason for action (eg as with the good faith duty of company directors); in another, to a person's state of knowledge when a particular event occurs.
For my own part, I consider the burden of the formula in the s 289 setting to be obvious enough. Its concern is with the state of mind of a person concerning his or her receipt of the payment: if that person knows or has reason to know that he or she is not entitled to a payment received -- ie is not entitled to use the moneys received as his or her own -- that person does not receive the payment in good faith. Absent such knowledge or reason to know, the receipt would be in good faith.
Given the conventional liability of a mistaken payee of money from consolidated revenue to repay that money irrespective of his or her belief as to an entitlement to it (ie the 'rule' in Auckland Harbour Board v R [1924] AC 318), the concession made to the mistaken payee by s 289 of the SYA Act does seem in all probability to be directed to a payee who receives the money (to put the matter positively) in the good faith belief that he or she is entitled to receive it. In other words the frame of the section is to exclude from the right to a waiver, a person who knows or has reason to know that he or she is not entitled to receive the payment. It would be surprising to find that the parliament intended otherwise."
30. At 152 ALR 131 Finn J concluded:
"… can a receipt be otherwise than in good faith when the recipient is unaware that the payment has been received? The short answer to that in my view is 'yes'. Knowing that, in the relevant period, he had no entitlement to receive an Austudy payment, he was never in a position to be able to assert that any mistaken payment made to him was one to which he had an entitlement. Thus while he may have received a payment of which he was ignorant, he could not, in the sense that I have explained, have received it in good faith."
31. That decision of Finn J was applied by French J in Haggerty v Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs (2000) 31 AAR 529 at 533-4; [2000] FCA 1287 at [13]. After referring to Prince, French J said of the requirement of good faith in the context of s. 289 of the SYA Act (at 31 AAR 534, [2000] FCA 1287 at [16]):
Consistently with what his Honour said in the Prince case, want of good faith will arise where there is a positive belief that the payment has been made by mistake. It will also arise where there is a suspicion held by the recipient that he or she may not be entitled to the payment made or a doubt as to the entitlement coupled with some objective basis for such suspicion or doubt. The provision does not, however, authorise the imputation of want of good faith in any of the senses above described simply because there are in existence objective facts which would raise a belief or a doubt or a suspicion of non-entitlement in the mind of some imaginary recipient. That proposition is quite consistent with the view that the existence of such facts may support an inference that the recipient disbelieved or doubted or was suspicious about his or her entitlement. 'Reason to know' as Finn J used that term in Prince does not necessarily import a criterion of imputed as distinct from actual want of good faith as I have described it.
32. The above decisions were applied in the context of s. 1237A of the Social Security Act by Finn J in Jordan v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2004) 86 ALD 256 at 261-62; [2004] FCA 1582 at [25]-[29]. In that case Mr Jordan had received two kinds of benefits, one of which should have been reduced due to receipt of the other. Mr Jordan was aware that he was not entitled to the full amount of both benefits, but did not appreciate that he was receiving both forms of benefit. Justice Finn upheld the decision of this Tribunal to the effect that the overpayment was not received in good faith.
33. I do not regard the terms of s. 97(2)(a) or (3)(c) of the Administration Act to be materially distinguishable from those of s. 1237A of the Social Security Act or s. 289(2) of the SYA Act. I am therefore bound to apply these decisions and am required to conclude that, if the Applicant knew she was not entitled to FTB payments in respect of her oldest child, she could not be said to receive the payments in good faith for the purposes of s. 97(2)(a) and (3)(c) of the Administration Act.
34. The evidence before me made it clear that the Applicant did know that she was not entitled to receive FTB in respect at her oldest child at the time she received the payment. She gave evidence that she called the Respondent's delegate on a number of occasions to check she was not being overpaid because she knew she was not entitled to any FTB payment in respect of her oldest child. She said that when she completed the 2002/2003 claim form, she knew that she wasn't entitled to any benefit in respect of her oldest child.
35. It follows that it cannot be said that the Applicant received the relevant portion of the debt in good faith for the purposes of s. 97 of the Administration Act. By the "relevant portion of the debt" I mean the sum of $1,208.51, being the total debt of $2,256.14 less the sum of $1,047.63 which the Respondent conceded should be waived. That is not to say that the Applicant did not act reasonably, or did anything wrong. Indeed, the materials before me demonstrate that the Applicant telephoned the Respondent's delegate on a number of occasions to query the payment and seek to confirm that she was entitled to it before she spent the money. However, the Applicant will not have received a payment in good faith for the purposes of s. 97(2)(a) and (3)(c) of the Administration Act if she knew that she was not entitled to FTB in respect of her oldest child at the time she received the payment. It is clear that the Applicant knew she was not entitled to FBT in respect of her oldest child at the time the payment was received, so that the relevant portion of the debt cannot be waived under s. 97 of the Administration Act.
36. The second potentially applicable provision is s. 101 of the Administration Act, which provides:
The Secretary may waive the right to recover all or part of a debt if the Secretary is satisfied that:
(a) the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i)making a false statement or a false representation; or
(ii)failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the family assistance law; and
(b) there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and
(c) it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.
37. It follows from the Respondent's concession that the debt arose wholly as a result of administrative error that the requirements of s. 101(a) of the Administration Act are satisfied. On the basis of that concession, and the evidence of the Applicant before this Tribunal, I am satisfied that the debt did not result wholly or partly from the Applicant or another person knowingly making a false statement or a false representation, or failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the family assistance law.
38. I and also satisfied that, if s. 101 of the Administration Act is otherwise applicable, it would be more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt. The circumstances in which a debt may be written off are provided for by s. 95 of the Administration Act, and in my opinion none of the criteria provided for in that section are satisfied in the present case.
39. The critical issue is then whether the requirements of s. 101(b) of the Administration Act are satisfied in this case. Section 101(b) requires that I be satisfied that there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive the debt. I am not able to find any such special circumstances which I consider would warrant waiving the debt in this case.
40. The term "special circumstances" is not defined by the Administration Act, and the approach of the Tribunal and the Federal Court in a large number of cases has been to regard the matters to which the Tribunal may have regard when considering whether special circumstances exist as unconfined. Although it dealt with a somewhat different provision to s. 101 of the Administration Act, the following passage from the decision of this Tribunal in Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 at 3 is often cited in this kind of context:
"An expression such as 'special circumstances' is by its nature incapable of precise or exhaustive definition. The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional. Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend on the context in which they occur. For it is context which allows one to say that the circumstances of one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases. That is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be regarded as special".
41. The decision of the Tribunal in Beadle was affirmed by the Full Court of the Federal Court on appeal: (1985) 7 ALD 670. While the Court recognised that it was not possible to lay down precise rules as to what constituted special circumstances, the expression "unusual, uncommon or exceptional" was not, as Hill J noted in Dranichnikov v Centrelink (2003) 75 ALD 134; [2003] FCAFC 133 at [65], actually affirmed by the Full Court.
42. In Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Allan (2001) 116 FCR 1 at [17] Heerey J said, in the context of the statutory predecessor to s. 1184K of the Social Security Act:
"It is not sensible to lay down precise limits or precise rules about what may constitute special circumstances: Beadle v Director-General of Social Security 7 ALD 670 at 673; 60 ALR 225 at 228. Ill health financial circumstances and the unfairness of a strict application of the Act are some matters which may in an individual case, constitute special circumstances Kirkbright v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281 at 284, 288; see also Kertland v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 95 FCR 64 at 71."
43. Similarly, in Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 at 545 Kiefel J said, in a passage she again adopted in Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Chamberlain (2002) 116 FCR 348 at [19]:
"The phrase “special circumstances”, it has been said, although imprecise is sufficiently understood not to require judicial gloss: Beadle's case (at ALR 229 ; ALD 674), and for present purposes it is sufficient to observe that it would require something to distinguish Mr Groth's case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case. That was, I consider, the only enquiry to be undertaken in this case. It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary. The enquiry I have referred to would involve considering what would be the effect, if the provision in question or the principle of liability it creates, is applied."
44. In Re Fuller and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2004) 83 ALD 152; [2004] AATA 615 at [27] Downes J expressed the view that both hardship and unfairness can form the basis of exercising the discretion, in the context of s. 1184K of the Social Security Act.
45. The above comments reflect the approach that was taken in Ryde v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] FCA 866 in the context of s. 1237AAD of the Social Security Act, which is in materially the same terms as s. 101 of the Administration Act.
46. The only limitation apparent from s. 101(b) of the Administration Act is that the special circumstances are not constituted by financial hardship alone. That, of course, does not make financial hardship irrelevant if there are other factors which suggest that there are special circumstances.
47. In some cases special circumstances can arise in whole or part from the manner in which the Respondent or the Respondent's delegates administer the relevant legislation. This was the case Re Reardon and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2002] AATA 33. In that case the Tribunal had regard, in the context of s. 1237AAD of the Social Security Act, to the administrative error which caused the debt to arise when determining that there were special circumstances that made it desirable to waive half the debt.
48. Taking all of the circumstances of the present case into account, I am unable to find special circumstances which would justify waiving the whole or any part of the relevant portion of the debt under s. 101 of the Administration Act. Again, by the "relevant portion of the debt" I mean the sum of $1,208.51, being the total debt of $2,256.14 less the sum of $1,047.63 which the Respondent conceded should be waived. The Applicant has had the benefit of a payment to which she was not entitled, and there is no reason why she should not be required to repay the relevant portion of the debt. I have considered the Applicant's financial position and, while I accept her evidence in that regard, I do not find that it would impose undue hardship on the Applicant to require repayment of the relevant portion of the debt. The Applicant is employed and receives an income which would allow repayments to be made, whether by periodic deductions or otherwise. I have taken account of the fact that the Applicant contacted the Respondent's delegate on a large number of occasions to try and confirm the correctness of her payments and has been understandably frustrated by administrative error of the Respondent's delegate. I have also taken into account the difficult personal circumstances which the Applicant described in her evidence before me. However, on balance I do not consider that these circumstances, either alone or taken together, constitute special circumstances which would justify the waiver of the relevant portion of the debt in whole or part.
49. Therefore, I find that the Applicant owes a debt of $2,256.14 in respect of FTB overpayments made between 24 July 2002 and 30 June 2003, but that $1,047.63 of that debt should be waived under s. 97(1) and (3) of the Administration Act. It follows that the amount of $1,208.51 is payable in respect of this period.
DECISION
50. The total debt owed by the Applicant is therefore $176.87 for the period 1 July 2002 to 24 July 2002 and $2,256.14 for the period 24 July 2002 to 30 June 2003, being a total of $2,433.01. It is appropriate to waive $1,047.63 of that debt, resulting in the total owing by the Applicant being $1,385.38.
51. For the above reasons, the decision of the SSAT dated 13 October 2005 is set aside and there is substituted a decision that the Applicant owes a debt of $2,433.01 in respect of FTB overpayments received in the 2002/2003 financial year, but that $1,047.63 of that debt is waived.
I certify that the fifty one (51) preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Ms LR Tovey, Member
Signed: ..................(Sgd. Ms R Riberi) .....................
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 7 August 2006
Date of Decision 22 December 2006
Representative for the Applicant Self RepresentedRepresentative of the Respondent Mr A Holt
Centrelink Legal Services
0
10
0