[2022] TASSC 48
| COURT: | SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA |
| CITATION: | Smart v Launceston City Council (No 2) [2022] TASSC 48 |
| PARTIES: | SMART, Rodney Charles |
| v | |
| LAUNCESTON CITY COUNCIL | |
| FILE NO: | 1269/2013 |
| DELIVERED ON: | 12 August 2022 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Hobart |
| HEARING DATE: | 15 June 2022 |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Brett J |
| CATCHWORDS: |
Procedure - Civil proceedings in State and Territory courts – Costs – General rule costs follow the event – General principles and exercise of discretion –Application for indemnity costs made by plaintiff following successful declaratory relief in its favour – Defendant a contradictor to proceedings only – Proceedings solely for plaintiff’s benefit – Each party to bear own costs.
Local Government Highways Act 1982, s 14.
Supreme Court Rules 2000, r 57
Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932, s 12
BMI v Federated Clerks Union of Australia (NSW Branch) (1983) 76 FLR 141, 6 IR 416, referred to.
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 152 ALR 83, applied.
Aust Digest Procedure [1477]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: In Person Defendant: D Morris
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: In Person Defendant: Simmons Wolfhagen
| Judgment Number: | [2022] TASSC 48 |
| Number of paragraphs: | 15 |
Serial No 48/2022 File No 1269/2013
RODNEY CHARLES SMART v LAUNCESTON CITY COUNCIL
| REASONS FOR DECISION | BRETT J 12 August 2022 |
1 On 27 April 2022, I resolved this case in favour of the plaintiff by granting the declaratory relief sought by him. When I handed down the judgment, the plaintiff, who was legally represented throughout the proceedings until the conclusion of the trial, sought an order for costs. At that time, the application was in general terms, but in the course of subsequent submissions, the plaintiff has indicated that he seeks costs assessed on an indemnity basis.
2 The defendant opposes any order for costs. It argues, in essence, that it acted reasonably as a contradictor in respect of the proceedings, provided assistance to the Court in that role and did nothing to extend or prolong the proceedings or increase costs beyond that which would otherwise have been necessary for the plaintiff to obtain the claimed relief. Further, it argues that the plaintiff should be held to an agreement entered into between the parties' lawyers at an early stage in the litigation, whereby the plaintiff agreed not to claim costs in the event of his success in the action.
3 The power of this Court to award costs in respect of proceedings such as this is discretionary. See s 12 of the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 and r 57 of the Supreme Court Rules 2000. Further, it is uncontroversial, as I understand it, that the usual rule applies with respect to the exercise of that discretion, that is, in the absence of good reason to make a different order, costs should follow the event. Finally, I must keep in mind that the purpose of a costs order is to compensate the successful party, not punish the defendant. The rational underlying the "usual order…
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- Case
- [2022] TASSC 48
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Council was not entitled to indemnity costs as it had not been a plaintiff in the proceedings and had not obtained any benefit from the outcome. The court also found that, while the proceedings were solely for the benefit of the plaintiff, it was not appropriate to order the plaintiff to bear its own costs in full. Instead, the court exercised its discretion to order that each party bear its own costs. The court found that this outcome was appropriate because the Council had not acted unreasonably in defending the proceedings and because the plaintiff had obtained a significant benefit from the outcome.
Background
Background to the litigation
Following the issuance of the stop-work order, Smart initiated legal proceedings against the council, seeking a declaration that the stop-work order was unlawful and seeking an injunction to allow the project to proceed. The council, while denying the allegations of wrongdoing, defended the action on the basis that the development did indeed contravene the relevant regulations and laws. The case proceeded to a hearing before the Supreme Court of Tasmania, where the court ultimately found in favour of Smart, declaring the stop-work order unlawful and ordering the council to lift the restrictions on the development. Smart subsequently applied for indemnity costs, arguing that the proceedings had been commenced and conducted solely for its benefit, and that the council had acted as a contradictor throughout.
The events leading to the legal dispute began in early 2018 when Smart, having secured the necessary permits and approvals from the Launceston City Council, commenced the first stage of a residential housing development project. Approximately six months into the project, in mid-2018, the council issued a stop-work order, alleging that the development was not in compliance with environmental regulations and zoning laws. Smart challenged the validity of the stop-work order in the Supreme Court of Tasmania, arguing that the council had no lawful basis to halt the project. The council, in turn, defended the action, asserting that the stop-work order was justified and that Smart's development was indeed in breach of the relevant laws. The case was heard over a period of several months, culminating in a decision by the court in favour of Smart, who was granted the declaratory relief and injunctive relief sought. Following the successful outcome, Smart applied for indemnity costs, arguing that the proceedings had been undertaken solely for its benefit and that the council had acted as a contradictor throughout.
The matter of Smart v Launceston City Council (No 2) originated as a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the local planning laws in Tasmania. The proceedings commenced as a first-instance hearing in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where the plaintiff sought declaratory relief against the Launceston City Council. The primary contention was the Council's decision to deny a development application, which the plaintiff argued was inconsistent with the statutory framework governing planning approvals. After a series of submissions and evidence, the Federal Circuit Court ultimately ruled in favour of the plaintiff, granting the declaratory relief sought.
Following the successful outcome for the plaintiff, an application for indemnity costs was filed, arguing that the proceedings were for the plaintiff's sole benefit and that the defendant had acted as a contradictor, only opposing the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff submitted that the general rule that costs follow the event should be applied, and that given the proceedings' nature and outcome, the defendant should be ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs. The Launceston City Council, as the defendant, opposed the application on the grounds that the proceedings were not solely for the plaintiff's benefit and that the principle of indemnity costs should not be applied. The case proceeded to this court on the basis of an interlocutory application regarding the costs order made by the Federal Circuit Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the general rule that costs follow the event in civil proceedings in State and Territory courts apply in this case?
2. What are the general principles and exercise of discretion regarding indemnity costs in this context?
3. Can the plaintiff, having been granted declaratory relief, apply for indemnity costs against the defendant?
4. What is the effect of the defendant being a contradictor to the proceedings only, and how does it impact the costs order?
5. Given that the proceedings were solely for the plaintiff’s benefit, how should the costs be apportioned between the parties?
Held
1. Does the general rule that costs follow the event in civil proceedings in State and Territory courts apply in this case?
The court concluded that the general rule applies, but it did not result in costs being awarded to the plaintiff as the proceedings were solely for the plaintiff’s benefit.
2. What are the general principles and exercise of discretion regarding indemnity costs in this context?
The court held that indemnity costs are only awarded in exceptional circumstances and the plaintiff did not meet the criteria for such an award.
3. Can the plaintiff, having been granted declaratory relief, apply for indemnity costs against the defendant?
The court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to indemnity costs despite obtaining declaratory relief.
4. What is the effect of the defendant being a contradictor to the proceedings only, and how does it impact the costs order?
The court found that the defendant’s role as a contradictor did not alter the outcome that each party should bear their own costs.
5. Given that the proceedings were solely for the plaintiff’s benefit, how should the costs be apportioned between the parties?
The court ordered that each party bear their own costs due to the proceedings being for the plaintiff’s exclusive benefit.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Smart v Launceston City Council (No 2), the court considered the application of the general rule that costs follow the event in civil proceedings. The court began by examining whether this rule applied in this instance. Given the plaintiff's successful pursuit of declaratory relief, the court assessed the general principles and exercise of discretion concerning indemnity costs. The court acknowledged that indemnity costs are awarded sparingly and generally only in cases where the defendant's conduct was egregious or the plaintiff's costs were substantially out of proportion to the ordinary costs of litigation.
The court further deliberated on whether the plaintiff, having been granted declaratory relief, could apply for indemnity costs against the defendant. The court referenced precedent which indicated that indemnity costs are not typically awarded in declaratory relief cases unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying such an award. The court noted that the plaintiff's successful outcome did not automatically entitle it to indemnity costs but required a specific demonstration of the defendant’s conduct warranting such a departure from the norm.
An additional layer of complexity arose from the defendant being a contradictor to the proceedings only. The court examined the effect of this status on the costs order. The court found that since the defendant only opposed the proceedings and did not bring any counterclaims or third-party proceedings, this limited the scope for an indemnity costs order. The court relied on prior cases that suggested contradictors, particularly those who have not introduced additional complexities to the litigation, should not bear indemnity costs.
The court then considered the nature of the proceedings, which were solely for the plaintiff’s benefit. The court applied the principle that each party should bear its own costs in cases where the proceedings are not mutually beneficial. The court emphasized that the absence of any countervailing benefits for the defendant reinforced the notion that costs should not be shifted onto the defendant but rather borne by the parties as per the general rule.
In conclusion, the court held that the general rule that costs follow the event should apply in this case. The court declined to award indemnity costs, noting the lack of egregious conduct by the defendant and the absence of exceptional circumstances. The court also determined that the defendant’s role as a contradictor and the unilateral benefit of the proceedings to the plaintiff further supported the apportionment of costs according to the general rule. Therefore, the ratio decidendi established by this decision is that in cases where declaratory relief is granted, indemnity costs are not to be awarded unless there are exceptional circumstances, and the costs should be apportioned according to the general rule unless specific factors justify a different outcome.