Sluggett v Commonwealth of Australia
[2012] FCA 963
•7 September 2012
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sluggett v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCA 963
Citation: Sluggett v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCA 963 Appeal from: Sluggett v Commonwealth of Australia [2011] FMCA 609 Parties: CHANDRAKANTHI SLUGGETT v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA File number: SAD 227 of 2011 Judge: LANDER J Date of judgment: 7 September 2012 Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – appeal from Federal Magistrates Court – discrimination – disability discrimination – discrimination in employment – direct discrimination – indirect discrimination – harassment Legislation: Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 4
Federal Magistrates Court Act 1999 (Cth) s 45Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO
Date of hearing: 6 August 2012 Place: Adelaide Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 68 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Dr C Bleby Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
SAD 227 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: CHANDRAKANTHI SLUGGETT
AppellantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
LANDER J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 SEPTEMBER 2012
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
SAD 227 OF 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: CHANDRAKANTHI SLUGGETT
AppellantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
LANDER J
DATE:
7 SEPTEMBER 2012
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an appeal from an order of a Federal Magistrate dismissing the appellant’s application complaining of disability discrimination by the respondent in her employment with the respondent.
The appellant was born in Sri Lanka on 15 November 1967. When she was 18 months of age she contracted poliomyelitis, also known as infantile paralysis. She spent her early years in a Buddhist orphanage in Sri Lanka. When she was 10 years old she was adopted by her Australian parents and came to live in Australia. She attended school in Berri, Port Augusta and Leigh Creek, but completed her secondary schooling at Glenunga High School in Adelaide in 1985. After completing Year 12 she had a variety of jobs, including as a kitchen hand, cook and waitress, managing a jewellery shop and child minding.
In 1987, she commenced tertiary education, completing a Bachelor of Arts degree at Flinders University in 1990. In 1992, she commenced a post-graduate Bachelor of Social Administration (Social Work) degree, also at Flinders University, but did not complete that degree for reasons that are not relevant to this proceeding.
In 1982, at the age of 15, the appellant had an operation on her left leg and foot to correct a physical deformity as a consequence of the poliomyelitis which she had contracted. Her foot was reconstructed and she received a tendon transplant to enable her to move her foot and toes, and enable her to walk.
In 1993, when she was about 26 years of age, she was diagnosed with post-polio syndrome, a condition that affects survivors of poliomyelitis many years after they have recovered from the initial acute viral attack of the disease.
The symptoms of that syndrome can be debilitating and include fatigue, muscle pain and joint pain, lack of strength and endurance, and respiratory, speech and swallowing problems.
The appellant was first employed by the Commonwealth Public Service in 1996 and remained an employee until May 2008 when her service was terminated.
In October 2007, the appellant complained to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) that between July 2004 and May 2008 she was the subject of systematic disability discrimination in her employment. The discrimination she complained of took the form of direct and indirect discrimination and harassment within the terms of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA). The complaint made to HREOC was unstructured and took the form of a general complaint of disability discrimination by the respondent over the whole of the period referred to.
On 22 May 2008, a delegate of the President of HREOC terminated the complaint alleging discrimination under the DDA, stating “I have carefully considered all the information that has been provided and I am satisfied that the complaint is lacking in substance”.
On 29 May 2008, the appellant commenced a proceeding in the Federal Magistrates Court against the Commonwealth of Australia – Department of Immigration and Citizenship (formerly the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs) as the first respondent and the Commonwealth of Australia – Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (formerly the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs) as the second respondent. Eventually, the proceeding continued against the Commonwealth of Australia in its own right.
On 23 December 2008, the appellant applied for an order that the Court make a declaration “to allow discovery generally by the Respondent in these proceedings, and by a specified date”.
On 2 February 2009, the parties consented to the Federal Magistrate making orders that:
1.The Commonwealth will provide the applicant’s occupational health and safety file and the personnel file within 14 days of today’s date.
2.The time for the applicant to file her trial material is extended to 4:00pm on 3 February 2009.
3.The time for the respondent to file their trial material is extended to 4:00pm on 24 February 2009.
4.The proceedings be adjourned to 25 February 2009 at 9:30am to ascertain whether or not the matter can proceed to trial.
Those orders were never challenged, not that they could have been, having been made by consent at any time prior to the commencement of the trial on 16 November 2009. Two previous attempts to commence the trial had been made in 2009, but the hearing dates were vacated because the proceeding was not ready or an attempt was made at alternative dispute resolution.
As the Federal Magistrate has observed, the estimate that was given the Court of a five day hearing “proved to be woefully inadequate”.
The matter proceeded for six days in November 2009, eight days in February 2010, one day in July 2010, one day in October 2010, four days in January 2011, one day in February 2011, and 10 days in March 2011 when it concluded.
The appellant was represented by solicitors and counsel until 28 January 2011, when immediately after the appellant’s cross-examination had concluded, the appellant’s counsel, Ms Claire O’Connor, announced to the Court that her instructions and those of her instructing solicitors had been withdrawn, and that she was “seeking leave of the Court to withdraw from the file”.
Counsel for the respondent recognised that the appellant’s counsel’s withdrawal meant that the matter would have to be adjourned so that the appellant could obtain her documents from her lawyers and prepare herself to represent herself. The Federal Magistrate said:
HIS HONOUR: Ms Sluggett, as I said to Dr Bleby and as Dr Bleby concedes, the prospect of you having to re-examine yourself this morning and this afternoon is not a viable course of conduct, and that must mean that the proceedings are adjourned and we have an alternative date when it was anticipated that the various remaining witnesses from the Commonwealth would give their evidence. I think I need to have the matter mentioned before the formal date for resumption so that I can know what your situation is, and in a moment I will discuss that with Dr Bleby and then with yourself.
The reality must be, I think, that the case will have to go on, whether you are represented or not, which must mean that you will have to represent yourself because this case has already been delayed by your misfortune when you were in a road accident, and it has to be brought to a conclusion by either some resolution between the parties or a judgment from myself. It cannot go on indefinitely. So I will need to know, I think, what your situation is, and Dr Bleby will need to know what your situation is so no more time is wasted, but I need again to underline to you that the case will proceed whether you are represented or not, I think, unless something extraordinary occurs. Dr Bleby, do you agree that I need to know and you need to know what the position is prior to the resumption of the hearing?
The proceeding was adjourned to a directions hearing on 21 February 2011 to ascertain whether the appellant was legally represented, but noting that the hearing was to proceed on 28 February 2011.
At the directions hearing on 21 February 2011, the following exchange took place between the appellant and the Federal Magistrate:
HIS HONOUR: And, Ms Sluggett, you needn’t stand up. The trial is to resume a week today. What’s you[r] position, Ms Sluggett?
MS C. SLUGGETT: I’ve contacted well over 20 different lawyers and law firms as well as community legal centres and disability advocate bodies. I have found a solicitor and a counsel and am currently waiting on approval from the Attorney General grant to vary the current grant which I already had at the time. I have spent over $50,000 of my own money from my late mother’s inheritance and I don’t have any other assets or any other money so I’m just waiting on the Attorney General’s department to confirm.
HIS HONOUR: So will you be in a position to proceed next Monday?
MS SLUGGETT: With respect to that, your Honour, not quite because I’ve been working through the cross-examination component of the transcript and I’m finding it very hard to determine when the Commonwealth’s questions start and ends as well as when my answers begins because of the way the transcript is written. The information is in the same paragraphs and it’s hard to know what were my answers. However, I have been working on the re-examination issues, have found some – I’m trying to limit it to as little as possible because I’m actually doing it on my own without any form of assistance at the moment, so.
On 28 February 2011, Mr Charman, a barrister, appeared as a friend of the Court to advise the Court that JusticeNet, which is an organisation that provides pro bono assistance for people who are otherwise having difficulties before the Court, had been contacted by the appellant. He advised the Court that if JusticeNet were to appoint counsel to review the file, counsel would have to ask for a considerable period of time to review it, provide advice and seek instructions, and “there could be no guarantee that we could act at the end of all of that in any event”.
The following exchange then took place between the Federal Magistrate and the parties:
HIS HONOUR: Now, Ms Sluggett, we are at the stage of re-examination. That is the next stage.
DR BLEBY: I think so, Your Honour. Yes.
HIS HONOUR: So, are you ready to go into the witness box and we will do that aspect of the case now.
MS SLUGGETT: Yes, your Honour. I have prepared something in writing that I want to follow through. So do you want me to go there?
HIS HONOUR: I think this is part of your evidence, so it needs to be given, in a formal sense, from the witness box on oath. Before we begin, when you get to the witness box, I will ask you in general terms, what areas you wish to re-examine and that might be of some assistance to Dr Bleby.
MS SLUGGETT: Okay.
HIS HONOUR: Do you need some assistance?
MS SLUGGETT: ….. I’m okay, Your Honour. Thank you.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, so what areas do you wish to re-examine on? I think, Ms Sluggett, Ms O’Connor, before she departed, indicated that there would be three or four discrete areas. What is your position?
The appellant has complained that the Federal Magistrate should not have continued to hear her application in circumstances where she was unrepresented and did not have sufficient time in which to prepare herself to conduct her re-examination and the cross-examination of the respondent’s witnesses.
In support of that argument, which I shall address shortly, the appellant brought an interlocutory application on this appeal seeking leave to tender further evidence in support of the grounds of appeal. Against the respondent’s objection, I allowed the tender of the evidence, which was evidence that explained the circumstances in which the appellant’s counsel had ceased to act. That was evidence that could not have been tendered to the Federal Magistrate. I warned the appellant that the evidence she was seeking to tender did not support the proposition that she made and, in fact, was contrary to her interests. However, she persisted with the application and I allowed it.
The appellant tendered the written advice from Ms O’Connor, which was given to the agency funding the appellant’s proceeding and which Ms O’Connor had given her on 27 January.
Ms O’Connor advised:
…
4.Ms Sluggett had a mediation with her former solicitors which I attended. The Cwth made an offer which she rejected.
5.On the first day of the trial in this matter, in November 2009, the Cwth made another, higher offer. Ms Sluggett rejected this.
6.Both the former solicitor and you, acting at the beginning of the trial, got signed instructions.
7.The decision by Ms Sluggett not to accept either offer was against all legal advice that she received from her former solicitors, you and me.
8.We had a conference with Ms Sluggett in January of this (sic) with the consent of the Cwth before she finished cross examination with a view to getting instructions to put an offer to the Cwth. Such an offer, in my opinion, would only be contemplated by the Cwth if they thought there was a financial advantage to them but not because there was any prospect of Ms Sluggett winning her case. We informed Ms Sluggett, by going through the allegations she made in her evidence to date and the inconsistences (sic) in her own materials, why we thought she would not win. The transcript was not provided as I formed the view this would be improper, but I had been dot pointing the issues raised by the Cwth during the trial so I could talk to her.
9.Ms Sluggett informed us that she thought she was doing well in the trial. I thought this was so clearly not the case I formed the view that Ms Sluggett was not able to appreciate the legal hurdles she faced.
10.During further cross examination Ms Sluggett produced more materials which neither you nor I had seen before. Some of these were referred to in cross examination where she gave an answer like ‘I have that at home.’
11.During earlier meetings the obligation for discloser (sic) was discussed with Ms Sluggett but for some reason I think she thought she should only discover material that helped her case. An example is a submission she made regarding a breach of code of conduct inquiry where she claimed to have written some 53 pages which were never presented. When delivering that to court and then discussing disclosure to her of that she said words to the effect of “well I haven’t read it lately, what if it contains material that doesn’t help my case?” You and I explained discovery again to her but she did not seem to be interested.
12.In relation to discovery along with the 53 pages referred to she also brought along materials of some relevance and I gave some to the Cwth immediately; and have provided you with the remainder to determine if there is anything that ought to be disclosed as it is relevant to the issues.
13.Although Ms Sluggett seems to have some difficulties understanding and/or accepting advice I think she is fit to instruct us as she has had assessments done by her treating psychiatrist and the Cwth psychiatrist and neither raised this as an issue.
14.It is my view that Ms Sluggett has not made out any of the above claims against the Cwth and, further, that it is my view that there is nothing to cross examine any witness about. I appreciate you have not been at the trial so I have attempted to dot point my reasons below.
The Federal Magistrate, in his extensive reasons for judgment, said that the appellant used “her undoubted familiarity with the mechanisms of complaint as an instrument of intimidation against the respondent and its agents”. As a witness the Federal Magistrate described the appellant as argumentative and evasive. He did not regard her as a candid witness. He had grave concerns about the reliability of much of her evidence. He found the respondent’s witnesses’ evidence to be more reliable than the appellant’s.
It is in circumstances where the delegate of the President of HREOC described her complaint as unsubstantiated, her lawyers advised her that she had no case, and the Court found that she was an unreliable witness and that she used her complaints as an instrument of intimidation, that the appellant prosecutes this appeal against the Federal Magistrate’s orders.
There is one aspect of the notice of appeal that can be dealt with quite quickly. The appellant has complained that the respondent failed to make general discovery as requested by the appellant in her application, which resulted in the orders of 2 February 2009. In my opinion, that complaint should have been addressed within the time in which the appellant had to either seek leave to appeal or to appeal from the orders made by the Federal Magistrate on 2 February 2009. The order for discovery (paragraph 1 of the orders made on 2 February 2009) was an interlocutory order. If the appellant was dissatisfied with that order, she should have appealed at that time.
The parties conducted the whole of the proceeding upon the basis of the order for discovery and it is too late, three years after the order was made and the trial has concluded, to make a complaint concerning that order.
In any event, such complaint was bound to fail for two reasons. First, the presumption in the Federal Magistrates Court is that the parties are not entitled to discovery: s 45 of the Federal Magistrates Court Act 1999 (Cth). That section provides that discovery is “not allowed” unless the Court or the Federal Magistrate declares it is appropriate in the interests of the administration of justice to allow discovery. The appellant could not have expected any order for more than limited discovery. Secondly, the order was made by consent.
There is nothing before this Court to suggest that the Federal Magistrate erred in making the order of which complaint is made.
Insofar as the appellant’s notice of appeal complains about the making of that order, or the effect of that order, those grounds of the appeal must be dismissed.
The appellant has also suggested that the respondent failed to make adequate discovery, but there is nothing to suggest that the respondent did not comply with the Federal Magistrate’s order for limited discovery, which makes this complaint also untenable. If the respondent had failed to comply with the Federal Magistrate’s order for discovery, any complaint should have been made in the Federal Magistrates Court and before trial. Again, even if it now could be demonstrated that the respondent had not complied with the Federal Magistrate’s order, the complaint is made far too late.
The appellant’s notice of appeal claims 11 separate grounds of appeal, although the first five are, in fact, not grounds at all.
In ground 6 the appellant complains that the Federal Magistrate did not give her a fair and adequate opportunity to present her case because she was required “to represent herself, following the cross examination of the Applicant by the Respondent and to the end of the proceedings”.
She also complained that she was required to proceed with her case in accordance with previous dates set by the Court.
The Federal Magistrate did not require the appellant to represent herself. On 28 January 2011, as I have already indicated, the appellant’s counsel and her solicitors withdrew, which left the appellant unrepresented.
The appellant was thereafter apparently unable to obtain legal representation and she subsequently prosecuted her proceeding herself.
Insofar as the appellant claims that the Federal Magistrate required her to represent herself that claim is simply wrong.
Her complaint that the Federal Magistrate did not give her sufficient time to prepare for re-examination is also wrong. When the appellant’s counsel withdrew, the Federal Magistrate did not require the appellant to proceed on that day, but adjourned the proceeding for a month to allow the appellant to prepare herself for her own re-examination and for the calling of witnesses, and for the further prosecution of the proceeding.
At no stage did the appellant complain to the Federal Magistrate that she was given insufficient time in which to prepare herself. Indeed, she said on 28 February, when the trial resumed after a directions hearing had been held on 21 February, that she was ready to proceed. She then proceeded to re-examine herself. The respondent then opened its case and the matter was adjourned to the following day for the respondent’s evidence. The following day the Federal Magistrate asked the appellant if she was ready to go on with her case and she replied in the affirmative. The matter proceeded.
In this ground the appellant also complains that she was not provided with a full copy of the transcript after her lawyer withdrew. The Federal Magistrate was not under any obligation to provide the appellant with a copy of the transcript. The provision of a transcript is a matter between a party and the transcript provider.
Lastly, she complains that she “was not physically able to carry the material to the Court for the purpose of cross examination of the Commonwealth witnesses therefore could not adequately examine the Respondents (sic) witnesses nor adequately present a case.”
The appellant is entitled to sympathy for her physical (and mental) disabilities. However, the complaint made is not a ground of appeal, because it does not identify any error on the Federal Magistrate’s part.
Ground 6 must be dismissed.
Ground 7 deals with the appellant’s complaint in relation to the order for discovery made on 2 February 2009 with which I have already dealt.
Ground 8 complains of the Federal Magistrate’s failure to take into account relevant information, namely the applicant’s physical disability arising from polio, which is a disability within the definition of s 4 of the DDA and which is in addition to the disability caused by post-polio syndrome. The appellant also complains that the Federal Magistrate failed to take into account that the appellant suffered psychiatric conditions during the course of her employment.
The appellant’s complaint to HREOC dated 2 April 2007 identified the disability discrimination of which the appellant complained. She identified her impairment as being physical and neuromuscular on account of her having contracted polio as a child, and a present disability of post-polio syndrome. She did not complain of any disability directly arising out of the polio she suffered as a child. Nor did she complain of a disability arising from any mental illness. She therefore did not complain of any discrimination arising out of those disabilities. The Federal Magistrate approached the appellant’s proceeding by reference to the disabilities of which the appellant had complained to HREOC. He did not consider the appellant’s mental health condition as a separate disability, nor did he consider as the appellant has complained in her outline of submissions that she suffered from a physical disability of polio.
The appellant did not at any time, either in her complaint to HREOC or her evidence in the Court, complain that she had been discriminated against by reason of any mental illness or psychiatric condition.
Section 46PO of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) allows a complainant to HREOC, after that complaint has been terminated, to apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court. The application must be brought within 28 days of the complaint being terminated: s 46PO(2).
Section 46PO(3) provides:
(3) The unlawful discrimination alleged in the application:
(a)must be the same as (or the same in substance as) the unlawful discrimination that was the subject of the terminated complaint; or
(b)must arise out of the same (or substantially the same) acts, omissions or practices that were the subject of the terminated complaint.
The appellant’s claim for unlawful discrimination in the Federal Magistrates Court was limited to the same discrimination (or the same in substance) as was the subject of the terminated complaint or had to have arisen out of the same (or substantially the same) acts or omissions or procedures complained of in the terminated complaint. The Federal Magistrate was right to proceed as he did.
Although evidence was led of a psychiatric condition suffered by the appellant, that evidence was led as part of her claim that it was an injury suffered in consequence of the discrimination. It was not led as evidence of a disability which attracted protection under the DDA.
The Federal Magistrate addressed that evidence in the context in which it was led.
Ground 8 must be dismissed.
Grounds 9, 10 and 11 provide:
9.Judge Brown erred in matter of law in finding that there was no discrimination in employment under s5,s6,s15, s35, s42 or s123(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992; as,
9.1The Applicant was not given fair and adequate opportunity to present the case;
9.2That there was no evidence or other material to justify making of the decision.
9.3In making of the decision, Judge Brown FM was subjective and failed to apply the objective of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992;
9.4Judge Brown did not take relevant information into consideration and took irrelevant information into consideration.
9.5Judge Brown did not give equal weight to the evidence.
9.6Judge Brown did not compare whether the Respondent treated another employee without a disability same way as it treated the Applicant if the same or similar circumstance surrounding the Applicant had also applied to that person.
10.In relation to s15(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992, Judge Brown FM erred in matter of law in not finding that there was discrimination; as
10.1 Judge Brown failed to give adequate reasons for the decision
10.2Did not take relevant information into consideration and took irrelevant information into consideration
11.This application is incomplete – I am still working through the ‘Reason for the Decision’, which is 177 pages long with 748 paragraphs; transcript is over 1000pages and the exhibits are over 1000pages. His honour Justice Finn asked me to submit no more than two pages and I am submitting what I have worked through to-date.
Ground 9, like the appellant’s case before the Federal Magistrate, was unparticularised and unstructured.
At the hearing before the Federal Magistrate, the respondent’s counsel endeavoured to formulate from the morass of complaints and evidence adduced by the appellant different subject matters for consideration by the Federal Magistrate. Eleven separate complaints were identified which the Federal Magistrate adopted for the purpose of his reasons.
Those complaints were:
No Date Details Applicable provision of DDA 1 July 2004 – 31 May 2005 Following abolition of ATSIC failure to map out Ms Sluggett Section 5 – direct 2 1 July 2005 – November 2005 APS2 officer level 12, 33 Waymouth Street, Adelaide – failure to implement recommendations of Dewing & Lewis. Section 6 – indirect 3 28 November 2005 – February 2006 Move to level 5, 33 Waymouth Street, Adelaide – inadequate work station Section 6 – indirect 4 6 February 2005 – 13 February 2006 Interaction between Ms Sluggett and Mr Cox Section 35 – harassment 5 22 February 2006 – 31 May 2006 Being sent on paid sick leave by Ms Corbisiero. Section 5 – direct 6 31 May 2006 – 22 June 2006 Failure to implement Agus recommendations; failure to provide proper chair mat and headset and to repair the applicant’s chair.
Hostile treatment from Ms Corbisiero.
Response to applicant’s partial invalidity application.
Section 5 – direct.
Section 35 – harassment.
7 26 July 2006 – 28 July 2006 Meeting involving Ms Sluggett, Ms Corbisiero, Ms Merrick, Mr Cohen and Ms Cowell.
Threat of code of conduct proceedings. Refusal of chair for mail sorting purposes.
Section 5 – direct.
Section 6 – indirect.
8 28 July 2006 – 10 May 2007 Failure to provide proper arrangements for the applicant to deal with mail. The direction that Ms Sluggett “meet and greet” job interviewees, given the weight and configuration of the ICC door.
Provision of the applicant’s file to Ms Corbisiero. The review of action procedure.
Section 5 – direct.
Section 6 – indirect.
9 16 May 2007 – 3 July 2007 Harassment by Ms Corbisiero. Section 35 – harassment. 10 September 2007 Move to level 18, 11 Waymouth Street, Adelaide. Inappropriate duties. Failure to deal with OHS complaint. Section 5 – direct. 11 28 August 2007 – 28 May 2008 Notification to applicant she was potentially excess to requirements leading to her retrenchment from public service. Section 5 – direct.
The headings, which were identified by the respondent’s counsel and by the Federal Magistrate, were addressed in considerable detail by the Federal Magistrate, and each of the complaints within the time identified under the heading “Date” were addressed and dismissed.
On this appeal the appellant addressed in her written submissions each of the headings which had been identified by the respondent’s counsel and adopted by the Federal Magistrate. She complained in respect of each of the headings that his Honour had erred in finding there was no discrimination in relation to that heading.
The outline of submissions does not identify how it was that the Federal Magistrate erred in respect of his findings in that regard and, in my opinion, the various complaints, which are made in relation to the subject matters of those headings, cannot be upheld.
There is nothing in the grounds of appeal, nor was anything identified in the appellant’s written or oral submissions, which would suggest that the Federal Magistrate was wrong to proceed in the way that he did and to dismiss each of the complaints in the way that he did.
Ground 9 must be dismissed.
Ground 10 is a rather puzzling complaint, having regard to the fact that the Federal Magistrate dealt with, as I have said, the 11 separate complaints identified by the respondent in his reasons for judgment, which ran to 177 pages and 748 paragraphs.
The complaint that the Federal Magistrate did not give adequate reasons, which is again unparticularised, is not sustainable and ground 10 must be dismissed.
Ground 11 is not a ground of appeal.
In my opinion, the appellant’s appeal should be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding sixty-eight (68) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Lander. Associate:
Dated: 7 September 2012